slice 10D (agent): DR capstone — identity escrow + restore-mode consumption (v0.18.0)

Identity escrow wraps {tunnel_token,pbs_token} under the SAME R via age
(scrypt+ChaCha20-Poly1305), reusing the K-escrow pty; wrong R fails closed.
escrow.Create optionally emits the identity blob; escrow-create uploads it +
the non-secret directive; identity-consume recovers it (R by hand, never
logged). K-escrow + 10C Consume untouched. Closes slice 10 with hub v0.11.0;
operator-side rotation model (hub holds no Cloudflare write-power).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -3,6 +3,34 @@
 All notable changes to **felhom-agent** are recorded here. Update on every code
 change that gets pushed.
 
+## v0.18.0 — slice 10D: DR capstone — identity escrow + restore-mode consumption (agent side) (2026-06-10)
+
+The agent half of the slice-10 DR capstone (closes slice 10). Grounded by both 10-series spikes
+(escrow-consumption + identity-restore). The hub half (recovery-mode toggle, re-enroll + credential
+rotation, directive serving) is hub v0.11.0. **Operator-side rotation model (locked):** the hub holds
+no Cloudflare write-power; the destructive tunnel/PBS rotation is the operator's step from a trusted
+environment (same spirit as 10B).
+
+### Added (`internal/escrow`)
+- **Identity escrow** (`identity.go`): `WrapIdentity`/`UnwrapIdentity` (+ `…Bundle`) wrap the
+  `{tunnel_token, pbs_token}` bundle under the SAME recovery code `R` via **`age`** (scrypt +
+  ChaCha20-Poly1305 — a vetted passphrase-AEAD, not hand-rolled), reusing the K-escrow pty mechanism
+  (passphrase via the tty, data via files; `R`/tokens never logged). Same two-factor, zero-knowledge
+  shape as the K-escrow. A **wrong R fails closed** (no bundle). `age` is a runtime dep for the
+  identity path (analogous to proxmox-backup-client for K).
+- **`escrow.Create`** gains an optional `IdentityBundle` → also emits an `IdentityBlob` under the same
+  R (additive; the K-escrow + 10C `Consume` paths are byte-unchanged). Self-verifies the identity
+  round-trip before shipping.
+- **`--selftest=escrow-create -identity-bundle <file> -directive <file>`** — also wrap + upload the
+  identity blob + the **non-secret** DR directive (pbs repo/ns, expected key fingerprint, tunnel id).
+- **`--selftest=identity-consume -blob <file> -keydest <file>`** (R via `FELHOM_RECOVERY_CODE`) —
+  recover the identity bundle through the real code; tokens written 0600, never logged.
+
+### Tests
+- identity bundle round-trips (wrap→unwrap byte-identical; blob is opaque ciphertext); wrong R fails
+  closed + the blob stays retryable; input validation. K-escrow/10C tests byte-unchanged (additive).
+  (age integration tests gated to a host with the `age` CLI.)
+
 ## v0.17.0 — slice 10C: escrow consumption (productionize the spike) (2026-06-10)
 
 Turns the throwaway 10C spike harness into a real, tested **`Consume`** path: recover the PBS key

REPORT.md

@@ -1,50 +1,48 @@
-# REPORT — slice 10C: escrow consumption — productionize the spike (v0.17.0) (2026-06-10)
+# REPORT — slice 10D (agent half): DR capstone — identity escrow + restore-mode consumption (v0.18.0) (2026-06-10)
 
 > Overwrite-latest report. Cumulative history: [CHANGELOG.md](CHANGELOG.md).
 
 ## What was implemented
 
-The 10C spike proved the crypto + real-data restore on a key-less box (recover `K` from `(blob, R)`,
+The agent half of the slice-10 DR capstone (closes slice 10), grounded by both 10-series spikes
-restore real data, GO). 10C turns that throwaway harness into a real, tested **`Consume`** path.
+(escrow-consumption + identity-restore). The hub half (recovery-mode, re-enroll, directive serving)
-**Agent-only — no hub change** (10C reads its four inputs as parameters; 10D sources blob/fingerprint/
+is hub v0.11.0. **Rotation model (locked):** the hub holds no Cloudflare write-power; the destructive
-PBS-connection from the hub and prompts for R).
+tunnel/PBS rotation is the operator's step from a trusted environment (same spirit as 10B).
 
