felhom-agent/CHANGELOG.md

Changelog

All notable changes to felhom-agent are recorded here. Update on every code change that gets pushed.

v0.3.1 — slice-3 validation follow-ups (2026-06-08)

Changed

• Collector keeps the known run-status on a GuestConfig failure (internal/hub/collect.go): previously a per-guest config-read error forced status="unknown"; now the run-status from ListLXC is preserved (only the spec is dropped). An empty status is still normalized to unknown (wire value is always running|stopped|unknown). Test renamed to TestCollect_GuestConfigFailureKeepsStatusOmitsSpec and asserts the preserved running + nil spec.
• --selftest usage error string now reads (want read|task|hub).

Added

• Cross-repo contract fixture internal/hub/testdata/host-report.golden.json + TestHostReport_ContractMatchesGolden — compares the marshaled HostReport field-name sets (top level + host + guests[0]) against the golden, failing on any json-tag drift. The file is kept byte-identical with felhom-hub's copy (duplicated contract until a shared types module; revisit when slices 5/6 populate the empty collections). Version → 0.3.1.

v0.3.0 — hub client + host-report + first daemon loop (slice 3) (2026-06-08)

The agent's first daemon: a periodic read-only host-report POSTed to the hub (the heartbeat). No Proxmox mutations, no desired-state/signed-op consumption, no storage/backup collection yet — those are slices 4/5/6.

Added

• internal/hub package:
  • HostReport wire contract (report.go) shared field-for-field with the hub ingest: host metrics, guests (vmid + spec), cloudflared status, and the storage_targets/backups/restore_tests/pbs_snapshots/audit_tail collections defined but emitted empty (typed [], slices 5/6 fill them).
  • Collector (collect.go) builds the report from a read-only proxmoxReader (adapted to the real internal/proxmox surface — node held by the client, value returns, proxmox.Guest) + a CloudflaredProber. Partial-failure policy: a failed NodeStatus is a hard error (skip the POST); a failed per-guest GuestConfig degrades that guest to status="unknown" (spec omitted) but still sends; a cloudflared probe failure → "unknown", never fatal.
  • CloudflaredProber + SystemctlProber (systemctl is-active cloudflared; read-only — NOT a Privileged/root op; tunnel management is a later slice).
  • Client (client.go): POST /api/v1/host-report with Authorization: Bearer <key>, standard TLS (system roots or optional ca_file; verification always on). Typed *TransportError / *HTTPError; the bearer token never appears in any error.
  • Loop (loop.go): the daemon — immediate first report then tick; adopts the hub's poll_interval_seconds clamped to [60,3600]; resilient (a collect/report error is logged and the loop continues); clean shutdown on context cancel.
  • ControlEnvelope: only poll_interval_seconds is acted on; blocked / desired_generation / has_signed_ops are parsed-but-ignored (logged at most) pending reconcile (slice 4).
• Config: HubConfig (url/host_id/api_key/poll_seconds/timeout_seconds/ca_file), FELHOM_AGENT_HUB_* env overlay, HubConfig.Validate() (mode-aware — proxmox-only --selftest=read|task still runs without hub config), WithDefaults(), and Redacted() now also blanks the hub key. configs/agent.example.json gains hub (and authz) blocks.
• cmd/felhom-agent: the no---selftest mode is now the daemon (poll loop); added --selftest=hub (one collect+report, prints the report + envelope). Version 0.2.0 → 0.3.0.

Tests

• Report serialization (field names; empty collections are [] not null; spec omitted when unknown); client (Bearer header, non-2xx→*HTTPError, transport→*TransportError, token never in error); collector (host mapping, guest spec, per-guest failure degrades-but-still-reports, NodeStatus hard error, cloudflared error→unknown); loop (immediate first report, continuation after an injected error, interval adoption + clamp); config (hub validate/redact/env).

Notes

• internal/proxmox and internal/authz were not touched — no new proxmox surface was needed (ListLXC already exposes status/maxmem/maxdisk; GuestConfig exposes cores). The task's proxmoxReader sketch (node-arg/pointer/LXC) was adapted to the real exports as instructed.
• Defined-but-empty this slice: storage_targets, backups, restore_tests, pbs_snapshots, audit_tail (slices 5/6). Parsed-but-ignored: the envelope's blocked/desired_generation/has_signed_ops (slice 4).

v0.2.0 — authz signed-op verifier (slice 2) (2026-06-08)

Production form of the Phase-4 signing primitive: a key-type-agnostic SSHSIG verifier for operator-signed destructive ops, with the full anti-replay/ authorization pipeline and a durable, crash-safe nonce store. What slice 4 (reconcile) will call to gate destructive desired-state deltas. No hub, no signing CLI, no reconcile loop.

