A rebuilt box could not run the escrow ceremony AT ALL, with no way forward from inside the product.
This was the only open item blocking a customer from something we promise them.
MECHANISM, established at file:line rather than assumed. The preflight refuses on
escrow.pbs_storage_id; the pbsdr bridge writes that key; and it wrote it from exactly one place —
finishConverged, reached only on the paths that actually converge.
The marker and the key live in different places and die at different times. The marker is host-side
(<agent-state>/pbsdr/marker.json). The key is in agent.json, which step_agent_config renders from
`base = {}` unless an explicit --preserve-from is given (felhom.eu/scripts/felhom-host-install.sh:
2396 the step, :2449 the render, :2579 the O_TRUNC write; the flag :1246, defaulting empty at :256)
— AND THE RENDER NEVER WRITES AN escrow SECTION AT ALL (grep over the whole heredoc: zero hits). So
a rebuild keeps the marker and takes the key: same descriptor, same hash, early return, and the seed
never runs again into a config that no longer has it.
A rebuild is only the case that was measured. The same hole opens for a hand-edited or restored
config, which is the honest reason this is a seam fix rather than an installer fix: the seed must be
a thing the loop ASSERTS, not a thing it did once.
Apply now re-asserts the seed BEFORE the idempotent early return. seedEscrowStorageID is unchanged
and still never clobbers a different existing value — an operator's own choice outranks the
descriptor's, with a warning naming both.
THE EARLY RETURN IS KEPT. It stops a converged box re-running Proxmox operations every 60s, and
TestSeedReasserted_OnConvergedTick_WithZeroProxmoxCalls asserts ZERO recorded runner calls on that
tick, so a "fix" that simply deleted the return would fail. Cost: one small file read plus a JSON
parse per tick, no exec, no network, early-returning once the value matches.
A seed failure can never un-converge the box: Warn plus a message on the published status, exactly
as finishConverged does it — no marker write, no state change.
Tests drive the REAL Apply with a real temp-dir agent.json and a call-recording runner; calling
seedEscrowStorageID directly cannot see the early return, which IS the defect. Production wiring
(pbsdr.NewManager(..., cfg.SourcePath, ...)) is asserted by walking main.go's AST, not by
strings.Contains, which a commented-out call also satisfies.
Red-proofs, each with the mutation asserted applied: removing the new call makes Scenario A fail on
today's tree (it did, with the intended message); removing the early return makes the
zero-Proxmox-calls assertion fail (it did).
go build / go vet / go test ./... green (29 packages), run separately from this commit.
Closes the agent half of R-39's fleet fix. Requires hub >=0.68.0 for the re-arm signal;
that hub is safe for 0.90.0 agents (unknown key dropped), so it deploys first.
Three compounding defects let a box report `applied` while every PBS request 401'd:
1. The re-key was INVISIBLE. An ep0 re-issue rotates the secret of an existing token, so
token_id/fingerprint/datastore/namespace come back byte-identical and the descriptor
content hash never moved — the converged agent short-circuited and never consumed the
fresh secret. WirePBSDR.SecretGeneration (field-exact with the hub) is what moves the
hash now, because descriptorHash marshals this struct.
2. The agent could not READ its own credential. It writes /etc/pve/priv/storage/<id>.pw
through the root wrapper, but that dir is 0700 root:www-data and the wrapper had no
read verb — so the target resolver got "permission denied" every cycle, warned, and
skipped. The one loop that could have caught the 401 was blind BY CONSTRUCTION. Adds a
narrow `read` verb (+ exactly one sudoers line, + a pbsdr-read capability row): one
secret to stdout, no network, no mutation, never in argv (sudo logs argv), traversal
refused by the id grammar, the dir allowlist AND a resolved-path prefix assertion.
3. Nothing probed AUTHENTICATION. pbs.ProbeAuth (GET /version + an ErrUnauthorized
sentinel) runs on the 15-minute collect path and its verdict becomes a loud
`auth_failed` the hub escalates to a fresh mint. /version needs no datastore, namespace
or privilege, so a 401 means the CREDENTIAL is bad; 403 is deliberately NOT treated as
unauthorized, since re-keying a too-narrow token would mint forever without fixing
anything. A transport error is UNKNOWN, never a rejection — otherwise every network
blip burns a credential. Recovery self-clears.
R-50b(a): the report now carries the installed wrapper's sha256 so drift against the
vouched manifest value is answerable. Empty = unknown, never drift.
Three red-proofs, all at the assertion level. Removing SecretGeneration fails the re-arm
test with "consume calls=1, want 2". Swallowing the probe result leaves State:applied
AuthFailed:false — the July-18 shape exactly. Notably, deleting the wrapper's id charset
guard alone does NOT open a traversal hole (readlink + the prefix assertion still catch
it), so the isolating red-proof removes BOTH and shows the out-of-tree secret printed —
the layering is real, and a single-guard red-proof would have passed vacuously.
- pbsdr: on a 403 pre-check (non-default storage id, no ACL yet) self-grant via the root wrapper then re-read, instead of aborting before the grant — closes F4/R-22. Red-proof TestSelfGrant_PreCheck403DoesNotAbortBeforeGrant.
- escrow preflight: late-bound CurrentPBSStorageID re-reads agent.json so a pbsdr-seeded pbs_storage_id flips the row green in-process (no restart). Red-proof TestEscrowPreflight_PBSStorageIDLiveReload.
- internal/poke: contentless UDP poke listener bound exclusively to the box WG /32 (port 51822), leading-edge debounced, fires the hub-loop out-of-band trigger for an immediate desired-state cycle. First slice of R-13. Red-proofs TestBindConfinement + TestDebounceCoalescesBurst.
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