v0.144.0 code: R8 measures the real download (R-865); an OS pass's report survives a killed agent (R-868); the debug pass runs from the saved block when the hub is away (R-866)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS
REPORT + CONTEXT: 2026-10-04 night (R-840 / R-860)
2026-10-05 07:14:32 +02:00 · 2026-10-04 20:39:47 +02:00 · 2026-10-04 20:08:16 +02:00 · 2026-10-04 19:36:58 +02:00 · 2026-10-04 18:21:46 +02:00 · 2026-10-04 18:21:24 +02:00
24 changed files with 2475 additions and 83 deletions
@@ -1,3 +1,92 @@
+## v0.143.0 — the config bundle: a signed route for a box's root-owned files (R-840, decision 96) (2026-10-04)
+
+Released by `scripts/release-agent.sh`: binary sha256 `41c0d3060013dfda795262147454248149bee0888c0935170fdb85de6e7a35da`,
+config bundle `felhom-config-bundle.json` sha256 `8d7273cf5313ef62b867cb6f831c631923a436452d6f90b8ff7f0771170396ba`.
+
+- **The bundle.** Every root-owned file the installer's step 5 writes (sudoers ×2, the five wrappers, the crash guard
+  and its units, the agent and rollback units, the start-limit drop-in, the mgmt watchdog, the OOB belt's files) as ONE
+  reproducible JSON file, built by `scripts/build-config-bundle.py` from `BUNDLE_FILES` in `configs/felhom-os-apply`
+  (one table) and published beside the binary. The installer (1.31.0) installs the same file.
+- **The route.** A signed `agent_config_update` {agent_version, bundle_sha256} (`felhom-opsign -op agent_config_update
+  -bundle-sha256 …`). The agent is the courier (downloads, checks the sha, hands over); `felhom-os-apply` mode `bundle`
+  verifies it ITSELF: the operator signature against the root-owned `/etc/felhom/operator-signers` (or, when that file
+  is missing, ONLY the installer's pinned key, after which it creates the file with exactly that key), the host binding,
+  the window, its own nonce; the bundle sha; every path in `BUNDLE_FILES` (R16) and never a trust file (R17); every
+  content check before the first write (visudo, sh/bash -n, python, unit sections, the RuntimeDirectory guard, User=,
+  nft -c, and that the route itself survives). Atomic per file, previous copies kept under
+  `/var/lib/felhom-os-apply/bundle-prev/`; a self-check after (visudo -c, `sudo -l` lists the route, the new wrapper's
+  `--self-check`, the self-update wrapper's usage, the crash guard's status = kernel.panic); any failure puts every
+  previous copy back. A newly installed crash guard is started (`enable --now`: kernel.panic for this boot, no reboot).
+  Record `/etc/felhom/config-bundle.json`; the agent reports it as `system.config_bundle`, the facts mode adds drift.
+- **Bootstrap.** A box whose `felhom-os-apply` predates 0.143.0 cannot take the first bundle by the route (nothing on it
+  can write a root file from a signed job): `felhom.eu/scripts/felhom-bundle-bootstrap.sh` is the one by-hand step.
+- **`build-golden.sh` 3.2.0** (not part of the binary): `GOLDEN_GUEST_PKGS` brings the template to exactly the
+  approved guest release (only installed packages, never newer, never a removal or a new package) and prints the
+  first-night count.
+- Tests: `configs/test_felhom_config_bundle.py` (43; 22 of 22 mutants red), `internal/osupdate/bundle_test.go`,
+  `internal/hub/bundle_record_test.go`. Live: `felhom.eu/documentation/audits/r840-config-bundle-2026-10-04/partB/`.
+
+## v0.142.1 — a Docker step no longer leaves the controller and traefik blind (R-858, `09` decision 95)
+
+> **RELEASED 2026-10-04** by `scripts/release-agent.sh` — tag `v0.142.1` (`4950030`), sha256
+> `003f882a59abfc10021a1f97a4744ab78ab1e916b1392dcef132e7067f3c62bd`, verified by download. Not vouched at release time.
+
+**MinAgent impact:** none. A same-day patch release, by the operator's ruling 95 after a live incident.
+
+- **The incident.** v0.142.0's Docker step on demo-felhom (14:13 UTC) restarted dockerd, which recreates
+  `/run/docker.sock`. live-restore kept every container running — including `felhom-controller` and `traefik`, which
+  bind-mount the socket FILE and so kept the deleted inode. The controller could not reach Docker for 1 h 44 min (hub:
+  DOWN, "docker not reachable"); its own health check stayed "healthy", so the step's health rule PASSED.
+- **The fix.** After a Docker step that installed something, the wrapper restarts ONLY the containers that mount
+  `/var/run/docker.sock` or `/run/docker.sock` (`os-apply: SOCKET-USERS restarted=…`; the apps and the engine untouched).
+  The guest health reading gains `controller_docker_ok` (`docker exec felhom-controller docker version`), and the health
+  rule fails when it is false — the consequence, not the mechanism.
+- Proven live on demo-hp BEFORE the release (signed undo to 29.7.2): the two restarted, guest / controller / traefik on
+  the same socket inode, healthy. Red-proofs: `felhom.eu/documentation/audits/os-docker-crash-2026-10-04/partE-incident/`.
+
+## v0.142.0 — the Docker engine slow lane, the version report, the crash guard (`11` §5.8, §5.9; `09` decisions 87–89)
+
+> **RELEASED 2026-10-04** by `scripts/release-agent.sh` — tag `v0.142.0` (`b1746c2`), sha256
+> `7beb32224d6495e9561acfd3ad8a48393a799520f196080011cb27fceb6d1de6`, verified by download. Not vouched at release time.
+
+**MinAgent impact:** none. **Needs hub v0.132.0** for the System page, the Docker approval and the crash events; an older
+hub stores the new `system` stanza unread. **Needs the new root files** on an installed box (R-840): the wrapper,
+`/etc/felhom/os-trust.json`, `/etc/felhom/operator-signers` and the crash guard — the installer 1.30.0 writes them; the
+demo boxes got them by hand.
+
+- **Docker `live-restore` ON** (decision 87). Wrapper mode `live-restore-on`: merge `"live-restore": true` into the
+  guest's `/etc/docker/daemon.json` and `systemctl reload docker` — never a restart (R-835). An invalid daemon.json is
+  left alone (R16); a reload that does not enable it puts the old file back. The leg runs it once before a Docker step;
+  `--selftest=live-restore -vmid N` runs it by hand. Measured: demo-hp 24 containers, demo-felhom 5 — the same ids after.
+- **The Docker engine slow lane** (`11` §5.8). Wrapper layer `docker`, lane `slow` only, the six Docker packages only,
+  origin `Docker CE` only (R2; a Docker package in a fast-lane plan is refused). **R3 — the wrapper checks the authority
+  itself**, never the agent's config: a ring-1 step or ANY undo needs a signed `os_docker_step` it verifies with
+  `ssh-keygen -Y verify` against the ROOT-owned `/etc/felhom/operator-signers` (namespace `felhom-op-v1`, the blob's
+  `key_id`), bound to `/etc/felhom/os-trust.json` `host_id`, inside its time window, never replayed (a root-owned nonce
+  file), with exactly the signed packages and undo flag; an unsigned ring-0 step needs that file's
+  `"ring0_slow_lane": true` (the demo boxes only, set by hand). **R15:** live-restore must be on. An undo may downgrade
+  (`--allow-downgrades`) only inside a signed job. The leg: ring 0 runs the Docker step at night after a healthy guest
+  and host step (`select pending-docker`); ring 1 never does — only `DockerStepExecutor` (signed job, heavy-op gate).
+  **Health:** the guest rule + every container running at the start has the SAME id after + the engine reports the
+  installed version; a changed id is `health_failed`. Measured ring 0: 29.7.x → 29.8.2 on both demo boxes, every id kept.
+- **The version report** (R-852, decision 89). Wrapper mode `facts` (read-only): host Debian, running and next-boot
+  kernel (`next_entry` > saved default > newest installed, by dpkg order), held packages (R-848), kernel taint (oops,
+  warn), `kernel.panic`, the crash guard state; guest Debian, Docker engine, containerd, live-restore. The host report
+  gains `system {pve_version, kernel_version, vmid, facts, facts_error}`, read at most every 10 min (~2 s);
+  `--selftest=os-facts -vmid N`. A value nobody could read is `unknown`.
+- **R-849:** the guest is scanned for "restart needed" on every pass too, so a guest restart clears it.
+- **The crash guard** (decision 88, R-851): `configs/felhom-crash-guard` + `felhom-crash-guard.service` (early boot;
+  its ExecStop writes a clean-stop marker) + an hourly re-arm timer + `/etc/felhom/crash-guard.conf`. A boot without
+  the marker followed an unclean stop (a crash, a power cut or a hard reset — pstore saved nothing for a real panic on
+  demo-hp, so they cannot be told apart). Armed: `kernel.panic = 10`. After the 2nd unclean boot within 60 min it
+  TRIPS (`kernel.panic = 0`), so the 3rd crash within the hour leaves the box off; it re-arms after 24 h of normal
+  running or `felhom-crash-guard rearm`. State in `/var/lib/felhom-crash-guard/state.json` (0644; read by facts).
+- **After the tag (main only, not shipped to boxes): `configs/build-golden.sh` 3.1.0** — the golden's `daemon.json`
+  carries `"live-restore": true` with a fail-closed assertion, and `GOLDEN_DOCKER_PKGS` pins the approved Docker engine
+  set (all six `name=version`); without it the bake log warns that the set is the newest, not an approved one.
+- Tests: wrapper 76 (DockerLane, LiveRestore, Facts, RealSignatureCheck with a throwaway key), crash guard 9, Go leg +
+  executor; red-proofs `felhom.eu/documentation/audits/os-docker-crash-2026-10-04/partB/agent-redproofs.txt` (17 caught).
+
 ## v0.141.1 — "reboot needed" is true on the host (found live on demo-felhom, 2026-10-04)

 > **RELEASED 2026-10-04** by `scripts/release-agent.sh` — tag `v0.141.1` (`a6bc3f1`), sha256
@@ -1,5 +1,13 @@
 # CONTEXT — felhom-agent working state

+> **2026-10-04 night — v0.143.0 RELEASED + vouched (R-840, decision 96): the config bundle.** `felhom-os-apply` mode
+> `bundle` (signed `agent_config_update`, verified by the wrapper itself; trust files never bundle paths) +
+> `--install-bundle` (installer 1.31.0); `BUNDLE_FILES` is the one table; `scripts/build-config-bundle.py`;
+> `release-agent.sh` publishes it. A box whose `felhom-os-apply` predates 0.143.0 needs ONE by-hand bootstrap
+> (`felhom.eu/scripts/felhom-bundle-bootstrap.sh`) — done on both demo boxes; Tester 2 waits for the operator (R-862).
+> Both demo boxes: agent 0.143.0, bundle 0.143.0 (record `/etc/felhom/config-bundle.json`). R-861 found: the sudoers is
+> root-equivalent. `build-golden.sh` 3.2.0 (`GOLDEN_GUEST_PKGS`). Runbook `felhom.eu/documentation/runbooks/config-bundle.md`.
+

 > **2026-09-25 night — v0.133.0 AND v0.134.0 DELIVERED to both demo boxes (CC-signed `agent_update`, ruling 1);
 > restore test back ON (the `-1` config kept as `agent.json.night-0925-off`). v0.134.0 = R-685:** `backup/runner.go`
@@ -1,11 +1,19 @@
-# REPORT — 2026-10-04: v0.141.0 + v0.141.1, the host fast lane, the true tunnel status, the fast leg
+# REPORT — agent v0.143.0: the config bundle (R-840) — 2026-10-04

-Full session report: `felhom.eu/REPORT-os-host-lane-2026-10-04.md`.
+**What:** a signed route for a box's root-owned files. `felhom-os-apply` gained mode `bundle` (signed
+`agent_config_update`, verified by the wrapper itself) and `--install-bundle` (the installer's root entry);
+`BUNDLE_FILES` is the one table of 22 paths; `scripts/build-config-bundle.py` builds it reproducibly;
+`release-agent.sh` publishes it beside the binary; the agent reports `system.config_bundle`; `felhom-opsign` signs it.
+Also `build-golden.sh` 3.2.0 (`GOLDEN_GUEST_PKGS`).

- Tunnel (R-841): the agent reads the guest's cloudflared container and its health check; three states.
- Host fast lane: the wrapper gains the host layer (R12 appliance proof from the root-owned install record, R14 no
-  kernel/boot/firmware); the leg runs the host step after a healthy guest step; host health rule.
- Speed (R-845): one call per layer instead of one per package; measured before/after in the session report.
- Tests green; red-proofs in the audit folder.
- v0.141.1 (same day): the host "reboot needed" scan hid `lxc-start` and was never cleared by a reboot — both fixed,
-  found live on demo-felhom, red-proved.
+**Released:** v0.143.0, binary `41c0d306…`, bundle `8d7273cf…` (reproducible), vouched in the hub with golden 0.293.0.
+**Delivered:** demo-hp and demo-felhom (signed `agent_update`), then the one-file bootstrap, then the bundle by the
+signed route (0 written of 22; probe 71/71). demo-hp also: a wrong sha refused, a one-line change and its undo, a replay
+rejected. Tester 2: the signed `agent_update` queued (operator ruling 97); its bundle waits for the operator's
+bootstrap (R-862).
+
+**Tests:** `configs/test_felhom_config_bundle.py` 43 (22 of 22 mutants red), Go `internal/osupdate/bundle_test.go`,
+`internal/hub/bundle_record_test.go`; `go vet ./... && go test ./...` rc=0; gates green.
+**Found:** R-861 — the sudoers already lets the agent user reach root (read, not exploited).
+Evidence and the full report: `felhom.eu/documentation/audits/r840-config-bundle-2026-10-04/`,
+`felhom.eu/REPORT-r840-config-bundle-2026-10-04.md`.
@@ -15,6 +15,10 @@
 | `SudoHostOps.run` | internal/storage/hostops.go | `run(ctx, name, args...) error` | allowlisted exec with stderr-wrapped error | Every arg pre-validated via validate.go before this is called |
 | `Prober.Probe` | internal/capability/probe.go | `Probe(ctx) []Status` | live sudo-policy capability check (`sudo -n -l --`) | Needs a DIRECT runner (never the sudo-prefixing one — double-sudo); never executes probed cmds. v0.86.0: config-gated caps (`Capability.GatedBy` + `Prober.GateActive`) report `inactive`/"disabled by configuration" ONLY when healthy — broken plumbing stays degraded; the pbsdr-* gate answers from `pbsdr.Manager.DRConfigured` (marker-backed across restarts) |
 | `stageTemp` | internal/localapi/intermediary.go | `stageTemp(pattern, content) (path, err)` | random-named temp before a root `install` (audit B1) | Fixed /tmp names are a TOCTOU — sudoers globs expect `/tmp/felhom-*-*.ext` |
+| `BUNDLE_FILES` + `Bundle` (mode `bundle`, `--install-bundle`) | configs/felhom-os-apply | the ONE table of root-owned paths + the installer of them | ANY new root-owned file the installer writes (sudoers line, wrapper, unit) — add it to the table, never a new installer fetch (R-840) | The builder (`scripts/build-config-bundle.py`) and the installer read the same table; `test_every_root_file_the_installer_writes_is_in_the_bundle` fails on a path the bundle lacks. Trust files (`/etc/felhom/os-trust.json`, `operator-signers`) are NEVER bundle paths (R17) |
+| `osupdate.ConfigUpdateExecutor` | internal/osupdate/bundle.go | signed op `agent_config_update` {agent_version, bundle_sha256} | delivering the bundle to an installed box | a courier only: the root wrapper re-verifies signature, host, nonce and sha itself |
+| `osupdate.Leg.SendUnsent` / `lockPass` (v0.144.0, R-868) | internal/osupdate/unsent.go | `(ctx) int` | an OS-pass report the agent never sent (killed mid-pass): the wrapper keeps `report-<run>-<layer>-apply.json` beside the plan; the agent deletes it once the hub has it | any new caller that runs an apply pass must hold `lockPass` (flock, across processes) — the sender must never take a running pass's copy |
+| `osupdate.LoadSavedBlock` (v0.144.0, R-866) | internal/osupdate/leg.go | `(planDir) (block, savedAt, ok)` | the hub's newest os_update block as the daemon last received it (`os-update-block.json`) | the debug pass uses it ONLY when the hub cannot be reached, and says so in its header; no saved block → no pass |
 | `guesthook.InstallSnippet` / `Register` | internal/guesthook/install.go | `InstallSnippet(ctx, runner) error` | pre-start self-heal hook install (C1 net) | Same random-temp+install pattern; snippet delegates to the agent binary (no shell logic). Issues `mkdir -p /var/lib/vz/snippets` FIRST (v0.63.0, B2 — fresh boxes lack the dir; sudoers grants exactly that argv) |

 ### Disk / format safety (role gates, durable IDs, format guards)
@@ -868,6 +868,13 @@ func runDaemon(cfg config.Config, logger *slog.Logger, logRing *applog.Ring) int
 	logger.Info("felhom-agent daemon starting",
 		"version", version, "host_id", cfg.Hub.HostID, "hub_url", cfg.Hub.URL,
 		"interval_s", hcfg.PollSeconds) // hub key intentionally not logged
+	// R-868 (v0.144.0): an OS pass whose agent was killed kept its report on disk — send it now (a pass that starts
+	// first sends it itself; the pass lock keeps the two apart).
+	go func() {
+		if n := osLeg.SendUnsent(ctx); n > 0 {
+			logger.Info("osupdate: sent kept report(s) at start", "count", n)
+		}
+	}()

 	// Reconcile (slice 4) runs alongside the hub loop, sharing the per-guest queue
 	// (doc 03 §10). At slice 4 the desired-state provider is empty (no hub serving
@@ -1101,7 +1108,18 @@ func runDaemon(cfg config.Config, logger *slog.Logger, logRing *applog.Ring) int
 			}
 			return release, nil
 		}}
-	jobsRunner := signedjobs.NewRunner(client, gate, signedjobs.ExecutorChain{wipeExec, decommExec, updateExec, dockerExec}, cfg.Hub.HostID, logger)
+	// Agent v0.143.0 (R-840): the config bundle — the box's root-owned files by a signed job; the wrapper verifies it.
+	bundleExec := osupdate.ConfigUpdateExecutor{Leg: osLeg, URLTemplate: suCfg.URLTemplate, Username: suCfg.Username, Token: suCfg.Token,
+		// The capability probe confirms from the agent's side: `sudo -l` lists every command the new sudoers grants.
+		AfterInstall: func(ctx context.Context) {
+			ok, total, degraded := capability.Summarize(probeAll(ctx))
+			names := make([]string, 0, len(degraded))
+			for _, d := range degraded {
+				names = append(names, d.Name)
+			}
+			logger.Warn("osupdate: capability probe after the config bundle", "ok", ok, "total", total, "degraded", strings.Join(names, ","))
+		}}
+	jobsRunner := signedjobs.NewRunner(client, gate, signedjobs.ExecutorChain{wipeExec, decommExec, updateExec, dockerExec, bundleExec}, cfg.Hub.HostID, logger)
 	loop.SetEnvelopeObserver(hub.MultiObserver(desiredSyncer, jobsRunner))

 	// Controller-driven escrow ceremony (v0.88.0): static config facts + the LATE-BOUND DR gate —
@@ -3564,15 +3582,15 @@ func runSelftestOSUpdate(ctx context.Context, cfg config.Config, logger *slog.Lo
 		return 1
 	}
 	leg := newOSLeg(cfg, client, px, logger)
-	resp, err := client.FetchDesiredState(ctx)
-	if err != nil {
-		fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "selftest=os-update: desired state:", err)
+	blk, source, ok := selftestOSBlock(ctx, client, leg.PlanDir)
+	if !ok {
+		fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "selftest=os-update:", source)
 		return 1
 	}
-	leg.SetBlock(resp.DesiredState.OSUpdate)
+	leg.SetBlock(blk)
 	b := leg.Block()
-	fmt.Printf("=== felhom-agent %s selftest=os-update vmid=%d ring=%d enabled=%v guest-release=%v host-release=%v appliance=%v ===\n",
-		version, vmid, b.Ring, b.Enabled, b.Release != nil, b.HostRelease != nil, leg.Appliance)
+	fmt.Printf("=== felhom-agent %s selftest=os-update vmid=%d ring=%d enabled=%v guest-release=%v host-release=%v appliance=%v block=%s ===\n",
+		version, vmid, b.Ring, b.Enabled, b.Release != nil, b.HostRelease != nil, leg.Appliance, source)
 	start := time.Now()
 	pass := leg.Run(ctx, vmid, "debug")
 	worst := pass.Guest
@@ -3598,6 +3616,24 @@ func runSelftestOSUpdate(ctx context.Context, cfg config.Config, logger *slog.Lo
 	return 1
 }