-### `escrow.Consume(ctx, blob, R, expectedFingerprint, keyDest)`
+### Identity escrow (`internal/escrow/identity.go`)
-The consumption contract, baking in the spike findings:
+- `WrapIdentity`/`UnwrapIdentity` (+ `…Bundle`) wrap the `{tunnel_token, pbs_token}` bundle under the
-1. **Unwrap** the blob (operating on a copy — **F-C6**: the input blob is read-only, so a failed
+  SAME recovery code `R` via **`age`** (scrypt + ChaCha20-Poly1305 — vetted passphrase-AEAD, not
-   Consume is **retryable**) with `R`; a **wrong R fails closed** at the scrypt KDF (**F-C3**) → a
+  hand-rolled), **reusing the K-escrow pty mechanism** (passphrase via the tty, data via files;
-   clear, R-free error, **nothing written**.
+  `R`/tokens never logged). Same two-factor, zero-knowledge shape as the K-escrow; a **wrong R fails
-2. **Fingerprint gate (F-C4)** — `KeyFingerprint(recovered)` must equal the expected (the hub knows
+  closed** (no bundle). `age` is a runtime dep for the identity path (like proxmox-backup-client for K).
-   it); a mismatch **fails fast + loud, no install, no restore attempted** (the cheap correctness
+- `escrow.Create` gains an optional `IdentityBundle` → emits `IdentityBlob` under the same R
-   check *before* any multi-GB restore).
+  (additive; the K-escrow + 10C `Consume` are byte-unchanged; self-verifies the identity round-trip).
-3. **Atomic install (F-C2)** at `keyDest` (`0600`, write-temp-sibling → rename); any failure leaves
+- `--selftest=escrow-create -identity-bundle <f> -directive <f>` (wrap + upload the identity blob +
-   **no partial install**. The recovered key lives only in a `0700` tempdir that is always removed.
+  non-secret directive) and `--selftest=identity-consume -blob <f> -keydest <f>` (R via
+  `FELHOM_RECOVERY_CODE`; tokens written 0600, never logged) — the real code, drillable.
 
-**Secret discipline:** `R` and key bytes are never logged/persisted (only fingerprint prefixes); the
+### Restore-mode orchestration (10D.3)
-input blob is read-only; `K` is never mutated. **Zero-knowledge holds**: the hub serves the blob +
+Composed from proven pieces: re-enroll (hub) → fetch directive (10A) → `Consume` K (10C, fingerprint
-expected fingerprint + PBS connection; **R is by-hand from the customer, never the hub** — a hub
+-gated) + `identity-consume` (R by hand) → restore guests from PBS (restore-overwrite gated by 10B) →
-compromise alone still cannot decrypt.
+re-establish the tunnel (recovered token + reconstituted origin — proven in the 10D spike). The
+destructive cred rotation is the operator's step.
 
-### `--selftest=escrow-consume`
+## Tests
-`-blob -fingerprint -keydest`, R via env `FELHOM_RECOVERY_CODE` (off the command line / `ps`). Invokes
+- identity round-trips (wrap→unwrap byte-identical; blob is opaque ciphertext); wrong R fails closed +
-the **real** `Consume` live — the spike's S3 via the production path, not a harness.
+  blob stays retryable; input validation. K-escrow/10C unchanged. `go test ./...` green (age
-
+  integration tests gated to a host with the `age` CLI).
-## Tests (non-hollow)
-- valid → key installed + `KeyFingerprint(dest) == expected` + `0600` + **blob byte-unchanged**;
-  **wrong R** → error + **no file at dest** + blob unchanged; **fingerprint mismatch** → fail fast +
-  **no install** (the gate runs before any restore); input validation; format-tolerant fingerprint
-  compare (no empty-fingerprint gate-bypass); atomic-install. `go test ./...` green (integration
-  round-trip gated to a host with `proxmox-backup-client`).
 
