v0.92.0 was published before live verification showed three of the four guestnet probes had
no sudoers grant, so that artifact lacks FELHOM_GUESTNET and the guestnet-* capability rows.
Superseded, not overwritten: a published version stays immutable (the v0.91.0 -> v0.91.1
precedent). Watchdog code is unchanged; the functional fix is the sudoers file, which must
ship with the binary.
Closes the OPEN RISK in INCIDENT-guest-dhclient-killed-2026-07-20 §5. The guest's dhclient
is started once by ifupdown at boot and nothing supervises it; when it died on 2026-07-20
the guest ran another ~80 minutes on its unexpired lease, then lost its address and default
route and took the tunnel, hub reports, catalog sync and the controller->agent channel with
it (1h15m outage, healthy-looking for the first 80 minutes).
So liveness of the DHCP client is itself a probe: a DHCP guest is unhealthy the moment
`pgrep -x dhclient` comes back empty, while the lease is still live. Waiting for the address
to vanish is waiting out the silent window.
internal/guestnet: four fixed-shape pct exec probes (address, default route, interfaces
mode, dhclient liveness — parsers pinned to output captured live from 9201), the incident's
heal invocation verbatim, and dampers throughout: two consecutive bad probes, >=10 min
between heals, <=3/hour, observe-only while guest or agent uptime < 3 min. Refuses to act on
a static guest, an unknown mode, an unprobeable guest, or an unproven guest list (the source
is the pool-verified ListLXC ∩ felhom pool, never a bare ListLXC). A failed probe reads as
unknown, never as a dead client. Healthy cycles log a Debug line so "no alarms" and "never
probed" stay distinguishable. Not in the errc fan-out — a guest watchdog must never be able
to kill the agent.
guest_net is the repo's first default-ON gate (opt-out is `{"disable": true}`): it looks only
inward at guests we already own, and the failure exists on every box today.
Report block ships as GuestNetStatus, not the spec's WireGuestNet: Wire* is the DOWN
direction in this repo, report stanzas are *Status.
Red-proofs: classify reverted to IP-presence-only -> the July-20 fixture reports "healthy"
with zero heals; un-wiring the reporter and the goroutine fails the AST wiring test.
Also: `var version` was stale at 0.89.0 (ldflags hid it; `go run` did not).
v0.91.0 built the AuthSink seam and the NoteAuthResult consumer, and main.go never
called SetAuthSink. The reporter skips probing when no sink is attached, so the entire
auth-honesty leg was silently inert — no probe, no auth_failed, no self-heal — and
nothing failed, because every unit test injected the sink directly.
Caught during STOP-1 live verification by checking the wiring instead of trusting it.
Same class as the controller v0.154.0 defect the day before: a table test over a seam
proves the seam, not the caller.
The published 0.91.0 artifact is superseded, not overwritten — a published version stays
immutable. TestLiveReporter_NoSinkMeansNoProbe pins the no-sink-no-probe contract so the
inert case is documented behaviour rather than an accident; only live evidence can prove
the wiring itself.
Closes the agent half of R-39's fleet fix. Requires hub >=0.68.0 for the re-arm signal;
that hub is safe for 0.90.0 agents (unknown key dropped), so it deploys first.
Three compounding defects let a box report `applied` while every PBS request 401'd:
1. The re-key was INVISIBLE. An ep0 re-issue rotates the secret of an existing token, so
token_id/fingerprint/datastore/namespace come back byte-identical and the descriptor
content hash never moved — the converged agent short-circuited and never consumed the
fresh secret. WirePBSDR.SecretGeneration (field-exact with the hub) is what moves the
hash now, because descriptorHash marshals this struct.
2. The agent could not READ its own credential. It writes /etc/pve/priv/storage/<id>.pw
through the root wrapper, but that dir is 0700 root:www-data and the wrapper had no
read verb — so the target resolver got "permission denied" every cycle, warned, and
skipped. The one loop that could have caught the 401 was blind BY CONSTRUCTION. Adds a
narrow `read` verb (+ exactly one sudoers line, + a pbsdr-read capability row): one
secret to stdout, no network, no mutation, never in argv (sudo logs argv), traversal
refused by the id grammar, the dir allowlist AND a resolved-path prefix assertion.
