Commit Graph
3 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
admin ec7e699fd7 agent (unreleased): fixes after an independent review — one lock for the writers of agent.json, the trust run serialised and bounded, the CA copy keeps its previous root, the profile stanza from the wrapper's answer, a stale give-up ends, both boot tokens from one read
gates / gates (push) Successful in 48s
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS
2026-11-14 19:09:21 +01:00
admin a1135018c7 agent (unreleased): a refused signed job and a watchdog give-up reach the hub (R-1383, D78)
gates / gates (push) Successful in 42s
The job runner clears a job with its outcome, a closed reason code and the op's name. The guest-power watchdog's
give-up rides the host report until the guest runs.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS
2026-11-14 17:29:53 +01:00
admin 367a503a0f F-REBOOT + F-LEAK: the agent's authority over guest lifecycle (v0.107.0)
F-REBOOT — a guest rebooted mid-backup never came back (fault 11: 9m47s of total
appliance outage, no lock, nothing retrying). The existing stale-lock recovery is
correct but missed it two ways: its predicate needs a stale vzdump lock and that
guest was unlocked, and it runs only at agent startup. New periodic guest-power
watchdog acts on 'should be running, is not, is not locked'.

onboot is the should-be-running signal, not invented here: stalelock.go already
uses it for this same decision, it is 0 on scratch/golden, and pve-guests uses it
at host boot. Guards: onboot:0 never touched (Scenario B), a locked guest is left
to the stale-lock path, a guest with a vzdump in flight is left stopped,
unprovable ownership acts on nothing, unconfirmable backup state fails safe.
Bounded retry 3x at 1/2/4m then ERROR (Scenario C) — a healthy start takes ~25s.

F-LEAK — a failed restore-test could not destroy its scratch (403 VM.Allocate).
It is pool membership, not privsep: VM.Allocate is granted at /pool/felhom only,
and a failed restore never completes the --pool association. Fix needs NO new
grant — Pool.Allocate is already held, so the teardown adopts the stranded
scratch into the pool and retries the destroy. Guarded by scratchAdoptAllowed:
scratch provenance AND the numeric band, both required (Scenario E).

Six red-proofs across both fixes, all observed failing.
2026-07-28 10:27:07 +02:00