 ## Versioning / docs
-- Version `0.16.0 → 0.17.0`; `CHANGELOG.md`. Doc 03 §8a (consumption implemented; zero-knowledge) +
+- Version `0.17.0 → 0.18.0`; `CHANGELOG.md`. Doc 03 §9 (10D done → **slice 10 CLOSED**) + the
-  §9 (10C done) updated. No cross-repo golden (no wire change).
+  host-loss DR flow with the operator-side rotation model.
 
-## Out of scope (per the task)
+## Deferred (non-blocking, per the locked model)
-- DR orchestration (re-enroll in restore mode, *which* guests, identity restore) → **10D**;
+- The hub Config DR/Recovery **web UI** (functional via the recovery-mode admin API today) + a small
-  populating/serving the restore directive from the hub → **10D**.
+  operator rotation CLI (the tunnel/PBS rotation + stale-connector delete is a documented operator
+  procedure from the trusted environment — the hub never holds Cloudflare write-power).
 
 ## Pending
-- **Live validation** on the demo: create a fresh escrow from the live `K` → `Consume` on a key-less
+- The operator-in-the-loop **DR drill** (live, throwaway identity): host-loss → recovery mode →
-  scratch → restore a real encrypted backup with the consumed key; **wrong R → clean failure, nothing
+  re-enroll (old key revoked) → R → consume → restore → re-establish → operator rotates/retires the
-  installed**; the live `K` stays byte-unchanged.
+  old connector → only the new box serves. CC drives the `[CC]` steps; the operator does the trusted
+  steps.

cmd/felhom-agent/main.go

@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ import (
 
 // version is the agent version. Overridable at build time with
 // -ldflags "-X main.version=<v>"; defaults to the in-repo CHANGELOG version.
-var version = "0.17.0"
+var version = "0.18.0"
 
 func main() {
 	var (
@@ -62,10 +62,12 @@ func main() {
 		custDomain  string
 		custName    string
 		custEmail   string
-		blobPath    string
+		blobPath      string
-		expectedFP  string
+		expectedFP    string
-		keyDest     string
+		keyDest       string
-		showVersion bool
+		idBundlePath  string
+		directivePath string
+		showVersion   bool
 	)
 	flag.StringVar(&cfgPath, "config", envOr("FELHOM_AGENT_CONFIG", "/etc/felhom-agent/agent.json"), "path to the agent config file (JSON)")
 	flag.Var(&selftest, "selftest", "run a self-test and exit: bare/`read` = read-only queries; `task` = reversible mutating exercise (needs -vmid); `hub` = one collect+report; `storage` = observe storage (+ -watch); `backup` = one-shot backup of -vmid; `restore-test` = restore→boot→verify→teardown of -archive (or newest backup); `pbs-verify` = trigger a PBS verify + print snapshot records; `bring-up` = restore→reset identity→size→start link-up of -archive into -vmid (needs -mode/-archive/-vmid; tears down unless -keep); `provision` = full slice-8A chain: bring-up provision + mint token + populate bootstrap config mount (needs -archive/-vmid/-customer-id/-customer-domain; keeps the guest)")
@@ -82,6 +84,8 @@ func main() {
 	flag.StringVar(&blobPath, "blob", "", "for --selftest=escrow-consume: path to the R-wrapped escrow blob file")
 	flag.StringVar(&expectedFP, "fingerprint", "", "for --selftest=escrow-consume: the EXPECTED key fingerprint (the gate target)")
 	flag.StringVar(&keyDest, "keydest", "", "for --selftest=escrow-consume: where to install the recovered key (0600)")
+	flag.StringVar(&idBundlePath, "identity-bundle", "", "for --selftest=escrow-create: a 0600 JSON file {tunnel_token,pbs_token} to ALSO escrow under R (10D)")
+	flag.StringVar(&directivePath, "directive", "", "for --selftest=escrow-create: a JSON file with the non-secret DR directive (pbs repo/ns, expected fingerprint, tunnel id)")
 	flag.StringVar(&custID, "customer-id", "", "for --selftest=provision: the customer id to seed into the guest's bootstrap")
 	flag.StringVar(&custDomain, "customer-domain", "", "for --selftest=provision: the customer domain to seed")
 	flag.StringVar(&custName, "customer-name", "", "for --selftest=provision: the customer display name to seed (optional)")
@@ -131,9 +135,11 @@ func main() {
 			customer: provision.DocCustomer{ID: custID, Domain: custDomain, Name: custName, Email: custEmail},
 		}))
 	case "escrow-create":
-		os.Exit(runSelftestEscrowCreate(context.Background(), cfg, logger, pbsStorage, paperkey, offline, upload))
+		os.Exit(runSelftestEscrowCreate(context.Background(), cfg, logger, pbsStorage, paperkey, offline, upload, idBundlePath, directivePath))
 	case "escrow-consume":
 		os.Exit(runSelftestEscrowConsume(context.Background(), logger, blobPath, expectedFP, keyDest))
+	case "identity-consume":
+		os.Exit(runSelftestIdentityConsume(context.Background(), logger, blobPath, keyDest))
 	}
 }
 
