R-812 option A: the Proxmox package lane (layer pve) + the /etc/pve write gate

The wrapper gains layer "pve" (slow lane): the host's Proxmox userspace
packages only — origin "Proxmox Debian Repository", never a kernel / boot /
firmware / microcode name (R14), no removal, no undo, a new package only from
an allow-list; authority = a signed os_pve_step or the root-owned ring-0 mark.
The night leg runs it in ring 0 after a healthy host step; ring 1 only by a
signed job (PVEStepExecutor). While it runs, the agent's own /etc/pve writes
(every non-GET API call, pct config verbs, pvesm, pveum, felhom-pbs-apply)
wait on internal/pvegate. Health = the host rule + unchanged container ids +
pveversion reads the installed pve-manager.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS
This commit is contained in:
2026-10-07 10:07:41 +02:00
parent ac90169a5d
commit ce1a4b4758
17 changed files with 990 additions and 41 deletions
+5 -1
View File
@@ -52,6 +52,10 @@ const (
// (signed, operational key) like agent_update; the root wrapper re-verifies the same signature itself.
ClassOSDockerStep OpClass = "os_docker_step"
// A Proxmox package step on the host (R-812 option A, `11` §5.10) — ring 1. Destructive-class (signed, operational
// key) like os_docker_step; the root wrapper re-verifies the same signature itself.
ClassOSPVEStep OpClass = "os_pve_step"
// The config bundle (agent v0.143.0, R-840, `11` §5.4.2): the box's ROOT-OWNED files (sudoers, wrappers, units).
// Destructive-class (signed, operational key) like agent_update; the root wrapper re-verifies the signature itself.
ClassAgentConfigUpdate OpClass = "agent_config_update"
@@ -123,7 +127,7 @@ func Classify(class OpClass, prov Provenance) Disposition {
return Destructive
case ClassKeyRotation:
return Destructive
case ClassAgentUpdate, ClassOSDockerStep, ClassAgentConfigUpdate:
case ClassAgentUpdate, ClassOSDockerStep, ClassOSPVEStep, ClassAgentConfigUpdate:
// Never benign — no agent-internal provenance can make replacing the agent binary
// unsigned-safe (a compromised process must not be able to self-bless an update).
return Destructive