Campaign pool-effects F1 (HIGH): the bring-up compensating rollback and the
restore-test teardown destroyed the target vmid even when RestoreLXC failed
synchronously without creating anything — destroying a guest the transaction
never made (only the pool ACL 403 contained it). A RestoreLXC UPID is now the
sole destroy authorization in all three destroy paths (in-process bring-up
defer, in-process restore-test teardown, Recover). F2: the restore-test
advances past an 'already exists' band vmid (invisible squatter) instead of
failing + false-alerting; a fully-occupied band Skips.
Red-proof verified: with the gates reverted, the four new tests fail with the
innocent-guest destroy. go build/vet/test clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The shared front half of provision and guest-loss DR as a journaled reconcile job
(internal/reconcile/bringup.go), mirroring the restore-test's crash-safety but keeping
the guest on success and applying a scenario-specific identity policy. Agent-only; no
hub/wire change. Grounded by the slice-7 bring-up spike (commit 3342993): F1/F3/F4.
- RunBringUp: restore -> reset identity -> size -> attach mounts -> start link-up;
verdict is liveness (waitRunning), success KEEPS the guest.
- identity policy: provision = fresh MAC (net0 sans hwaddr -> PVE regen) + hostname,
host-side; machine-id/host-keys regenerate guest-side (systemd + baked golden unit).
dr_guest_loss = preserve continuity (keep hostname; keep MAC unless KeepMAC=false).
- compensating rollback: mid-flight failure destroys the just-created guest
(SameTxnCreated provenance, gated); new Rollback journal flag + Recover.recoverBringUp
reap a half-built guest from a crash.
- F4: coalesced config PUT + bounded retry on the transient PVE config-lock 500 only.
- --selftest=bring-up (mode/archive/vmid/hostname/keep).
- configs/build-golden.sh: validated golden recipe incl. the F3 first-boot host-key unit.
- doc-03 §9 + identity-reset settled/implemented.
Deferred (stated): provisioning back half -> slice 8; host-loss DR + escrow consumption
and the BringUpSpec source (hub desired-state) -> slice 10.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Fixes the crying-wolf false-fail surfaced by the live hub-enrollment runbook:
PVE's guest-start task exits "WARNINGS: 1" for the benign systemd-nesting
advisory, and WaitTask treated any non-OK exitstatus as failure, so the verdict
was decided by an advisory exit code before the real boot check ran. Every
modern-distro restore-test reported pass:false.
- proxmox.WaitOptions.AllowWarnings (opt-in; default keeps all callers strict)
- restore-test start step accepts warnings, surfaces them, verdict stays waitRunning
- RestoreTestResult.StartWarnings/.WarningsRecognized + version-free "enable
nesting" recognizer (can't rot back at systemd 258+); GuestAPI.TaskLogTail
- hub.RestoreTest.warnings/.warnings_recognized wire fields (consumed by hub v0.7.5)
- scheduler logs clean / passed-with-recognized / passed-with-unrecognized warnings
- tests: WaitTask warnings matrix; restore-test pass/fail-on-liveness; version-free
regression guard (systemd 256-300)
Single agent bump 0.6.0 -> 0.7.0 covering the agent half of both task phases.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The security core of slice 4: hub-supplied intent is no longer trusted for
destructive change. The gate fronts the per-guest queue's executor, so every
mutation passes it. Reuses internal/authz for all crypto (surface untouched).
- Classifier (doc 03 §4): benign vs destructive by provenance + data-bearing-
ness, NOT by verb. Destroy/overwrite of customer data is destructive unless
agent-internal provenance (same-journaled-txn create, or agent-tagged scratch)
makes it benign — and that provenance is journal-recorded, NEVER hub-sourced.
Unknown op class fails safe to destructive.
- Reversibility gate: benign -> allowed unsigned; destructive -> requires a
verified, role-scoped, action-bound operator signature, else pending_signature
and never executed. Every decision audited (signal, never the guard).
- Signed-op consuming layer over authz.Verifier.Verify (locked pipeline
untouched): role-scoping (doc 04 §4 — recovery=rotation only, operational=
ordinary destructive + planned rotation) + op-to-action binding (op+host+
guest+params must match the gated action).
- Signed-job orchestration: idempotency dedupe by nonce + journal-wrapped
execution via an injected DestructiveExecutor (nil this slice — inert).
- Crash recovery (Note 1): Engine.Recover consumes the journal InFlight() set at
startup (resume-or-rollback) — covers an op that crashed after the POST and
before its terminal record, which idempotency dedupe alone cannot. Added
TaskStatusOnce to the GuestAPI seam. Wired into daemon startup.
- Note 2: memory comparison canonicalized to MiB (desiredMemoryMiB) so a
non-MiB-aligned MemoryBytes converges in one pass, not perpetual drift.
- Daemon: builds the verifier from config signers (none = nil verifier, the
common slice-4 state), the gate (+SlogAudit), runs Recover before mutating.
Adversarial matrix proven against the REAL authz.Verifier with in-test-minted
SSHSIGs (framing replicated in reconcile's test binary; authz untouched, no
signing added to the verify-only package): unsigned job + unsigned desired-state
delta -> pending_signature; unknown signer/expired/replay-across-restart/wrong
host -> typed authz rejections; wrong guest/op/params -> binding_mismatch;
recovery key on ordinary destructive -> role_denied; hub-supplied scratch tag
ignored -> refused; valid+role+target+fresh nonce -> accepted then replay
rejected. Full module race-clean + vet-clean on the Linux build server.
Inert this slice: no destructive deltas served until slice 10; the destructive
path is classified, gated, and tested but not wired to live execution.
CHECKPOINT: Phase B complete (slice 4 done). Awaiting validation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
New internal/reconcile package: the agent-side control core's structural half.
- Per-guest serializer Queue (doc 03 §10): the single choke point all mutation
sources funnel through; same-vmid serial in submit order, different vmids
parallel (cond-var FIFO lanes).
- Desired-state model + DesiredProvider seam; EmptyProvider is the only live
source at slice 4 (no hub serving until slice 10) so the live engine computes
an empty action set and performs zero mutations.
- Normalization layer (FieldNormalizers): normalized desired-vs-actual so
Proxmox round-trip quirks don't read as drift. normDesc promoted out of
main.go to reconcile.NormDescription; selftest uses the shared helper.
- Plan (pure diff): minimal benign action set (Start/Stop/SetConfig) for guests
in both desired and actual; provision/destroy out of scope here.
- Engine: dispatches onto the shared queue; honors the dual-mode SetConfig
contract (UPID -> WaitTask; empty UPID -> synchronous success).
- Durable op journal + idempotency store (mirrors authz.FileNonceStore):
in-flight task ids for crash detection + AlreadyApplied dedupe across restart.
- Wired into runDaemon alongside the hub loop, sharing the queue; runs cleanly
with no desired state and no signers.
Full module race-clean and vet-clean on the Linux build server.
CHECKPOINT: Phase A only. Awaiting validation before Phase B (the reversibility
gate + signed-op consuming layer, landing v0.4.0).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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