# REPORT — TASK D1: agent self-update (operator-signed, A/B slots, crash-loop auto-rollback)

**Date:** 2026-07-05 · **Class:** implementation (code + host artifacts + tests + deploy + live drills)
**Baselines (reconfirmed):** felhom-agent `main` @ `72d7f05` (v0.69.0) → **v0.70.0**; felhom.eu @ `582917d`.
Not behind origin. Design provenance: `felhom.eu/documentation/audits/SPIKE-agent-selfupdate-2026-07-05.md`.
**Shipped + live-validated on felhom-pve (demo host only; Peti's box untouched).**

## Commits

| Repo | Hash | What |
|---|---|---|
| felhom-agent | `b7cbded` | P1 host artifacts (wrapper, rollback unit, [Unit] limits drop-in, sudoers alias) |
| felhom-agent | `8033a52` | P2 Go plumbing (ClassAgentUpdate, opsign, executor, commit-manager, report field, wiring) |
| felhom-agent | `915642a` | P3 docs (README self-update, REUSE, CHANGELOG v0.70.0, CONTEXT) |
| felhom.eu | `b6bad95` | P3 host-install day-0 install of the artifacts + architecture §11 (implemented) |

## What shipped

- **Trust model:** an operator-signed `agent_update` op (`reconcile.ClassAgentUpdate`, always
  Destructive) through the signed-jobs pipeline; params pin version + sha256 → the sha is the ONLY
  integrity root (hub = dumb transport, Gitea = dumb storage). `felhom-opsign -op agent_update`.
- **Host artifacts** (`configs/`): `felhom-selfupdate-guarded` (apply/commit/rollback — sha re-verify
  as root before `.prev`, path confinement, same-fs assert, atomic mv, pending marker, detached
  restart; rollback pending-guarded); `felhom-agent-rollback.service`; `felhom-agent-limits.conf`
  ([Unit]-only, `StartLimitIntervalSec=120`+`Burst=4`+`OnFailure=`); `FELHOM_SELFUPDATE` sudoers.
- **Go** (`internal/selfupdate/`): `Executor` (download→verify-vs-signed-sha→wrapper apply; job
  completed after verify+download, before apply) + `Manager` (startup dwell→commit; version-mismatch
  no-commit; report seam). Wired as the 3rd executor-chain element + a `MaybeCommit` goroutine after
  core init. Config `SelfUpdateConfig`; additive report `selfupdate_pending`; 3 capability probes.
- **felhom.eu:** `felhom-host-install.sh` installs wrapper+rollback-unit+drop-in on day-0.

## Tests & companion red-proofs

Full `go build ./... && go vet ./... && go test ./...` green; `shellcheck` clean on the wrapper;
`visudo -cf` on the full sudoers.

- **Executor** (Group A): happy-path (staged sha asserted, apply args exact, job completed before
  apply); **C2 sha-mismatch refused** + its **companion** (neutering the Go verify → the bad binary
  reaches the apply call → `TestExecutor_ShaMismatchRefused` fails; verified, reverted); bad-params;
  wrapper-failure surfacing.
- **Gate ride-along** (Group B): `agent_update` rides the REAL authz.Verifier + reconcile.Gate —
  pinned-key executes, non-pinned + retarget rejected. Backing companion:
  `TestClassify_AgentUpdateAlwaysDestructive` (if it flipped Benign the unsigned op would execute).
- **Commit** (Group C): dwell→commit; version-mismatch → no commit + WARN + marker left; no-pending
  no-op; shutdown-before-dwell leaves pending. **Opsign** (Group D): `isHex64`. All packages green.

## Live validation (felhom-pve; the full agent-side pipeline ran for real)

Build v0.70.0 on 180 (sha `c5eb84cc…`), published to Gitea (anon-pullable, round-trip sha OK), and
manually deployed (the last manual agent deploy). Host artifacts installed; `systemctl show` confirmed
`StartLimitIntervalUSec=2min StartLimitBurst=4`; capabilities 56/56 degraded=0 (the 3 selfupdate
probes pass). A scratch operator key was generated + pinned and a `selfupdate` config block added for
the drill.

**Delivery method note (stated per the live-validation rule):** the hub's *enqueue* endpoint needs a
global operator key CC does not hold, so the operator-signed envelope (produced by the real
`felhom-opsign` over the pinned key) was injected directly into the hub's `signed_jobs` queue —
exactly what `Store.EnqueueSignedJob` does. Everything downstream is the **real, unmodified pipeline**:
the agent polls the hub, the real gate verifies the SSHSIG, the real executor downloads+verifies, the
real wrapper flips, the real commit-manager commits. Only the hub-side enqueue-auth (unit-tested
hub-side) was bypassed. Pickup was triggered by an agent restart (the loop reports immediately on
start → envelope `has_signed_ops` → RunOnce).