+// selftestOSBlock is the debug pass's os_update block (R-866, v0.144.0): the hub's, fetched fresh; when the hub cannot
+// be reached, the block the daemon last saved — named in the selftest's first line, so a pass with the hub away can
+// be exercised by hand (the daemon's own leg already ran from its last block; the selftest stopped). No saved block
+// and no hub → not run (ok=false), never a guessed block.
+func selftestOSBlock(ctx context.Context, f interface {
+	FetchDesiredState(context.Context) (*hub.DesiredStateResponse, error)
+}, planDir string) (*hub.WireOSUpdate, string, bool) {
+	resp, err := f.FetchDesiredState(ctx)
+	if err == nil {
+		return resp.DesiredState.OSUpdate, "hub", true
+	}
+	saved, at, ok := osupdate.LoadSavedBlock(planDir)
+	if !ok {
+		return nil, fmt.Sprintf("desired state: %v — and no saved block (the daemon saves one when the hub sends it)", err), false
+	}
+	return saved, fmt.Sprintf("SAVED(%s; hub unreachable: %v)", at.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339), err), true
+}
+
 // runSelftestFacts prints the versions the host report carries (R-852, agent v0.142.0) — read-only.
 //
 //	sudo -u felhom-agent felhom-agent --config … --selftest=os-facts -vmid 9201
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+package main
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-agent/internal/hub"
+	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-agent/internal/osupdate"
+)
+
+type r866Fetcher struct{ err error }
+
+func (f r866Fetcher) FetchDesiredState(context.Context) (*hub.DesiredStateResponse, error) {
+	if f.err != nil {
+		return nil, f.err
+	}
+	r := &hub.DesiredStateResponse{}
+	r.DesiredState.OSUpdate = &hub.WireOSUpdate{Ring: 1, Enabled: true}
+	return r, nil
+}
+
+// R-866 (v0.144.0). THE NIGHT'S SHAPE (A3, Tester 1 box, hub blocked): `selftest=os-update: desired state: hub:
+// transport error … connect: invalid argument` — the debug pass could not run at all. Now it runs from the block the
+// daemon saved, and its header says so.
+// COMPANION RED-PROOF: return at once on a fetch error in selftestOSBlock → "the pass did not run from the saved block".
+func TestR866_DebugPassUsesTheSavedBlockWhenTheHubIsAway(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	leg := &osupdate.Leg{PlanDir: dir}
+	r := &hub.DesiredStateResponse{}
+	r.DesiredState.OSUpdate = &hub.WireOSUpdate{Ring: 0, Enabled: true}
+	leg.OnDesiredState(context.Background(), r) // the daemon received a block and saved it
+	away := r866Fetcher{err: errors.New("hub: transport error: connect: invalid argument")}
+	b, src, ok := selftestOSBlock(context.Background(), away, dir)
+	if !ok || b == nil || b.Ring != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("the pass did not run from the saved block: ok=%v block=%+v src=%q", ok, b, src)
+	}
+	if !strings.HasPrefix(src, "SAVED(") || !strings.Contains(src, "hub unreachable") {
+		t.Fatalf("the header must say the block is the saved one: %q", src)
+	}
+	// the hub reachable: its block wins, and the header says "hub"
+	b, src, ok = selftestOSBlock(context.Background(), r866Fetcher{}, dir)
+	if !ok || b.Ring != 1 || src != "hub" {
+		t.Fatalf("hub block not used: %+v %q", b, src)
+	}
+}
+
+// No hub and nothing saved: the pass does not run on a guessed block.
+func TestR866_NoHubNoSavedBlockDoesNotRun(t *testing.T) {
+	_, why, ok := selftestOSBlock(context.Background(), r866Fetcher{err: errors.New("down")}, t.TempDir())
+	if ok || !strings.Contains(why, "no saved block") {
+		t.Fatalf("ok=%v why=%q", ok, why)
+	}
+}
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ func main() {

 func run() error {
 	var (
-		op        = flag.String("op", "", "op class to sign, e.g. storage_wipe | guest_destroy | decommission | agent_update")
+		op        = flag.String("op", "", "op class to sign, e.g. storage_wipe | guest_destroy | decommission | agent_update | os_docker_step | agent_config_update")
 		host      = flag.String("host", "", "target host_id (anti-retarget — the op runs ONLY on this host)")
 		guest     = flag.String("guest", "", "target guest_id (\"\" = host-scoped op)")
 		keyID     = flag.String("key-id", "", "key id of the signing key (must match a pinned agent signer)")
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ func run() error {
 		fstype    = flag.String("fstype", "ext4", "for storage_wipe: the filesystem to mkfs after wipe")
 		agentVer  = flag.String("agent-version", "", "for agent_update: the target agent version (e.g. 0.70.1)")
 		sha256Hex = flag.String("sha256", "", "for agent_update: the pinned lowercase-hex sha256 of the target binary")
+		bundleSHA = flag.String("bundle-sha256", "", "for agent_config_update: the pinned sha256 of felhom-config-bundle.json (R-840)")
 		keyFile   = flag.String("key", "", "operator signing key (ssh private key / sk- key handle) for ssh-keygen -Y sign")
 		ttl       = flag.Duration("ttl", 30*time.Minute, "validity window from now (issued_at..expires_at)")
 		nonce     = flag.String("nonce", "", "explicit nonce (default: a fresh 128-bit random nonce)")
@@ -95,6 +96,17 @@ func run() error {
 			}
 			pj, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]string{"version": *agentVer, "sha256": *sha256Hex})
 			params = string(pj)
+		case "agent_config_update":
+			// R-840: the box's root-owned files. The ROOT wrapper verifies this signature itself and refuses a bundle
+			// whose sha256 is not exactly this one.
+			if *agentVer == "" || *bundleSHA == "" {
+				return fmt.Errorf("agent_config_update needs -agent-version and -bundle-sha256 (the pinned bundle hash)")
+			}
+			if !isHex64(*bundleSHA) {
+				return fmt.Errorf("agent_config_update -bundle-sha256 must be 64 lowercase hex chars (got %d)", len(*bundleSHA))
+			}
+			pj, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]string{"agent_version": *agentVer, "bundle_sha256": *bundleSHA})
+			params = string(pj)
 		default:
 			params = "{}"
 		}
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ set -euo pipefail

 # Script provenance — logged into every bake transcript next to the baked controller tag, so an
 # archive can always be traced to the script that produced it. Bump on any behavior change.
-GOLDEN_SCRIPT_VERSION="3.0.0"
+GOLDEN_SCRIPT_VERSION="3.2.0"

 VMID="${1:-9100}"
 TEMPLATE="${2:-local:vztmpl/debian-13-standard_13.1-2_amd64.tar.zst}"
@@ -112,7 +112,15 @@ for i in $(seq 1 30); do
  if pct exec "$VMID" -- getent hosts download.docker.com >/dev/null 2>&1; then break; fi
  sleep 1
 done
-pct exec "$VMID" -- bash -c '
+# v3.1.0 (`11` §5.8): GOLDEN_DOCKER_PKGS pins the APPROVED Docker engine set (the hub's newest Docker release, all six
+# "name=version"); without it the newest stable set is installed and the bake log says so.
+GOLDEN_DOCKER_PKGS="${GOLDEN_DOCKER_PKGS:-}"
+if [[ -n "$GOLDEN_DOCKER_PKGS" ]]; then
+  echo "[golden] Docker engine set PINNED to the approved release: $GOLDEN_DOCKER_PKGS"
+else
+  echo "[golden] WARNING: GOLDEN_DOCKER_PKGS not set — installing the newest stable Docker set, not an approved one"
+fi
+pct exec "$VMID" -- env GOLDEN_DOCKER_PKGS="$GOLDEN_DOCKER_PKGS" bash -c '
  set -e
  export DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive
  apt-get update -qq
@@ -122,7 +130,54 @@ pct exec "$VMID" -- bash -c '
  echo "deb [signed-by=/etc/apt/keyrings/docker.asc] https://download.docker.com/linux/debian trixie stable" \
    > /etc/apt/sources.list.d/docker.list
  apt-get update -qq
-  apt-get install -y -qq docker-ce docker-ce-cli containerd.io >/dev/null
+  if [ -n "$GOLDEN_DOCKER_PKGS" ]; then
+    apt-get install -y -qq $GOLDEN_DOCKER_PKGS >/dev/null
+  else
+    apt-get install -y -qq docker-ce docker-ce-cli containerd.io >/dev/null
+  fi
+  dpkg-query -W containerd.io docker-buildx-plugin docker-ce docker-ce-cli docker-ce-rootless-extras docker-compose-plugin 2>/dev/null | sed "s/^/  installed: /"
+'
+# v3.2.0 (Part F of the R-840 brief, `11` §5.3): GOLDEN_GUEST_PKGS = the newest APPROVED guest release, as
+# "name=version …" (the hub's os_releases row for layer guest, IN FORCE — never a cancelled test approval). The bake
+# brings every package the template HAS to exactly that version, under felhom-os-apply's rules: never a package the
+# template lacks (--only-upgrade), never newer than approved, never a removal or a new package (a simulation is checked
+# first and the bake FAILS on either). Empty = no approved guest release in force: the template's versions stay, and
+# the box's first night installs whatever release is approved then. Either way the bake PRINTS the first-night count:
+# how many installed packages are older than the approved version (target 0).
+GOLDEN_GUEST_PKGS="${GOLDEN_GUEST_PKGS:-}"
+pct exec "$VMID" -- env GOLDEN_GUEST_PKGS="$GOLDEN_GUEST_PKGS" bash -c '
+  set -e
+  export DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive
+  if [ -z "$GOLDEN_GUEST_PKGS" ]; then
+    echo "[golden] no approved guest release given - the template versions stay; first-night count vs an approved release: n/a"
+    echo "[golden] pending Debian upgrades in the baked guest (what a FUTURE approval may bring): $(apt list --upgradable 2>/dev/null | grep -c /)"
+    exit 0
+  fi
+  want=""
+  for nv in $GOLDEN_GUEST_PKGS; do
+    n=${nv%%=*}; v=${nv#*=}
+    cur=$(dpkg-query -W -f="\${Version}" "$n" 2>/dev/null) || continue           # not in the template: never added
+    dpkg --compare-versions "$cur" lt "$v" && want="$want $n=$v"
+  done
+  if [ -n "$want" ]; then
+    sim=$(apt-get -s install --only-upgrade -o Dpkg::Options::=--force-confold $want)
+    if echo "$sim" | grep -q "^Remv "; then echo "[golden] FATAL: the approved guest set would REMOVE a package"; echo "$sim" | grep "^Remv "; exit 1; fi
+    for p in $(echo "$sim" | awk "/^Inst /{print \$2}"); do
+      dpkg-query -W "$p" >/dev/null 2>&1 || { echo "[golden] FATAL: the approved guest set would ADD $p - not in the template"; exit 1; }
+    done
+    apt-get install -y -qq --only-upgrade -o Dpkg::Options::=--force-confold -o Dpkg::Options::=--force-confdef $want >/dev/null
+    echo "[golden] approved guest release installed: $(echo $want | wc -w) package(s) brought to the approved version"
+  else
+    echo "[golden] approved guest release: the template already runs every approved version"
+  fi
+  left=0
+  for nv in $GOLDEN_GUEST_PKGS; do
+    n=${nv%%=*}; v=${nv#*=}
+    cur=$(dpkg-query -W -f="\${Version}" "$n" 2>/dev/null) || continue
+    dpkg --compare-versions "$cur" lt "$v" && { left=$((left+1)); echo "  still older: $n $cur < $v"; }
+  done
+  echo "[golden] first-night count vs the approved guest release: $left (target 0)"
+  [ "$left" -eq 0 ] || { echo "[golden] FATAL: $left package(s) stayed older than the approved release"; exit 1; }
 '
 echo "[golden] baking daemon.json: classic overlay2 driver (containerd-snapshotter OFF) + log rotation …"
 # containerd-snapshotter (Docker 28+/29 default) keeps the IMAGE content store under
@@ -135,9 +190,12 @@ echo "[golden] baking daemon.json: classic overlay2 driver (containerd-snapshott
 # layout (a container's `df /` reports the single volume, phase-0 spike). Since v3.0.0 /var/lib/docker
 # is a BIND of <volume>/docker rather than the mp0 mount itself, wired immediately below; data-root
 # still needs no override because the path is unchanged. Log caps kill the most common runaway.
+# v3.1.0: "live-restore": true (`09` decision 87) — a Docker engine update then restarts no app (`11` C5). A box made
+# from this golden never needs the agent's one-time live-restore-on step. NEVER removed by a plain restart (R-835).
 pct exec "$VMID" -- bash -c 'mkdir -p /etc/docker; cat > /etc/docker/daemon.json <<JSON
 {
  "features": { "containerd-snapshotter": false },
+  "live-restore": true,
  "log-driver": "json-file",
  "log-opts": { "max-size": "10m", "max-file": "3" }
 }
@@ -175,6 +233,8 @@ pct exec "$VMID" -- bash -c 'systemctl restart docker; sleep 3; docker run --rm
 # Guard: the image store MUST be on the data volume now. /var/lib/containerd holding the images would
 # mean containerd-snapshotter is still on (the split would leave images on the rootfs).
 pct exec "$VMID" -- bash -c 'drv=$(docker info 2>/dev/null | sed -n "s/.*Storage Driver: //p"); [ "$drv" = "overlay2" ] || { echo "[golden] FATAL: storage driver is $drv, expected overlay2 — images would not land on the data volume"; exit 1; }'
+# v3.1.0 ASSERTION: live-restore is ON in the running daemon (decision 87), or the bake fails closed.
+pct exec "$VMID" -- bash -c 'lr=$(docker info --format "{{.LiveRestoreEnabled}}" 2>/dev/null); [ "$lr" = "true" ] && echo "  live-restore: on" || { echo "[golden] FATAL: live-restore is $lr, expected true (decision 87)"; exit 1; }'
 # ASSERTION 1 (RETARGETED v3.0.0, not removed). /var/lib/docker must be a real mount — now the V-c
 # bind of <volume>/docker rather than the mp0 mount itself. Still fails closed on the same failure:
 # if the bind did not take, Docker's data-root silently sits on the OS rootfs and the golden ships
@@ -86,8 +86,82 @@ SIG_NAMESPACE = "felhom-op-v1"
 SIGNED_OP = "os_docker_step"
 NONCE_FILE = "/var/lib/felhom-os-apply/nonces.json"
 DAEMON_JSON = "/etc/docker/daemon.json"
+# R-858 (v0.142.1): a Docker engine step restarts dockerd, which RECREATES the socket file. With live-restore the
+# containers keep running — and one that bind-mounts the socket FILE keeps the deleted inode: measured 2026-10-04 on
+# demo-felhom, the controller and traefik were blind to Docker for 1h44m. After a step that installed something, the
+# wrapper restarts exactly the containers that mount one of these paths (never the apps, never the engine).
+DOCKER_SOCKETS = ("/var/run/docker.sock", "/run/docker.sock")
 CRASH_GUARD_STATE = "/var/lib/felhom-crash-guard/state.json"

+# ---------- the config bundle (R-840, agent v0.143.0, `11` §5.4.2) ----------
+# A signed `agent_config_update` job carries {agent_version, bundle_sha256}; the bundle is ONE JSON file built from this
+# repo's configs/ at the agent tag (scripts/build-config-bundle.py) and published beside the binary. The installer
+# installs the SAME bundle through this same code (--install-bundle, root only, never reachable through sudo), so a new
+# box and an updated box cannot drift. This table is the ONLY set of paths a bundle may write — a signed bundle naming
+# any other path is refused (R16) — and it is also the builder's list (one table). Each entry:
+#   dest: (source file under configs/, mode, check, policy)
+# check:  the content check BEFORE anything is written (R18): sudoers → visudo -cf; sh / bash → -n; python → compile;
+#         unit → a [Unit]/[Service]/[Timer] section; unit-nort → that, and never RuntimeDirectory= (the G1 incident);
+#         agent-unit → User=felhom-agent; dropin → a [Unit] section (SF-3); nft → nft -c -f; plain → none.
+# policy: replace → always written when it differs; if-absent → only when the box has none (a setting the operator may
+#         have tuned); oob → only on a box with the OOB belt (/etc/felhom-sshd exists — the installer's --no-oob leaves none).
+# Order matters: the sudoers files come LAST, so a referenced wrapper is in place before the line that allows it.
+BUNDLE_FORMAT = 1
+BUNDLE_OP = "agent_config_update"
+BUNDLE_RECORD = "/etc/felhom/config-bundle.json"     # what the box runs (0644 root; the non-root agent reports it)
+BUNDLE_PREV_DIR = "/var/lib/felhom-os-apply/bundle-prev"  # the previous copies of every file a bundle replaced
+BUNDLE_KEEP = 3
+BUNDLE_MAX_BYTES = 4 * 1024 * 1024
+BUNDLE_RE = re.compile(r"^bundle-[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+(-[0-9A-Za-z.]+)?\.json$")
+OOB_DIR = "/etc/felhom-sshd"
+BUNDLE_FILES = [
+    ("/usr/local/sbin/felhom-mkfs-guarded", "felhom-mkfs-guarded.sh", 0o755, "bash", "replace"),
+    ("/usr/local/sbin/felhom-selfupdate-guarded", "felhom-selfupdate-guarded", 0o755, "sh", "replace"),
+    ("/usr/local/sbin/felhom-pbs-apply", "felhom-pbs-apply", 0o755, "bash", "replace"),
+    ("/usr/local/sbin/felhom-backup-target-apply", "felhom-backup-target-apply", 0o755, "bash", "replace"),
+    ("/usr/local/sbin/felhom-os-apply", "felhom-os-apply", 0o755, "python", "replace"),
+    ("/usr/local/sbin/felhom-crash-guard", "felhom-crash-guard", 0o755, "python", "replace"),
+    ("/etc/systemd/system/felhom-crash-guard.service", "felhom-crash-guard.service", 0o644, "unit", "replace"),
+    ("/etc/systemd/system/felhom-crash-guard-check.service", "felhom-crash-guard-check.service", 0o644, "unit", "replace"),
+    ("/etc/systemd/system/felhom-crash-guard-check.timer", "felhom-crash-guard-check.timer", 0o644, "unit", "replace"),
+    ("/etc/felhom/crash-guard.conf", "crash-guard.conf", 0o644, "plain", "if-absent"),
+    ("/etc/systemd/system/felhom-agent.service", "felhom-agent.service", 0o644, "agent-unit", "replace"),
+    ("/etc/systemd/system/felhom-agent-rollback.service", "felhom-agent-rollback.service", 0o644, "unit", "replace"),
+    ("/etc/systemd/system/felhom-agent.service.d/felhom-agent-limits.conf", "felhom-agent-limits.conf", 0o644, "dropin", "replace"),
+    ("/usr/local/sbin/felhom-mgmt-watchdog", "felhom-mgmt-watchdog.sh", 0o755, "sh", "replace"),
+    ("/etc/tmpfiles.d/felhom-privsep.conf", "felhom-privsep.tmpfiles", 0o644, "plain", "replace"),
+    ("/etc/systemd/system/felhom-mgmt-watchdog.service", "felhom-mgmt-watchdog.service", 0o644, "unit-nort", "replace"),
+    ("/etc/systemd/system/felhom-mgmt-watchdog.timer", "felhom-mgmt-watchdog.timer", 0o644, "unit-nort", "replace"),
+    ("/etc/systemd/system/felhom-sshd.service", "felhom-sshd.service", 0o644, "unit-nort", "oob"),
+    ("/etc/felhom-oob.nft", "felhom-oob.nft", 0o644, "nft", "oob"),
+    ("/etc/systemd/system/felhom-oob-nft.service", "felhom-oob-nft.service", 0o644, "unit", "oob"),
+    ("/etc/sudoers.d/felhom-op", "felhom-op.sudoers", 0o440, "sudoers", "oob"),
+    ("/etc/sudoers.d/felhom-agent", "felhom-agent.sudoers", 0o440, "sudoers", "replace"),
+]
+BUNDLE_DESTS = {e[0]: e for e in BUNDLE_FILES}
+# The trust root is never a bundle's to change (R17): who may sign is decided by these files, so no bundle may carry them.
+TRUST_PATHS = (TRUST_FILE, TRUST_SIGNERS, BUNDLE_RECORD)
+# When /etc/felhom/operator-signers is MISSING (a box installed before installer 1.30.0), the job is verified against —
+# and the file is created with — exactly this key: the operational key felhom-host-install.sh pins
+# (OPERATOR_KEY_OPERATIONAL_*). Never any other. Pinned equal to the installer by
+# test_pinned_operator_key_equals_the_installers. Signer rotation is a separate, later act (`04` §3).
+PINNED_OPERATOR_KEY_ID = "felhom-op-1"
+PINNED_OPERATOR_KEY_LINE = ("ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIL8z0qCNgA3x2xxAB0Qj5ro8waFjGZ8Ta/sWB63tlLw+ felhom-op-1")
+# The self-check (after install, before the record): the route itself must survive — a bundle whose sudoers no longer
+# lets the agent call this wrapper would cut the box off from every later bundle.
+SELF_CHECK_SUDO_LINE = "/usr/local/sbin/felhom-os-apply --plan /var/lib/felhom-agent/os/plan-*.json"
+PINNED_SIGNERS = "<pinned operator key>"   # verify_sig: check against the pinned key, not a file on the box
+
+
+def pinned_signers_line():
+    """The ssh allowed_signers line the installer writes (felhom-host-install.sh _write_slow_lane_trust), byte for byte."""
+    return f'{PINNED_OPERATOR_KEY_ID} namespaces="{SIG_NAMESPACE}" {PINNED_OPERATOR_KEY_LINE}\n'
+
+
+def sha256_hex(data):
+    import hashlib
+    return hashlib.sha256(data).hexdigest()
+

 class Refused(Exception):
    def __init__(self, code, reason):
@@ -126,6 +200,32 @@ class Runner:
        if rc != 0:
            raise Refused("R7", f"could not write {path} in the guest")

+    def save_report(self, plan_path, report):
+        """R-868: keep an apply pass's report on disk until the agent has sent it (the agent deletes it). Written
+        INTO the agent's own plan dir as root, so: the dir is opened with O_NOFOLLOW and must be a real directory
+        owned by the agent (a symlink swapped in for it is refused); the file is created O_EXCL|O_NOFOLLOW after
+        removing an old one, then handed to the agent (0600). Any failure only loses the copy — never the run."""
+        base = os.path.basename(plan_path)
+        name = "report-" + base[len("plan-"):]
+        dfd = os.open(PLAN_DIR, os.O_RDONLY | os.O_DIRECTORY | os.O_NOFOLLOW)
+        try:
+            st = os.fstat(dfd)
+            if not stat.S_ISDIR(st.st_mode) or st.st_uid != self.agent_uid():
+                raise OSError(f"{PLAN_DIR} is not the agent's own directory")
+            try:
+                os.unlink(name, dir_fd=dfd)
+            except FileNotFoundError:
+                pass
+            fd = os.open(name, os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | os.O_NOFOLLOW, 0o600, dir_fd=dfd)
+            try:
+                os.write(fd, (json.dumps(report, sort_keys=True) + "\n").encode())
+                os.fchown(fd, self.agent_uid(), -1)
+            finally:
+                os.close(fd)
+        finally:
+            os.close(dfd)
+        return os.path.join(PLAN_DIR, name)
+
    def now(self):
        return time.time()