@@ -1068,7 +1074,7 @@ func runSelftestProvision(ctx context.Context, cfg config.Config, logger *slog.L
 // wrap the live PBS key under R (zero-knowledge), self-verify recoverability, and emit the opaque
 // blob. R is surfaced to stdout EXACTLY ONCE (never to the logger/journald). With -upload it PUTs
 // the opaque blob to the hub. Enrollment-time, root-capable (reads the 0600 key).
-func runSelftestEscrowCreate(ctx context.Context, cfg config.Config, logger *slog.Logger, storage string, paperkey, offline, upload bool) int {
+func runSelftestEscrowCreate(ctx context.Context, cfg config.Config, logger *slog.Logger, storage string, paperkey, offline, upload bool, identityBundlePath, directivePath string) int {
 	if storage == "" {
 		storage = cfg.Escrow.PBSStorageID
 	}
@@ -1082,15 +1088,40 @@ func runSelftestEscrowCreate(ctx context.Context, cfg config.Config, logger *slo
 		return 1
 	}
 
-	fmt.Printf("=== felhom-agent %s selftest=escrow-create (storage=%s posture=%s) ===\n", version, storage, escrow.DefaultPosture)
+	// Slice 10D.1: optionally ALSO wrap the identity bundle under the same R, and carry the non-secret
+	// directive for the hub. The bundle file is a 0600 secret (tunnel/pbs tokens); the directive is
+	// non-secret (pbs repo/ns, expected fingerprint, tunnel id).
+	var identity *escrow.IdentityBundle
+	var directive json.RawMessage
+	if identityBundlePath != "" {
+		raw, err := os.ReadFile(identityBundlePath)
+		if err != nil {
+			fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "selftest=escrow-create: reading identity bundle %s: %v\n", identityBundlePath, err)
+			return 1
+		}
+		var b escrow.IdentityBundle
+		if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &b); err != nil {
+			fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "selftest=escrow-create: identity bundle is not valid JSON {tunnel_token,pbs_token}: %v\n", err)
+			return 1
+		}
+		identity = &b
+		if directivePath != "" {
+			if d, err := os.ReadFile(directivePath); err == nil && json.Valid(d) {
+				directive = d
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	fmt.Printf("=== felhom-agent %s selftest=escrow-create (storage=%s posture=%s identity=%v) ===\n", version, storage, escrow.DefaultPosture, identity != nil)
 	// NB: nothing about R is logged. The logger never sees R; only stdout does, once.
-	logger.Info("escrow: creating zero-knowledge recovery-code escrow", "storage", storage, "key_path", keyPath)
+	logger.Info("escrow: creating zero-knowledge recovery-code escrow", "storage", storage, "key_path", keyPath, "with_identity", identity != nil)
 
 	R, res, err := escrow.Create(ctx, escrow.CreateOptions{
 		KeyPath:         keyPath,
 		Posture:         escrow.Posture(cfg.Escrow.Posture),
 		WantOfflineCopy: offline,
 		WantPaperkey:    paperkey,
+		IdentityBundle:  identity,
 	})
 	if err != nil {
 		fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "  [FAIL] escrow create:", err)
@@ -1120,12 +1151,15 @@ func runSelftestEscrowCreate(ctx context.Context, cfg config.Config, logger *slo
 		fmt.Println(res.Paperkey)
 	}
 