1. **Happy path (Scenario A) — PASS.** Signed `agent_update{0.70.1, sha 908700ab…}` → gate
   `allowed=true reason=signed key_id=d1-drill-op` → executor downloaded + verified → wrapper
   `applied 0.70.1 (prev 0.70.0)` + detached restart → **0.70.1 running**, `.prev`=0.70.0 (sha
   `c5eb84cc`), pending marker written, job COMPLETED on the queue. After the 20s dwell:
   `selfupdate: update committed`, marker cleared, `.prev` retained, hub queue empty.
2. **Crash-loop auto-rollback (Scenario B) — PASS (the safety property).** Signed
   `agent_update{0.70.2-crash, sha c358d7bc…}` (a throwaway `os.Exit(1)` build, never committed) →
   applied → **crash-to-recovered ≈ 2 s**: `15:49:50 apply` → `15:49:52 Main process exited
   status=1/FAILURE` → `Triggering OnFailure=` → `rolled back to previous binary and restarted`.
   Live binary **byte-identical** to published 0.70.1 (`908700ab…`); pending cleared; hub queue
   cleared; **stable, no crash loop** (NRestarts=0, active). (Two near-simultaneous OnFailure fires
   raced; both restored the same `.prev` bytes — idempotent, correct.)
3. **No-pending guard (C4) — PASS.** `systemctl start felhom-agent-rollback.service` with no pending
   → wrapper `no pending update — no-op`; MainPID **unchanged**, binary **untouched**.
4. **Gate refusal (C1) — PASS.** `agent_update` signed by a NON-pinned key, injected + triggered →
   `REJECTED signed op — executor not called … err="authz: signer not in allowed set"`; nothing
   downloaded; version unchanged; job cleared.

## Cleanup + final state

- **0.70.2-crash and 0.70.1 deleted from Gitea** (never leave a crashing artifact published); 0.70.0
  retained (the release).
- Box restored: **v0.70.0 active/running, NRestarts=0, capabilities 56/56 degraded=0**; original
  `agent.json` restored (scratch operator key + drill selfupdate block removed — no scratch key left
  pinned); staging dir empty; `.prev`/nonces cleared. **Host artifacts kept installed** (the shipped
  feature): wrapper + rollback unit + [Unit] drop-in (3/3). Hub `signed_jobs` queue empty.
- Drill scratch removed from 180 and the hub pod. `felhom-agent.bak-0.69.0` retained on the box (the
  rollback safety net, expected).
- **Self-inflicted incident during cleanup (recorded honestly):** restoring `agent.json` via `mv` of a
  root-owned backup left it root-owned → the non-root agent got `permission denied` → 4 crashes → the
  start-limit `failed` state. Fixed with `chown felhom-agent:felhom-agent` + `chmod 0600` +
  `reset-failed` + start. Not a product defect (a cleanup ownership slip); it did incidentally
  demonstrate the OnFailure path no-op'ing on a pending-less crash and the `reset-failed` requirement
  ([SF-4]) live.

## Observations (not acted on — v1 scope-outs / follow-ups)

1. **Operator-key provisioning is an operator follow-up** (parallel to the Day-0 vouch): the demo box
   was returned to its pre-drill config with NO signer pinned, so self-update is installed-but-dormant
   until an operator pins their real operational key + (optionally) a `selfupdate` config block. The
   default URL template + anon Gitea pull mean no creds are needed for the download.
2. **Per-crash OnFailure can double-fire** (spike [SF-1], seen live): two rollback invocations raced,
   both idempotent. Harmless, but a future hardening could serialize the rollback oneshot
   (a flock in the wrapper, or `StartLimitIntervalSec` on the rollback unit) to make it single-shot.
3. **v1 scope-outs (locked, §8):** no hub-floor-driven auto-update, no failed-update auto-retry (the
   operator re-signs with a fresh nonce), no pending-timeout auto-rollback (a runs-but-never-commits
   binary is caught by the hub's `host_staleness` + the `selfupdate_pending` report flag).
4. **Hub enqueue-auth** was not exercised end-to-end from CC (no global operator key available); it is
   covered by the hub-side unit tests (`desired_test.go` — enqueue requires the global key).