3. Nothing probed AUTHENTICATION. pbs.ProbeAuth (GET /version + an ErrUnauthorized
sentinel) runs on the 15-minute collect path and its verdict becomes a loud
`auth_failed` the hub escalates to a fresh mint. /version needs no datastore, namespace
or privilege, so a 401 means the CREDENTIAL is bad; 403 is deliberately NOT treated as
unauthorized, since re-keying a too-narrow token would mint forever without fixing
anything. A transport error is UNKNOWN, never a rejection — otherwise every network
blip burns a credential. Recovery self-clears.
R-50b(a): the report now carries the installed wrapper's sha256 so drift against the
vouched manifest value is answerable. Empty = unknown, never drift.
Three red-proofs, all at the assertion level. Removing SecretGeneration fails the re-arm
test with "consume calls=1, want 2". Swallowing the probe result leaves State:applied
AuthFailed:false — the July-18 shape exactly. Notably, deleting the wrapper's id charset
guard alone does NOT open a traversal hole (readlink + the prefix assertion still catch
it), so the isolating red-proof removes BOTH and shows the out-of-tree secret printed —
the layering is real, and a single-guard red-proof would have passed vacuously.
MinAgent coupling: felhom-controller v0.143.0 gates its guest-memory-resize UI on
this agent (FeatureGuestMemoryResize, MinAgent 0.90.0).
R-24 guest RAM resize (internal/localapi/guestmemory.go): self-scoped GET/POST
/guest/memory. Agent enforces every bound FRESH per request (min 2048, max
host_total-2048, shrink floor max(2048, usage+512)); applies via PVE SetConfig —
live cgroup apply, no reboot (Phase-0 proven on the nested demo box). Verify-after-apply
re-reads maxmem before claiming success. New narrow MemoryOps seam (GuestAPI untouched);
Options.Memory nil -> 503. Memory only.
R-28 fast-tick (internal/fasttick): while any desired-state item is unapplied -
including the pre-tunnel window a hub poke can't reach - pulse the shared out-of-band
trigger every 30s, self-disarm on convergence. Four cached sources (desired-gen==0,
reconcile Planned-Pending>0, pbsdr waiting_secret only, wgtunnel desired-not-operational);
LOUD pbsdr states + pending_signature excluded. Seams: reconcile.Engine.LastResult() +
wgtunnel.Manager.TunnelConvergence() (cached, no per-tick exec).
Guests-0/0: hypothesis REFUTED live (9201 IS a pool member; 0/0 was the pre-provision
window; PoolAddVMID re-assert already covers restore-over-existing). No code change; the
fast-tick mitigates the window.
Tests + red-proofs (i floor guard, ii max guard, iii always-pulse) all restored green.
- pbsdr: on a 403 pre-check (non-default storage id, no ACL yet) self-grant via the root wrapper then re-read, instead of aborting before the grant — closes F4/R-22. Red-proof TestSelfGrant_PreCheck403DoesNotAbortBeforeGrant.
- escrow preflight: late-bound CurrentPBSStorageID re-reads agent.json so a pbsdr-seeded pbs_storage_id flips the row green in-process (no restart). Red-proof TestEscrowPreflight_PBSStorageIDLiveReload.
- internal/poke: contentless UDP poke listener bound exclusively to the box WG /32 (port 51822), leading-edge debounced, fires the hub-loop out-of-band trigger for an immediate desired-state cycle. First slice of R-13. Red-proofs TestBindConfinement + TestDebounceCoalescesBurst.
HashResticPassword = sha256 hex over the trimmed password (pinned
cross-repo vector). escrowUploadRequest gains restic_pw_sha256,omitempty
— set only when a staged password was sealed into the blob. Contract test
updated; hub mirrors next.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
ModeDRGuestLoss now passes restore-time MountOverrides for the two
platform-constant structural binds (mp8 parent, mp9 bootstrap) via the
shared throwaway-volume format helper - without them a customer-archive
restore under the privsep token fails outright ("restoring 'mp8' to bind
mount is only possible for root"). New post-restore step 4d swaps the real
binds in via the host runner (root pct set, one slot per call), deletes the
displaced unusedN volumes (API config PUT; a scoped-token refusal logs the
residue loudly instead of widening privileges), and respects the
committed/launched rollback envelope. Provision passes nil overrides -
byte-identical behavior (regression contract test).