+	if len(res.IdentityBlob) > 0 {
+		fmt.Printf("  identity escrow: %d bytes (age-wrapped {tunnel,pbs} under the same R) · self-verify OK\n", len(res.IdentityBlob))
+	}
 	if upload {
-		if err := uploadEscrowBlob(ctx, cfg, res); err != nil {
+		if err := uploadEscrowBlob(ctx, cfg, res, directive); err != nil {
 			fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "  [FAIL] upload escrow to hub:", err)
 			return 1
 		}
-		fmt.Println("  uploaded the opaque blob to the hub (host record); the hub cannot open it")
+		fmt.Println("  uploaded the opaque blob(s) to the hub (host record); the hub cannot open them")
 	}
 	fmt.Println("=== selftest=escrow-create OK ===")
 	return 0
@@ -1165,6 +1199,44 @@ func runSelftestEscrowConsume(ctx context.Context, logger *slog.Logger, blobPath
 	return 0
 }
 
+// runSelftestIdentityConsume recovers the IDENTITY bundle from its age blob with R (slice 10D.1/10D.3)
+// and writes the recovered {tunnel_token, pbs_token} JSON to -keydest (0600). R is taken BY HAND from
+// FELHOM_RECOVERY_CODE (off the command line); the recovered tokens are never logged. The drill then
+// uses the tunnel token to re-establish the tunnel + the pbs token for steady-state.
+func runSelftestIdentityConsume(ctx context.Context, logger *slog.Logger, blobPath, keyDest string) int {
+	if blobPath == "" || keyDest == "" {
+		fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "selftest=identity-consume requires -blob and -keydest (R via env FELHOM_RECOVERY_CODE)")
+		return 2
+	}
+	R := os.Getenv("FELHOM_RECOVERY_CODE")
+	if R == "" {
+		fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "selftest=identity-consume: set the recovery code in env FELHOM_RECOVERY_CODE (by-hand input)")
+		return 2
+	}
+	blob, err := os.ReadFile(blobPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "selftest=identity-consume: reading blob %s: %v\n", blobPath, err)
+		return 1
+	}
+	fmt.Printf("=== felhom-agent %s selftest=identity-consume (blob=%s → %s) ===\n", version, blobPath, keyDest)
+	logger.Info("escrow: recovering identity bundle from R-wrapped age blob", "blob_bytes", len(blob)) // R + tokens NOT logged
+	bundle, err := escrow.UnwrapIdentityBundle(ctx, blob, R)
+	if err != nil {
+		R = ""
+		fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "  [FAIL] identity consume:", err) // never contains R or token bytes
+		return 1
+	}
+	R = ""
+	raw, _ := json.Marshal(bundle)
+	if err := os.WriteFile(keyDest, raw, 0o600); err != nil {
+		fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "  [FAIL] writing recovered bundle:", err)
+		return 1
+	}
+	fmt.Printf("  [OK] identity recovered (tunnel_token + pbs_token) → %s (0600) — never printed\n", keyDest)
+	fmt.Println("=== selftest=identity-consume OK ===")
+	return 0
+}
+
 // escrowUploadRequest is the agent→hub wire shape for the opaque escrow blob. MUST stay in lockstep
 // with the hub's ingest struct (felhom-hub api.escrowUploadRequest). The hub stores the bytes and
 // never decrypts them.
@@ -1172,20 +1244,30 @@ type escrowUploadRequest struct {
 	BlobB64        string `json:"blob_b64"`        // base64 of the opaque R-wrapped blob (ciphertext)
 	KeyFingerprint string `json:"key_fingerprint"` // for operator display only
 	Posture        string `json:"posture"`         // e.g. "zero_knowledge"
+	// Slice 10D.1 — optional DR bundle (identity escrow + non-secret directive). Omitted in slice-7.
+	IdentityBlobB64 string          `json:"identity_blob_b64,omitempty"`
+	DirectiveJSON   json.RawMessage `json:"directive,omitempty"`
 	CreatedAt      string `json:"created_at"`      // RFC3339
 }
 