@@ -139,6 +239,10 @@ class Runner:
            sp = os.path.join(d, "sig")
            with open(sp, "w") as f:
                f.write(sig)
+            if signers == PINNED_SIGNERS:
+                signers = os.path.join(d, "allowed_signers")
+                with open(signers, "w") as f:
+                    f.write(pinned_signers_line())
            p = subprocess.run(["ssh-keygen", "-Y", "verify", "-f", signers, "-I", key_id, "-n", namespace, "-s", sp],
                               input=blob, capture_output=True, timeout=30)
            return p.returncode
@@ -165,6 +269,62 @@ class Runner:
        except Exception:
            pass

+    # ---------- host files, for the config bundle (R-840). Tests replace these with an in-memory tree. ----------
+    def read_bytes(self, path):
+        with open(path, "rb") as f:
+            return f.read()
+
+    def lexists(self, path):
+        return os.path.lexists(path)
+
+    def isdir(self, path):
+        return os.path.isdir(path)
+
+    def put_file(self, path, data, mode):
+        """Atomic: a root-owned temp file beside the target (same filesystem), fsync, then rename over it."""
+        d = os.path.dirname(path)
+        os.makedirs(d, mode=0o755, exist_ok=True)
+        tmp = os.path.join(d, f".{os.path.basename(path)}.felhom-new.{os.getpid()}")
+        fd = os.open(tmp, os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL, 0o600)
+        try:
+            with os.fdopen(fd, "wb") as f:
+                f.write(data)
+                f.flush()
+                os.fchown(f.fileno(), 0, 0)
+                os.fchmod(f.fileno(), mode)
+                os.fsync(f.fileno())
+            os.replace(tmp, path)
+        except BaseException:
+            try:
+                os.remove(tmp)
+            except OSError:
+                pass
+            raise
+
+    def remove(self, path):
+        os.remove(path)
+
+    def list_dir(self, path):
+        try:
+            return sorted(os.listdir(path))
+        except OSError:
+            return []
+
+    def rmtree(self, path):
+        import shutil
+        shutil.rmtree(path, ignore_errors=True)
+
+    def check_content(self, kind, data):
+        """Run an external syntax check on a root-only temp copy. Returns (rc, message)."""
+        import tempfile
+        cmd = {"sudoers": ["visudo", "-cf"], "sh": ["sh", "-n"], "bash": ["bash", "-n"], "nft": ["nft", "-c", "-f"]}[kind]
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="felhom-bundle-") as d:
+            p = os.path.join(d, "f")
+            with open(p, "wb") as f:
+                f.write(data)
+            r = subprocess.run(cmd + [p], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=60)
+            return r.returncode, (r.stdout + r.stderr).strip()[-300:]
+

 class Apply:
    def __init__(self, runner, plan_path):
@@ -198,8 +358,12 @@ class Apply:

    def check_plan(self, plan):
        mode = plan.get("mode", "apply")
-        if mode not in ("apply", "inventory", "health", "facts", "live-restore-on"):
+        if mode not in ("apply", "inventory", "health", "facts", "live-restore-on", "bundle"):
            raise Refused("R11", f"unknown mode {mode!r}")
+        if mode == "bundle":
+            if plan.get("layer") != "host":
+                raise Refused("R11", "bundle is a host-layer mode")
+            return mode, "host", 0, "bundle"
        layer = plan.get("layer")
        if layer not in ("guest", "host", "docker"):
            raise Refused("R12", f"layer {layer!r} is not guest, host or docker")
@@ -293,9 +457,12 @@ class Apply:
            raise Refused("R3", f"{TRUST_FILE} names no host_id")
        return t

-    def verify_signed(self, signed, trust):
-        """R3: an operator-signed os_docker_step, checked HERE (not by the agent): signature against the root-owned
-        signers file, op, host binding, time window, and a root-owned nonce record (no replay)."""
+    def verify_signed(self, signed, trust, op_name=SIGNED_OP, signers=None, burn=True):
+        """R3: an operator-signed job, checked HERE (not by the agent): signature against the root-owned signers file (or,
+        for a bundle on a box that has none, the PINNED key — `signers` names that temp file), op, host binding, time
+        window, and a root-owned nonce record (no replay). burn=False leaves the nonce for the caller to burn after its
+        own checks (a bundle refused for a wrong sha keeps its job usable — the operator fixes the sha, not the key).
+        Returns the params; with burn=False, (params, nonce, expiry)."""
        import base64
        if not isinstance(signed, dict) or not isinstance(signed.get("blob_b64"), str) or not isinstance(signed.get("sig"), str):
            raise Refused("R3", "the signed job is malformed")
@@ -307,17 +474,19 @@ class Apply:
        key_id = op.get("key_id", "")
        if not isinstance(key_id, str) or not re.match(r"^[A-Za-z0-9._-]{1,64}$", key_id):
            raise Refused("R3", "the signed blob names no plain key_id")
-        try:
-            st = self.r.stat(TRUST_SIGNERS)
-        except OSError:
-            raise Refused("R3", f"no {TRUST_SIGNERS} — no operator key to check a signed job against")
-        if st.st_uid != 0 or (st.st_mode & 0o022):
-            raise Refused("R3", f"{TRUST_SIGNERS} is not root-owned and root-only-writable")
-        rc = self.r.verify_sig(TRUST_SIGNERS, key_id, SIG_NAMESPACE, blob, signed["sig"])
+        if signers is None:
+            signers = TRUST_SIGNERS
+            try:
+                st = self.r.stat(TRUST_SIGNERS)
+            except OSError:
+                raise Refused("R3", f"no {TRUST_SIGNERS} — no operator key to check a signed job against")
+            if st.st_uid != 0 or (st.st_mode & 0o022):
+                raise Refused("R3", f"{TRUST_SIGNERS} is not root-owned and root-only-writable")
+        rc = self.r.verify_sig(signers, key_id, SIG_NAMESPACE, blob, signed["sig"])
        if rc != 0:
            raise Refused("R3", f"the operator signature does not verify (ssh-keygen rc={rc})")
-        if op.get("op") != SIGNED_OP:
-            raise Refused("R3", f"the signed op is {op.get('op')!r}, not {SIGNED_OP}")
+        if op.get("op") != op_name:
+            raise Refused("R3", f"the signed op is {op.get('op')!r}, not {op_name}")
        if (op.get("target") or {}).get("host_id") != trust["host_id"]:
            raise Refused("R3", "the signed job is for another host")
        now = self.r.now()
@@ -331,12 +500,20 @@ class Apply:
        nonce = op.get("nonce")
        if not isinstance(nonce, str) or not nonce:
            raise Refused("R3", "the signed job has no nonce")
+        if nonce in self.r.read_nonces():
+            raise Refused("R3", "the signed job was already used (replay)")
+        if not burn:
+            return op.get("params") or {}, nonce, exp
+        self.burn_nonce(nonce, exp)
+        return op.get("params") or {}
+
+    def burn_nonce(self, nonce, exp):
        seen = self.r.read_nonces()
        if nonce in seen:
            raise Refused("R3", "the signed job was already used (replay)")
        seen[nonce] = exp
+        now = self.r.now()
        self.r.write_nonces({k: v for k, v in seen.items() if v > now})
-        return op.get("params") or {}

    def docker_authority(self, plan):
        """R3 for the docker layer: returns (who, undo). A signed job binds the EXACT package list and the undo flag."""
@@ -476,6 +653,10 @@ class Apply:
            for k, src in (("debian", "debian"), ("docker_engine", "engine"), ("containerd", "containerd")):
                g[k] = kv.get(src, "").strip() or "unknown"
            g["live_restore"] = {"true": "on", "false": "off"}.get(kv.get("live", "").strip(), "unknown")
+        try:
+            h["config_bundle"] = Bundle(self).state()
+        except Exception as e:  # a read problem must never cost the System page its other facts
+            h["config_bundle"] = {"version": "unknown", "error": str(e)[:200]}
        self.report["facts"] = {"host": h, "guest": g}
        return 0

@@ -575,7 +756,10 @@ class Apply:
                if len(p) >= 4 and p[3]:
                    cont[p[0]]["id"] = p[3]
        nrc, _, _ = self.g(["getent", "hosts", "deb.debian.org"], timeout=30)
-        return {"docker_ok": rc == 0, "containers": cont,
+        # R-858: the controller's own health check stayed "healthy" while it could not reach Docker at all — so ask
+        # the consequence directly: can the controller talk to the engine from inside its container?
+        crc, _, _ = self.g(["docker", "exec", "felhom-controller", "docker", "version", "--format", "{{.Server.Version}}"], timeout=60)
+        return {"docker_ok": rc == 0, "containers": cont, "controller_docker_ok": crc == 0,
                "controller": cont.get("felhom-controller", {}).get("health", "absent"),
                "network_ok": nrc == 0}

@@ -650,8 +834,20 @@ class Apply:
        plan = self.load_plan()
        self.mode, self.layer, self.vmid, self.select = self.check_plan(plan)
        self.report.update(mode=self.mode, layer=self.layer, release_id=plan.get("release_id"), vmid=self.vmid)
+        # R-868 (v0.144.0): the agent's run id, trigger and ring travel in the report, so a report the agent never
+        # received (it was killed mid-pass) can be sent later from the saved copy. Plain ids only; anything else
+        # is dropped, never refused (the plan's other checks decide).
+        rid, trig, ring = plan.get("run_id"), plan.get("trigger"), plan.get("ring")
+        if isinstance(rid, str) and re.match(r"^[A-Za-z0-9._-]{1,80}$", rid):
+            self.report["run_id"] = rid
+        if isinstance(trig, str) and re.match(r"^[a-z0-9_-]{1,20}$", trig):
+            self.report["trigger"] = trig
+        if ring in (0, 1) and not isinstance(ring, bool):
+            self.report["ring"] = ring
        if self.mode == "facts":
            return self.facts()
+        if self.mode == "bundle":
+            return Bundle(self).from_plan(plan)
        if self.layer == "host":
            self.check_appliance()
        self.check_guest(self.vmid)
@@ -728,6 +924,23 @@ class Apply:
            out.append({"name": p["name"], "version": p["to"], "origin": "Debian-Security" if "Debian-Security" in o else "Debian"})
        return out

+    def restart_socket_users(self):
+        """R-858: restart ONLY the containers that bind-mount the Docker socket, so they attach to the new one."""
+        rc, out, _ = self.g(["docker", "ps", "-q", "--no-trunc"], timeout=60)
+        users = []
+        for cid in out.split():
+            irc, iout, _ = self.g(["docker", "inspect", "-f", "{{.Name}}|{{range .Mounts}}{{.Destination}};{{end}}", cid], timeout=60)
+            if irc != 0 or "|" not in iout:
+                continue
+            name, mounts = iout.strip().split("|", 1)
+            if any(m in DOCKER_SOCKETS for m in mounts.split(";")):
+                users.append(name.lstrip("/"))
+        users.sort()
+        if users:
+            rrc, _, rerr = self.g(["docker", "restart"] + users, timeout=300)
+            self.r.log(f"os-apply: SOCKET-USERS restarted={','.join(users)} rc={rrc} (R-858: they held the old docker socket)")
+        return users
+
    def pending_docker(self):
        """Ring 0 (select pending-docker): the newest pending version of each INSTALLED Docker package, Docker origin."""
        rc, pend, remv, _ = self.simulate(["dist-upgrade"])
@@ -837,6 +1050,8 @@ class Apply:
                return 3, None
            self.report["upgraded"] = [{"name": n, "version": v} for n, v in upgrade]
            self.report["seconds"] = round(secs, 1)
+            if self.layer == "docker":
+                self.report["socket_restarted"] = self.restart_socket_users()
            procs, reboot = self.restart_needed()
            self.report["restart_needed"] = procs
            self.report["docker_restart_needed"] = any(p in ("dockerd", "containerd") for p in procs)
@@ -848,7 +1063,11 @@ class Apply:
                self.remove_snapshot_sources()

    def download_bytes(self, args):
-        rc, out, _ = self.x(APT_ENV + ["apt-get", "-s", "-o", "Debug::NoLocking=1", "--print-uris", "-q"] + args)
+        # R-865 (v0.144.0): NO `-s`. With `-s` apt prints the simulation ("Inst …") and no URI list, so this summed
+        # 0 B and R8 only ever applied its 500 MB floor (measured 2026-10-04: 0 URIs with -s, 3 URIs without).
+        # `--print-uris` alone downloads nothing — measured on 9202 2026-10-05: the archive cache and the versions
+        # unchanged. Pinned by test_R8_counts_the_real_download / test_download_bytes_never_simulates.
+        rc, out, _ = self.x(APT_ENV + ["apt-get", "-o", "Debug::NoLocking=1", "--print-uris", "-q"] + args)
        total = 0
        for l in out.splitlines():
            m = re.match(r"^'[^']+' \S+ ([0-9]+) ", l)
@@ -875,8 +1094,341 @@ class Apply:
        self.x(APT_ENV + ["apt-get", "-q", "update"], timeout=600)


