The wrapper gains layer "pve" (slow lane): the host's Proxmox userspace
packages only — origin "Proxmox Debian Repository", never a kernel / boot /
firmware / microcode name (R14), no removal, no undo, a new package only from
an allow-list; authority = a signed os_pve_step or the root-owned ring-0 mark.
The night leg runs it in ring 0 after a healthy host step; ring 1 only by a
signed job (PVEStepExecutor). While it runs, the agent's own /etc/pve writes
(every non-GET API call, pct config verbs, pvesm, pveum, felhom-pbs-apply)
wait on internal/pvegate. Health = the host rule + unchanged container ids +
pveversion reads the installed pve-manager.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS
The per-VM ACL is consumed by the destroy it authorises (PVE remove_vm_access,
LXC.pm:906), so it works once per slot. Fourth root-fenced exception, band-enforced in
sudoers literally + in code + at the caller. API destroy still tried first.
writeImage drops bash -c/printf for GuestExecStdin(img+\n -> tee /etc/felhom-controller-image);
new Runner.RunStdin/GuestExecStdin route stdin through the fenced sudo -n runner. 5 narrow,
auditable sudoers grants (no general pct exec, no bash -c) + capability manifest entries (Critical)
so the self-probe watches them and the build-test asserts coverage (companion red-proof). No
controller change; swap orchestration/rollback/state unchanged. Spike GO.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EPZ4GJ8L5Jqf8UiPwbn1kt
Stand up the felhom-agent project (module gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-agent,
binary felhom-agent) and the internal/proxmox package: the typed library every
other agent module calls to talk to Proxmox.
- API-first Client (hand-rolled REST over net/http, PVEAPIToken auth) with typed
read ops (version/nodes/status/lxc/config/storage) and async mutating ops
(restore/vzdump/snapshot/rollback/delete-snapshot/setconfig/start/stop), each
returning a UPID. WaitTask polls task status until stopped and asserts
exitstatus OK (authz can surface at task exec, not the POST — phase1-2 §1.3).
- Fenced Privileged (root-CLI) backend for the THREE proven exceptions only
(keyctl pct create, USB mount/fstab, SMART/sensors); each cites why it can't be
the API. Fence is structural (Client never shells out, Privileged never HTTPs)
and asserted in routing_test.go.
- TLS: SHA-256 leaf-cert pinning or CA file; insecure mode explicit + off by
default. No blanket verification disable.
- 403 -> privilege-named APIError; failed task -> privilege-named TaskError.
- JSON config + env overrides (token never logged); slog logging.
- cmd/felhom-agent --selftest (read-only health report) + gated --selftest=task
(reversible snapshot/rollback/delete exercise of WaitTask). No daemon loop yet.
- Types grounded in the spike findings and exact JSON shapes captured live from
demo-felhom (PVE 9.2.2). Unit tests use a mock transport + runner.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
admin