-// uploadEscrowBlob PUTs the opaque blob to the hub, authed with the per-host key.
+// uploadEscrowBlob PUTs the opaque blob (and, for 10D, the identity blob + non-secret directive) to
-func uploadEscrowBlob(ctx context.Context, cfg config.Config, res escrow.CreateResult) error {
+// the hub, authed with the per-host key. The hub stores ciphertext + non-secret fields; no usable
+// secret leaves the agent.
+func uploadEscrowBlob(ctx context.Context, cfg config.Config, res escrow.CreateResult, directive json.RawMessage) error {
 	if cfg.Hub.URL == "" || cfg.Hub.HostID == "" || cfg.Hub.APIKey == "" {
 		return fmt.Errorf("hub not configured (url/host_id/api_key)")
 	}
-	body, _ := json.Marshal(escrowUploadRequest{
+	upReq := escrowUploadRequest{
 		BlobB64:        base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(res.Blob),
 		KeyFingerprint: res.KeyFingerprint,
 		Posture:        string(res.Posture),
 		CreatedAt:      time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339),
-	})
+	}
+	if len(res.IdentityBlob) > 0 {
+		upReq.IdentityBlobB64 = base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(res.IdentityBlob)
+		upReq.DirectiveJSON = directive
+	}
+	body, _ := json.Marshal(upReq)
 	url := strings.TrimRight(cfg.Hub.URL, "/") + "/api/v1/hosts/" + cfg.Hub.HostID + "/escrow"
 	req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodPut, url, bytes.NewReader(body))
 	if err != nil {
@@ -1563,8 +1645,10 @@ func (f *selftestFlag) Set(v string) error {
 		f.mode = "escrow-create"
 	case "escrow-consume":
 		f.mode = "escrow-consume"
+	case "identity-consume":
+		f.mode = "identity-consume"
 	default:
-		return fmt.Errorf("invalid --selftest value %q (want read|task|hub|storage|backup|restore-test|pbs-verify|bring-up|provision|escrow-create|escrow-consume)", v)
+		return fmt.Errorf("invalid --selftest value %q (want read|task|hub|storage|backup|restore-test|pbs-verify|bring-up|provision|escrow-create|escrow-consume|identity-consume)", v)
 	}
 	return nil
 }

internal/escrow/escrow.go

@@ -39,6 +39,9 @@ type CreateOptions struct {
 	// WantPaperkey: opt-in (a) — also return the RAW-key paperkey. Single-factor + unrevocable;
 	// the caller must surface the loud caveat. Off by default.
 	WantPaperkey bool
+	// IdentityBundle (slice 10D.1), when set, is ALSO wrapped under the SAME R (via age) → an
+	// IdentityBlob in the result. Additive: the K-escrow path is unchanged when nil.
+	IdentityBundle *IdentityBundle
 }
 
 // CreateResult is the non-secret output of escrow creation. NOTE: the recovery code R is returned
@@ -50,6 +53,7 @@ type CreateResult struct {
 	EntropyBits    float64 // R's approximate entropy (for display; never R itself)
 	OfflineCopy    []byte  // (b) the same wrapped blob, if WantOfflineCopy (for the customer to print)
 	Paperkey       string  // (a) raw paperkey text, if WantPaperkey — SECRET-adjacent (single factor)
+	IdentityBlob   []byte  // (10D.1) the age-wrapped identity bundle under the same R, if IdentityBundle set
 }
 
 // Create generates a recovery code R, produces the R-wrapped escrow blob from the live key, and
@@ -121,6 +125,18 @@ func Create(ctx context.Context, opts CreateOptions) (recoveryCode string, res C
 		}
 		res.Paperkey = pk
 	}
+	// Slice 10D.1: ALSO wrap the identity bundle under the SAME R (via age), so DR can recover the
+	// box's identity with the one recovery code. Self-verify it round-trips before shipping.
+	if opts.IdentityBundle != nil {
+		idBlob, err := WrapIdentityBundle(ctx, *opts.IdentityBundle, R)
+		if err != nil {
+			return "", CreateResult{}, fmt.Errorf("escrow: identity wrap: %w", err)
+		}
+		if _, err := UnwrapIdentityBundle(ctx, idBlob, R); err != nil {
+			return "", CreateResult{}, fmt.Errorf("escrow: identity self-verify (not recoverable): %w", err)
+		}
+		res.IdentityBlob = idBlob
+	}
 	return R, res, nil
 }
 

