Commit Graph

7 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
admin c12b512316 GL-5: DR bring-up structural bind overrides + 4d real-bind swap
ModeDRGuestLoss now passes restore-time MountOverrides for the two
platform-constant structural binds (mp8 parent, mp9 bootstrap) via the
shared throwaway-volume format helper - without them a customer-archive
restore under the privsep token fails outright ("restoring 'mp8' to bind
mount is only possible for root"). New post-restore step 4d swaps the real
binds in via the host runner (root pct set, one slot per call), deletes the
displaced unusedN volumes (API config PUT; a scoped-token refusal logs the
residue loudly instead of widening privileges), and respects the
committed/launched rollback envelope. Provision passes nil overrides -
byte-identical behavior (regression contract test).

Engine grows an optional HostRunner + StateDir seam (DR refuses up front
without a runner); selftest bring-up wires the ExecRunner + cleans the
scratch mp9 host dir on teardown; proxmox.GuestConfig.Unused() added.
6 new tests incl. C2 mid-swap rollback + C3 older-archive + 403-warn paths.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
2026-07-08 08:48:11 +02:00
admin ca0b169a4e feat(reconcile): re-assert pool membership after restore-over-existing (campaign-2 R2, v0.74.0)
Pool membership is what lets the pool-scoped token reach a guest; pct restore
--pool sets it only at CREATE, so a restore over an existing VMID drops the guest
from the felhom pool and 403s the next restore-test/DR on VM.Audit. This empty-pool
state is the true root cause of the campaign's "R1" (bind-mount restore failing was
a symptom — restore-test's existing bind neutralization never ran without config-read).

Add Client.PoolAddVMID (PUT /pools, additive+idempotent, Pool.Allocate) and call it
in bring-up after liveness when spec.Pool!="" — warn-not-fail on a hiccup (liveness
wins). B3 scratch-teardown 403 diagnosed as a cascade (restoretest already passes
Pool). Role/ACL untouched. Tests + red-proof.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
2026-07-07 18:42:19 +02:00
admin b9356d60ab v0.60.0: proof-of-launch destroy gating (F1a/b/c) + restore-test band-advance (F2)
Campaign pool-effects F1 (HIGH): the bring-up compensating rollback and the
restore-test teardown destroyed the target vmid even when RestoreLXC failed
synchronously without creating anything — destroying a guest the transaction
never made (only the pool ACL 403 contained it). A RestoreLXC UPID is now the
sole destroy authorization in all three destroy paths (in-process bring-up
defer, in-process restore-test teardown, Recover). F2: the restore-test
advances past an 'already exists' band vmid (invisible squatter) instead of
failing + false-alerting; a fully-occupied band Skips.

Red-proof verified: with the gates reverted, the four new tests fail with the
innocent-guest destroy. go build/vet/test clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-02 10:18:51 +02:00
admin 7639ab5c4b v0.53.0: restore guests INTO the felhom pool (pool-scoped-ACL enabler)
RestoreLXCOptions.Pool → pct restore --pool (omit-when-empty). New
reconcile.DefaultPool="felhom"; BringUpSpec.Pool threaded to the bring-up
restore; BOTH restore sites pool the guest (provision/DR via spec.Pool set to
DefaultPool by the CLI; restore-test scratch via DefaultPool = SPIKE residual
#2). No agent ACL change (ships in host-install v1.6.0); the pool param is inert
until the token has Pool.Allocate + the pool exists, so publishing is safe ahead
of the coordinated swap. Tests + red-proofs; go build/vet/test clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-01 12:32:41 +02:00
admin 459dad954b v0.40.0: third CT volume — SSD user-data (/mnt/sys_drive, mp1) baked + -sysdata-grow
Extends the OS/Docker-data split to a three-volume layout: rootfs + Docker-data
(mp0) + SSD user-data (mp1 @ /mnt/sys_drive, backup=1) = the controller's
system_data_path. Clears the controller's "not a separate drive" warning with
zero controller change (it already auto-discovers <sys_drive>/felhom-data and
warns via system.IsMountPoint; the mp reaches the container via the existing
-v /mnt:/mnt:rslave bind).

- build-golden.sh: --mp1 ...,mp=/mnt/sys_drive,backup=1 (env GOLDEN_SYSDATA_GB=8);
  findmnt /mnt/sys_drive separate-mount guard + vzdump aborts if mp0 OR mp1 excluded.
- bringup.go: DefaultSysDataMount=mp1; BringUpSpec.{SysDataGrowGB,SysDataMount};
  new "4c" online grow-only block mirroring the "4b" Docker-data grow.
- main.go: -sysdata-grow / -sysdata-mount flags wired into all three call sites.
- Tests: SysDataGrow (asserts ResizeLXC mp1 +42G) + SysDataGrowZeroNoResize.
- RUNBOOK extended to the three-volume layout (32 rootfs + 200 docker + 50 user-data).

Static CT volume, NOT an enrolled drive — never enrolls/ejects/decommissions.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017PsnU2ASocYrvzqE82YDYW
2026-06-23 16:25:14 +02:00
admin d7d68fdd83 v0.29.0: OS/Docker-data storage split — golden + provision (Phase 1)
build-golden.sh bakes a small OS rootfs + a dedicated /var/lib/docker volume
(mp0, backup=1) carrying the baked images, plus Docker log rotation. bringup.go
grows the golden's data volume to the per-customer target (DataVolGrowGB) and
emits backup=1 on data mounts (GuestMount.Backup) — closing the spike-B3 silent
DB-loss trap. CLI gains -rootfs-grow/-datavol-grow/-datavol-mount. New
RUNBOOK-provisioning-storage.md. Phase 2 = felhom-controller v0.58.0.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-13 15:38:26 +02:00
admin 57405c1a99 slice 7 Phase 1: unified bring-up reconcile job (provision + guest-loss DR) (v0.8.0)
The shared front half of provision and guest-loss DR as a journaled reconcile job
(internal/reconcile/bringup.go), mirroring the restore-test's crash-safety but keeping
the guest on success and applying a scenario-specific identity policy. Agent-only; no
hub/wire change. Grounded by the slice-7 bring-up spike (commit 3342993): F1/F3/F4.

- RunBringUp: restore -> reset identity -> size -> attach mounts -> start link-up;
  verdict is liveness (waitRunning), success KEEPS the guest.
- identity policy: provision = fresh MAC (net0 sans hwaddr -> PVE regen) + hostname,
  host-side; machine-id/host-keys regenerate guest-side (systemd + baked golden unit).
  dr_guest_loss = preserve continuity (keep hostname; keep MAC unless KeepMAC=false).
- compensating rollback: mid-flight failure destroys the just-created guest
  (SameTxnCreated provenance, gated); new Rollback journal flag + Recover.recoverBringUp
  reap a half-built guest from a crash.
- F4: coalesced config PUT + bounded retry on the transient PVE config-lock 500 only.
- --selftest=bring-up (mode/archive/vmid/hostname/keep).
- configs/build-golden.sh: validated golden recipe incl. the F3 first-boot host-key unit.
- doc-03 §9 + identity-reset settled/implemented.

Deferred (stated): provisioning back half -> slice 8; host-loss DR + escrow consumption
and the BringUpSpec source (hub desired-state) -> slice 10.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-09 21:27:49 +02:00