-def main(argv, runner=None):
+class Bundle:
+    """The config bundle (R-840, `11` §5.4.2): every root-owned file the installer's step 5 writes, installed as ONE
+    signed unit. Every check runs before the first write; a failed write or a failed self-check puts every previous
+    copy back. Refusal codes: R1 (the bundle file), R3 (authority), R16 (a path outside BUNDLE_FILES), R17 (a trust
+    file), R18 (a content check or a wrong sha)."""
+
+    def __init__(self, apply):
+        self.a, self.r = apply, apply.r
+        self.report = apply.report
+
+    # ---------- reading and checking ----------
+    def load_file(self, path):
+        d, base = os.path.dirname(path or ""), os.path.basename(path or "")
+        if d != PLAN_DIR or not BUNDLE_RE.match(base) or ".." in path:
+            raise Refused("R1", f"the bundle must be {PLAN_DIR}/bundle-<version>.json, got {path!r}")
+        try:
+            st = self.r.stat(path)
+        except OSError as e:
+            raise Refused("R1", f"cannot stat the bundle: {e}")
+        if not stat.S_ISREG(st.st_mode):
+            raise Refused("R1", "the bundle is not a regular file")
+        if st.st_uid != self.r.agent_uid():
+            raise Refused("R1", f"the bundle is not owned by {AGENT_USER}")
+        if st.st_size > BUNDLE_MAX_BYTES:
+            raise Refused("R1", "the bundle is larger than 4 MB")
+        return self.r.read_bytes(path)
+
+    def parse(self, data, want_sha, want_version=None):
+        """The bundle bytes → [(dest, content, mode, check, policy)], every content check passed. Nothing is written."""
+        import base64
+        got = sha256_hex(data)
+        if got != want_sha:
+            raise Refused("R18", f"the bundle's sha256 is {got}, not the pinned {want_sha}")
+        try:
+            b = json.loads(data)
+        except ValueError as e:
+            raise Refused("R18", f"the bundle is not JSON: {e}")
+        if not isinstance(b, dict) or b.get("format") != BUNDLE_FORMAT:
+            raise Refused("R18", f"the bundle format is not {BUNDLE_FORMAT}")
+        ver = b.get("agent_version")
+        if not isinstance(ver, str) or not re.match(r"^[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+(-[0-9A-Za-z.]+)?$", ver):
+            raise Refused("R18", f"the bundle names no agent version ({ver!r})")
+        if want_version is not None and ver != want_version:
+            raise Refused("R18", f"the bundle is for agent {ver}, the signed job pins {want_version}")
+        files = b.get("files")
+        if not isinstance(files, list) or not files:
+            raise Refused("R18", "the bundle lists no files")
+        out, seen = [], set()
+        for e in files:
+            if not isinstance(e, dict) or not isinstance(e.get("path"), str):
+                raise Refused("R18", "a bundle entry has no path")
+            dest = e["path"]
+            if dest in TRUST_PATHS:
+                raise Refused("R17", f"{dest} is the trust root — no bundle may add, remove or change a signer")
+            if dest not in BUNDLE_DESTS:
+                raise Refused("R16", f"{dest} is not a path a bundle may write")
+            if dest in seen:
+                raise Refused("R18", f"{dest} is named twice")
+            seen.add(dest)
+            try:
+                content = base64.b64decode(e.get("content_b64", ""), validate=True)
+            except (ValueError, TypeError):
+                raise Refused("R18", f"{dest}: the content is not base64")
+            if sha256_hex(content) != e.get("sha256"):
+                raise Refused("R18", f"{dest}: the content does not match its sha256")
+            _, _, mode, check, policy = BUNDLE_DESTS[dest]
+            self.check_content(dest, check, content)
+            out.append((dest, content, mode, check, policy))
+        order = [x[0] for x in BUNDLE_FILES]
+        out.sort(key=lambda x: order.index(x[0]))  # the table's order: the sudoers files last
+        return ver, out
+
+    def check_content(self, dest, check, content):
+        try:
+            text = content.decode("utf-8")
+        except UnicodeDecodeError:
+            raise Refused("R18", f"{dest} is not UTF-8 text")
+        if check in ("sudoers", "sh", "bash", "nft"):
+            rc, msg = self.r.check_content(check, content)
+            if rc != 0:
+                raise Refused("R18", f"{dest} fails its {check} check: {msg}")
+        elif check == "python":
+            try:
+                compile(text, dest, "exec")
+            except SyntaxError as e:
+                raise Refused("R18", f"{dest} is not valid Python: {e}")
+        elif check in ("unit", "unit-nort", "agent-unit", "dropin"):
+            if not re.search(r"^\[(Unit|Service|Timer)\]\s*$", text, re.M):
+                raise Refused("R18", f"{dest} has no [Unit]/[Service]/[Timer] section")
+            if check == "unit-nort" and re.search(r"^\s*RuntimeDirectory\s*=", text, re.M | re.I):
+                raise Refused("R18", f"{dest} declares RuntimeDirectory= — the G1 incident; refused")
+            if check == "agent-unit" and not re.search(r"^User=" + AGENT_USER + r"\s*$", text, re.M):
+                raise Refused("R18", f"{dest} does not run the agent as {AGENT_USER}")
+            if check == "dropin" and not re.search(r"^\[Unit\]\s*$", text, re.M):
+                raise Refused("R18", f"{dest} must keep its start limits in [Unit] (SF-3)")
+        # The route must survive the bundle: a sudoers without this wrapper's line, or a wrapper without the bundle
+        # mode, would cut the box off from every later bundle.
+        if dest == "/etc/sudoers.d/felhom-agent" and SELF_CHECK_SUDO_LINE not in text:
+            raise Refused("R18", "the new sudoers no longer lets the agent call felhom-os-apply — the bundle route would end")
+        if dest == "/usr/local/sbin/felhom-os-apply" and f'BUNDLE_OP = "{BUNDLE_OP}"' not in text:
+            raise Refused("R18", "the new felhom-os-apply has no bundle mode — the bundle route would end")
+
+    def live(self, dest):
+        """(bytes or None, mode or None, uid or None) of what the box has now."""
+        if not self.r.lexists(dest):
+            return None, None, None
+        st = self.r.stat(dest)
+        if not stat.S_ISREG(st.st_mode):
+            return b"", None, None  # a symlink or a directory: always replaced by the real file
+        return self.r.read_bytes(dest), stat.S_IMODE(st.st_mode), st.st_uid
+
+    def plan_writes(self, files):
+        """Decide per file: write / same / kept (if-absent and present) / skipped (oob on a box without the belt)."""
+        oob = self.r.isdir(OOB_DIR)
+        plan = []
+        for dest, content, mode, check, policy in files:
+            if policy == "oob" and not oob:
+                plan.append((dest, content, mode, "skipped", None, None))
+                continue
+            old, old_mode, old_uid = self.live(dest)
+            if policy == "if-absent" and old is not None:
+                plan.append((dest, content, mode, "kept", old, old_mode))
+            elif old == content and old_mode == mode and old_uid == 0:
+                plan.append((dest, content, mode, "same", old, old_mode))
+            else:
+                plan.append((dest, content, mode, "write", old, old_mode))
+        return plan
+
+    # ---------- the two entries ----------
+    def from_plan(self, plan):
+        """A signed agent_config_update, from the agent (sudo, the --plan line)."""
+        data = self.load_file(plan.get("bundle"))
+        trust = self.a.load_trust()
+        signers, bootstrap = TRUST_SIGNERS, False
+        if not self.r.lexists(TRUST_SIGNERS):
+            signers, bootstrap = PINNED_SIGNERS, True
+            self.r.log(f"os-apply: BUNDLE {TRUST_SIGNERS} is missing — verifying against the installer's pinned key "
+                       f"{PINNED_OPERATOR_KEY_ID} only")
+        params, nonce, exp = self.a.verify_signed(plan.get("signed"), trust, op_name=BUNDLE_OP,
+                                                  signers=None if not bootstrap else signers, burn=False)
+        sha, ver = params.get("bundle_sha256"), params.get("agent_version")
+        if not isinstance(sha, str) or not re.match(r"^[0-9a-f]{64}$", sha) or not isinstance(ver, str):
+            raise Refused("R3", "the signed job does not pin agent_version and bundle_sha256")
+        ver, files = self.parse(data, sha, ver)
+        self.a.burn_nonce(nonce, exp)
+        return self.install(ver, sha, files, "signed", bootstrap)
+
+    def from_installer(self, path, sha):
+        """The installer (root, never through sudo): the hub manifest pinned the sha; no signature."""
+        try:
+            data = self.r.read_bytes(path)
+        except OSError as e:
+            raise Refused("R1", f"cannot read the bundle: {e}")
+        ver, files = self.parse(data, sha)
+        return self.install(ver, sha, files, "installer", False)
+
+    # ---------- install, self-check, undo ----------
+    def install(self, ver, sha, files, authority, bootstrap):
+        log = self.r.log
+        plan = self.plan_writes(files)
+        counts = {k: sum(1 for p in plan if p[3] == k) for k in ("write", "same", "kept", "skipped")}
+        log(f"os-apply: BUNDLE START agent={ver} sha={sha[:16]} authority={authority} files={len(plan)} "
+            f"write={counts['write']} same={counts['same']} kept={counts['kept']} skipped={counts['skipped']}")
+        stamp = time.strftime("%Y%m%dT%H%M%SZ", time.gmtime(self.r.now()))
+        prev = os.path.join(BUNDLE_PREV_DIR, f"{stamp}-before-{ver}")
+        done = []  # (dest, old bytes or None, old mode)
+        rep = {"agent_version": ver, "sha256": sha, "authority": authority, "prev_dir": prev,
+               "written": [p[0] for p in plan if p[3] == "write"], "kept": [p[0] for p in plan if p[3] == "kept"],
+               "skipped": [p[0] for p in plan if p[3] == "skipped"], "same": counts["same"]}
+        self.report["bundle"] = rep
+        try:
+            for dest, content, mode, action, old, old_mode in plan:
+                if action != "write":
+                    continue
+                if old is not None:
+                    self.r.put_file(prev + dest, old, 0o600)
+                done.append((dest, old, old_mode))
+                self.r.put_file(dest, content, mode)
+                log(f"os-apply: BUNDLE WROTE {dest} ({'replaced' if old is not None else 'new'})")
+            self.after_install(plan)
+            rep["self_check"] = self.self_check(plan)
+        except (Refused, OSError, subprocess.SubprocessError) as e:
+            reason = e.reason if isinstance(e, Refused) else str(e)
+            log(f"os-apply: BUNDLE FAILED — {reason}; putting {len(done)} previous file(s) back")
+            rep["rolled_back"] = self.undo(done)
+            rep["failed"] = reason[:300]
+            self.report["failed"] = {"rc": 3, "step": "bundle", "reason": reason[:300]}
+            return 3
+        rep["signers_created"] = False
+        if bootstrap and not self.r.lexists(TRUST_SIGNERS):
+            self.r.put_file(TRUST_SIGNERS, pinned_signers_line().encode(), 0o644)
+            rep["signers_created"] = True
+            log(f"os-apply: BUNDLE created {TRUST_SIGNERS} with exactly the pinned key {PINNED_OPERATOR_KEY_ID}")
+        record = {"format": BUNDLE_FORMAT, "agent_version": ver, "bundle_sha256": sha, "authority": authority,
+                  "installed_at": time.strftime("%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ", time.gmtime(self.r.now())),
+                  "files": {p[0]: (sha256_hex(p[1]) if p[3] in ("write", "same") else
+                                   (sha256_hex(p[4]) if p[3] == "kept" else "skipped")) for p in plan}}
+        self.r.put_file(BUNDLE_RECORD, (json.dumps(record, indent=2, sort_keys=True) + "\n").encode(), 0o644)
+        self.prune()
+        log(f"os-apply: BUNDLE DONE agent={ver} written={counts['write']} same={counts['same']} "
+            f"self-check=ok signers-created={rep['signers_created']}")
+        return 0
+
+    def after_install(self, plan):
+        written = {p[0] for p in plan if p[3] == "write"}
+        dests = {p[0] for p in plan if p[3] != "skipped"}
+        if any(d.startswith("/etc/systemd/system/") for d in written):
+            self.must(["systemctl", "daemon-reload"], "systemctl daemon-reload")
+        if "/etc/tmpfiles.d/felhom-privsep.conf" in written:
+            self.must(["systemd-tmpfiles", "--create", "/etc/tmpfiles.d/felhom-privsep.conf"], "systemd-tmpfiles")
+        # `enable --now` starts a unit that is not running and leaves a running one alone (no restart). For the crash
+        # guard that runs its boot step once on a box that never had it: kernel.panic for THIS boot, as the boot unit
+        # would set it (`11` §5.9); with no earlier state it is the "first" boot, never counted as an unclean one.
+        if "/etc/systemd/system/felhom-crash-guard.service" in dests:
+            self.must(["systemctl", "enable", "--now", "felhom-crash-guard.service", "felhom-crash-guard-check.timer"],
+                      "enable the crash guard")
+        if "/etc/systemd/system/felhom-mgmt-watchdog.timer" in dests:
+            self.must(["systemctl", "enable", "--now", "felhom-mgmt-watchdog.timer"], "enable the mgmt watchdog timer")
+
+    def must(self, argv, what):
+        rc, out, err = self.r.host(argv, 120)
+        if rc != 0:
+            raise Refused("R18", f"{what} failed (rc={rc}): {(out + err).strip()[-200:]}")
+
+    def self_check(self, plan):
+        """After the install, before the record: the box still has a working route and working wrappers."""
+        sc = {}
+        self.must(["visudo", "-c"], "visudo -c (the whole sudoers)")
+        sc["visudo"] = "ok"
+        rc, out, err = self.r.host(["sudo", "-n", "-l", "-U", AGENT_USER], 60)
+        if rc != 0 or "/usr/local/sbin/felhom-os-apply --plan" not in out:
+            raise Refused("R18", f"sudo -l for {AGENT_USER} no longer lists felhom-os-apply (rc={rc})")
+        sc["sudo_l"] = "felhom-os-apply listed"
+        rc, out, err = self.r.host(["/usr/bin/python3", "/usr/local/sbin/felhom-os-apply", "--self-check"], 60)
+        if rc != 0 or f"bundle-format={BUNDLE_FORMAT}" not in out:
+            raise Refused("R18", f"the installed felhom-os-apply does not answer its self-check (rc={rc})")
+        sc["os_apply"] = out.strip()[:120]
+        rc, out, err = self.r.host(["/bin/sh", "/usr/local/sbin/felhom-selfupdate-guarded"], 60)
+        if rc != 2 or "usage" not in (out + err):
+            raise Refused("R18", f"the installed felhom-selfupdate-guarded does not answer with its usage (rc={rc})")
+        sc["selfupdate"] = "usage ok"
+        dests = {p[0] for p in plan if p[3] != "skipped"}
+        if "/usr/local/sbin/felhom-crash-guard" in dests:
+            rc, out, err = self.r.host(["/usr/local/sbin/felhom-crash-guard", "status"], 60)
+            try:
+                st = json.loads(out)
+            except ValueError:
+                st = None
+            if rc != 0 or not isinstance(st, dict):
+                raise Refused("R18", f"the crash guard does not answer its status (rc={rc})")
+            try:
+                panic = int(self.r.read_file("/proc/sys/kernel/panic").strip())
+            except (OSError, ValueError):
+                panic = None
+            if panic != st.get("kernel_panic"):
+                raise Refused("R18", f"kernel.panic is {panic}, the crash guard set {st.get('kernel_panic')}")
+            sc["crash_guard"] = {"armed": st.get("armed"), "kernel_panic": panic}
+        return sc
+
+    def undo(self, done):
+        """Put every previous copy back (newest write first); remove files the bundle created."""
+        back = []
+        for dest, old, old_mode in reversed(done):
+            try:
+                if old is None:
+                    self.r.remove(dest)
+                else:
+                    self.r.put_file(dest, old, old_mode if old_mode is not None else 0o644)
+                back.append(dest)
+            except OSError as e:
+                self.r.log(f"os-apply: BUNDLE UNDO could not restore {dest}: {e}")
+        if any(d.startswith("/etc/systemd/system/") for d in back):
+            self.r.host(["systemctl", "daemon-reload"], 120)
+        rc, _, _ = self.r.host(["visudo", "-c"], 60)
+        self.r.log(f"os-apply: BUNDLE UNDO restored={len(back)} visudo-after={'ok' if rc == 0 else 'FAILED'}")
+        return back
+
+    def prune(self):
+        names = [n for n in self.r.list_dir(BUNDLE_PREV_DIR)]
+        for n in names[:-BUNDLE_KEEP]:
+            self.r.rmtree(os.path.join(BUNDLE_PREV_DIR, n))
+
+    # ---------- the facts mode's view ----------
+    def state(self):
+        """What the box runs: the record, and every bundle path's live sha256 against it (drift = changed by hand)."""
+        rec = None
+        try:
+            rec = json.loads(self.r.read_file(BUNDLE_RECORD))
+        except (OSError, ValueError):
+            rec = None
+        live = {}
+        for dest, *_ in BUNDLE_FILES:
+            try:
+                data, _, _ = self.live(dest)
+            except OSError:
+                data = None
+            live[dest] = sha256_hex(data) if data is not None else "absent"
+        out = {"version": (rec or {}).get("agent_version", "none"), "live": live}
+        if rec:
+            out["installed_at"] = rec.get("installed_at")
+            out["bundle_sha256"] = rec.get("bundle_sha256")
+            want = rec.get("files") or {}
+            out["drift"] = sorted(d for d, h in want.items() if h != "skipped" and live.get(d) != h)
+        out["signers_present"] = self.r.lexists(TRUST_SIGNERS)
+        return out
+
+
+def main(argv, runner=None, environ=None):
    r = runner or Runner()
+    env = os.environ if environ is None else environ
+    if argv[1:] == ["--self-check"]:
+        # The bundle's self-check runs the NEW wrapper this way: it parses and starts. Reads nothing, changes nothing.
+        print(f"felhom-os-apply ok bundle-format={BUNDLE_FORMAT} files={len(BUNDLE_FILES)}")
+        return 0
+    if len(argv) == 5 and argv[1] == "--install-bundle" and argv[3] == "--sha256":
+        # The INSTALLER's entry (root, a fresh box). Unreachable through sudo: the sudoers line pins argv[1] to --plan,
+        # and a sudo caller is refused here as well (sudo always sets SUDO_UID).
+        a = Apply(r, "")
+        if "SUDO_UID" in env:
+            r.log("os-apply: REFUSED: R1 --install-bundle is the installer's entry, never through sudo")
+            print("OSAPPLY-REPORT " + json.dumps({"refused": {"code": "R1", "reason": "install-bundle via sudo"}}))
+            return 2
+        sha = argv[4]
+        if not re.match(r"^[0-9a-f]{64}$", sha):
+            print("OSAPPLY-REPORT " + json.dumps({"refused": {"code": "R18", "reason": "sha256 is not 64 lowercase hex"}}))
+            return 2
+        a.report["mode"] = "bundle"
+        try:
+            rc = Bundle(a).from_installer(argv[2], sha)
+        except Refused as e:
+            r.log(f"os-apply: REFUSED: {e.code} {e.reason}")
+            a.report["refused"] = {"code": e.code, "reason": e.reason}
+            rc = 2
+        print("OSAPPLY-REPORT " + json.dumps(a.report, sort_keys=True))
+        return rc
    if len(argv) != 3 or argv[1] != "--plan":
        r.log("os-apply: REFUSED: R1 usage: felhom-os-apply --plan /var/lib/felhom-agent/os/plan-<id>.json")
        print("OSAPPLY-REPORT " + json.dumps({"refused": {"code": "R1", "reason": "usage"}}))
@@ -894,6 +1446,13 @@ def main(argv, runner=None):
        a.report["failed"] = {"rc": 124, "timeout": str(e.cmd)[:200]}
        rc = 3
    a.report["pass_seconds"] = round(time.time() - t0, 1)
+    if a.report.get("mode") == "apply":
+        # R-868: BEFORE the stdout line — a killed agent never reads stdout, and this copy is how its report still
+        # reaches the hub (the agent sends an unsent copy when it starts, and deletes it once sent).
+        try:
+            r.save_report(argv[2], a.report)
+        except Exception as e:
+            r.log(f"os-apply: the report copy could not be saved (the run is unaffected): {e}")
    print("OSAPPLY-REPORT " + json.dumps(a.report, sort_keys=True))
    return rc

