# REPORT — RUNBOOK: hub enrollment round-trip + failed-PBS-verify validation (2026-06-09)

> Overwrite-latest report (most recent significant work only). Cumulative history lives in
> [CHANGELOG.md](CHANGELOG.md). This was an **operational validation run** (RUNBOOK, no code
> change) against the **live, deployed v0.7.4 hub** — it closes the "End-to-end hub reflection"
> gap that the prior slice-6-Phase-B report flagged as *Not done*.

## Outcome

**All runbook objectives met.** The demo host (`demo-felhom`) was enrolled on the deployed hub
for the first time, the daemon→hub round-trip was confirmed end-to-end on **v0.7.4**, and the
**failed-PBS-verify `[WARN]`** — the loudest offsite-DR signal — was driven live by a real
corrupted chunk in a dedicated throwaway datastore, with the encrypted production datastore
(`felhom-spike`) proven untouched (blast radius contained). Teardown left the system clean; per
explicit decision the demo host is **kept enrolled as a persistent systemd service**.

Components exercised live: agent `felhom-agent` **v0.6.0** (daemon, PBS verify loop, host-report
collector) ↔ hub `felhom-hub` **v0.7.4** (host-report auth/ingest, storage/guests/pbs/restore
reflection, failed-verify WARN).

## Phase 0 — pre-flight (all green)

- **Image gate:** ArgoCD app `felhom` **Synced + Healthy**; hub Deployment image
  `…/felhom-hub:v0.7.4`; pod log `[INFO] felhom-hub v0.7.4 starting`. All three agree.
- **Customer config:** `demo-felhom` exists in `customer_configs` (confirmed via a non-mutating
  `GET /api/v1/config/demo-felhom` probe → `401 invalid password`, i.e. row present).
- **Existing enrollment:** `hosts` table empty (`count(*)=0`) → minted fresh.
- **Agent config:** at `/root/.config/felhom-agent/agent.json` (no systemd unit; launched
  manually); **no `hub` section**; cadences `restore_test=-1`, `pbs_verify=-1` (both disabled);
  `local_backup_target=local`; `pbs_secret_dir=/etc/pve/priv/storage`. Backed up to
  `agent.json.pre-runbook`. Scratch guest **9999** (`felhom-selftest-scratch`, LXC) present.

## Phase A — happy-path round-trip (CHECKPOINT GREEN)

- **A.1 mint:** `POST /api/v1/admin/hosts` (global-key-gated, via the deployed hub) → **201**,
  `host_id=demo-felhom-01`, 64-hex per-host key. Key transferred to the host out-of-band (stdin
  pipe → 0600 file → atomic config patch), never echoed.
- **A.2 config:** added the `hub` block (`url`, `host_id`, `api_key`) + test cadences
  (poll 60, pbs_verify 120, restore_test 300).
- **A.3 seed:** `vzdump 9999 → local` (mode downgraded snapshot→stop, expected for a stopped CT).
- **A.4 daemon + reflection:** daemon up (`version=0.6.0 host_id=demo-felhom-01
  hub_url=https://hub.felhom.eu`); all loops started. The **18:17:07** host-report reflected,
  confirmed both in hub logs and the hub store (`host_reports.report_json`):
  - ✅ **host-report auth + ingest** (slice 3) — `2xx`, no "Unknown host_id".
  - ✅ **storage_targets** (slice 5) — 4 targets incl. `felhom-pbs`.
  - ✅ **guests** reflected.
  - ✅ **pbs_snapshots** (slice-6 Phase B) — `felhom-spike` ct/9001 `verify_state:"ok"`,
    **`encrypted:true`** → the encrypted-storage verify path observed `ok` live.
  - ✅ **restore_tests** (slice-6 Phase A) — recorded and reflected.
  - `backups` empty (expected — no `RecordBackup` caller until slice 10).

  **Finding (benign false-negative):** the scheduled restore-test reports **`pass:false`**
  because the restored scratch guest's `vzstart` returns `exitstatus "WARNINGS: 1"` —
  the warning is cosmetic: `WARN: Systemd 257 detected. You may need to enable nesting.`
  The guest boots fine; the agent's strict `WaitTask` (`exitstatus == "OK"`) treats any
  WARNING as failure. This means **every restore-test of a modern-distro (Debian 13 /
  systemd 257) LXC will false-fail**, generating spurious DR alarms. It did, usefully, also
  exercise the hub's `[WARN] restore-test FAILED` path. *(See "Follow-ups".)*

## Phase C — destructive failed-verify (fenced; the slice-6-Phase-B closure)

A dedicated throwaway datastore `verifyfail` (`/mnt/5_hdd/pbs-verifyfail`, **unencrypted**, one
backup ⇒ every chunk exclusive) isolated the blast radius. `felhom-spike` and the homelab
`/mnt/5_hdd/backup/` tree were never touched.