Engine grows an optional HostRunner + StateDir seam (DR refuses up front
without a runner); selftest bring-up wires the ExecRunner + cleans the
scratch mp9 host dir on teardown; proxmox.GuestConfig.Unused() added.
6 new tests incl. C2 mid-swap rollback + C3 older-archive + 403-warn paths.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
Prerequisite for felhom-sshd (H1). Closes the SPIKE-felhom-sshd §8 lockout: a
second sshd's RuntimeDirectory=sshd removed the SHARED /run/sshd privsep dir and
took stock sshd on :22 down (sessions reset after KEXINIT).
Host artifacts (configs/, installed by felhom-host-install):
- felhom-privsep.tmpfiles: layer 1, boot-persistent /run/sshd owned by no unit
- felhom-mgmt-watchdog.sh/.service/.timer: layer 2, AGENT-INDEPENDENT ~60s heal
(stat-first recreate + reset-failed sshd only if failed + heal-marker); never
RuntimeDirectory=, never restarts stock sshd, never touches a healthy dir.
Go (internal/mgmtplane): read-only Reporter → additive omitempty mgmt_plane
heartbeat stanza (privsep_dir_ok/sshd_reachable/healed_recently/privsep_healed_at),
wired via Collector.SetMgmtPlaneReporter. Non-hollow tests + red-proofs.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
- reconcile: ClassAgentUpdate op class; always Destructive (no provenance
blesses replacing the root-adjacent binary). classify test + companion
(TestClassify_AgentUpdateAlwaysDestructive).
- opsign: `-op agent_update` with -agent-version + -sha256 (isHex64-validated);
params {version,sha256}. isHex64 test (Group D).
- config: SelfUpdateConfig{URLTemplate,Username,Token,StateDir,DwellSeconds}
+ WithDefaults + Token redaction.
- internal/selfupdate: Executor (download → verify vs the SIGNED sha → sudo -n
wrapper `apply`; sha is the only integrity root — mismatch refuses + removes,
agent untouched); Manager (startup dwell → `commit`; version-mismatch → no
commit + loud WARN + marker left for report visibility; shutdown-before-dwell
leaves pending). WrapperRunner seam → tests never shell out.
- hub report: additive selfupdate_pending(+version) via SetSelfUpdateReporter
seam; both omitempty (Wireguard precedent) so the cross-repo golden contract
stays byte-stable — no hub change.
- capability manifest: 3 non-critical FELHOM_SELFUPDATE probes.
- main.go: updateExec appended to the executor chain; commit-manager wired to
the report seam + MaybeCommit goroutine after core init.
Tests: Group A (executor happy/sha-mismatch+companion/bad-params/wrapper-fail),
B (agent_update rides the real gate: pinned-key executes, non-pinned +
retarget rejected), C (commit/version-mismatch/no-pending/shutdown), D (opsign).
C2 companion red-proof verified (neutered Go verify → bad binary reaches apply
→ test fails), reverted. Full go test ./... green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
wgtunnel.InstallRecoveredKey: write an escrow-recovered WG private key (create-
only, refuse-overwrite) so the tunnel re-establishes with the same identity/pubkey
(same /32), no keygen. Wired into identity-consume -install-wg-key (opt-in;
pre-S3 blob → logged fresh-keygen fallback). Value never logged.
internal/dr (new): consume the host_loss restore_directive (was logged-ignored)
into an inspectable RestorePlan via the AddConsumer raw seam — per guest
{vmid,archive,target,sizing} + per drive {durable_id→mount} + offsite PBS coord.
DERIVE-AND-SURFACE only; the Consumer has no restore/destroy dependency (execute-
nothing is structural). guest_loss/absent → no plan.
Tests + red-proofs (WG create-only overwrite; plan mode-gate). No secrets on
argv/stdout/logs. The destructive in-place restore is a separate operator-present
STOP-gated drill.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
A WAN (pbs-tier) restore of a large guest exceeds the restore-task wait's 10m
default → the wait expired mid-restore, teardown fired against a still-restoring
(not-yet-pool-associated) scratch guest → leak + a phantom VM.Allocate 403.