@@ -0,0 +1,545 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Tests for the config bundle (R-840, `11` §5.4.2): felhom-os-apply's `bundle` mode and `--install-bundle`, and
+scripts/build-config-bundle.py. An in-memory host plays the files; nothing real is written or run. Each refusal has a
+test; each test names the rule it pins. Red-proof: `audits/r840-config-bundle-2026-10-04/partB/redproof.txt`.
+
+Run: python3 configs/test_felhom_config_bundle.py   (also run by internal/osupdate's Go test)
+"""
+import sys
+sys.dont_write_bytecode = True  # importing the builder must not leave scripts/__pycache__ behind
+import base64
+import contextlib
+import hashlib
+import importlib.machinery
+import importlib.util
+import io
+import json
+import os
+import pathlib
+import re
+import stat as statmod
+import unittest
+
+HERE = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parent
+REPO = HERE.parent
+_loader = importlib.machinery.SourceFileLoader("osapply", os.environ.get("OSAPPLY_UNDER_TEST", str(HERE / "felhom-os-apply")))
+_spec = importlib.util.spec_from_loader("osapply", _loader)
+osapply = importlib.util.module_from_spec(_spec)
+_loader.exec_module(osapply)
+_bl = importlib.machinery.SourceFileLoader("bundlebuild", str(REPO / "scripts" / "build-config-bundle.py"))
+_bs = importlib.util.spec_from_loader("bundlebuild", _bl)
+builder = importlib.util.module_from_spec(_bs)
+_bl.exec_module(builder)
+
+PLAN = "/var/lib/felhom-agent/os/plan-b1.json"
+BUNDLE = "/var/lib/felhom-agent/os/bundle-0.143.0.json"
+HOST = "demo-hp-bb76ea"
+INSTALLER = REPO.parent / "felhom.eu" / "scripts" / "felhom-host-install.sh"
+
+
+class St:
+    def __init__(self, mode, uid):
+        self.st_mode, self.st_uid, self.st_size = mode, uid, 100
+
+
+class Box:
+    """An in-memory host. files: path -> bytes; modes/uids per path; dirs: a set."""
+
+    def __init__(self, bundle_bytes, signed, oob=False, signers=True):
+        self.files, self.modes, self.uids = {}, {}, {}
+        self.dirs = {osapply.OOB_DIR} if oob else set()
+        self.put(osapply.TRUST_FILE, json.dumps({"host_id": HOST, "ring0_slow_lane": False}).encode(), 0o644)
+        if signers:
+            self.put(osapply.TRUST_SIGNERS, b'felhom-op-1 namespaces="felhom-op-v1" ssh-ed25519 AAAA felhom-op-1\n', 0o644)
+        self.put("/proc/sys/kernel/panic", b"0\n", 0o644)
+        self.plan = {"release_id": "bundle-0.143.0", "layer": "host", "mode": "bundle", "bundle": BUNDLE, "signed": signed}
+        self.put(PLAN, json.dumps(self.plan).encode(), 0o600, uid=999)
+        self.put(BUNDLE, bundle_bytes, 0o600, uid=999)
+        self.sig_rc, self.nonces, self.clock = 0, {}, 1791115200.0  # 2026-10-04T12:00:00Z
+        self.calls, self.logs, self.writes = [], [], []
+        self.visudo_fail = False      # the WHOLE sudoers (`visudo -c`) after install
+        self.sudo_l = "    (root) NOPASSWD: /usr/local/sbin/felhom-os-apply --plan /var/lib/felhom-agent/os/plan-*.json\n"
+        self.guard = {"armed": True, "kernel_panic": 10}
+
+    def put(self, p, data, mode, uid=0):
+        self.files[p], self.modes[p], self.uids[p] = data, mode, uid
+
+    # Runner interface
+    def now(self):
+        return self.clock
+
+    def log(self, line):
+        self.logs.append(line)
+
+    def agent_uid(self):
+        return 999
+
+    def verify_sig(self, signers, key_id, ns, blob, sig):
+        self.verified = (signers, key_id, ns)
+        return self.sig_rc
+
+    def read_nonces(self):
+        return dict(self.nonces)
+
+    def write_nonces(self, d):
+        self.nonces = dict(d)
+
+    def read_file(self, p):
+        if p not in self.files:
+            raise OSError("no such file")
+        return self.files[p].decode()
+
+    def read_bytes(self, p):
+        if p not in self.files:
+            raise OSError("no such file")
+        return self.files[p]
+
+    def stat(self, p):
+        if p not in self.files:
+            raise OSError("no such file")
+        return St(statmod.S_IFREG | self.modes[p], self.uids[p])
+
+    def lexists(self, p):
+        return p in self.files
+
+    def isdir(self, p):
+        return p in self.dirs
+
+    def put_file(self, p, data, mode):
+        self.writes.append(p)
+        self.put(p, data, mode)
+
+    def remove(self, p):
+        self.writes.append("rm " + p)
+        del self.files[p]
+
+    def list_dir(self, p):
+        return sorted({k[len(p) + 1:].split("/")[0] for k in self.files if k.startswith(p + "/")})
+
+    def rmtree(self, p):
+        for k in [k for k in self.files if k.startswith(p + "/")]:
+            del self.files[k]
+
+    def check_content(self, kind, data):
+        return (1, f"{kind}: syntax error") if b"BROKEN-SYNTAX" in data else (0, "")
+
+    def host(self, argv, timeout=600, stdin=None):
+        self.calls.append(argv)
+        if argv[:2] == ["visudo", "-c"]:
+            return (1, "", "parse error") if self.visudo_fail else (0, "ok", "")
+        if argv[:2] == ["sudo", "-n"]:
+            return 0, self.sudo_l, ""
+        if argv[-1] == "--self-check":
+            body = self.files.get("/usr/local/sbin/felhom-os-apply", b"")
+            return (0, "felhom-os-apply ok bundle-format=1 files=22\n", "") if b"BUNDLE_OP" in body else (1, "", "boom")
+        if argv[-1] == "/usr/local/sbin/felhom-selfupdate-guarded":
+            return 2, "", "felhom-selfupdate-guarded: usage: ...\n"
+        if argv[-1] == "status" and argv[0].endswith("felhom-crash-guard"):
+            return 0, json.dumps(self.guard), ""
+        if argv[:3] == ["systemctl", "enable", "--now"] and "felhom-crash-guard.service" in argv:
+            self.put("/proc/sys/kernel/panic", f"{self.guard['kernel_panic']}\n".encode(), 0o644)
+        return 0, "", ""
+
+
+def signed_job(sha, version="0.143.0", host=HOST, op="agent_config_update", nonce="b1",
+               issued="2026-10-04T11:50:00Z", expires="2026-10-04T12:30:00Z"):
+    blob = json.dumps({"expires_at": expires, "issued_at": issued, "key_id": "felhom-op-1", "nonce": nonce, "op": op,
+                       "params": {"agent_version": version, "bundle_sha256": sha},
+                       "target": {"guest_id": "", "host_id": host}}, sort_keys=True).encode()
+    return {"blob_b64": base64.b64encode(blob).decode(), "sig": "-----BEGIN SSH SIGNATURE-----\nx\n-----END SSH SIGNATURE-----\n"}
+
+
+def real_bundle(version="0.143.0"):
+    data = builder.build(version)
+    return data, hashlib.sha256(data).hexdigest()
+
+
+def edited_bundle(edit):
+    """The real bundle, with edit(files_list) applied and every sha recomputed — a SIGNED bundle with bad content."""
+    b = json.loads(builder.build("0.143.0"))
+    edit(b["files"])
+    for e in b["files"]:
+        e["sha256"] = hashlib.sha256(base64.b64decode(e["content_b64"])).hexdigest()
+    data = (json.dumps(b, indent=1, sort_keys=True) + "\n").encode()
+    return data, hashlib.sha256(data).hexdigest()
+
+
+def replace_content(files, path, fn):
+    for e in files:
+        if e["path"] == path:
+            e["content_b64"] = base64.b64encode(fn(base64.b64decode(e["content_b64"]))).decode()
+
+
+def run(box, argv=None, environ=None):
+    buf = io.StringIO()
+    with contextlib.redirect_stdout(buf):
+        rc = osapply.main(argv or ["felhom-os-apply", "--plan", PLAN], runner=box, environ=environ or {})
+    line = [l for l in buf.getvalue().splitlines() if l.startswith("OSAPPLY-REPORT ")][-1]
+    return rc, json.loads(line[len("OSAPPLY-REPORT "):])
+
+
+def box_files(box):
+    return {p: box.files[p] for p in box.files if p in osapply.BUNDLE_DESTS}
+
+
+class Install(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_fresh_box_gets_every_file_and_a_record(self):
+        data, sha = real_bundle()
+        box = Box(data, signed_job(sha))
+        rc, rep = run(box)
+        self.assertEqual(rc, 0, rep)
+        b = rep["bundle"]
+        # every path but the four OOB ones (no belt on this box)
+        self.assertEqual(len(b["written"]), len(osapply.BUNDLE_FILES) - 4, b)
+        self.assertEqual(len(b["skipped"]), 4)
+        self.assertEqual(box.files["/etc/sudoers.d/felhom-agent"], (REPO / "configs" / "felhom-agent.sudoers").read_bytes())
+        self.assertEqual(box.modes["/etc/sudoers.d/felhom-agent"], 0o440)
+        rec = json.loads(box.files[osapply.BUNDLE_RECORD])
+        self.assertEqual((rec["agent_version"], rec["bundle_sha256"], rec["authority"]), ("0.143.0", sha, "signed"))
+        self.assertIn("b1", box.nonces, "the job is consumed")
+        self.assertEqual(b["self_check"]["crash_guard"], {"armed": True, "kernel_panic": 10})
+        self.assertIn(["systemctl", "daemon-reload"], box.calls)
+
+    def test_sudoers_is_written_after_every_wrapper(self):
+        """Order: a referenced wrapper is in place before the sudoers line that allows it."""
+        data, sha = edited_bundle(lambda f: f.reverse())  # the bundle lists the sudoers FIRST; the wrapper must reorder
+        box = Box(data, signed_job(sha))
+        rc, rep = run(box)
+        self.assertEqual(rc, 0, rep)
+        w = [p for p in box.writes if p in osapply.BUNDLE_DESTS]
+        self.assertEqual(w[-1], "/etc/sudoers.d/felhom-agent")
+        self.assertLess(w.index("/usr/local/sbin/felhom-os-apply"), w.index("/etc/sudoers.d/felhom-agent"))
+
+    def test_identical_box_writes_nothing(self):
+        """The demo boxes' case: hand-copied files equal to the release → 0 written, all 'same'."""
+        data, sha = real_bundle()
+        box = Box(data, signed_job(sha))
+        for dest, src, mode, _, policy in osapply.BUNDLE_FILES:
+            if policy != "oob":
+                box.put(dest, (REPO / "configs" / src).read_bytes(), mode)
+        rc, rep = run(box)
+        self.assertEqual(rc, 0, rep)
+        self.assertEqual(rep["bundle"]["written"], [])
+        self.assertEqual(rep["bundle"]["same"], len(osapply.BUNDLE_FILES) - 5)  # 4 oob skipped + crash-guard.conf kept
+        self.assertEqual(rep["bundle"]["kept"], ["/etc/felhom/crash-guard.conf"])
+
+    def test_a_wrong_mode_is_rewritten(self):
+        data, sha = real_bundle()
+        box = Box(data, signed_job(sha))
+        box.put("/etc/sudoers.d/felhom-agent", (REPO / "configs" / "felhom-agent.sudoers").read_bytes(), 0o644)
+        rc, rep = run(box)
+        self.assertIn("/etc/sudoers.d/felhom-agent", rep["bundle"]["written"])
+        self.assertEqual(box.modes["/etc/sudoers.d/felhom-agent"], 0o440)
+
+    def test_tuned_crash_guard_conf_is_kept(self):
+        data, sha = real_bundle()
+        box = Box(data, signed_job(sha))
+        box.put("/etc/felhom/crash-guard.conf", b"LIMIT=5\n", 0o644)
+        rc, rep = run(box)
+        self.assertEqual(rc, 0, rep)
+        self.assertEqual(box.files["/etc/felhom/crash-guard.conf"], b"LIMIT=5\n")
+
+    def test_oob_files_only_on_a_box_with_the_belt(self):
+        data, sha = real_bundle()
+        box = Box(data, signed_job(sha), oob=True)
+        rc, rep = run(box)
+        self.assertEqual(rc, 0, rep)
+        self.assertIn("/etc/sudoers.d/felhom-op", rep["bundle"]["written"])
+        self.assertEqual(rep["bundle"]["skipped"], [])
+
+    def test_previous_copies_are_kept(self):
+        data, sha = real_bundle()
+        box = Box(data, signed_job(sha))
+        box.put("/usr/local/sbin/felhom-pbs-apply", b"#!/bin/bash\necho old\n", 0o755)
+        rc, rep = run(box)
+        self.assertEqual(rc, 0, rep)
+        self.assertEqual(box.files[rep["bundle"]["prev_dir"] + "/usr/local/sbin/felhom-pbs-apply"], b"#!/bin/bash\necho old\n")
+
+
+class Refusals(unittest.TestCase):
+    """Each: refused, and NOTHING on the box changed."""
+
+    def refused(self, box, code):
+        before = dict(box_files(box))
+        rc, rep = run(box)
+        self.assertEqual(rc, 2, rep)
+        self.assertEqual(rep["refused"]["code"], code, rep)
+        self.assertEqual(box_files(box), before, "a refusal changed a file")
+        self.assertNotIn(osapply.BUNDLE_RECORD, box.files)
+        return rep
+
+    def test_wrong_sha_is_refused(self):
+        data, sha = real_bundle()
+        box = Box(data, signed_job("0" * 64))
+        self.refused(box, "R18")
+        self.assertEqual(box.nonces, {}, "a wrong sha must not burn the job")
+
+    def test_bad_signature_is_refused(self):
+        data, sha = real_bundle()
+        box = Box(data, signed_job(sha))
+        box.sig_rc = 255
+        self.refused(box, "R3")
+
+    def test_other_op_is_refused(self):
+        data, sha = real_bundle()
+        self.refused(Box(data, signed_job(sha, op="agent_update")), "R3")
+
+    def test_other_host_is_refused(self):
+        data, sha = real_bundle()
+        self.refused(Box(data, signed_job(sha, host="demo-felhom-8363b5")), "R3")
+
+    def test_expired_job_is_refused(self):
+        data, sha = real_bundle()
+        self.refused(Box(data, signed_job(sha, expires="2026-10-04T11:55:00Z")), "R3")
+
+    def test_replayed_job_is_refused(self):
+        data, sha = real_bundle()
+        box = Box(data, signed_job(sha))
+        box.nonces = {"b1": box.clock + 600}
+        self.refused(box, "R3")
+
+    def test_version_mismatch_is_refused(self):
+        data, sha = real_bundle()
+        self.refused(Box(data, signed_job(sha, version="0.142.1")), "R18")
+
+    def test_sudoers_failing_visudo_is_refused(self):
+        data, sha = edited_bundle(lambda f: replace_content(f, "/etc/sudoers.d/felhom-agent", lambda c: c + b"BROKEN-SYNTAX\n"))
+        self.refused(Box(data, signed_job(sha)), "R18")
+
+    def test_sudoers_dropping_the_route_is_refused(self):
+        data, sha = edited_bundle(lambda f: replace_content(f, "/etc/sudoers.d/felhom-agent",
+                                                            lambda c: c.replace(b"/usr/local/sbin/felhom-os-apply --plan", b"/bin/true --plan")))
+        self.refused(Box(data, signed_job(sha)), "R18")
+
+    def test_wrapper_without_bundle_mode_is_refused(self):
+        data, sha = edited_bundle(lambda f: replace_content(f, "/usr/local/sbin/felhom-os-apply",
+                                                            lambda c: c.replace(b'BUNDLE_OP = "agent_config_update"', b'BUNDLE_OPX = 1')))
+        self.refused(Box(data, signed_job(sha)), "R18")
+
+    def test_python_syntax_error_is_refused(self):
+        data, sha = edited_bundle(lambda f: replace_content(f, "/usr/local/sbin/felhom-crash-guard", lambda c: c + b"\ndef (\n"))
+        self.refused(Box(data, signed_job(sha)), "R18")
+
+    def test_unit_with_runtime_directory_is_refused(self):
+        data, sha = edited_bundle(lambda f: replace_content(f, "/etc/systemd/system/felhom-mgmt-watchdog.service",
+                                                            lambda c: c + b"RuntimeDirectory=sshd\n"))
+        self.refused(Box(data, signed_job(sha)), "R18")
+
+    def test_agent_unit_not_as_the_agent_user_is_refused(self):
+        data, sha = edited_bundle(lambda f: replace_content(f, "/etc/systemd/system/felhom-agent.service",
+                                                            lambda c: c.replace(b"User=felhom-agent", b"User=root")))
+        self.refused(Box(data, signed_job(sha)), "R18")
+
+    def test_a_bundle_that_changes_a_signer_is_refused(self):
+        """R17: the trust root is not a bundle's to change — not even a signed one."""
+        def add(f):
+            f.append({"path": osapply.TRUST_SIGNERS, "content_b64": base64.b64encode(b"evil-key\n").decode()})
+        data, sha = edited_bundle(add)
+        box = Box(data, signed_job(sha))
+        self.refused(box, "R17")
+        self.assertIn(b"felhom-op-1", box.files[osapply.TRUST_SIGNERS])
+
+    def test_a_path_outside_the_table_is_refused(self):
+        def add(f):
+            f.append({"path": "/etc/shadow", "content_b64": base64.b64encode(b"root::0:0\n").decode()})
+        data, sha = edited_bundle(add)
+        self.refused(Box(data, signed_job(sha)), "R16")
+
+    def test_content_not_matching_its_sha_is_refused(self):
+        b = json.loads(builder.build("0.143.0"))
+        b["files"][0]["content_b64"] = base64.b64encode(b"#!/bin/bash\nexit 0\n").decode()
+        data = json.dumps(b).encode()
+        self.refused(Box(data, signed_job(hashlib.sha256(data).hexdigest())), "R18")
+
+    def test_bundle_outside_the_plan_dir_is_refused(self):
+        data, sha = real_bundle()
+        box = Box(data, signed_job(sha))
+        box.plan["bundle"] = "/tmp/bundle-0.143.0.json"
+        box.files[PLAN] = json.dumps(box.plan).encode()
+        self.refused(box, "R1")
+
+    def test_bundle_not_owned_by_the_agent_is_refused(self):
+        data, sha = real_bundle()
+        box = Box(data, signed_job(sha))
+        box.uids[BUNDLE] = 0
+        self.refused(box, "R1")
+
+    def test_no_trust_file_is_refused(self):
+        data, sha = real_bundle()
+        box = Box(data, signed_job(sha))
+        del box.files[osapply.TRUST_FILE]
+        self.refused(box, "R3")
+
+
+class SelfCheckUndo(unittest.TestCase):
+    def assert_restored(self, box, before, rep):
+        self.assertTrue(rep["bundle"]["rolled_back"], rep)
+        self.assertEqual(box_files(box), before, "the previous files must be back, byte for byte")
+        self.assertNotIn(osapply.BUNDLE_RECORD, box.files)
+
+    def with_old_files(self):
+        data, sha = real_bundle()
+        box = Box(data, signed_job(sha))
+        box.put("/usr/local/sbin/felhom-pbs-apply", b"#!/bin/bash\necho old\n", 0o755)
+        box.put("/etc/sudoers.d/felhom-agent", b"# old sudoers\n", 0o440)
+        return box
+
+    def test_route_missing_after_install_puts_everything_back(self):
+        box = self.with_old_files()
+        before = dict(box_files(box))
+        box.sudo_l = "    (root) NOPASSWD: /bin/true\n"
+        rc, rep = run(box)
+        self.assertEqual(rc, 3, rep)
+        self.assert_restored(box, before, rep)
+        self.assertEqual(box.calls[-1], ["visudo", "-c"], "the undo re-checks the whole sudoers")
+
+    def test_visudo_failing_after_install_puts_everything_back(self):
+        box = self.with_old_files()
+        before = dict(box_files(box))
+        box.visudo_fail = True
+        rc, rep = run(box)
+        self.assertEqual(rc, 3, rep)
+        self.assert_restored(box, before, rep)
+
+    def test_crash_guard_disagreeing_with_kernel_panic_puts_everything_back(self):
+        box = self.with_old_files()
+        before = dict(box_files(box))
+        box.guard = {"armed": True, "kernel_panic": 10}
+        box.host_orig = box.host
+
+        def host(argv, timeout=600, stdin=None):
+            if argv[:3] == ["systemctl", "enable", "--now"]:
+                box.calls.append(argv)
+                return 0, "", ""   # the unit "started" but kernel.panic stayed 0
+            return box.host_orig(argv, timeout, stdin)
+        box.host = host
+        rc, rep = run(box)
+        self.assertEqual(rc, 3, rep)
+        self.assert_restored(box, before, rep)
+
+
+class TrustBootstrap(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_missing_signers_verifies_against_the_pinned_key_and_creates_it(self):
+        data, sha = real_bundle()
+        box = Box(data, signed_job(sha), signers=False)
+        rc, rep = run(box)
+        self.assertEqual(rc, 0, rep)
+        self.assertEqual(box.verified[0], osapply.PINNED_SIGNERS, "verified against the pinned key, nothing else")
+        self.assertTrue(rep["bundle"]["signers_created"])
+        self.assertEqual(box.files[osapply.TRUST_SIGNERS], osapply.pinned_signers_line().encode())
+        self.assertEqual(box.modes[osapply.TRUST_SIGNERS], 0o644)
+
+    def test_missing_signers_and_a_job_the_pinned_key_did_not_sign(self):
+        data, sha = real_bundle()
+        box = Box(data, signed_job(sha), signers=False)
+        box.sig_rc = 255
+        rc, rep = run(box)
+        self.assertEqual((rc, rep["refused"]["code"]), (2, "R3"))
+        self.assertNotIn(osapply.TRUST_SIGNERS, box.files)
+
+    def test_present_signers_are_never_touched(self):
+        data, sha = real_bundle()
+        box = Box(data, signed_job(sha))
+        box.put(osapply.TRUST_SIGNERS, b'felhom-op-2 namespaces="felhom-op-v1" ssh-ed25519 BBBB felhom-op-2\n', 0o644)
+        rc, rep = run(box)
+        self.assertEqual(rc, 0, rep)
+        self.assertEqual(box.verified[0], osapply.TRUST_SIGNERS)
+        self.assertFalse(rep["bundle"]["signers_created"])
+        self.assertIn(b"felhom-op-2", box.files[osapply.TRUST_SIGNERS])
+
+    def test_agent_writable_signers_are_refused(self):
+        data, sha = real_bundle()
+        box = Box(data, signed_job(sha))
+        box.uids[osapply.TRUST_SIGNERS] = 999
+        rc, rep = run(box)
+        self.assertEqual((rc, rep["refused"]["code"]), (2, "R3"))
+
+    def test_pinned_operator_key_equals_the_installers(self):
+        """The bootstrap key is exactly the one felhom-host-install.sh pins (OPERATOR_KEY_OPERATIONAL_*)."""
+        text = INSTALLER.read_text()
+        kid = re.search(r'^OPERATOR_KEY_OPERATIONAL_ID="([^"]+)"', text, re.M).group(1)
+        line = re.search(r'^OPERATOR_KEY_OPERATIONAL_LINE="([^"]+)"', text, re.M).group(1)
+        self.assertEqual((osapply.PINNED_OPERATOR_KEY_ID, osapply.PINNED_OPERATOR_KEY_LINE), (kid, line))
+        # and the file format is the installer's printf, byte for byte
+        self.assertIn("printf '%s namespaces=\"felhom-op-v1\" %s\\n'", text)
+
+
+class InstallerEntry(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_installer_installs_without_a_signature(self):
+        data, sha = real_bundle()
+        box = Box(data, None)
+        box.put("/root/bundle.json", data, 0o600)
+        rc, rep = run(box, ["felhom-os-apply", "--install-bundle", "/root/bundle.json", "--sha256", sha])
+        self.assertEqual(rc, 0, rep)
+        self.assertEqual(json.loads(box.files[osapply.BUNDLE_RECORD])["authority"], "installer")
+
+    def test_installer_entry_checks_the_sha(self):
+        data, sha = real_bundle()
+        box = Box(data, None)
+        box.put("/root/bundle.json", data, 0o600)
+        rc, rep = run(box, ["felhom-os-apply", "--install-bundle", "/root/bundle.json", "--sha256", "1" * 64])
+        self.assertEqual((rc, rep["refused"]["code"]), (2, "R18"))
+
+    def test_installer_entry_is_refused_through_sudo(self):
+        data, sha = real_bundle()
+        box = Box(data, None)
+        box.put("/root/bundle.json", data, 0o600)
+        rc, rep = run(box, ["felhom-os-apply", "--install-bundle", "/root/bundle.json", "--sha256", sha], {"SUDO_UID": "999"})
+        self.assertEqual((rc, rep["refused"]["code"]), (2, "R1"))
+        self.assertNotIn(osapply.BUNDLE_RECORD, box.files)
+
+    def test_self_check_answers(self):
+        buf = io.StringIO()
+        with contextlib.redirect_stdout(buf):
+            rc = osapply.main(["felhom-os-apply", "--self-check"], runner=Box(b"", None))
+        self.assertEqual(rc, 0)
+        self.assertIn("bundle-format=1", buf.getvalue())
+
+
+class Facts(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_state_reports_drift_against_the_record(self):
+        data, sha = real_bundle()
+        box = Box(data, signed_job(sha))
+        run(box)
+        box.put("/usr/local/sbin/felhom-pbs-apply", b"#!/bin/bash\necho by hand\n", 0o755)
+        a = osapply.Apply(box, PLAN)
+        st = osapply.Bundle(a).state()
+        self.assertEqual(st["version"], "0.143.0")
+        self.assertEqual(st["drift"], ["/usr/local/sbin/felhom-pbs-apply"])
+        self.assertTrue(st["signers_present"])
+
+    def test_state_without_a_record_says_none(self):
+        box = Box(b"", None)
+        st = osapply.Bundle(osapply.Apply(box, PLAN)).state()
+        self.assertEqual(st["version"], "none")
+        self.assertNotIn("drift", st)
+        self.assertEqual(st["live"]["/etc/sudoers.d/felhom-agent"], "absent")
+
+
+class Builder(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_reproducible(self):
+        self.assertEqual(builder.build("0.143.0"), builder.build("0.143.0"))
+
+    def test_every_source_exists_and_every_dest_is_unique(self):
+        dests = [e[0] for e in osapply.BUNDLE_FILES]
+        self.assertEqual(len(dests), len(set(dests)))
+        for _, src, *_ in osapply.BUNDLE_FILES:
+            self.assertTrue((REPO / "configs" / src).is_file(), src)
+
+    def test_every_root_file_the_installer_writes_is_in_the_bundle(self):
+        """One source of truth: a felhom root-owned path the installer names must be a bundle path, a trust file, or a
+        path the AGENT itself writes at run time (named here, with why). Scope is a regex over the WHOLE installer."""
+        text = INSTALLER.read_text()
+        found = set(re.findall(r"(/usr/local/sbin/felhom-[a-z-]+|/etc/systemd/system/felhom-[a-z.-]+|"
+                               r"/etc/sudoers\.d/felhom-[a-z-]+|/etc/felhom-oob\.nft|/etc/tmpfiles\.d/felhom-[a-z.-]+|"
+                               r"/etc/felhom/[a-z.-]+)", text))
+        agent_writes = {"/usr/local/sbin/felhom-shared-parent", "/etc/systemd/system/felhom-shared-parent.service"}
+        trust = {osapply.TRUST_FILE, osapply.TRUST_SIGNERS, osapply.TRUST_SIGNERS + ".tmp", osapply.BUNDLE_RECORD}
+        missing = sorted(p for p in found if p not in osapply.BUNDLE_DESTS and p not in agent_writes | trust)
+        self.assertEqual(missing, [], "the installer writes these root files, but the bundle does not carry them")
+        # the limits drop-in is named through $AGENT_UNIT in the installer
+        self.assertIn("/etc/systemd/system/felhom-agent.service.d/felhom-agent-limits.conf", osapply.BUNDLE_DESTS)
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()
@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ class Fake:
        self.sig_rc = 0
        self.nonces = {}
        self.clock = 1791115200.0  # 2026-10-04T12:00:00Z
+        self.saved_reports = []  # R-868: (plan path, report) the wrapper kept on disk
        self.files[osapply.TRUST_FILE] = json.dumps({"host_id": "demo-hp-bb76ea", "ring0_slow_lane": False})
        self.stats[osapply.TRUST_FILE] = St(mode=statmod.S_IFREG | 0o644, uid=0)
        self.files[osapply.TRUST_SIGNERS] = 'felhom-op-1 namespaces="felhom-op-v1" ssh-ed25519 AAAA\n'
@@ -113,6 +114,10 @@ class Fake:
    def log(self, line):
        self.logs.append(line)

+    def save_report(self, plan_path, report):
+        self.saved_reports.append((plan_path, json.loads(json.dumps(report))))
+        return plan_path.replace("/plan-", "/report-")
+
    def host(self, argv, timeout=600, stdin=None):
        self.calls.append(("host", argv))
        if argv[0] == "/usr/sbin/pct" and argv[1] == "status":
@@ -168,8 +173,8 @@ class Fake:
            if "-f" in a:
                self.dpkg_audit = ""
                return 0, "Setting up x (1) ...\n" if getattr(self, "repaired", False) else "", ""
-            if "-s" in a:
-                return self.sim(a)
+            if "--print-uris" in a or "-s" in a:
+                return self.sim(a)  # --print-uris prints and installs nothing, with or without -s (9202, 2026-10-05)
            if "install" in a:
                if self.install_rc:
                    return self.install_rc, "", "E: boom"
@@ -186,6 +191,14 @@ class Fake:
            return 0, self.engine + "\n", ""
        if cmd == "docker" and a[1:3] == ["ps", "-q"]:
            return 0, "".join(i + "\n" for i in self.ids), ""
+        if cmd == "docker" and a[1] == "inspect":
+            mounts = {"aaa111": "/felhom-controller|/var/run/docker.sock;/app/data;", "bbb222": "/app|/data;"}
+            return 0, mounts.get(a[-1], "/other|;") + "\n", ""
+        if cmd == "docker" and a[1] == "restart":
+            self.restarted_containers = a[2:]
+            return 0, "", ""
+        if cmd == "docker" and a[1] == "exec":
+            return (1, "", "Cannot connect to the Docker daemon") if getattr(self, "controller_blind", False) else (0, self.engine + "\n", "")
        if cmd == "docker":
            ids = self.ids + ["x"] * 2
            return 0, f"felhom-controller\trunning\tUp 1 hour (healthy)\t{ids[0]}\napp\trunning\tUp 1 hour (healthy)\t{ids[1]}\n", ""
@@ -224,7 +237,14 @@ class Fake:

    def sim(self, a):
        if "--print-uris" in a:
-            return 0, "'http://x/libc6.deb' libc6.deb 4000000 SHA256:x\n", ""
+            if "-s" in a:
+                # real apt (measured 9202 2026-10-05): with -s it prints the SIMULATION, no URI list
+                return 0, "Inst libc6 [2.41-12+deb13u4] (2.41-12+deb13u4 Debian:13.7/stable [amd64])\n", ""
+            # real apt's line shape, verbatim from 9202 2026-10-05 (audits/night-fixes-2026-10-05/partC/)
+            return 0, ("Need to get 4347 kB of archives.\n"
+                       "'http://deb.debian.org/debian/pool/main/b/bash/bash_5.2.37-2%2bb10_amd64.deb' bash_5.2.37-2+b10_amd64.deb 1500792 MD5Sum:27b11721fea83d73b96e0f7023863771\n"
+                       "'http://deb.debian.org/debian/pool/main/g/glibc/libc6_2.41-12%2bdeb13u4_amd64.deb' libc6_2.41-12+deb13u4_amd64.deb 2846580 MD5Sum:5559581916477ef1f57ea9f82cecf22e\n"
+                       + getattr(self, "extra_uris", "")), ""
        if "dist-upgrade" in a:
            if getattr(self, "pending_sim", None) is not None and not getattr(self, "_pending_used", False):
                self._pending_used = True
@@ -265,7 +285,7 @@ class Happy(unittest.TestCase):
        self.assertEqual(rep["pending"][0]["name"], "bash")
        self.assertTrue(any(l.startswith("os-apply: REPAIR ") for l in f.logs), "the repair line must always print")
        self.assertTrue(any(l.startswith("os-apply: DONE rc=0") for l in f.logs))
-        inst = [c for c in f.calls if c[0] == "guest" and "install" in c[2] and "-s" not in c[2] and "-f" not in c[2]]
+        inst = [c for c in f.calls if c[0] == "guest" and "install" in c[2] and "-s" not in c[2] and "-f" not in c[2] and "--print-uris" not in c[2]]
        self.assertTrue(inst and "Dpkg::Options::=--force-confold" in inst[0][2], "must keep existing config files")

    def test_already_current_is_a_no_op(self):
@@ -335,7 +355,7 @@ class Refusals(unittest.TestCase):
        self.assertEqual(rc, 2, rep)
        self.assertEqual(rep["refused"]["code"], code, rep)
        self.assertTrue(any(l.startswith(f"os-apply: REFUSED: {code} ") for l in f.logs), f.logs)
-        inst = [c for c in f.calls if c[0] == "guest" and "install" in c[2] and "-s" not in c[2] and "-f" not in c[2]]
+        inst = [c for c in f.calls if c[0] == "guest" and "install" in c[2] and "-s" not in c[2] and "-f" not in c[2] and "--print-uris" not in c[2]]
        self.assertEqual(inst, [], "a refusal must install nothing")
        return rep

