The live validation hit PVE's all-or-nothing restore rule: mpN params
without an explicit rootfs -> HTTP 500 "mount points configured, but
'rootfs' not set" (the same constraint restoretest.go:211 documents for the
live-config path; the spike never ran an override restore). The lost guest
has no live config, so the rootfs SIZE now comes from the archive's own
embedded config via NEW Client.ExtractArchiveConfig (GET vzdump/
extractconfig - verified live: answers 200 under the scoped agent token;
PBS keys stay server-side, the spike's candidate-1 rejection holds; used
for the SIZE ONLY - the bind layout stays the platform constants).
Unparseable/unreadable archive config -> clean refusal before any restore.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
Pool membership is what lets the pool-scoped token reach a guest; pct restore
--pool sets it only at CREATE, so a restore over an existing VMID drops the guest
from the felhom pool and 403s the next restore-test/DR on VM.Audit. This empty-pool
state is the true root cause of the campaign's "R1" (bind-mount restore failing was
a symptom — restore-test's existing bind neutralization never ran without config-read).
Add Client.PoolAddVMID (PUT /pools, additive+idempotent, Pool.Allocate) and call it
in bring-up after liveness when spec.Pool!="" — warn-not-fail on a hiccup (liveness
wins). B3 scratch-teardown 403 diagnosed as a cascade (restoretest already passes
Pool). Role/ACL untouched. Tests + red-proof.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
The control envelope becomes live: the agent caches the hub's desired-state +
generation and re-fetches GET /hosts/{id}/desired-state only when the
generation advances. A new internal/desired Syncer maps the wire shape into a
reconcile.CachingProvider feeding the engine; benign deltas reconcile, an
explicit guest decommission is gated pending_signature (exec is 10B). Adds the
DesiredStateResponse/WireDesiredState wire types + Client.FetchDesiredState +
the loop EnvelopeObserver seam. Cross-repo golden (envelope + desired-state)
byte-identical with the hub.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Fixes the crying-wolf false-fail surfaced by the live hub-enrollment runbook:
PVE's guest-start task exits "WARNINGS: 1" for the benign systemd-nesting
advisory, and WaitTask treated any non-OK exitstatus as failure, so the verdict
was decided by an advisory exit code before the real boot check ran. Every
modern-distro restore-test reported pass:false.
- proxmox.WaitOptions.AllowWarnings (opt-in; default keeps all callers strict)
- restore-test start step accepts warnings, surfaces them, verdict stays waitRunning
- RestoreTestResult.StartWarnings/.WarningsRecognized + version-free "enable
nesting" recognizer (can't rot back at systemd 258+); GuestAPI.TaskLogTail
- hub.RestoreTest.warnings/.warnings_recognized wire fields (consumed by hub v0.7.5)
- scheduler logs clean / passed-with-recognized / passed-with-unrecognized warnings
- tests: WaitTask warnings matrix; restore-test pass/fail-on-liveness; version-free
regression guard (systemd 256-300)
Single agent bump 0.6.0 -> 0.7.0 covering the agent half of both task phases.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The security core of slice 4: hub-supplied intent is no longer trusted for
destructive change. The gate fronts the per-guest queue's executor, so every
mutation passes it. Reuses internal/authz for all crypto (surface untouched).
- Classifier (doc 03 §4): benign vs destructive by provenance + data-bearing-
ness, NOT by verb. Destroy/overwrite of customer data is destructive unless
agent-internal provenance (same-journaled-txn create, or agent-tagged scratch)
makes it benign — and that provenance is journal-recorded, NEVER hub-sourced.
Unknown op class fails safe to destructive.
- Reversibility gate: benign -> allowed unsigned; destructive -> requires a
verified, role-scoped, action-bound operator signature, else pending_signature
and never executed. Every decision audited (signal, never the guard).
- Signed-op consuming layer over authz.Verifier.Verify (locked pipeline
untouched): role-scoping (doc 04 §4 — recovery=rotation only, operational=
ordinary destructive + planned rotation) + op-to-action binding (op+host+
guest+params must match the gated action).
- Signed-job orchestration: idempotency dedupe by nonce + journal-wrapped
execution via an injected DestructiveExecutor (nil this slice — inert).
- Crash recovery (Note 1): Engine.Recover consumes the journal InFlight() set at
startup (resume-or-rollback) — covers an op that crashed after the POST and
before its terminal record, which idempotency dedupe alone cannot. Added
TaskStatusOnce to the GuestAPI seam. Wired into daemon startup.
- Note 2: memory comparison canonicalized to MiB (desiredMemoryMiB) so a
non-MiB-aligned MemoryBytes converges in one pass, not perpetual drift.
- Daemon: builds the verifier from config signers (none = nil verifier, the
common slice-4 state), the gate (+SlogAudit), runs Recover before mutating.
Adversarial matrix proven against the REAL authz.Verifier with in-test-minted
SSHSIGs (framing replicated in reconcile's test binary; authz untouched, no
signing added to the verify-only package): unsigned job + unsigned desired-state
delta -> pending_signature; unknown signer/expired/replay-across-restart/wrong
host -> typed authz rejections; wrong guest/op/params -> binding_mismatch;
recovery key on ordinary destructive -> role_denied; hub-supplied scratch tag
ignored -> refused; valid+role+target+fresh nonce -> accepted then replay
rejected. Full module race-clean + vet-clean on the Linux build server.
Inert this slice: no destructive deltas served until slice 10; the destructive
path is classified, gated, and tested but not wired to live execution.
CHECKPOINT: Phase B complete (slice 4 done). Awaiting validation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
New internal/reconcile package: the agent-side control core's structural half.
- Per-guest serializer Queue (doc 03 §10): the single choke point all mutation
sources funnel through; same-vmid serial in submit order, different vmids
parallel (cond-var FIFO lanes).
- Desired-state model + DesiredProvider seam; EmptyProvider is the only live
source at slice 4 (no hub serving until slice 10) so the live engine computes
an empty action set and performs zero mutations.
- Normalization layer (FieldNormalizers): normalized desired-vs-actual so
Proxmox round-trip quirks don't read as drift. normDesc promoted out of
main.go to reconcile.NormDescription; selftest uses the shared helper.
- Plan (pure diff): minimal benign action set (Start/Stop/SetConfig) for guests
in both desired and actual; provision/destroy out of scope here.
- Engine: dispatches onto the shared queue; honors the dual-mode SetConfig
contract (UPID -> WaitTask; empty UPID -> synchronous success).
- Durable op journal + idempotency store (mirrors authz.FileNonceStore):
in-flight task ids for crash detection + AlreadyApplied dedupe across restart.
- Wired into runDaemon alongside the hub loop, sharing the queue; runs cleanly
with no desired state and no signers.
Full module race-clean and vet-clean on the Linux build server.
CHECKPOINT: Phase A only. Awaiting validation before Phase B (the reversibility
gate + signed-op consuming layer, landing v0.4.0).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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