- RestoreTestSpec.RestoreTaskTimeout (0→10m default); the restore WaitTask passes
it. Local tier unchanged (10m).
- config RestoreTestPBSRestoreTimeoutSeconds + accessor (default 120m).
- main restoreTaskTimeout(cfg,tier): configured PBS timeout only when tier==pbs,
else 0. Both scheduler + selftest spec builds.
- Tests + WaitOptions red-proof + accessor contract.
The "grant scratch-band VM.Allocate" follow-up is diagnosed not blind-applied:
the scratch is restored INTO /pool/felhom (ACL already grants VM.Allocate), so
the earlier 403 was a consequence of the timeout. No ACL/host-install change.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
Phase-1 live probe (felhom-hetzner) proved backup/restore/list/isolation over
the tunnel with a per-customer DatastoreBackup token, but the agent's PBS client
was namespace-unaware: Snapshots hit the datastore root (403 for a scoped token)
and Verify was whole-datastore (needs Datastore.Verify ~ admin). Operator-
approved fix.
- pbs.Config.Namespace + Client.namespace; Snapshots appends ?ns=; Verify sends
ns= (ns-scoped verify works with DatastoreBackup on the own ns — no admin
widening, Phase-1 confirmed). Root-ns clients unchanged (whole-datastore).
- proxmox.Storage.Namespace (parsed from /storage `namespace`).
- pbsTargetsFromPVE threads s.Namespace into the client.
Confirmed tenant ACL: DatastoreBackup on /datastore/felhom-offsite/<ns> (NOT
/ns/<ns>) to BOTH felhom@pbs (user) AND felhom@pbs!<ns> (token) — PBS privsep =
intersection; isolation holds (cross-ns 403 proven). TestClient_NamespaceScoping
red-proofed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
v4-pin (doc 06 §4.2): renderConf takes a pre-resolved IPv4 literal and writes
Endpoint=<ip>:<port> — never the DNS name, never AAAA. Resolver seam (A records
only, LookupNetIP "ip4"); multiple A → lowest (deterministic fleet-wide);
renderConf stays pure. Resolved IP cached: steady-state Apply = zero DNS + zero
execs. DNS failure keeps the last conf (never a teardown).
Watchdog (loop-only, so Apply's zero-exec steady state is untouched): handshake
age > wg_tunnel.stale_after_seconds (default 180) → re-resolve; IP changed →
re-render + restart (endpoint re-IP recovery); IP same → no churn (throttled
warn). Staleness read reuses wg show latest-handshakes (never dump).
Capability: wg-conf-install/enable/restart/handshake-read flipped Critical=true
(backups ride the tunnel from S4); apt-install + disable stay non-critical.
TestWGCapabilityCriticality pins the set.
Tests + red-proofs a/b/d all fire. No new sudoers grant; no wire/JSON change.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
Sudoers: fixed-path conf install, enable/restart/disable, latest-handshakes-only
wg read (dump FORBIDDEN — the S1 incident). 6 capability-manifest entries
(Critical=false until S4 makes the tunnel load-bearing). WGTunnelConfig with
enabled=false DEFAULT (the safety gate: a v0.64.0 rollout without explicit
config is a no-op). Daemon wiring mirrors lanresolver + AddConsumer +
SetWireguardReporter; --selftest=wgtunnel single-shot. IdentityBundle
+wg_private_key (omitempty; pre-S3 blobs cannot be retrofitted — documented)
with escrow-create auto-inject (field name only in logs). Red-proof (e) run.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
B3: Lookup re-reads the append-only store once on a miss (cross-process
coherence with the one-shot provisioner; size short-circuit bounds the cost;
behind the TokenAuthority seam). B2: fenced mkdir -p /var/lib/vz/snippets
before the snippet install + the one narrow sudoers grant. Both red-proofed;
drill findings DRILL-day0-cleanroom-2026-07-03 B3/B2.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
staleLockController.Guests() = ListLXC ∩ GET /pools/felhom members (ownership
PROVEN via the pool registry, never assumed from enumeration scope); pool-read
failure fail-safes the whole recovery through the existing guest-list guard.