@@ -446,6 +466,24 @@ class Refusals(unittest.TestCase):
        f.free = 100 * 1024 * 1024
        self.refused(f, "R8")

+    # R-865: the download is the real one. 2 GB of URIs, 5 GB free: 5 GB < 3 x 2 GB -> R8, with the size in the line.
+    # COMPANION RED-PROOF: put "-s" back into download_bytes -> 0 B -> no refusal -> this test fails.
+    def test_R8_counts_the_real_download(self):
+        f = Fake()
+        f.free = 5 * 1024 ** 3
+        f.extra_uris = "'http://deb.debian.org/debian/pool/main/b/big/big_1_amd64.deb' big_1_amd64.deb 2000000000 MD5Sum:x\n"
+        rep = self.refused(f, "R8")
+        self.assertIn("download 2004347372 B", str(rep))
+
+    def test_download_bytes_never_simulates(self):
+        f = Fake()
+        rc, rep = run(f)
+        self.assertEqual(rc, 0, rep)
+        calls = [c[2] for c in f.calls if c[0] == "guest" and "--print-uris" in c[2]]
+        self.assertTrue(calls, "download_bytes was never called")
+        for c in calls:
+            self.assertNotIn("-s", c, f"--print-uris with -s prints no URIs: {c}")
+
    def test_R9_guest_locked_by_a_backup(self):
        f = Fake()
        f.files["/etc/pve/lxc/9201.conf"] = CONF_OK + "lock: backup\n"
@@ -804,6 +842,26 @@ class DockerLane(unittest.TestCase):
        rc, rep = run(f)
        self.assertEqual(rep["plan"]["upgrade"], 0, "an older version on an unsigned step is 'already', never installed")

+    def test_step_restarts_only_the_socket_users(self):
+        # R-858: after an engine step, ONLY the container that mounts the docker socket is restarted (here the controller)
+        f = docker_fake(signed=signed_job())
+        rc, rep = run(f)
+        self.assertEqual(rc, 0, rep)
+        self.assertEqual(f.restarted_containers, ["felhom-controller"])
+        self.assertEqual(rep["socket_restarted"], ["felhom-controller"])
+
+    def test_no_install_restarts_nothing(self):
+        f = docker_fake(signed=signed_job())
+        f.installed.update({"docker-ce": "5:29.8.2-1~debian.13~trixie", "containerd.io": "2.3.6-1~debian.13~trixie"})
+        rc, rep = run(f)
+        self.assertFalse(hasattr(f, "restarted_containers"), "nothing installed -> no container restart")
+
+    def test_health_says_when_the_controller_cannot_reach_docker(self):
+        f = docker_fake(signed=signed_job())
+        f.controller_blind = True
+        rc, rep = run(f)
+        self.assertFalse(rep["health_after"]["controller_docker_ok"])
+
    def test_health_carries_container_ids(self):
        f = docker_fake(signed=signed_job())
        rc, rep = run(f)
@@ -934,3 +992,88 @@ class RealSignatureCheck(unittest.TestCase):

 if __name__ == "__main__":
    unittest.main()
+
+
+class UnsentReport(unittest.TestCase):
+    """R-868 (v0.144.0): an apply pass keeps its report on disk until the agent has sent it.
+    COMPANION RED-PROOF: drop the r.save_report call in main() -> test_apply_keeps_a_copy fails."""
+
+    def test_apply_keeps_a_copy_with_the_agents_ids(self):
+        f = Fake()
+        f.plan.update(run_id="20261005T0257-ab12", trigger="debug", ring=0)
+        rc, rep = run(f)
+        self.assertEqual(rc, 0, rep)
+        self.assertEqual(len(f.saved_reports), 1, "an apply pass must keep its report on disk")
+        path, saved = f.saved_reports[0]
+        self.assertEqual(path, PLAN)
+        self.assertEqual(saved, rep, "the copy is the report the agent would have read")
+        self.assertEqual((saved["run_id"], saved["trigger"], saved["ring"]), ("20261005T0257-ab12", "debug", 0))
+
+    def test_a_refusal_is_kept_too(self):
+        f = Fake()
+        f.free = 1
+        rc, rep = run(f)
+        self.assertEqual(rc, 2)
+        self.assertEqual(f.saved_reports[0][1]["refused"]["code"], "R8")
+
+    def test_other_modes_keep_nothing(self):
+        f = Fake()
+        f.plan["mode"] = "health"
+        run(f)
+        self.assertEqual(f.saved_reports, [])
+
+    def test_odd_ids_are_dropped_not_trusted(self):
+        f = Fake()
+        f.plan.update(run_id="../../etc/x", trigger="Night; rm", ring=True)
+        rc, rep = run(f)
+        self.assertEqual(rc, 0, rep)
+        for k in ("run_id", "trigger", "ring"):
+            self.assertNotIn(k, rep)
+
+
+class SaveReportOnDisk(unittest.TestCase):
+    """The real Runner.save_report on a temp dir: root writes into the AGENT's directory, so a symlink must never
+    be followed — neither for the directory nor for the file name."""
+
+    def setUp(self):
+        import tempfile
+        self.tmp = tempfile.mkdtemp()
+        self.dir = os.path.join(self.tmp, "os")
+        os.mkdir(self.dir)
+        self.prev = osapply.PLAN_DIR
+        osapply.PLAN_DIR = self.dir
+        self.r = osapply.Runner()
+        self.r.agent_uid = lambda: os.getuid()
+
+    def tearDown(self):
+        import shutil
+        osapply.PLAN_DIR = self.prev
+        shutil.rmtree(self.tmp)
+
+    def test_writes_0600_next_to_the_plan(self):
+        p = self.r.save_report(os.path.join(self.dir, "plan-r1-guest-apply.json"), {"mode": "apply"})
+        self.assertEqual(p, os.path.join(self.dir, "report-r1-guest-apply.json"))
+        st = os.stat(p)
+        self.assertEqual(statmod.S_IMODE(st.st_mode), 0o600)
+        with open(p) as fh:
+            self.assertEqual(json.load(fh), {"mode": "apply"})
+
+    def test_a_symlink_at_the_name_is_replaced_not_followed(self):
+        victim = os.path.join(self.tmp, "victim")
+        with open(victim, "w") as fh:
+            fh.write("untouched")
+        os.symlink(victim, os.path.join(self.dir, "report-r2-guest-apply.json"))
+        self.r.save_report(os.path.join(self.dir, "plan-r2-guest-apply.json"), {"mode": "apply"})
+        with open(victim) as fh:
+            self.assertEqual(fh.read(), "untouched")
+        self.assertFalse(os.path.islink(os.path.join(self.dir, "report-r2-guest-apply.json")))
+
+    def test_a_symlinked_directory_is_refused(self):
+        real = os.path.join(self.tmp, "elsewhere")
+        os.mkdir(real)
+        link = os.path.join(self.tmp, "linked")
+        os.symlink(real, link)
+        osapply.PLAN_DIR = link
+        with self.assertRaises(OSError):
+            self.r.save_report(os.path.join(link, "plan-r3-guest-apply.json"), {"mode": "apply"})
+        self.assertEqual(os.listdir(real), [])
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+package hub
+
+import (
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+// R-840: the agent reports the bundle record itself — "none" when no bundle ever reached the box (so an old wrapper
+// cannot hide that), "unknown" when it cannot be read, else the version and sha the root wrapper recorded.
+func TestReadBundleRecord(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	p := filepath.Join(dir, "config-bundle.json")
+	if got := string(readBundleRecord(p)); got != `{"version":"none"}` {
+		t.Fatalf("absent: %s", got)
+	}
+	os.WriteFile(p, []byte("{broken"), 0o644)
+	if got := string(readBundleRecord(p)); got != `{"version":"unknown"}` {
+		t.Fatalf("broken: %s", got)
+	}
+	os.WriteFile(p, []byte(`{"format":1,"agent_version":"0.143.0","bundle_sha256":"abc","installed_at":"2026-10-04T20:00:00Z","authority":"signed","files":{"/x":"y"}}`), 0o644)
+	if got := string(readBundleRecord(p)); got != `{"authority":"signed","bundle_sha256":"abc","installed_at":"2026-10-04T20:00:00Z","version":"0.143.0"}` {
+		t.Fatalf("record: %s", got)
+	}
+}
@@ -92,30 +92,31 @@ type GuestNetReporter interface {
 // Collector builds a HostReport from read-only sources. All deps are behind narrow
 // interfaces for unit testing.
 type Collector struct {
-	px           proxmoxReader
-	cf           CloudflaredProber
-	storage      StorageObserver
-	backups      BackupReporter
-	restoreTests RestoreTestReporter
-	provenTests  ProvenRestoreTestReporter
-	pbs          PBSReporter
-	temp         TempReader                                    // slice 9: host CPU/chassis temp (nil-safe → nil temp)
-	capProbe     func(ctx context.Context) []capability.Status // v0.44.0: privileged-capability self-check (nil → empty)
-	leafFP       string                                        // v0.48.0: served local-API leaf fp (static per process; "" when local API disabled)
-	addrEnum     AddressEnumerator                             // v0.119.0: host interface enumeration; nil => the REAL one (see collectAddresses)
-	wg           WireguardReporter                             // S3: offsite-tunnel status (nil → stanza omitted)
-	pbsdr        PBSDRReporter                                 // slice 2: PBS DR tier bridge state (nil → stanza omitted)
-	ctrlSup      ControllerSupervisorReporter                  // R-523: in-guest controller supervisor (nil → stanza omitted)
-	guestNet     GuestNetReporter                              // R-54: per-guest network watchdog (nil → stanza omitted)
-	selfUpdate   SelfUpdateReporter                            // D1: agent self-update pending status (nil → false)
-	mgmtPlane    MgmtPlaneReporter                             // G1: management-plane health (nil → stanza omitted)
-	oob          OOBReporter                                   // H1: operator-access health (nil → stanza omitted)
-	system       SystemReporter                                // R-852: the box versions (nil → API fields only)
-	backupTarget func() ConfiguredBackupTarget                 // R-109: primary backup tier id (nil → recipe records unknown)
-	hostID       string
-	agentVersion string
-	logger       *slog.Logger
-	now          func() time.Time
+	px               proxmoxReader
+	cf               CloudflaredProber
+	storage          StorageObserver
+	backups          BackupReporter
+	restoreTests     RestoreTestReporter
+	provenTests      ProvenRestoreTestReporter
+	pbs              PBSReporter
+	temp             TempReader                                    // slice 9: host CPU/chassis temp (nil-safe → nil temp)
+	capProbe         func(ctx context.Context) []capability.Status // v0.44.0: privileged-capability self-check (nil → empty)
+	leafFP           string                                        // v0.48.0: served local-API leaf fp (static per process; "" when local API disabled)
+	addrEnum         AddressEnumerator                             // v0.119.0: host interface enumeration; nil => the REAL one (see collectAddresses)
+	wg               WireguardReporter                             // S3: offsite-tunnel status (nil → stanza omitted)
+	pbsdr            PBSDRReporter                                 // slice 2: PBS DR tier bridge state (nil → stanza omitted)
+	ctrlSup          ControllerSupervisorReporter                  // R-523: in-guest controller supervisor (nil → stanza omitted)
+	guestNet         GuestNetReporter                              // R-54: per-guest network watchdog (nil → stanza omitted)
+	selfUpdate       SelfUpdateReporter                            // D1: agent self-update pending status (nil → false)
+	mgmtPlane        MgmtPlaneReporter                             // G1: management-plane health (nil → stanza omitted)
+	oob              OOBReporter                                   // H1: operator-access health (nil → stanza omitted)
+	system           SystemReporter                                // R-852: the box versions (nil → API fields only)
+	bundleRecordPath string                                        // R-840: test seam; "" = BundleRecordPath
+	backupTarget     func() ConfiguredBackupTarget                 // R-109: primary backup tier id (nil → recipe records unknown)
+	hostID           string
+	agentVersion     string
+	logger           *slog.Logger
+	now              func() time.Time
 }

 // NewCollector builds a collector. hostID echoes config.Hub.HostID; agentVersion is
@@ -262,6 +263,33 @@ func (c *Collector) SetSystemReporter(r SystemReporter) *Collector {
 	return c
 }

+// BundleRecordPath is the root-owned record felhom-os-apply writes after a config bundle installs (R-840).
+const BundleRecordPath = "/etc/felhom/config-bundle.json"
+
+// readBundleRecord returns the record's summary: version/sha/installed_at, "none" when the file is absent, "unknown"
+// when it cannot be read or parsed (never a guess).
+func readBundleRecord(path string) json.RawMessage {
+	if path == "" {
+		path = BundleRecordPath
+	}
+	b, err := os.ReadFile(path)
+	if os.IsNotExist(err) {
+		return json.RawMessage(`{"version":"none"}`)
+	}
+	var rec struct {
+		AgentVersion string `json:"agent_version"`
+		BundleSHA256 string `json:"bundle_sha256"`
+		InstalledAt  string `json:"installed_at"`
+		Authority    string `json:"authority"`
+	}
+	if err != nil || json.Unmarshal(b, &rec) != nil || rec.AgentVersion == "" {
+		return json.RawMessage(`{"version":"unknown"}`)
+	}
+	out, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]string{"version": rec.AgentVersion, "bundle_sha256": rec.BundleSHA256,
+		"installed_at": rec.InstalledAt, "authority": rec.Authority})
+	return out
+}
+
 func unknownIfEmpty(s string) string {
 	if strings.TrimSpace(s) == "" {
 		return "unknown"
@@ -273,6 +301,7 @@ func unknownIfEmpty(s string) string {
 func (c *Collector) systemInfo(ctx context.Context, ns proxmox.NodeStatus) *SystemInfo {
 	si := &SystemInfo{PVEVersion: unknownIfEmpty(ns.PVEVersion), KernelVersion: unknownIfEmpty(ns.KVersion),
 		ReadAt: c.now().Format(time.RFC3339)}
+	si.ConfigBundle = readBundleRecord(c.bundleRecordPath)
 	if c.system == nil {
 		si.FactsError = "no facts reader wired"
 		return si
@@ -255,6 +255,10 @@ type SystemInfo struct {
 	Facts         json.RawMessage `json:"facts,omitempty"`
 	FactsError    string          `json:"facts_error,omitempty"`
 	ReadAt        string          `json:"read_at"`
+	// ConfigBundle is the box's root-owned config bundle record (R-840, agent v0.143.0), read by the agent itself from
+	// /etc/felhom/config-bundle.json (0644): {"version":"none"} on a box no bundle reached, so an OLD wrapper cannot
+	// hide it. The wrapper's facts carry the same record plus the drift (files changed by hand).
+	ConfigBundle json.RawMessage `json:"config_bundle,omitempty"`
 }

