package escrow

import (
	"context"
	"errors"
	"fmt"
)

// R-199 links 6→8 — fetch this host's own sealed identity blob, open it with the customer's recovery
// code R, and hand back EXACTLY ONE field: the offsite restic repository password.
//
// WHY ONLY ONE FIELD. The bundle also carries the Cloudflare tunnel token, the PBS access token and
// the WG private key (see IdentityBundle). The caller in this flow — the in-guest controller, one
// trust tier down — needs none of them, and returning them would widen the blast radius of a
// controller compromise for no gain. Narrowing costs nothing here and is not recoverable later.
//
// WHY R NEVER TOUCHES DISK. `UnwrapIdentity` stages the BLOB and the recovered plaintext in a
// `MkdirTemp` that it removes, and feeds R through the pty; R itself is never written. This wrapper
// keeps that property: it takes R as an argument, passes it straight through, and holds no copy.
// Callers must clear their own reference (the `R = ""` discipline in cmd/felhom-agent).
//
// The errors below are DISTINCT on purpose. "could not fetch", "no blob", "wrong code" and "the blob
// predates the field" are FOUR different situations for the operator and only one of them is a fault.
//
// ⚠ THERE WERE THREE, AND THE FOURTH WAS THE DEFECT (R-224, 2026-08-06). This comment said "three"
// and named "no blob", "wrong code" and "predates the field" — while a FAILED FETCH was wrapped as an
// anonymous error and fell through the caller's `default` branch into the wrong-code message. So a
// hub that could not be reached was reported to the customer as a bad recovery code.
//
// Measured live on 2026-08-05 (CAMPAIGN-11 F3): with the hub REJECTed at the appliance's firewall and
// a CORRECT current recovery code, the customer was told the code did not open their package — in
// 0.0556 s, when a real unseal costs ~1 s of scrypt. The agent's own log carried the truth the whole
// time (`escrow: fetching the sealed bundle: hub: transport error: … no route to host`) and the HTTP
// boundary threw it away.
//
// The discriminator therefore has to be a VALUE, not a log line — that is what ErrBundleFetch is.

var (
	// ErrBundleFetch — the sealed bundle could not be FETCHED (the hub refused, was unreachable, or
	// the transport failed). **The recovery code was never used**, so nothing about it is known and
	// nothing may be said about it. Wraps the underlying cause for the operator log; carries no secret.
	ErrBundleFetch = errors.New("escrow: the sealed bundle could not be fetched")
	// ErrNoEscrowBlob — the hub holds no sealed bundle for this host. Not a fault: no ceremony has run.
	ErrNoEscrowBlob = errors.New("escrow: the hub holds no sealed identity bundle for this host (no ceremony has run)")
	// ErrNoResticPassword — the bundle opened, but carries no repository password. Real and expected
	// for a pre-fork-4 blob (agent < v0.77.0, 2026-07-09): the field did not exist and CANNOT be
	// retro-fitted, because R is never retained. Distinguished from a wrong code so the operator is
	// not sent hunting for a mistyped recovery code that was typed correctly.
	ErrNoResticPassword = errors.New("escrow: the recovered bundle carries NO offsite repository password (a pre-fork-4 blob — the field did not exist when it was sealed and cannot be retro-fitted)")
)

// BlobFetcher yields this host's own opaque identity-escrow blob. present=false is a clean "none".
// An interface-free func field keeps this package free of any dependency on the hub client.
type BlobFetcher func(ctx context.Context) (blob []byte, present bool, err error)

// OffsiteKeyRecoverer is the assembled links 6→8. Construct it with a fetcher; call it with R.
type OffsiteKeyRecoverer struct {
	Fetch BlobFetcher
}

// RecoverOffsiteRepoPassword fetches, unseals and extracts. It returns ONLY the repository password.
//
// A WRONG RECOVERY CODE FAILS CLOSED at the scrypt KDF inside UnwrapIdentity — `age -d` exits
// non-zero and emits no plaintext, so there is no partial result and nothing is written anywhere.
// That property is the crypto's, not a check here, which is why this function has no "validate R"
// step to get wrong.
//
// NOTHING IS LOGGED BY THIS FUNCTION and no error it returns contains R, the password, or blob bytes.
func (r OffsiteKeyRecoverer) RecoverOffsiteRepoPassword(ctx context.Context, recoveryCode string) (string, error) {
	if r.Fetch == nil {
		return "", fmt.Errorf("escrow: recoverer has no blob fetcher configured")
	}
	if recoveryCode == "" {
		return "", fmt.Errorf("escrow: the recovery code is required")
	}
	blob, present, err := r.Fetch(ctx)
	if err != nil {
		// R-224: joined with ErrBundleFetch so the caller can classify by VALUE. The cause stays
		// wrapped for the operator log; neither carries a secret. Before this, the fetch failure was
		// an anonymous error and the local-api handler's `default` branch reported it to the customer
		// as a wrong recovery code.
		return "", fmt.Errorf("%w: %w", ErrBundleFetch, err)
	}
	if !present || len(blob) == 0 {
		return "", ErrNoEscrowBlob
	}
	bundle, err := UnwrapIdentityBundle(ctx, blob, recoveryCode)
	if err != nil {
		return "", err // already the fail-closed "the recovery code did not unwrap…" message; no secret in it
	}
	if bundle.ResticRepoPassword == "" {
		return "", ErrNoResticPassword
	}
	return bundle.ResticRepoPassword, nil
}