New Client.Pool read (needs Pool.Audit — host-install v1.9.0; Pool.Allocate
does NOT satisfy it, spike T2). Composed pve:pool-read capability (non-critical)
+ --selftest pool-read line. Red-proofed negative tests drive the REAL
controller over a broad-token-shaped fake.
Per SPIKE-a1-pool-membership-read-2026-07-03.md; audit A1
(AUDIT-blast-radius-hostroot-localapi-2026-07-02).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
From AUDIT-blast-radius-hostroot-localapi-2026-07-02.md. Each fix ships with a
non-hollow test + a companion red-proof (shown failing on the pre-fix impl).
Sudoers install-source grants became globs — deploy the sudoers drop-in with
the binary. A1 (stale-lock pool-membership) deliberately excluded (spike).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
Campaign pool-effects F1 (HIGH): the bring-up compensating rollback and the
restore-test teardown destroyed the target vmid even when RestoreLXC failed
synchronously without creating anything — destroying a guest the transaction
never made (only the pool ACL 403 contained it). A RestoreLXC UPID is now the
sole destroy authorization in all three destroy paths (in-process bring-up
defer, in-process restore-test teardown, Recover). F2: the restore-test
advances past an 'already exists' band vmid (invisible squatter) instead of
failing + false-alerting; a fully-occupied band Skips.
Red-proof verified: with the gates reverted, the four new tests fail with the
innocent-guest destroy. go build/vet/test clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Agent-view showed "—" device + no size for a raw (no-PVE-storage) drive because
the registry union row never set backing_device/total_bytes/used_bytes (Observe
drives get those from pvesm status). Resolve BackingDevice via ByUUIDDevicePath +
read capacity via statfsCapacity (build-tagged syscall.Statfs; no-op off-Linux).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The Impl-2a registry union row omitted GuestPath + BoundUnderParent, so the
controller read a registry-only (raw) drive as "Leválasztva" despite being mounted
+ bound live. Populate them like the Observe path (StablePathForRaw +
boundUnderParent). Last piece of first-class raw-drive support.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
buildLocalAPIServer never passed Options.HostReader, so s.host was nil — the
v0.56.0 durableIDForMount raw-mount fallback + the role gate's host classification
silently no-op'd. Wire storage.NewProcHostReader(). This makes the raw-drive
intent/guest-bind resolution actually fire live.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
ReassertGuestBinds mapped durable-id->mount from Observe() only, so a raw enrolled
drive was never found and its in-guest bind wasn't re-asserted after reboot/re-mount
(drive showed "Leválasztva"). Augment the map from the mount table (raw /mnt/<name>
-> device fs-UUID via HostReader), skipping the /mnt/felhom-drives bind; Observe
failure no longer aborts. Completes v0.56.0's raw-drive durability.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
durableIDForMount was Observe-only, so a raw (non-PVE-storage) drive's enroll
intent + guest-bind went unrecorded ("durable-id unresolved") — it mounted+bound
but wasn't intent-tracked (RegistryKnownTargets skips intent==new). Fall back to
resolving the mount's device fs-UUID (HostReader.Mounts + ResolveUUID) →
uuid:<fs-uuid>, same scheme as Observe. Test + red-proof. Residual:
ReassertGuestBinds still Observe-based (raw guest-bind not re-asserted post-reboot).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
GET /disks/candidates enumerates host disks the Impl-1 unclaimed filter proves
free (init/attach split). RegistryKnownTargets sources the watchdog's known-drive
set from the intent registry + Felhom .mount units (not Observe/PVE storages) —
decouples drive health from PVE storage (closes the registry-only false-detach
class); Observe kept for real PVE storages + a deduped /disks union. Idempotent
existing-drive migration at start. Tests + red-proof (Observe misses a
registry-only drive; registry provider tracks it). go build/vet/test clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Impl-1. Format now runs a mandatory unclaimed-disk guard (internal/storage/claim.go:
SystemDisks + lsblk member-FSTYPE + foreign-mount + RO + pvs/zpool; fail-safe →
CLAIMED) before any mkfs — refuses the OS disk / LVM PV / ZFS-mdraid member /
foreign-mounted device even when non-data-bearing (guard sits in Format, not the
handler). Below the agent, mkfs goes ONLY through configs/felhom-mkfs-guarded.sh
(sudoers no longer allowlists raw mkfs.*), which re-checks the catastrophic cases
as root. Read-only pvs/zpool added to FELHOM_DISK. Tests + red-proof; capability