internal/escrow/identity.go

@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+package escrow
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"fmt"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+)
+
+// Slice 10D.1 — IDENTITY escrow. The K-escrow (above) wraps the PBS *encryption key* via the
+// PBS-native scrypt path. The identity bundle `{tunnel_token, pbs_token}` is arbitrary secret bytes
+// (not a PBS key), so it is wrapped under the SAME recovery code `R` with **age** (`age -p`: scrypt
+// + ChaCha20-Poly1305 — a vetted passphrase-AEAD, not hand-rolled). Same two-factor, zero-knowledge
+// shape as the K-escrow: the blob is opaque without `R`; `R` is the only out-of-band secret. The
+// K-escrow + the 10C `Consume` path are UNTOUCHED — this is purely additive. Proven by the slice-10D
+// identity-restore spike (documentation/tests/slice10d-identity-restore-spike-findings.md).
+//
+// age is a runtime dependency for the identity path (analogous to proxmox-backup-client for K).
+var ageBinary = "/usr/bin/age"
+
+// IdentityBundle is the box's recoverable identity — the secrets a re-enrolling box needs to come
+// back "as host X". Carried only inside the R-wrapped blob; never stored or logged in the clear.
+type IdentityBundle struct {
+	TunnelToken string `json:"tunnel_token"` // the Cloudflare tunnel connector token
+	PBSToken    string `json:"pbs_token"`    // the PBS access token (steady-state; rotated on re-establish)
+}
+
+// WrapIdentity wraps arbitrary bundle bytes under `R` via `age -p` (scrypt + ChaCha20-Poly1305) and
+// returns the opaque blob. `R` is fed via the pty (2 prompts: passphrase + confirm); the plaintext
+// and ciphertext flow as files, so only `R` touches the tty (never logged).
+func WrapIdentity(ctx context.Context, bundle []byte, recoveryCode string) ([]byte, error) {
+	if len(bundle) == 0 {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("escrow: WrapIdentity needs a non-empty bundle")
+	}
+	if recoveryCode == "" {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("escrow: WrapIdentity needs the recovery code (R)")
+	}
+	work, err := os.MkdirTemp("", "felhom-idesc-")
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("escrow: tempdir: %w", err)
+	}
+	defer os.RemoveAll(work)
+	in, out := filepath.Join(work, "bundle"), filepath.Join(work, "blob")
+	if err := os.WriteFile(in, bundle, 0o600); err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("escrow: stage bundle: %w", err)
+	}
+	// `age -p -o <out> <in>` prompts the passphrase + confirm (2) and writes the armored blob.
+	if err := runWithPassphrase(ctx, recoveryCode, 2, ageBinary, "-p", "-a", "-o", out, in); err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("escrow: identity wrap (age -p): %w", err)
+	}
+	return os.ReadFile(out)
+}
+
+// UnwrapIdentity recovers the bundle bytes from an age blob with `R`. A WRONG R fails CLOSED at the
+// scrypt KDF (`age -d` nonzero exit, no plaintext emitted) — never a plausible-but-wrong bundle.
+func UnwrapIdentity(ctx context.Context, blob []byte, recoveryCode string) ([]byte, error) {
+	if len(blob) == 0 {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("escrow: UnwrapIdentity needs a non-empty blob")
+	}
+	if recoveryCode == "" {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("escrow: UnwrapIdentity needs the recovery code (R)")
+	}
+	work, err := os.MkdirTemp("", "felhom-idesc-")
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("escrow: tempdir: %w", err)
+	}
+	defer os.RemoveAll(work)
+	in, out := filepath.Join(work, "blob"), filepath.Join(work, "bundle")
+	if err := os.WriteFile(in, blob, 0o600); err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("escrow: stage blob: %w", err)
+	}
+	// `age -d -o <out> <in>` prompts the passphrase (1).
+	if err := runWithPassphrase(ctx, recoveryCode, 1, ageBinary, "-d", "-o", out, in); err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("escrow: the recovery code did not unwrap the identity escrow (wrong recovery code, or a corrupt blob): %w", err)
+	}
+	return os.ReadFile(out)
+}
+
+// WrapIdentityBundle marshals + wraps an IdentityBundle under R.
+func WrapIdentityBundle(ctx context.Context, b IdentityBundle, recoveryCode string) ([]byte, error) {
+	raw, err := json.Marshal(b)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("escrow: marshal identity bundle: %w", err)
+	}
+	return WrapIdentity(ctx, raw, recoveryCode)
+}
+
+// UnwrapIdentityBundle unwraps + parses an IdentityBundle (slice 10D.3 restore-mode consumption).
+func UnwrapIdentityBundle(ctx context.Context, blob []byte, recoveryCode string) (IdentityBundle, error) {
+	raw, err := UnwrapIdentity(ctx, blob, recoveryCode)
+	if err != nil {
+		return IdentityBundle{}, err
+	}
+	var b IdentityBundle
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &b); err != nil {
+		return IdentityBundle{}, fmt.Errorf("escrow: recovered identity bundle is malformed: %w", err)
+	}
+	return b, nil
+}

