v0.96.0 — R-50 island NIC: provision attaches the guest island net1

- LocalAPIConfig.island_bridge + island_guest_addr (+ IslandEnabled, Validate
  all-or-nothing + CIDR guard)
- buildBringUpConfig attaches static net1 (island) on provision + DR when set;
  absent otherwise (pre-R-50 byte-for-byte). Plumbed from cfg.LocalAPI at both
  RunBringUp sites. Endpoint already follows listen_addr (A0: no template change).
- healer stays eth0-only (A3 verify-only) — red-proof test locks the scoping
- example config + firewall example rewritten for the island; REUSE updated
- 3 non-hollow tests; full green. MinAgent unchanged.

Coupling: host-install island config requires agent >= 0.96.0 (vouch first).

configs/agent.example.json

@@ -48,10 +48,16 @@
   },
   "local_api": {
     "enable": true,
-    "listen_addr": "192.168.0.162:8443",
+    "listen_addr": "169.254.253.1:8443",
     "cert_file": "/var/lib/felhom-agent/local-api.crt",
     "key_file": "/var/lib/felhom-agent/local-api.key",
-    "token_store": "/var/lib/felhom-agent/local-tokens.log"
+    "token_store": "/var/lib/felhom-agent/local-tokens.log",
+    "island_bridge": "vmbr9",
+    "island_guest_addr": "169.254.253.2/30"
+  },
+  "lan_resolver": {
+    "enable": true,
+    "host_ip": "192.168.0.162"
   },
   "log_level": "info"
 }

configs/felhom-localapi-firewall.example

@@ -1,20 +1,30 @@
-# felhom-agent local API — host firewall narrowing (doc 03 §6, slice 8A)
+# felhom-agent local API — host firewall narrowing (doc 03 §6; R-50 island update 2026-07-25)
 #
-# Defense-in-depth for the per-guest local API (the controller→agent channel on the host
-# bridge). The PER-GUEST BEARER TOKEN is the authorization gate; this firewall rule is an
-# ADDITIONAL layer that limits who can even reach the port. The slice-8A spike found no rule
-# was needed for reachability on the demo (PVE firewall off) — this narrows exposure so that
-# only guests on the bridge subnet (not arbitrary LAN hosts) can open a connection.
+# Defense-in-depth for the per-guest local API (the controller→agent channel). The PER-GUEST BEARER
+# TOKEN + the served-leaf pin are the authorization gate; a firewall rule is only an ADDITIONAL layer
+# limiting who can even open the port.
 #
-# The agent already binds the listener to the host BRIDGE IP (local_api.listen_addr), not
-# 0.0.0.0. This file adds the subnet restriction. Apply it at HOST SETUP (it is a host-level
-# packet-filter change, intentionally OUTSIDE the agent's 3-exception privileged fence — the
-# agent never mutates the host firewall at runtime).
+# ===  R-50 ISLAND INSTALL (the default on a fresh appliance)  =================================
+# The agent binds local_api.listen_addr on the HOST-INTERNAL island bridge — 169.254.253.1:8443 on
+# vmbr9, a bridge with NO physical port (bridge-ports none). That bind is the security win:
+#   * Nothing listens on the LAN IP at all, so no LAN host (or off-site attacker on the LAN) can
+#     reach the local API — the LAN:8443 surface is CLOSED by the bind, not by a rule.
+#   * vmbr9 has no uplink, so 169.254.253.1:8443 is reachable ONLY from the one guest wired to the
+#     /30 (169.254.253.2) — the controller. The portless bridge is the isolation.
+# So on an island install NO firewall rule is required for exposure; the topology provides it. If you
+# want belt-and-suspenders, restrict the port to the island bridge (it changes nothing, since nothing
+# off-bridge can route to a portless bridge anyway):
 #
-# Replace the bridge IP (192.168.0.162), port (8443), and the guest bridge subnet
-# (192.168.0.0/24) with this host's values.
+#   nft add rule inet filter input iifname != "vmbr9" ip daddr 169.254.253.1 tcp dport 8443 drop
+#
+# Verify: from the guest, a TLS connect to 169.254.253.1:8443 succeeds; there is no LAN listener to
+# probe (`ss -lnt 'sport = :8443'` shows only the island IP).
+#
+# ===  LEGACY LAN BIND (byo, --no-island, or an explicit --bridge-ip)  =========================
+# When the agent still binds a LAN bridge IP (e.g. 192.168.0.162:8443), the port is exposed to the
+# whole LAN and the subnet-narrowing rule below is worth applying. Replace the bridge IP, port, and
+# the guest bridge subnet with this host's values.
 #
-# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # Option A — nftables (recommended on PVE 8/9; inet filter table). Insert ABOVE any accept:
 #
 #   nft add rule inet filter input ip daddr 192.168.0.162 tcp dport 8443 \
@@ -22,13 +32,11 @@
 #   nft add rule inet filter input ip daddr 192.168.0.162 tcp dport 8443 \
 #       ip saddr 192.168.0.0/24 accept
 #
-# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # Option B — iptables:
 #
 #   iptables -A INPUT -d 192.168.0.162 -p tcp --dport 8443 -s 192.168.0.0/24 -j ACCEPT
 #   iptables -A INPUT -d 192.168.0.162 -p tcp --dport 8443 -j DROP
 #
-# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # Option C — PVE host firewall (/etc/pve/nodes/<node>/host.fw), if the PVE firewall is enabled.
 # Add under [RULES] (and ensure the firewall is enabled in cluster.fw / host.fw):
 #
@@ -36,5 +44,6 @@
 #   IN ACCEPT -source 192.168.0.0/24 -dport 8443 -proto tcp -log nolog
 #   IN DROP   -dport 8443 -proto tcp -log nolog
 #
-# Verify after applying: from a guest ON the bridge, a TLS connect to <bridge-ip>:8443 succeeds;
-# from an OFF-bridge host it is refused/dropped. (The token + leaf-pin still gate the request.)
+# Apply at HOST SETUP — a host-level packet-filter change, intentionally OUTSIDE the agent's
+# 3-exception privileged fence (the agent never mutates the host firewall at runtime). The token +
+# leaf-pin still gate the request regardless of which bind is in force.