 // HostMetrics is the host block, sourced from proxmox NodeStatus.
@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
+package osupdate
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"encoding/hex"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"fmt"
+	"io"
+	"net/http"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"regexp"
+	"strings"
+	"time"
+
+	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-agent/internal/signedjobs"
+)
+
+// OpConfigUpdate is the signed op that brings a box's ROOT-OWNED files (sudoers, wrappers, units) to a release's config
+// bundle (R-840, `11` §5.4.2). The params pin the agent version and the bundle's sha256; the root wrapper re-verifies
+// the signature, the host binding, the nonce and the sha ITSELF — this executor is only the courier.
+const OpConfigUpdate = "agent_config_update"
+
+// BundleFileName is the bundle's name beside the binary in the Gitea generic package felhom-agent/<version>/.
+const BundleFileName = "felhom-config-bundle.json"
+
+var (
+	bundleVersionRe = regexp.MustCompile(`^[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+(-[0-9A-Za-z.]+)?$`)
+	bundleSHARe     = regexp.MustCompile(`^[0-9a-f]{64}$`)
+)
+
+// ConfigUpdateParams are the signed params (the wrapper reads the same two names out of the signed blob).
+type ConfigUpdateParams struct {
+	AgentVersion string `json:"agent_version"`
+	BundleSHA256 string `json:"bundle_sha256"`
+}
+
+// BundleURL derives the bundle's URL from the agent binary's URL template (".../felhom-agent/{version}/felhom-agent").
+func BundleURL(binaryTemplate, version string) (string, error) {
+	if !strings.HasSuffix(binaryTemplate, "/felhom-agent") || !strings.Contains(binaryTemplate, "{version}") {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("cannot derive the bundle URL from %q (want …/{version}/felhom-agent)", binaryTemplate)
+	}
+	t := strings.TrimSuffix(binaryTemplate, "felhom-agent") + BundleFileName
+	return strings.ReplaceAll(t, "{version}", version), nil
+}
+
+// ConfigUpdateExecutor runs a verified agent_config_update (signedjobs.Executor).
+type ConfigUpdateExecutor struct {
+	Leg         *Leg
+	URLTemplate string // the agent binary's template (config.SelfUpdate.URLTemplate)
+	Username    string
+	Token       string
+	HTTPClient  *http.Client
+	// AfterInstall runs after a bundle installed (the capability re-probe; nil = none).
+	AfterInstall func(ctx context.Context)
+}
+
+// Execute implements signedjobs.Executor.
+func (e ConfigUpdateExecutor) Execute(ctx context.Context, op string, params json.RawMessage) error {
+	if op != OpConfigUpdate {
+		return signedjobs.ErrNoExecutor
+	}
+	so, ok := signedjobs.SignedOpFrom(ctx)
+	if !ok {
+		return fmt.Errorf("agent_config_update: no signed envelope in the context — the wrapper could not verify it")
+	}
+	var p ConfigUpdateParams
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(params, &p); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("agent_config_update: bad params: %w", err)
+	}
+	if !bundleVersionRe.MatchString(p.AgentVersion) || !bundleSHARe.MatchString(p.BundleSHA256) {
+		return fmt.Errorf("agent_config_update: params must pin agent_version (semver) and bundle_sha256 (64 hex)")
+	}
+	lg := e.Leg.log().With("op", OpConfigUpdate, "agent_version", p.AgentVersion)
+	url, err := BundleURL(e.URLTemplate, p.AgentVersion)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("agent_config_update: %w", err)
+	}
+	dir := e.Leg.PlanDir
+	if dir == "" {
+		dir = DefaultPlanDir
+	}
+	if err := os.MkdirAll(dir, 0o700); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("agent_config_update: plan dir: %w", err)
+	}
+	path := filepath.Join(dir, "bundle-"+p.AgentVersion+".json")
+	start := time.Now()
+	got, err := e.download(ctx, url, path)
+	if err != nil {
+		_ = os.Remove(path)
+		return fmt.Errorf("agent_config_update: download %s: %w", url, err)
+	}
+	defer os.Remove(path)
+	// The agent's own check is a courtesy (an early, clear error); the wrapper's is the gate.
+	if got != p.BundleSHA256 {
+		return fmt.Errorf("agent_config_update: the downloaded bundle's sha256 is %s, the signed job pins %s — nothing installed", got, p.BundleSHA256)
+	}
+	lg.Info("osupdate: config bundle downloaded; handing it to the root wrapper", "sha256", got[:16], "duration_ms", time.Since(start).Milliseconds())
+	runID := "bundle-" + e.Leg.now().UTC().Format("20060102T150405Z")
+	wr, err := e.Leg.call(ctx, runID, map[string]any{"release_id": "bundle-" + p.AgentVersion, "layer": LayerHost,
+		"mode": "bundle", "bundle": path,
+		"signed": map[string]string{"blob_b64": base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(so.Blob), "sig": string(so.Sig)}})
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("agent_config_update: %w", err)
+	}
+	if wr.refused() {
+		lg.Warn("osupdate: config bundle REFUSED by the wrapper — nothing changed", "refused", string(wr.Refused))
+		return fmt.Errorf("agent_config_update: refused: %s", wr.Refused)
+	}
+	if wr.failed() {
+		lg.Error("osupdate: config bundle FAILED — the wrapper put the previous files back", "failed", string(wr.Failed), "bundle", string(wr.Bundle))
+		return fmt.Errorf("agent_config_update: failed (previous files restored): %s", wr.Failed)
+	}
+	lg.Warn("osupdate: config bundle INSTALLED", "bundle", string(wr.Bundle), "pass_seconds", wr.PassSeconds)
+	if e.AfterInstall != nil {
+		e.AfterInstall(ctx)
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (e ConfigUpdateExecutor) download(ctx context.Context, url, dest string) (string, error) {
+	hc := e.HTTPClient
+	if hc == nil {
+		hc = &http.Client{Timeout: 2 * time.Minute}
+	}
+	req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, url, nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	if e.Username != "" || e.Token != "" {
+		req.SetBasicAuth(e.Username, e.Token)
+	}
+	resp, err := hc.Do(req)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	defer resp.Body.Close()
+	if resp.StatusCode < 200 || resp.StatusCode >= 300 {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("HTTP %d", resp.StatusCode)
+	}
+	f, err := os.OpenFile(dest, os.O_CREATE|os.O_TRUNC|os.O_WRONLY, 0o600)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	h := sha256.New()
+	// 4 MB is the wrapper's own limit; read one byte more so an oversized bundle fails there, visibly.
+	if _, err := io.Copy(io.MultiWriter(f, h), io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 4*1024*1024+1)); err != nil {
+		f.Close()
+		return "", err
+	}
+	if err := f.Close(); err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	return hex.EncodeToString(h.Sum(nil)), nil
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@
+package osupdate
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"encoding/hex"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"io"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"os"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-agent/internal/reconcile"
+	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-agent/internal/signedjobs"
+)
+
+// bundleWrapper plays felhom-os-apply for mode "bundle": it records the plan and the bundle file's bytes AT CALL TIME
+// (the executor deletes the file afterwards), and answers with rep.
+type bundleWrapper struct {
+	t      *testing.T
+	rep    string
+	plans  []map[string]any
+	bodies [][]byte
+}
+
+func (b *bundleWrapper) Run(_ context.Context, name string, args ...string) ([]byte, []byte, error) {
+	if name != WrapperPath || len(args) != 2 || args[0] != "--plan" {
+		b.t.Fatalf("unexpected command %s %v", name, args)
+	}
+	raw, err := os.ReadFile(args[1])
+	if err != nil {
+		b.t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	var plan map[string]any
+	_ = json.Unmarshal(raw, &plan)
+	b.plans = append(b.plans, plan)
+	body, _ := os.ReadFile(plan["bundle"].(string))
+	b.bodies = append(b.bodies, body)
+	return []byte("OSAPPLY-REPORT " + b.rep + "\n"), nil, nil
+}
+
+func serveBundle(t *testing.T, body []byte) (*httptest.Server, string) {
+	srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		if r.URL.Path != "/felhom-agent/0.143.0/"+BundleFileName {
+			http.NotFound(w, r)
+			return
+		}
+		_, _ = w.Write(body)
+	}))
+	t.Cleanup(srv.Close)
+	sum := sha256.Sum256(body)
+	return srv, hex.EncodeToString(sum[:])
+}
+
+func bundleExec(t *testing.T, w *bundleWrapper, srvURL string) (ConfigUpdateExecutor, *bool) {
+	l, _ := newLeg(t, &fakeWrapper{t: t}, nil)
+	l.Runner = w
+	called := false
+	return ConfigUpdateExecutor{Leg: l, URLTemplate: srvURL + "/felhom-agent/{version}/felhom-agent",
+		AfterInstall: func(context.Context) { called = true }}, &called
+}
+
+func signedCtx() context.Context {
+	return signedjobs.WithSignedOp(context.Background(), &reconcile.SignedOp{Blob: []byte(`{"op":"agent_config_update"}`), Sig: []byte("SIG")})
+}
+
+func params(v, sha string) json.RawMessage {
+	p, _ := json.Marshal(ConfigUpdateParams{AgentVersion: v, BundleSHA256: sha})
+	return p
+}
+
+// The courier hands the wrapper the bundle bytes it downloaded and the RAW signed envelope (the wrapper verifies both
+// itself), then runs the capability probe. Red-proof: drop "signed" from the plan → the plan check below fails.
+func TestConfigUpdate_PassesBundleAndEnvelopeToTheWrapper(t *testing.T) {
+	body := []byte(`{"format":1,"agent_version":"0.143.0","files":[]}`)
+	srv, sha := serveBundle(t, body)
+	w := &bundleWrapper{t: t, rep: `{"mode":"bundle","bundle":{"agent_version":"0.143.0","written":["/etc/sudoers.d/felhom-agent"]}}`}
+	e, called := bundleExec(t, w, srv.URL)
+	if err := e.Execute(signedCtx(), OpConfigUpdate, params("0.143.0", sha)); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	p := w.plans[0]
+	sg, _ := p["signed"].(map[string]any)
+	if p["mode"] != "bundle" || p["layer"] != "host" || sg == nil || sg["sig"] != "SIG" ||
+		sg["blob_b64"] != base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(`{"op":"agent_config_update"}`)) {
+		t.Fatalf("plan = %v", p)
+	}
+	if string(w.bodies[0]) != string(body) || !strings.HasSuffix(p["bundle"].(string), "/bundle-0.143.0.json") {
+		t.Fatalf("the wrapper got %q at %v", w.bodies[0], p["bundle"])
+	}
+	if !*called {
+		t.Fatal("the capability probe must run after an install")
+	}
+	if _, err := os.Stat(p["bundle"].(string)); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
+		t.Fatal("the downloaded bundle must be removed after the call")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestConfigUpdate_WrongShaNeverReachesTheWrapper(t *testing.T) {
+	srv, _ := serveBundle(t, []byte("tampered"))
+	w := &bundleWrapper{t: t}
+	e, called := bundleExec(t, w, srv.URL)
+	err := e.Execute(signedCtx(), OpConfigUpdate, params("0.143.0", strings.Repeat("a", 64)))
+	if err == nil || len(w.plans) != 0 || *called {
+		t.Fatalf("err=%v plans=%d", err, len(w.plans))
+	}
+}
+
+func TestConfigUpdate_RefusedAndFailedAreErrors(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, rep := range []string{`{"refused":{"code":"R17","reason":"trust root"}}`, `{"failed":{"rc":3},"bundle":{"rolled_back":["/x"]}}`} {
+		srv, sha := serveBundle(t, []byte("{}"))
+		w := &bundleWrapper{t: t, rep: rep}
+		e, called := bundleExec(t, w, srv.URL)
+		if err := e.Execute(signedCtx(), OpConfigUpdate, params("0.143.0", sha)); err == nil || *called {
+			t.Fatalf("%s: err=%v called=%v", rep, err, *called)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestConfigUpdate_GuardsBeforeAnyDownload(t *testing.T) {
+	w := &bundleWrapper{t: t}
+	e, _ := bundleExec(t, w, "http://127.0.0.1:1")
+	if err := e.Execute(signedCtx(), "agent_update", nil); !errors.Is(err, signedjobs.ErrNoExecutor) {
+		t.Fatalf("another op must pass through the chain: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := e.Execute(context.Background(), OpConfigUpdate, params("0.143.0", strings.Repeat("a", 64))); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("no envelope must refuse")
+	}
+	for _, p := range []json.RawMessage{params("0.143", strings.Repeat("a", 64)), params("0.143.0", "ABC"), json.RawMessage(`nope`)} {
+		if err := e.Execute(signedCtx(), OpConfigUpdate, p); err == nil {
+			t.Fatalf("bad params %s must refuse", p)
+		}
+	}
+	if len(w.plans) != 0 {
+		t.Fatal("no wrapper call on a refusal")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestBundleURL(t *testing.T) {
+	u, err := BundleURL("https://gitea.dooplex.hu/api/packages/admin/generic/felhom-agent/{version}/felhom-agent", "0.143.0")
+	if err != nil || u != "https://gitea.dooplex.hu/api/packages/admin/generic/felhom-agent/0.143.0/felhom-config-bundle.json" {
+		t.Fatalf("%s %v", u, err)
+	}
+	if _, err := BundleURL("https://example/felhom-agent-{version}.bin", "0.143.0"); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("an underivable template must refuse")
+	}
+}
+
+func (b *bundleWrapper) RunStdin(ctx context.Context, _ io.Reader, name string, args ...string) ([]byte, []byte, error) {
+	return b.Run(ctx, name, args...)
+}
@@ -73,6 +73,9 @@ func (e DockerStepExecutor) Execute(ctx context.Context, op string, params json.
 // RunDockerSigned is one signed Docker step (ring 1 or an undo): live-restore first (decision 87, a no-op when on),
 // then the docker layer with the signed envelope, which the wrapper verifies itself.
 func (l *Leg) RunDockerSigned(ctx context.Context, vmid int, p DockerStepParams, blob []byte, sig string) Report {
+	unlock := l.lockPass(true)
+	defer unlock()
+	l.sendUnsentLocked(ctx) // R-868
 	runID := l.now().UTC().Format("20060102T150405Z")
 	lg := l.log().With("run", runID, "vmid", vmid, "trigger", "signed", "release", p.ReleaseID, "undo", p.Undo)
 	if err := l.EnsureLiveRestore(ctx, runID, vmid); err != nil {
@@ -71,13 +71,16 @@ type Container struct {
 // Health is one health reading. Guest layer: DockerOK..Containers. Host layer: HostServices, GuestRunning and the
 // guest's own reading in Guest.
 type Health struct {
-	DockerOK     bool                 `json:"docker_ok"`
-	NetworkOK    bool                 `json:"network_ok"`
-	Controller   string               `json:"controller"`
-	Containers   map[string]Container `json:"containers"`
-	HostServices map[string]string    `json:"host_services,omitempty"`
-	GuestRunning *bool                `json:"guest_running,omitempty"`
-	Guest        *Health              `json:"guest,omitempty"`
+	DockerOK   bool                 `json:"docker_ok"`
+	NetworkOK  bool                 `json:"network_ok"`
+	Controller string               `json:"controller"`
+	Containers map[string]Container `json:"containers"`
+	// ControllerDockerOK: the controller reaches the engine from INSIDE its container (R-858, wrapper ≥ v0.142.1;
+	// nil from an older wrapper = not checked). Its own health check stayed "healthy" while it was blind.
+	ControllerDockerOK *bool             `json:"controller_docker_ok,omitempty"`
+	HostServices       map[string]string `json:"host_services,omitempty"`
+	GuestRunning       *bool             `json:"guest_running,omitempty"`
+	Guest              *Health           `json:"guest,omitempty"`
 }

 // WrapperReport is the wrapper's OSAPPLY-REPORT object.
@@ -102,6 +105,14 @@ type WrapperReport struct {
 	Undo                bool            `json:"undo"`
 	LiveRestore         json.RawMessage `json:"live_restore"`
 	Facts               json.RawMessage `json:"facts"`
+	Bundle              json.RawMessage `json:"bundle"` // the config bundle's result (R-840, mode "bundle")
+	// R-868 (v0.144.0): the agent's ids, echoed from the plan, so a report kept on disk can be sent without the
+	// agent process that started the pass. ReleaseID / VMID were always in the report.
+	RunID     string `json:"run_id"`
+	Trigger   string `json:"trigger"`
+	Ring      *int   `json:"ring"`
+	ReleaseID string `json:"release_id"`
+	VMID      int    `json:"vmid"`
 }

 func (w WrapperReport) refused() bool { return len(w.Refused) > 0 && string(w.Refused) != "null" }
@@ -132,6 +143,8 @@ type Report struct {
 	DockerEngine        string          `json:"docker_engine,omitempty"` // docker layer: the engine after the step
 	Authority           string          `json:"authority,omitempty"`     // docker layer: ring0 | signed
 	Undo                bool            `json:"undo,omitempty"`          // docker layer: a signed undo (downgrade)
+
+	unsent string // R-868: the wrapper's kept copy of this pass's report — deleted once the hub has it
 }

 // Reporter posts a report to the hub (*hub.Client).
@@ -158,14 +171,65 @@ type Leg struct {
 	block *hub.WireOSUpdate
 }

+// planFile / reportFile: the plan the agent writes and the copy of the report the wrapper keeps beside it (R-868).
+func planFile(dir, runID, layer, mode string) string {
+	return filepath.Join(dir, fmt.Sprintf("plan-%s-%s-%s.json", runID, layer, mode))
+}
+
+func reportFile(dir, runID, layer, mode string) string {
+	return filepath.Join(dir, fmt.Sprintf("report-%s-%s-%s.json", runID, layer, mode))
+}
+
+func (l *Leg) planDir() string {
+	if l.PlanDir == "" {
+		return DefaultPlanDir
+	}
+	return l.PlanDir
+}
+
 // OnDesiredState stores the hub's os_update block (desired.RawConsumer — store only, never block).
 func (l *Leg) OnDesiredState(_ context.Context, resp *hub.DesiredStateResponse) {
 	if resp == nil {
 		return
 	}
 	l.mu.Lock()
-	defer l.mu.Unlock()
 	l.block = resp.DesiredState.OSUpdate
+	l.mu.Unlock()
+	l.saveBlock(resp.DesiredState.OSUpdate)
+}
+
+// SavedBlockFile is the hub's newest os_update block as the daemon last received it (R-866, v0.144.0): the debug
+// pass falls back to it when the hub cannot be reached, and says so.
+const SavedBlockFile = "os-update-block.json"
+
+type savedBlock struct {
+	SavedAt time.Time         `json:"saved_at"`
+	Block   *hub.WireOSUpdate `json:"block"`
+}
+
+func (l *Leg) saveBlock(b *hub.WireOSUpdate) {
+	dir := l.planDir()
+	if err := os.MkdirAll(dir, 0o700); err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	body, _ := json.Marshal(savedBlock{SavedAt: l.now().UTC(), Block: b})
+	tmp := filepath.Join(dir, SavedBlockFile+".tmp")
+	if err := os.WriteFile(tmp, body, 0o600); err == nil {
+		_ = os.Rename(tmp, filepath.Join(dir, SavedBlockFile))
+	}
+}
+
+// LoadSavedBlock reads the block the daemon saved (R-866). ok=false: none saved yet.
+func LoadSavedBlock(dir string) (b *hub.WireOSUpdate, savedAt time.Time, ok bool) {
+	raw, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(dir, SavedBlockFile))
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, time.Time{}, false
+	}
+	var s savedBlock
+	if json.Unmarshal(raw, &s) != nil {
+		return nil, time.Time{}, false
+	}
+	return s.Block, s.SavedAt, true
 }

 // Block returns the newest os_update block. No block (an older hub, or nothing fetched yet) = ring 1, ON, no
@@ -240,6 +304,9 @@ func HealthVerdict(before, after *Health) (bool, string) {
 	if after.Controller != "healthy" {
 		return false, "the controller is " + after.Controller
 	}
+	if after.ControllerDockerOK != nil && !*after.ControllerDockerOK {
+		return false, "the controller cannot reach Docker (it holds an old socket — R-858)"
+	}
 	if before == nil {
 		return true, ""
 	}
@@ -345,15 +412,12 @@ func DockerHealthVerdict(before, after *Health, wantEngine, gotEngine string) (b

 // call writes the plan and runs the wrapper once.
 func (l *Leg) call(ctx context.Context, runID string, plan map[string]any) (WrapperReport, error) {
-	dir := l.PlanDir
-	if dir == "" {
-		dir = DefaultPlanDir
-	}
+	dir := l.planDir()
 	if err := os.MkdirAll(dir, 0o700); err != nil {
 		return WrapperReport{}, fmt.Errorf("osupdate: plan dir: %w", err)
 	}
 	b, _ := json.Marshal(plan)
-	path := filepath.Join(dir, fmt.Sprintf("plan-%s-%s-%s.json", runID, plan["layer"], plan["mode"]))
+	path := planFile(dir, runID, fmt.Sprint(plan["layer"]), fmt.Sprint(plan["mode"]))
 	if err := os.WriteFile(path, b, 0o600); err != nil {
 		return WrapperReport{}, fmt.Errorf("osupdate: write plan: %w", err)
 	}
@@ -387,6 +451,9 @@ type Pass struct {
 // Run is one pass: the guest layer, then (on an appliance, after a good guest step) the host layer, then (ring 0
 // only, after good earlier steps) the Docker engine set. trigger is "night" or "debug".
 func (l *Leg) Run(ctx context.Context, vmid int, trigger string) Pass {
+	unlock := l.lockPass(true)
+	defer unlock()
+	l.sendUnsentLocked(ctx) // R-868: a report a killed agent never sent goes first
 	g, h := l.runFast(ctx, vmid, trigger)
 	p := Pass{Guest: g, Host: h}
 	if g.Outcome == "skipped" {
@@ -514,7 +581,8 @@ func (l *Leg) runLayer(ctx context.Context, runID, layer string, vmid int, trigg
 	lg.Info("osupdate: START", "enabled", blk.Enabled, "release", rel.ID)

 	plan := map[string]any{"release_id": rel.ID, "layer": layer, "lane": lane, "vmid": vmid, "snapshot": rel.Snapshot,
-		"packages": []Package{}, "mode": "apply", "select": "listed"}
+		"packages": []Package{}, "mode": "apply", "select": "listed",
+		"run_id": runID, "trigger": trigger, "ring": blk.Ring} // R-868: echoed into the wrapper's kept copy
 	if rel.ID == "" {
 		plan["release_id"] = "none"
 	}
@@ -547,6 +615,9 @@ func (l *Leg) runLayer(ctx context.Context, runID, layer string, vmid int, trigg
 	}
 	rep.Mode = plan["mode"].(string)
 	wr, err := l.call(ctx, runID, plan)
+	if rep.Mode == "apply" {
+		rep.unsent = reportFile(l.planDir(), runID, layer, rep.Mode) // the wrapper kept a copy (R-868)
+	}
 	switch {
 	case err != nil:
 		rep.Outcome, rep.HealthReason = "failed", err.Error()
@@ -677,7 +748,11 @@ func (l *Leg) finish(ctx context.Context, lg *slog.Logger, rep Report) Report {
 		rctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.WithoutCancel(ctx), time.Minute)
 		defer cancel()
 		if err := l.Hub.PostOSReport(rctx, body); err != nil {
-			lg.Warn("osupdate: reporting to the hub failed (the run itself is done)", "err", err)
+			lg.Warn("osupdate: reporting to the hub failed (the run itself is done; the kept copy is sent at the next start or pass)", "err", err)
+		} else if rep.unsent != "" {
+			if rerr := os.Remove(rep.unsent); rerr != nil && !os.IsNotExist(rerr) {
+				lg.Warn("osupdate: could not delete the sent report's kept copy (it may be sent twice)", "path", rep.unsent, "err", rerr)
+			}
 		}
 	}
 	return rep
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ package osupdate
 import (
 	"context"
 	"encoding/json"
+	"fmt"
 	"io"
 	"os"
 	"os/exec"
@@ -21,6 +22,7 @@ type fakeWrapper struct {
 	applyRep  map[string]WrapperReport // per layer
 	healthSeq map[string][]*Health     // per layer: answers to successive "health" calls
 	plans     []map[string]any
+	keep      bool // R-868: like the real wrapper, keep an apply report beside the plan
 }