manifest updated. go build/vet/test clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
RestoreLXCOptions.Pool → pct restore --pool (omit-when-empty). New
reconcile.DefaultPool="felhom"; BringUpSpec.Pool threaded to the bring-up
restore; BOTH restore sites pool the guest (provision/DR via spec.Pool set to
DefaultPool by the CLI; restore-test scratch via DefaultPool = SPIKE residual
#2). No agent ACL change (ships in host-install v1.6.0); the pool param is inert
until the token has Pool.Allocate + the pool exists, so publishing is safe ahead
of the coordinated swap. Tests + red-proofs; go build/vet/test clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
New -cores N / -memory M (MiB) flags for --selftest=bring-up|provision (0 = keep
golden default), flowed through bringUpSizing into reconcile.BringUpSpec so the
existing buildBringUpConfig emits cores/memory into the pre-start config PUT (the
cap lands before first boot). No engine change. New pure-function test
TestBuildBringUpConfig_ResourceCaps asserts the set + omit-when-zero cases
(red-proof run + reverted). go build/vet/test clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The preventive counterpart to host_disk + storage_fill detectors: the periodic local
whole-guest vzdump now prunes its own old archives (keep-last=3, clamped >=1) so a box
can't refill its own root via its own backups. Local target only — PBS never pruned
(resolved via ListStorage; fail-safe skip on unknown). Seeded in host-install.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HxLA1mZurFq9kt8hneFeCs
Host-side NFS/SMB automount of a bulk-media NAS share under /mnt/felhom-drives/<name>
(propagates into the guest via the existing shared bind), the +100000 uid recipe,
per-share liveness, and add/list/remove local-API endpoints. A NAS is a distinct class
that bypasses the drive enroll/eject/decommission/SMART/watchdog machinery.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HxLA1mZurFq9kt8hneFeCs
F2-b: at startup, recover a guest left with a stale vzdump lock by a
reboot-during-backup — pct unlock -> delete dangling vzdump snapshot ->
start iff onboot, guarded by a no-vzdump-running invariant (fail-safe).
New internal/localapi/stalelock.go; proxmox GuestConfig.Lock()/OnBoot(),
ListSnapshots, ListRunningTasks, Snapshot type. New narrow sudoers grant
FELHOM_STALELOCK (pct unlock) + Critical capability stalelock-unlock.
F2-a: EnsureSharedParent only redeployed the boot script when the UNIT
differed, so the v0.36.6 make-private fix never reached hosts whose unit
was current -> /mnt/felhom-drives stayed in root's shared:1 and doubled
every drive bind. New sharedParentInstallStale compares BOTH script and
unit. Boot-time-only; never churns the live mount.
Both root causes confirmed live on felhom-pve before fixing. Green gate
(build/vet/test) all pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0162BnMpUXscPsUB1cU8Tr6K
HostReport.LeafFingerprint rides the served fp (from EnsureLeaf) on every report; empty when local
API disabled. Collector.SetLeafFingerprint threads it like Capabilities. Hub watches it for a re-key.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Pg8ANF97SEeKYSN5Jxw3qJ
controllerHealthy reads RestartCount (running&&rc>0 -> not ok) + signals needsDwell for no-healthcheck;
verify requires verifyDwell(=3) consecutive ok polls for a no-healthcheck image (real healthcheck
trusted immediately). Closes the F1 hole (alpine crash-loop passed the point-in-time check). Red-proof
+ dwell + real-image tests. No sudoers/orchestration change.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Pg8ANF97SEeKYSN5Jxw3qJ
writeImage drops bash -c/printf for GuestExecStdin(img+\n -> tee /etc/felhom-controller-image);
new Runner.RunStdin/GuestExecStdin route stdin through the fenced sudo -n runner. 5 narrow,
auditable sudoers grants (no general pct exec, no bash -c) + capability manifest entries (Critical)
so the self-probe watches them and the build-test asserts coverage (companion red-proof). No
controller change; swap orchestration/rollback/state unchanged. Spike GO.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EPZ4GJ8L5Jqf8UiPwbn1kt
New internal/capability: Manifest of required sudo -n grants + Prober that LISTS each
via 'sudo -n -l' (never executes) + binary-exists check → ok/degraded snapshot on the hub
report. Build-time test asserts manifest⊆sudoers (red-proof: dropping lxc-info FAILs the
gate). Startup logs N/N ok + ERROR per degraded. Serve-degraded; no allowlist change.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EPZ4GJ8L5Jqf8UiPwbn1kt
- configs/felhom-agent.service: canonical non-root unit (User=felhom-agent, sudo model);
deliberately NO NoNewPrivileges (breaks sudo) and NO mount-namespacing hardening (breaks
the intermediary-mount drive propagation into guests) — documented inline.
