Commit Graph

6 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
admin bb1692cbfb agent v0.26.0: slice 10 P2 activation — POST /guest/reboot (user-triggered)
Self-scoped guest reboot (pct reboot, detached, 202) so an enrolled-into-running-
guest drive's persisted bind activates at next boot. Tests: accepted + cross-guest
403. Pairs with controller v0.49.0 pending-drive detection + "Újraindítás most".

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-12 17:19:12 +02:00
admin c1d04c28c1 agent v0.25.0: slice 10 P2 — bind enrolled user-data drives into the guest
POST /disks/guest-attach binds an enrolled drive's felhom-data namespace into
the guest (Model A: felhom-data is the bind source mounted at /mnt/<name>, so
only Felhom's namespace crosses in). GuestBinder does mkdir+chown(100000)+pct set
(RW bind) via the fenced runner. Idempotent, free-slot selection, path-validated.
Spike-proven on 9201. Pairs with controller P2C + golden /mnt:rslave (P2B).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-12 15:38:55 +02:00
admin 7ae82e1d5d agent v0.24.0: role-gate the eject path (system/backup mounts unmount-protected at the agent)
handleDiskEject now resolves the authoritative role of the storage at `where`
and refuses 403 (no Unmount) unless it is user-data. Fails safe to protected on
ambiguity. Adds roleForMountPath + an injectable HostReader seam for testability.
TestEject_RoleGated asserts protected mounts are refused with no Unmount.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-12 09:29:09 +02:00
admin 15f7529a1c v0.23.0: device-ROLE classification + tiered storage-wipe gate (user-data customer-confirmable; system/backup operator-only)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-11 21:29:18 +02:00
admin 588fed2aa9 slice 10B: operator-signed destructive completion (offline key + signing CLI) (v0.16.0)
A destructive op runs ONLY on a pinned-key-verified, nonce-fresh, in-window,
host-bound, durable-id-bound operator signature. New cmd/felhom-opsign signs
canonical OpBlobs offline via ssh-keygen -Y sign (hardware-ready); the signing
key is never in the hub or agent. New internal/signedjobs runner verifies each
queued blob through the gate and only on all-pass runs the WipeExecutor, which
re-resolves the DURABLE device id + re-inspects (8C) before mkfs — closing the
8C data-bearing-wipe pending_signature gap. New storage durable-device
resolution; authz.CanonicalBlob promoted to production. Real-crypto tests assert
valid executes and forged/replay/expired/retarget/non-pinned are rejected
(executor never called).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-10 20:14:16 +02:00
admin c17cfde236 slice 8C Phase A: agent disk endpoints + data-bearing classifier gate + mkfs (v0.12.0)
internal/storage: mkfs executor (Format, device-pinned, narrow FELHOM_FORMAT
sudoers) + data-bearing device inspection (InspectDevice/DeviceProbe via
blkid+lsblk; conservative — ambiguous=data-bearing). internal/localapi: /disks
(+ data-bearing flag), /disks/assign (EnsureMount), /disks/eject (Unmount +
dependent guests), /disks/format. SECURITY CENTERPIECE: the agent inspects the
device itself; data-bearing format -> ClassStorageWipe gate -> pending_signature
refused; the caller's claim is never trusted. Additive (no controller change yet).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-10 12:52:22 +02:00