 func yes() *bool { b := true; return &b }
@@ -72,6 +74,22 @@ func (f *fakeWrapper) Run(_ context.Context, name string, args ...string) ([]byt
 			rep.Health = ok
 		}
 	}
+	if f.keep && plan["mode"] == "apply" {
+		kept := rep
+		kept.Layer, kept.RunID, _ = layer, fmt.Sprint(plan["run_id"]), 0
+		if tr, ok := plan["trigger"].(string); ok {
+			kept.Trigger = tr
+		}
+		if r, ok := plan["ring"].(float64); ok {
+			ri := int(r)
+			kept.Ring = &ri
+		}
+		kb, _ := json.Marshal(kept)
+		dst := filepath.Join(filepath.Dir(args[1]), "report-"+strings.TrimPrefix(filepath.Base(args[1]), "plan-"))
+		if err := os.WriteFile(dst, kb, 0o600); err != nil {
+			f.t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+	}
 	out, _ := json.Marshal(rep)
 	return []byte("OSAPPLY-REPORT " + string(out) + "\n"), []byte("os-apply: DONE rc=0\n"), nil
 }
@@ -346,7 +364,7 @@ func TestWrapperSuite(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Skip("python3 not available")
 	}
 	// the OS wrapper and (agent v0.142.0) the crash guard — both root programs in configs/ with their own suites
-	for _, suite := range []string{"../../configs/test_felhom_os_apply.py", "../../configs/test_felhom_crash_guard.py"} {
+	for _, suite := range []string{"../../configs/test_felhom_os_apply.py", "../../configs/test_felhom_crash_guard.py", "../../configs/test_felhom_config_bundle.py"} {
 		cmd := exec.Command(py, "-B", suite)
 		out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
 		if err != nil {
@@ -465,3 +483,24 @@ func TestDocker_ChangedIDIsHealthFailed(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("docker = %+v", p.Docker)
 	}
 }
+
+// R-858: a controller that cannot reach Docker fails the health rule even though its own check says healthy.
+// Red-proof: drop the ControllerDockerOK check in HealthVerdict and this fails.
+func TestHealthVerdict_ControllerBlindToDockerFails(t *testing.T) {
+	no, yes2 := false, true
+	after := guestOK()
+	after.ControllerDockerOK = &no
+	if ok, why := HealthVerdict(guestOK(), after); ok || !strings.Contains(why, "R-858") {
+		t.Fatalf("a blind controller passed: %v %q", ok, why)
+	}
+	if ok, _ := DockerHealthVerdict(guestOK(), after, "", ""); ok {
+		t.Fatal("the Docker rule passed a blind controller")
+	}
+	after.ControllerDockerOK = &yes2
+	if ok, why := HealthVerdict(guestOK(), after); !ok {
+		t.Fatalf("a seeing controller failed: %s", why)
+	}
+	if ok, _ := HealthVerdict(guestOK(), guestOK()); !ok {
+		t.Fatal("an older wrapper (no field) must not fail")
+	}
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
+package osupdate
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
+	"syscall"
+
+	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-agent/internal/hub"
+)
+
+// ── R-868 (v0.144.0): a pass whose agent was killed still reports ─────────────────────────────────────
+//
+// MEASURED 2026-10-05 02:57 UTC on demo-hp (night drill A5): the debug pass and the agent daemon were kill -9-ed while
+// apt-get ran. The root wrapper (its own process under sudo) finished all six packages, but the agent that would have
+// read its stdout and posted the report was gone; the hub never learned what the pass installed.
+//
+// THE MECHANISM: the wrapper writes its apply report to <plan dir>/report-<run>-<layer>-apply.json BEFORE printing
+// it (configs/felhom-os-apply save_report). The agent deletes that copy once the hub has the report (finish). A copy
+// still on disk is a report nobody sent: SendUnsent posts it — at the agent's start, and before every pass — and then
+// deletes it. A pass lock (flock on <plan dir>/pass.lock, released by the kernel when a process dies) keeps the
+// sender from picking up the copy of a pass that is still running, also across the daemon and a selftest process.
+// Pinned by TestR868_* (unsent_test.go).
+
+// lockPass takes the pass lock. block=false returns ok=false at once when another pass holds it. A lock that cannot
+// be opened at all (no plan dir yet) does not stop a pass: the unlock is then a no-op.
+func (l *Leg) lockPass(block bool) (unlock func()) {
+	u, _ := l.tryLockPass(block)
+	return u
+}
+
+func (l *Leg) tryLockPass(block bool) (unlock func(), ok bool) {
+	dir := l.planDir()
+	_ = os.MkdirAll(dir, 0o700)
+	f, err := os.OpenFile(filepath.Join(dir, "pass.lock"), os.O_CREATE|os.O_RDWR, 0o600)
+	if err != nil {
+		l.log().Warn("osupdate: pass lock unavailable — continuing without it", "err", err)
+		return func() {}, true
+	}
+	how := syscall.LOCK_EX
+	if !block {
+		how |= syscall.LOCK_NB
+	}
+	if err := syscall.Flock(int(f.Fd()), how); err != nil {
+		f.Close()
+		return func() {}, false
+	}
+	return func() { _ = syscall.Flock(int(f.Fd()), syscall.LOCK_UN); f.Close() }, true
+}
+
+// SendUnsent posts every report a pass kept on disk and nobody sent (R-868). It skips when a pass runs now (that
+// pass sends them first). Called at the agent's start.
+func (l *Leg) SendUnsent(ctx context.Context) int {
+	unlock, ok := l.tryLockPass(false)
+	if !ok {
+		l.log().Info("osupdate: a pass is running — its start sends any kept report")
+		return 0
+	}
+	defer unlock()
+	return l.sendUnsentLocked(ctx)
+}
+
+func (l *Leg) sendUnsentLocked(ctx context.Context) int {
+	if l.Hub == nil {
+		return 0 // nobody to send to: keep the copies for a process that has the hub
+	}
+	files, _ := filepath.Glob(filepath.Join(l.planDir(), "report-*.json"))
+	sent := 0
+	for _, f := range files {
+		b, err := os.ReadFile(f)
+		if err != nil {
+			l.log().Warn("osupdate: a kept report cannot be read", "path", f, "err", err)
+			continue
+		}
+		var wr WrapperReport
+		if err := json.Unmarshal(b, &wr); err != nil || wr.Layer == "" {
+			l.log().Warn("osupdate: a kept report is not a report — moved aside", "path", f, "err", err)
+			_ = os.Rename(f, f+".bad")
+			continue
+		}
+		rep := l.reportFromKept(ctx, wr, f)
+		lg := l.log().With("run", rep.RunID, "layer", rep.Layer, "vmid", rep.VMID, "ring", rep.Ring, "trigger", rep.Trigger)
+		lg.Info("osupdate: sending a report the agent never sent (the agent stopped mid-pass, R-868)", "path", f)
+		before := rep.unsent
+		_ = l.finish(ctx, lg, rep)
+		if _, err := os.Stat(before); os.IsNotExist(err) {
+			sent++
+			// the pass's plan file is left behind too when the agent was killed inside call()
+			_ = os.Remove(filepath.Join(filepath.Dir(f), "plan-"+strings.TrimPrefix(filepath.Base(f), "report-")))
+		}
+	}
+	return sent
+}
+
+// reportFromKept builds the hub report from a kept wrapper report, as runLayer would have. Health: the copy's own
+// before/after reading; when that is not healthy after an install, one fresh reading (services restart after an
+// install, and the pass that would have waited for them is gone).
+func (l *Leg) reportFromKept(ctx context.Context, wr WrapperReport, path string) Report {
+	ring := 1
+	if wr.Ring != nil {
+		ring = *wr.Ring
+	}
+	runID, trigger := wr.RunID, wr.Trigger
+	if runID == "" {
+		runID = strings.TrimSuffix(strings.TrimPrefix(filepath.Base(path), "report-"), ".json")
+	}
+	if trigger == "" {
+		trigger = "unknown"
+	}
+	rep := Report{RunID: runID, Layer: wr.Layer, Trigger: trigger, Mode: wr.Mode, Ring: ring, ReleaseID: wr.ReleaseID,
+		VMID: wr.VMID, unsent: path}
+	prefix := "sent after the agent stopped mid-pass (R-868)"
+	switch {
+	case wr.refused():
+		rep.Outcome, rep.Refused, rep.HealthReason = "refused", wr.Refused, prefix
+		return rep
+	case wr.failed():
+		rep.Outcome, rep.Refused = "failed", wr.Failed
+	case len(wr.Upgraded) == 0:
+		rep.Outcome = "nothing"
+	default:
+		rep.Outcome = "applied"
+	}
+	rep.Upgraded, rep.PassSeconds = wr.Upgraded, wr.PassSeconds
+	rep.DockerEngine, rep.Authority, rep.Undo = wr.DockerEngine, wr.Authority, wr.Undo
+	wantEngine := ""
+	for _, u := range wr.Upgraded {
+		if u.Name == "docker-ce" {
+			wantEngine = EngineOf(u.Version)
+		}
+	}
+	verdict := func(h *Health) (bool, string) {
+		switch wr.Layer {
+		case LayerDocker:
+			return DockerHealthVerdict(wr.HealthBefore, h, wantEngine, wr.DockerEngine)
+		case LayerHost:
+			t := hub.TunnelUnknown
+			if l.Tunnel != nil {
+				t, _ = l.Tunnel.Status(ctx)
+			}
+			return HostHealthVerdict(wr.HealthBefore, h, t)
+		}
+		return HealthVerdict(wr.HealthBefore, h)
+	}
+	ok, why := verdict(wr.HealthAfter)
+	if !ok && len(wr.Upgraded) > 0 && wr.VMID > 0 {
+		lane := "fast"
+		if wr.Layer == LayerDocker {
+			lane = "slow"
+		}
+		if hr, err := l.call(ctx, "kept-"+runID, map[string]any{"release_id": "kept", "layer": wr.Layer, "lane": lane,
+			"vmid": wr.VMID, "mode": "health", "packages": []Package{}}); err == nil && hr.Health != nil {
+			ok, why = verdict(hr.Health)
+		}
+	}
+	rep.Healthy, rep.HealthReason = ok, prefix
+	if why != "" {
+		rep.HealthReason = prefix + ": " + why
+	}
+	if !ok && rep.Outcome == "applied" {
+		rep.Outcome = "health_failed"
+	}
+	rep.Installed, rep.Pending = wr.Installed, wr.Pending
+	rep.RestartNeeded, rep.DockerRestartNeeded, rep.RebootNeeded = wr.RestartNeeded, wr.DockerRestartNeeded, wr.RebootNeeded
+	rep.RebootScanned = wr.RebootScanned
+	if wr.Layer == LayerDocker {
+		rep.Installed, rep.Pending = onlyDocker(wr.Installed), onlyDockerPending(wr.Pending)
+	} else {
+		planned := map[string]bool{}
+		for _, u := range wr.Upgraded {
+			planned[u.Name] = true
+		}
+		rep.NotCovered = notCovered(wr.Pending, ring, planned)
+	}
+	return rep
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+package osupdate
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+
+	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-agent/internal/hub"
+)
+
+// R-868 (v0.144.0). THE NIGHT'S SHAPE (A5, demo-hp 2026-10-05 02:57 UTC): the wrapper finished six packages, the agent
+// was kill -9-ed before it read the report; the hub never got it. Here: the wrapper's kept copy and the plan file are
+// on disk, a NEW agent process starts — it must send exactly one `applied` report and delete both files.
+// COMPANION RED-PROOF: drop the SendUnsent body (return 0) → "the hub got no report".
+func TestR868_KilledPassIsReportedAtStart(t *testing.T) {
+	w := &fakeWrapper{t: t}
+	l, h := newLeg(t, w, &hub.WireOSUpdate{Ring: 0, Enabled: true})
+	ring := 0
+	kept := WrapperReport{Mode: "apply", Layer: LayerGuest, RunID: "20261005T025700Z", Trigger: "debug", Ring: &ring, VMID: 9201,
+		ReleaseID: "ring0-20261005T025700Z", HealthBefore: guestOK(), HealthAfter: guestOK(),
+		Upgraded: []Package{{Name: "libc6", Version: "u4"}, {Name: "openssl", Version: "u3"}}}
+	b, _ := json.Marshal(kept)
+	rp := reportFile(l.PlanDir, kept.RunID, LayerGuest, "apply")
+	pp := planFile(l.PlanDir, kept.RunID, LayerGuest, "apply")
+	must(t, os.WriteFile(rp, b, 0o600))
+	must(t, os.WriteFile(pp, []byte("{}"), 0o600))
+	if n := l.SendUnsent(context.Background()); n != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("sent %d, want 1", n)
+	}
+	if len(h.reports) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("the hub got no report (or several): %+v", h.reports)
+	}
+	r := h.reports[0]
+	if r.Outcome != "applied" || !r.Healthy || r.Trigger != "debug" || r.RunID != kept.RunID || r.Ring != 0 || len(r.Upgraded) != 2 || r.VMID != 9201 {
+		t.Fatalf("report = %+v", r)
+	}
+	for _, p := range []string{rp, pp} {
+		if _, err := os.Stat(p); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
+			t.Fatalf("%s still on disk after the hub got it", filepath.Base(p))
+		}
+	}
+	// a second start sends nothing again — no duplicate report
+	if n := l.SendUnsent(context.Background()); n != 0 || len(h.reports) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("sent again: %d, reports %d", n, len(h.reports))
+	}
+}
+
+// A normal pass: the hub gets ONE report per layer and the kept copies are gone after it (nothing resent later).
+// COMPANION RED-PROOF: drop the os.Remove(rep.unsent) in finish → the next pass resends → "2 guest reports".
+func TestR868_NormalPassLeavesNoCopyAndNoDuplicate(t *testing.T) {
+	w := &fakeWrapper{t: t, keep: true, applyRep: map[string]WrapperReport{LayerGuest: {Upgraded: []Package{{Name: "libc6", Version: "u4"}}}}}
+	l, h := newLeg(t, w, &hub.WireOSUpdate{Ring: 0, Enabled: true})
+	l.Run(context.Background(), 9201, "debug")
+	left, _ := filepath.Glob(filepath.Join(l.PlanDir, "report-*.json"))
+	if len(left) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("kept copies left after the hub got them: %v", left)
+	}
+	l.Run(context.Background(), 9201, "debug") // the next pass sends kept copies first
+	guest := 0
+	for _, r := range h.reports {
+		if r.Layer == LayerGuest && r.Outcome == "applied" {
+			guest++
+		}
+	}
+	if guest != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("%d guest reports for 2 passes (a duplicate or a loss)", guest)
+	}
+}
+
+type failingHub struct{ n int }
+
+func (h *failingHub) PostOSReport(context.Context, []byte) error {
+	h.n++
+	return errors.New("hub away")
+}
+
+// The hub away: the copy stays, and goes at the next chance.
+func TestR868_HubAwayKeepsTheCopy(t *testing.T) {
+	w := &fakeWrapper{t: t, keep: true, applyRep: map[string]WrapperReport{LayerGuest: {Upgraded: []Package{{Name: "libc6", Version: "u4"}}}}}
+	l, _ := newLeg(t, w, &hub.WireOSUpdate{Ring: 0, Enabled: true})
+	l.Appliance = false
+	l.Hub = &failingHub{}
+	l.Run(context.Background(), 9201, "night")
+	left, _ := filepath.Glob(filepath.Join(l.PlanDir, "report-*.json"))
+	if len(left) != 2 { // ring 0: the guest step and the Docker step each kept one
+		t.Fatalf("the copies must stay while the hub is away: %v", left)
+	}
+	h := &fakeHub{}
+	l.Hub = h
+	if n := l.SendUnsent(context.Background()); n != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("sent %d: %+v", n, h.reports)
+	}
+	for _, r := range h.reports {
+		if r.Trigger != "night" || r.Ring != 0 {
+			t.Fatalf("the kept report lost its ids: %+v", r)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// A pass in progress holds the lock: the sender at start must not take that pass's copy (it would be sent twice).
+func TestR868_RunningPassKeepsTheSenderOff(t *testing.T) {
+	w := &fakeWrapper{t: t}
+	l, h := newLeg(t, w, nil)
+	must(t, os.WriteFile(reportFile(l.PlanDir, "r1", LayerGuest, "apply"), []byte(`{"mode":"apply","layer":"guest"}`), 0o600))
+	unlock := l.lockPass(true)
+	if n := l.SendUnsent(context.Background()); n != 0 || len(h.reports) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("sent while a pass ran: %d", n)
+	}
+	unlock()
+	if n := l.SendUnsent(context.Background()); n != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("not sent after the pass: %d", n)
+	}
+}
+
+func must(t *testing.T, err error) {
+	t.Helper()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+}
@@ -51,6 +51,10 @@ const (
 	// A Docker engine step in the customer guest (agent v0.142.0, `11` §5.8) — ring 1, and every undo. Destructive-class
 	// (signed, operational key) like agent_update; the root wrapper re-verifies the same signature itself.
 	ClassOSDockerStep OpClass = "os_docker_step"
+
+	// The config bundle (agent v0.143.0, R-840, `11` §5.4.2): the box's ROOT-OWNED files (sudoers, wrappers, units).
+	// Destructive-class (signed, operational key) like agent_update; the root wrapper re-verifies the signature itself.
+	ClassAgentConfigUpdate OpClass = "agent_config_update"
 )

 // Disposition is the classifier verdict.
@@ -119,7 +123,7 @@ func Classify(class OpClass, prov Provenance) Disposition {
 		return Destructive
 	case ClassKeyRotation:
 		return Destructive
-	case ClassAgentUpdate, ClassOSDockerStep:
+	case ClassAgentUpdate, ClassOSDockerStep, ClassAgentConfigUpdate:
 		// Never benign — no agent-internal provenance can make replacing the agent binary
 		// unsigned-safe (a compromised process must not be able to self-bless an update).
 		return Destructive
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""build-config-bundle.py — build the agent's CONFIG BUNDLE (R-840, `11` §5.4.2).
+
+Usage:  python3 scripts/build-config-bundle.py <agent-version> <out.json>     (prints the bundle's sha256)
+
+The bundle is every root-owned file the installer's step 5 writes for the agent (sudoers, wrappers, units), as ONE
+JSON file published beside the binary (felhom-agent/<version>/felhom-config-bundle.json). A box takes it by a signed
+`agent_config_update` job; a new box takes the SAME file from the installer. The list of files is NOT kept here: it is
+`BUNDLE_FILES` in configs/felhom-os-apply, the root wrapper that installs it — one table, so the builder cannot put in a
+path the wrapper would refuse, nor leave out one it expects.
+
+Reproducible by construction: no timestamps, sorted keys, the table's order. The same source at the same version gives
+the same sha256 every time (pinned by configs/test_felhom_config_bundle.py).
+"""
+import base64
+import hashlib
+import importlib.machinery
+import importlib.util
+import json
+import pathlib
+import re
+import sys
+
+REPO = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent
+CONFIGS = REPO / "configs"
+
+
+def load_wrapper(configs=CONFIGS):
+    loader = importlib.machinery.SourceFileLoader("osapply_for_bundle", str(configs / "felhom-os-apply"))
+    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_loader("osapply_for_bundle", loader)
+    mod = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
+    loader.exec_module(mod)
+    return mod
+
+
+def build(version, configs=CONFIGS):
+    if not re.match(r"^[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+(-[0-9A-Za-z.]+)?$", version):
+        raise SystemExit(f"build-config-bundle: version {version!r} is not semver")
+    w = load_wrapper(configs)
+    files = []
+    for dest, src, mode, check, policy in w.BUNDLE_FILES:
+        data = (configs / src).read_bytes()
+        files.append({"path": dest, "source": f"configs/{src}", "mode": oct(mode), "check": check, "policy": policy,
+                      "sha256": hashlib.sha256(data).hexdigest(), "content_b64": base64.b64encode(data).decode()})
+    body = {"format": w.BUNDLE_FORMAT, "agent_version": version, "files": files}
+    return (json.dumps(body, indent=1, sort_keys=True) + "\n").encode()
+
+
+def main(argv):
+    if len(argv) != 3:
+        print(__doc__, file=sys.stderr)
+        return 2
+    data = build(argv[1])
+    pathlib.Path(argv[2]).write_bytes(data)
+    print(hashlib.sha256(data).hexdigest())
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    sys.exit(main(sys.argv))
@@ -100,6 +100,15 @@ built_ver="$("$BIN" --version 2>/dev/null | awk '{print $2}')"
 BUILT_SHA="$(sha256sum "$BIN" | awk '{print $1}')"
 log "built ok: sha256 $BUILT_SHA"

+# ── 3b. The config bundle (R-840) ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+# Every root-owned file the installer's step 5 writes (sudoers, wrappers, units), as ONE file beside the binary. A box
+# takes it by a signed agent_config_update; a new box from the installer. Reproducible: same source → same sha.
+BUNDLE="$(mktemp -t felhom-config-bundle-XXXXXX)"
+trap 'rm -f "$BIN" "$BUNDLE"' EXIT
+BUNDLE_SHA="$(python3 "$REPO_ROOT/scripts/build-config-bundle.py" "$VERSION" "$BUNDLE")" || die "config bundle build failed"
+[[ "$BUNDLE_SHA" =~ ^[0-9a-f]{64}$ ]] || die "config bundle build printed no sha256"
+log "config bundle built: sha256 $BUNDLE_SHA"
+
 # ── 4. Tag LOCALLY (the push comes after the publish — see step 6) ──────────────────────────────
 #
 # THE ORDER CHANGED, AND ONLY THE PUSH MOVED (R-188, 2026-08-03).
@@ -153,6 +162,12 @@ if ! bash "$REPO_ROOT/scripts/publish-agent.sh" "$VERSION" "$BIN"; then
    die "publish failed"
 fi

+# ── 5b. Publish the config bundle beside the binary (same package version, same credentials) ──
+BURL="$GITEA_BASE/api/packages/$GITEA_OWNER/generic/felhom-agent/$VERSION/felhom-config-bundle.json"
+bcode="$(curl -sS -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' -u "${GITEA_USER}:${GITEA_TOKEN}" -X PUT --upload-file "$BUNDLE" "$BURL")"
+[[ "$bcode" == "201" || "$bcode" == "200" ]] || die "config bundle upload failed: HTTP $bcode (the binary IS published; re-run only the bundle upload)"
+log "config bundle published (HTTP $bcode)"
+
 # ── 6. Push the tag, now that the package exists ────────────────────────────────────────────────
 # This is the step that makes the release VISIBLE — to CI, and to every `raw/tag/v<version>/` fetch
 # the installer makes. It runs last of the two so CI can never see a tag whose package is not there.
@@ -193,6 +208,11 @@ DL_SHA="$(sha256sum "$DL" | awk '{print $1}')"
 [[ "$DL_SHA" == "$BUILT_SHA" ]] \
    || die "published sha $DL_SHA != built sha $BUILT_SHA — the artifact is not what was built"

+BDL="$(mktemp -t felhom-config-bundle-dl-XXXXXX)"
+trap 'rm -f "$BIN" "$DL" "$BUNDLE" "$BDL"' EXIT
+curl -fsS -o "$BDL" "$BURL" || die "round-trip GET of the config bundle failed"
+[[ "$(sha256sum "$BDL" | awk '{print $1}')" == "$BUNDLE_SHA" ]] || die "published config bundle sha != built sha"
+
 # The tag must also serve the configs the installer will fetch from it.
 cfg_code="$(curl -fsS -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' \
    "$GITEA_BASE/$GITEA_OWNER/felhom-agent/raw/tag/$TAG/configs/felhom-agent.service" 2>/dev/null || true)"
@@ -206,6 +226,7 @@ cat <<EOF
    version : $VERSION
    tag     : $TAG
    sha256  : $BUILT_SHA
+    bundle  : $BUNDLE_SHA   (felhom-config-bundle.json — vouch it with the agent)

  NOT VOUCHED. Vouching is what points machines at this version and stays your deliberate act:
  hub operator UI → Configs → Day-0 artifacts. Until then boxes keep installing the previous one.
Author	SHA1	Message	Date
admin	ca78c17b29	v0.144.0 code: R8 measures the real download (R-865); an OS pass's report survives a killed agent (R-868); the debug pass runs from the saved block when the hub is away (R-866) gates / gates (push) Successful in 19s Details Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS	2026-10-05 07:14:32 +02:00
admin	c8d12f1f2a	REPORT + CONTEXT: 2026-10-04 night (R-840 / R-860) gates / gates (push) Successful in 20s Details Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS	2026-10-04 20:39:47 +02:00
admin	dc9164c5af	CHANGELOG v0.143.0 (R-840); build-golden.sh 3.2.0: GOLDEN_GUEST_PKGS — the approved guest release at bake time, first-night count gates / gates (push) Successful in 19s Details Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS	2026-10-04 20:08:16 +02:00
admin	c9fa2e717b	R-840: the config bundle — a signed agent_config_update brings a box's root-owned files (sudoers, wrappers, units) gates / gates (push) Successful in 18s Details felhom-os-apply gains mode 'bundle' (signed, verified by the wrapper itself against the root-owned signers file — or, when that file is missing, only the installer's pinned key, which it then creates) and --install-bundle (the installer's root entry). BUNDLE_FILES is the one table of paths; every check (visudo, sh/bash -n, python, unit sections, RuntimeDirectory guard, nft -c, the route itself) runs before the first write; a failed write or self-check puts every previous copy back. The trust root is never a bundle path (R17). scripts/build-config-bundle.py builds it reproducibly; release-agent.sh publishes it beside the binary. The agent reports the bundle record in system.config_bundle. felhom-opsign signs agent_config_update. 43 wrapper tests (22 mutants red), Go executor tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS	2026-10-04 19:36:58 +02:00
admin	0af1187e03	CHANGELOG + REPORT: v0.142.1 released (R-858) gates / gates (push) Successful in 19s Details Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS	2026-10-04 18:21:46 +02:00
admin	495003051b	R-858: after a Docker engine step the wrapper restarts ONLY the containers that mount the docker socket (controller, traefik); the health rule fails when the controller cannot reach Docker from inside its container (ruling 95) gates / gates (push) Successful in 18s Details Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS	2026-10-04 18:21:24 +02:00
admin	42af3ab9bc	build-golden.sh 3.1.0: live-restore on in the golden (fail-closed assertion), GOLDEN_DOCKER_PKGS pins the approved Docker engine set gates / gates (push) Successful in 19s Details Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS	2026-10-04 17:30:19 +02:00
admin	f24dce5b95	CHANGELOG + REPORT: v0.142.0 released gates / gates (push) Successful in 18s Details Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS	2026-10-04 16:15:15 +02:00