Added

• internal/authz — Verifier: New(signers, store, hostID) + Verify(blob, sigArmored) (*VerifiedOp, error). Runs the LOCKED pipeline (order is load-bearing): parse armor → namespace → parse pubkey → allow-list (by key material, pub.Marshal() equality, not key_id) → crypto verify (over the raw received bytes, never re-canonicalized) → parse blob → target → time window → nonce recorded LAST. Each post-crypto stage rejects even with a valid signature.
• SSHSIG framing (sshsig.go) via golang.org/x/crypto/ssh — pem.Decode → strip 6-byte magic → ssh.Unmarshal → ssh.ParsePublicKey → recompute signed data with the named hash → pub.Verify (dispatches on key algorithm). No hand-rolled crypto. Key-type-agnostic: ed25519 / sk-ssh-ed25519 (FIDO2) / rsa / ecdsa via the one path.
• Fixed namespace felhom-op-v1 (package constant, never caller-supplied).
• OpBlob (corrected host_id/guest_id json tags) + VerifiedOp (op, host/guest, params, key_id, matched signer). key_id is advisory/audit only — never an authz input.
• Typed errors: ErrMalformed, ErrNamespace, ErrUnknownSigner, ErrBadSignature, ErrTarget, ErrExpired, ErrNotYetValid, ErrReplay (errors.Is-friendly).
• NonceStore + two impls: MemoryNonceStore (tests) and FileNonceStore — durable, crash-safe (fsync'd append log, replayed into an index on open, periodic compaction, expiry-only pruning). A nonce is fsync'd to disk before SeenOrRecord returns false; replay protection survives restart; I/O failure fails safe (reports seen=true). Target generalization: host_id matched strictly, guest_id surfaced for the caller to route.
• Config: AuthzConfig (nonce-store path + pinned operator signers tagged operational/recovery with a key_id, as authorized_keys lines).
• Version 0.2.0.

Tests

• Real OpenSSH interop via a committed ssh-keygen -Y sign vector (hermetic CI); per-stage rejection (each with an otherwise-valid sig); the headline invalid-sig-does-not-burn-the-nonce invariant; replay; persistence across restart; synthetic sk-ssh-ed25519 through the unchanged path; byte-exactness (a re-serialized blob fails crypto — not re-canonicalized).

Notes / corrections to the Phase-4 reference

• §7's Target lacked json tags (host_id/guest_id) — fixed.
• The doc paired "Go 1.24.4 / x/crypto v0.52.0", but v0.52.0 declares go 1.25.0 and does not build on Go 1.24. Resolved by upgrading the build server to go1.26.0 (backward-compatible; felhom-controller/hub unaffected); the module is go 1.25.0 on x/crypto v0.52.0.
• Free function → constructed Verifier; returns the full VerifiedOp; typed errors; clock-skew tolerance added; durable nonce store is the net-new work.
• Shared-contract dependency flagged (not built): the hub and the felhom-sign CLI must emit byte-identical canonical JSON or signatures won't verify; a shared canonicalizer both import would be the right home.

v0.1.0 — Scaffold + proxmox interaction layer (slice 1) (2026-06-08)

First slice: stand up the host-agent project and its foundation — the typed Proxmox interaction layer every other module will call. No reconcile loop, hub client, signing, or storage/backup orchestration yet (later slices).

Added

• Project scaffold: module gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-agent, binary felhom-agent (cmd/felhom-agent/), Go 1.24, zero external dependencies (pure stdlib). --version flag; version var overridable via -ldflags "-X main.version=<v>".
• internal/proxmox — API backend (Client): hand-rolled REST client over https://<host>:8006/api2/json with PVEAPIToken auth. Typed read ops (Version, Nodes, NodeStatus, ListLXC, GuestStatus, GuestConfig, ListStorage, NodeStorage, StorageContent) and async mutating ops returning a UPID (RestoreLXC — the primary create path, Vzdump, Snapshot, Rollback, DeleteSnapshot, SetConfig, Start, Stop).
• WaitTask: polls GET /nodes/{node}/tasks/{upid}/status until stopped, then asserts exitstatus == "OK" (authorization can surface at task execution, not the POST — phase1-2 §1.3). Exponential backoff (1s→5s cap), context cancellation + timeout. *APIError parses the offending privilege from a 403; *TaskError parses it from a failed task exitstatus + log tail.
• internal/proxmox — fenced root-CLI backend (Privileged): limited to the three proven OS-root exceptions only — CreateGoldenLXC (keyctl pct create), MountUSBByUUID, SMART, Sensors; each cites why it can't be the API. Fence is structural (Client never shells out, Privileged never makes an HTTP call) and asserted in tests.
• TLS trust: SHA-256 leaf-cert pinning (the host serves a self-signed cert) or a CA file; an explicitly-named insecure_skip_verify that is off by default. No blanket verification disable.
• internal/config: JSON config file + FELHOM_AGENT_* env overrides; the token secret is never logged (Redacted()).
• internal/log: slog setup (text, stderr, configurable level).
• cmd/felhom-agent --selftest: read-only health report against a live host (version/nodes/status/guests/storage); --selftest=task --vmid N exercises WaitTask on a reversible snapshot→rollback→delete op (gated; default selftest mutates nothing).
• Tests: unit tests with a mock HTTP transport + mock runner (UPID parse, WaitTask running→OK / failed-403 / timeout / ctx-cancel, 403→privilege error, response decoding against shapes captured live from demo-felhom, config redaction, and the API-vs-root routing fence).

Notes

• Types are grounded in the spike findings (felhom.eu/documentation/proxmox-platform.md, tests/phase{0,1-2,3}-findings.md) and the exact JSON shapes captured live from demo-felhom (PVE 9.2.2).
• Verified: go build/vet/test green on Go 1.24.4 (build server) and a live read-only --selftest against the demo host with TLS fingerprint pinning.
• The 16-privilege FelhomAgent role + privsep token (role on both user and token) is provisioned out-of-band; the agent only consumes the token.