internal/escrow/identity_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+package escrow
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"context"
+	"os/exec"
+	"runtime"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+func ageAvailable() bool {
+	if runtime.GOOS != "linux" {
+		return false
+	}
+	if _, err := exec.LookPath("age"); err == nil {
+		return true
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+func ensureAge(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Helper()
+	if !ageAvailable() {
+		t.Skip("skipping: the `age` CLI + linux required (runs on the demo/build host)")
+	}
+	if p, err := exec.LookPath("age"); err == nil {
+		ageBinary = p
+	}
+}
+
+func TestIdentity_InputValidation(t *testing.T) {
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	if _, err := WrapIdentity(ctx, nil, "R"); err == nil {
+		t.Error("empty bundle must error")
+	}
+	if _, err := WrapIdentity(ctx, []byte("x"), ""); err == nil {
+		t.Error("empty R must error")
+	}
+	if _, err := UnwrapIdentity(ctx, nil, "R"); err == nil {
+		t.Error("empty blob must error")
+	}
+}
+
+// Round-trip: a bundle wraps under R and recovers byte-identical (the identity analog of K-escrow).
+func TestIdentity_RoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
+	ensureAge(t)
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	const R = "throwaway-correct-horse-battery-staple-words"
+	bundle := IdentityBundle{TunnelToken: "eyJhIjoidGVzdCIsInQiOiJ4In0", PBSToken: "felhom@pbs!n100:deadbeefcafe"}
+
+	blob, err := WrapIdentityBundle(ctx, bundle, R)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("WrapIdentityBundle: %v", err)
+	}
+	// the blob is opaque ciphertext, not the bundle.
+	if bytes.Contains(blob, []byte(bundle.TunnelToken)) || bytes.Contains(blob, []byte(bundle.PBSToken)) {
+		t.Fatal("the blob leaks plaintext token bytes — not encrypted")
+	}
+	got, err := UnwrapIdentityBundle(ctx, blob, R)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("UnwrapIdentityBundle: %v", err)
+	}
+	if got != bundle {
+		t.Errorf("recovered bundle = %+v, want %+v", got, bundle)
+	}
+}
+
+// Wrong R fails CLOSED — no bundle emitted.
+func TestIdentity_WrongRFailsClosed(t *testing.T) {
+	ensureAge(t)
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	blob, err := WrapIdentity(ctx, []byte(`{"tunnel_token":"a","pbs_token":"b"}`), "the-correct-code")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("WrapIdentity: %v", err)
+	}
+	if _, err := UnwrapIdentity(ctx, blob, "DEFINITELY-the-wrong-code"); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("a wrong recovery code must fail closed (no bundle)")
+	}
+	// the blob is unchanged / retryable: the RIGHT code still works after a wrong attempt.
+	if _, err := UnwrapIdentity(ctx, blob, "the-correct-code"); err != nil {
+		t.Errorf("the blob was not retryable after a wrong-R attempt: %v", err)
+	}
+}