- scripts/publish-agent.sh: build (optional) + PUT binary to Gitea generic + sha256 +
GET round-trip. Pinned version, idempotent (delete-then-PUT).
- configs/build-golden.sh: after vzdump, compute sha256 + PUT golden.tar.zst to Gitea
generic (version = baked controller version). Opt-in; local auto-discovery stays fallback.
- cmd/felhom-agent/main.go: version 0.42.0 -> 0.43.0.
- README: process model now canonical (non-root + publish/install).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
New local-API POST /controller/swap (+ GET /controller/swap/status), withGuest-
scoped: the agent records the previous image, confirms the target is present,
rewrites /etc/felhom-controller-image, restarts felhom-controller-bootstrap.service,
verifies the new controller is healthy (docker inspect, <=90s), and ROLLS BACK to
the previous image if not. Single-flight per guest; strict image-ref validation;
crash-safety state file. GuestBinder.GuestExec is the pct-exec seam.
--selftest=controller-swap exercises it directly.
Tests: happy/rollback-on-unhealthy(+red-proof)/image-absent/no-healthcheck/
bad-image-400/single-flight-409.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TtXesNa2LGbMmE4DNL6SE7
The golden bakes --onboot 0 (template safety) and the back-half never overrode it, so every
provisioned customer guest was onboot:0 -> after a host reboot/power-cut the customer's whole
home-server stayed stopped until a manual pct start. Add a fatal 'pct set <vmid> -onboot 1' step
to BackHalf.Provision (right after the config-mount attach), mirroring the existing pct set ops.
No startup/boot-order: the v0.75 mountpoint-gate covers the drive-bind race at boot.
Golden build-golden.sh unchanged (templates must not auto-start). Unit-tested
(TestProvision_SetsOnbootOne + red-proof). RUNBOOK note added.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01FpBYrZCt9sFDqLgbG5GRGD
Extends the OS/Docker-data split to a three-volume layout: rootfs + Docker-data
(mp0) + SSD user-data (mp1 @ /mnt/sys_drive, backup=1) = the controller's
system_data_path. Clears the controller's "not a separate drive" warning with
zero controller change (it already auto-discovers <sys_drive>/felhom-data and
warns via system.IsMountPoint; the mp reaches the container via the existing
-v /mnt:/mnt:rslave bind).
- build-golden.sh: --mp1 ...,mp=/mnt/sys_drive,backup=1 (env GOLDEN_SYSDATA_GB=8);
findmnt /mnt/sys_drive separate-mount guard + vzdump aborts if mp0 OR mp1 excluded.
- bringup.go: DefaultSysDataMount=mp1; BringUpSpec.{SysDataGrowGB,SysDataMount};
new "4c" online grow-only block mirroring the "4b" Docker-data grow.
- main.go: -sysdata-grow / -sysdata-mount flags wired into all three call sites.
- Tests: SysDataGrow (asserts ResizeLXC mp1 +42G) + SysDataGrowZeroNoResize.
- RUNBOOK extended to the three-volume layout (32 rootfs + 200 docker + 50 user-data).
Static CT volume, NOT an enrolled drive — never enrolls/ejects/decommissions.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017PsnU2ASocYrvzqE82YDYW
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