- **C.1–C.3:** created `verifyfail` + `DatastoreAdmin` ACLs on **both** `felhom@pbs` and the
  token `felhom@pbs!n100` (PBS privsep intersection); registered it as a PVE `pbs` storage on the
  demo host (token authed → status **active**); put **exactly one** backup (`ct/9999`) into it.
- **C.4:** baseline verify **OK**, then corrupted one chunk
  (`.chunks/008f/008f536d…b121dd`, first byte `0x31→0xCE`, **size unchanged** → true digest
  mismatch with no size change, the realistic bit-rot case).
- **C.5.1 — agent local read path:** `--selftest=pbs-verify` → agent's `Verify`
  (`ignore-verified=false` re-read) detected it: `datastore=verifyfail failed=1 total=1`, the
  `ct/9999` `PBSSnapshot` shows `verify_state:"failed"`, while `felhom-spike` ct/9001 stays
  `ok`. Confirms `report.go` passes `verification.state` through and `verify.go` re-lists/counts.
- **C.5.2 — live wire → hub WARN:** the running daemon's verify loop caught it
  (`18:24:09 … FAILED-verify snapshots`), and the **18:32:07** host-report carried it. Hub logged:

  ```
  18:32:07 [WARN] host demo-felhom-01 PBS verify FAILED: ct/9999 ns=root owner=felhom@pbs!n100
  18:32:07 [INFO] host-report from demo-felhom-01 (3 guests, 5 storage targets, 0 backups,
                  1 restore-tests, 2 pbs-snapshots, 4928 bytes)
  ```

  Hub store confirmed containment: `verifyfail` ct/9999 `encrypted:false verify_state:"failed"`,
  `felhom-spike` ct/9001 `encrypted:true verify_state:"ok"`. **Real corrupted chunk → agent
  verify loop → wire → hub failed-verify WARN, end to end, on v0.7.4.**

## Teardown (clean; demo host kept enrolled by decision)

- Daemon stopped; `verifyfail` PVE storage + `verifyfail.pw` removed; datastore destroyed
  (`--destroy-data true`), ACLs deleted, `/mnt/5_hdd/pbs-verifyfail` removed.
- **Verified as-found:** only `felhom-spike` datastore remains (`verify` → **TASK OK**);
  `/mnt/5_hdd/backup/` tree byte-identical to the Phase-0 listing; no orphaned ACLs; seeded
  `local` backup of 9999 removed; stray temp/key files cleaned.
- **Enrollment retained (explicit choice "keep enrolled as a service"):** `hub` block kept;
  production cadences set (**poll 900**, **pbs_verify 6h**, **restore_test -1/disabled** to avoid
  the benign-warning spam); installed + enabled **`/etc/systemd/system/felhom-agent.service`**
  (active, enabled, survives reboot). First service report landed clean at **18:55:32**
  (1 pbs-snapshot, **no WARN**).

## What this proved (and didn't)

- **Proved live on v0.7.4:** slice-3 host-report auth + ingest; slice-5 storage_targets
  reflection; slice-6-Phase-B `pbs_snapshots` reflection **including the failed-verify `[WARN]`**
  via a real corrupted chunk; slice-6-Phase-A `restore_tests` reflection; the encrypted-storage
  verify path observed `ok` on `felhom-spike`.
- **Did not prove:** `backups` reflection (no daemon `RecordBackup` caller — golden-only until
  slice 10); the corruption test datastore was unencrypted (the verify *mechanism* is identical
  server-side; the encrypted config path is exercised by the normal `felhom-spike` verify).

## Follow-ups surfaced

1. **Restore-test false-fail on benign LXC start warnings** (new, notable): the agent treats
   `vzstart` `WARNINGS: n` as failure, so modern-distro LXC restore-tests always report
   `pass:false`. Options: treat `WARNINGS` distinct from non-OK, set scratch-guest
   `features: nesting=1` on restore, or whitelist the systemd-257 warning. Left **disabled** on
   the demo host as a stopgap.
2. **`POST /api/v1/admin/hosts` is global-key-gated only** and reachable via the public hub URL —
   anyone with the global key can mint a host. Lock down at the slice 7–8 auth cutover (doc 05 §11).
3. **Hub hardcodes `defaultHostPollSeconds = 900`** (`handler.go`) and the agent adopts it,
   silently overriding the configured `poll_seconds` — worth making configurable / documenting.
4. **`backups` producer** still absent (accept it lands with slice-10 desired-state).

## No secrets committed

The hub global key, the per-host key, and the PBS token secret are referenced by location only
(hub ConfigMap `hub-config`; `/root/.config/felhom-agent/agent.json` 0600;
`/etc/pve/priv/storage/*.pw` 0600) — never echoed into logs or this report.