Closes the agent half of R-39's fleet fix. Requires hub >=0.68.0 for the re-arm signal;
that hub is safe for 0.90.0 agents (unknown key dropped), so it deploys first.
Three compounding defects let a box report `applied` while every PBS request 401'd:
1. The re-key was INVISIBLE. An ep0 re-issue rotates the secret of an existing token, so
token_id/fingerprint/datastore/namespace come back byte-identical and the descriptor
content hash never moved — the converged agent short-circuited and never consumed the
fresh secret. WirePBSDR.SecretGeneration (field-exact with the hub) is what moves the
hash now, because descriptorHash marshals this struct.
2. The agent could not READ its own credential. It writes /etc/pve/priv/storage/<id>.pw
through the root wrapper, but that dir is 0700 root:www-data and the wrapper had no
read verb — so the target resolver got "permission denied" every cycle, warned, and
skipped. The one loop that could have caught the 401 was blind BY CONSTRUCTION. Adds a
narrow `read` verb (+ exactly one sudoers line, + a pbsdr-read capability row): one
secret to stdout, no network, no mutation, never in argv (sudo logs argv), traversal
refused by the id grammar, the dir allowlist AND a resolved-path prefix assertion.
3. Nothing probed AUTHENTICATION. pbs.ProbeAuth (GET /version + an ErrUnauthorized
sentinel) runs on the 15-minute collect path and its verdict becomes a loud
`auth_failed` the hub escalates to a fresh mint. /version needs no datastore, namespace
or privilege, so a 401 means the CREDENTIAL is bad; 403 is deliberately NOT treated as
unauthorized, since re-keying a too-narrow token would mint forever without fixing
anything. A transport error is UNKNOWN, never a rejection — otherwise every network
blip burns a credential. Recovery self-clears.
R-50b(a): the report now carries the installed wrapper's sha256 so drift against the
vouched manifest value is answerable. Empty = unknown, never drift.
Three red-proofs, all at the assertion level. Removing SecretGeneration fails the re-arm
test with "consume calls=1, want 2". Swallowing the probe result leaves State:applied
AuthFailed:false — the July-18 shape exactly. Notably, deleting the wrapper's id charset
guard alone does NOT open a traversal hole (readlink + the prefix assertion still catch
it), so the isolating red-proof removes BOTH and shows the out-of-tree secret printed —
the layering is real, and a single-guard red-proof would have passed vacuously.
Config-only (wrapper + red-proof); the Go binary is unchanged, so this ships
with the next agent deploy as a config artifact.
The reconcile verb built `args=(--server "$server" --fingerprint "$fp")`. PVE
treats a PBS storage's `server` as a CREATE-ONLY parameter and rejects the
ENTIRE `pvesm set` call — "can't change value of fixed parameter 'server'" —
even when the value passed is byte-identical to the stored one. So reconcile
could never succeed against an existing entry; it exited 255 every time.
That is severe rather than cosmetic because the agent consumes the hub's
ONE-TIME PBS token secret BEFORE invoking the wrapper. Each hub "Re-issue PBS
credentials" therefore minted a secret, the agent burned it, the wrapper
rejected the apply, and the entry stayed pinned to the revoked credential —
a PBS DR tier authenticating 401 indefinitely while the agent reported
`pbsdr: converged state=applied`.
Live-diagnosed on the N100 during the rehearsal wrap (felhom.eu
tests/VALIDATION-n100-rehearsal-2026-07-18.md F2, ROADMAP R-39). Proven on the
live entry before writing code: `pvesm set <id> --server <same> --fingerprint
<same>` -> rejected; the same call without --server -> rc 0. K (<id>.enc) and
the .pw store verified byte-untouched after the rejected call — PVE rejects
atomically, so the set-only law held.
Fix: drop --server. The server address is immutable by construction (relocating
a PBS endpoint needs a fresh create), so there was never anything to reconcile
there. --fingerprint (+ --password when a secret is fed) remain.
Red-proof TestReconcileNeverPassesServerToPvesmSet: isolates the reconcile)
block from the shipped wrapper, asserts no --server reaches `pvesm set` and
that --fingerprint is still pushed. Verified RED on the unfixed wrapper, GREEN
after. Handles two vacuous-pass traps that both fired while authoring it: the
pattern is line-ending tolerant (\r?\n — this repo is cloned on Windows, and an
\n-only pattern matches nothing and passes silently), and comment lines are
stripped before matching (the WHY note quotes the very flag under test).
NOT fixed here, both still open and riding the spec'd R-39 agent train:
1. R-39's primary half — the agent re-applies on a change of the DESCRIPTOR
HASH (manager.go ~L235), but a credential re-issue leaves the descriptor
byte-identical (same token_id/fingerprint; only the side-table secret
rotates) and bumps only the generation, so a converged agent still ignores
a fresh secret. This makes the apply succeed once it re-applies; it does
not make it re-apply.
2. The verify loop reads /etc/pve/priv/storage/<id>.pw directly as non-root —
a path it can only ever WRITE through the root wrapper (0700 root:www-data;
sudoers exposes create|reconcile|grant, no read verb), so it is permanently
blind to the failure it exists to catch.
Demo box: wrapper hotfixed in place (.bak-20260718-preR39 kept). NOT yet healed
— diagnosis consumed the pending secret against the unfixed wrapper; the agent
parked correctly in consumed-failed (no burn loop). Healing needs Viktor to
click "Re-issue PBS credentials"; the agent will then pick it up unaided
(marker.json absent, so the L235 short-circuit does not apply).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Nn3VgQk9iwEGgyx6QJ2NvE
admin