docs: REPORT/CONTEXT — v0.63.0 shipped + live-verified (B3 reload-on-miss, B2 snippets dir)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6

CONTEXT.md

@@ -5,6 +5,16 @@
 
 ## Current
 
+- **v0.63.0** (2026-07-03, live on felhom-pve + Gitea-published sha256 b4a89c81…) — **drill findings
+  B3 + B2 FIXED** (`DRILL-day0-cleanroom-2026-07-03.md`): `TokenStore.Lookup` reloads the append-only
+  store once on a miss (cross-process coherence with the one-shot provisioner — no more fresh-install
+  `/controller/swap` 401 / manual restart; size short-circuit bounds the cost; behind the
+  `TokenAuthority` seam) + `guesthook.InstallSnippet` issues a fenced `mkdir -p /var/lib/vz/snippets`
+  first (fresh boxes lacked the dir → the self-heal hook silently never installed). Sudoers gained
+  exactly that one grant — **ship sudoers WITH the binary** (done on felhom-pve). Red-proofed both;
+  Scenario-E method: compiled test suite run ON felhom-pve + live channel-health hit-path.
+  **OPERATOR FOLLOW-UP: bump the hub Day-0 manifest to agent 0.63.0** — until then fresh installs get
+  0.62.0 and the guide's D.1b restart-first step still applies (narrowed to "< v0.63.0" in the guide).
 - **v0.62.0** (2026-07-03) — **audit A1 RESOLVED**: the stale-lock reaper's scan is now
   pool-intersected (`staleLockController.Guests()` = `ListLXC` ∩ `Client.Pool("felhom")` members),
   fail-safe skip on pool-read failure; `pve:pool-read` capability (non-critical) + `--selftest`

REPORT.md

@@ -1,98 +1,82 @@
-# REPORT — v0.62.0: A1 pool-membership ownership check for the stale-lock reaper
+# REPORT — v0.63.0: B3 + B2 fresh-install fixes (token reload-on-miss + guesthook dir)
 
-**Date:** 2026-07-03 · **Class:** implementation (agent v0.61.0 → **v0.62.0**, live on felhom-pve)
-**Spec basis:** audit A1 (`AUDIT-blast-radius-hostroot-localapi-2026-07-02` §A) via the spike verdict
-(`felhom.eu/documentation/audits/SPIKE-a1-pool-membership-read-2026-07-03.md` Q3/Q4/Q5).
-**Companion:** felhom.eu `felhom-host-install.sh` v1.8.0 → **v1.9.0** (`Pool.Audit` in FelhomAgentGuest).
+**Date:** 2026-07-03 · **Class:** implementation, correctness+security discipline (agent v0.62.0 →
+**v0.63.0**, live on felhom-pve) · **Source findings:**
+`felhom.eu/documentation/audits/DRILL-day0-cleanroom-2026-07-03.md` B3/B2.
 
-## 1. Baselines & commits
+## Baselines & commits
 
-| Repo | Baseline | Shipped commit |
-|---|---|---|
-| felhom-agent | `3e760a559a` (v0.61.0) | **`3f37c5f`** — v0.62.0 code + tests + REUSE/CHANGELOG/CONTEXT |
-| felhom.eu | `5e3dfcb714` (script v1.8.0) | **`639a57e`** — script v1.9.0 + scripts/CHANGELOG + REUSE §2 errata + CONTEXT |
-
-## 2. What changed (agent)
-
-- `Client.Pool(ctx, name)` (proxmox/query.go): `GET /pools/{name}` → `PoolInfo{PoolID, Members[]{VMID,Type}}`.
-  API-side read — the `Client`-never-shells / `Privileged`-never-HTTPs fence is untouched.
-- `staleLockController.Guests()` (localapi/stalelock.go): **`ListLXC ∩ pool members`** (nonzero-vmid,
-  non-`storage` entries). Pool-read failure → wrapped error `pool membership read (pool=felhom): …`
-  → rides the pre-existing "guest list unavailable — skipping recovery" guard (`stalelock.go`
-  Server path). NEVER falls back to the unfiltered list. One INFO line per scan:
-  `stale-lock: scanning pool guests` (pool, listed, scanned). **Note (spec deviation, by
-  necessity):** the spec located this line in `RecoverStaleLockedGuests`; it is emitted by the
-  production controller instead, because the unchanged `StaleLockController` seam cannot carry the
-  pool name + pre-intersect count to the Server without breaking the 9 existing fake-based tests.
-  Net startup-log effect is identical (Scenario D line observed live, §5).
-- `NewStaleLockController(px, runner, pool, logger)`; main.go threads `reconcile.DefaultPool`.
-- Capability: composed closure in main.go appends `pve:pool-read` (non-critical) to the sudo
-  prober's snapshot; `internal/capability/` untouched. `--selftest` gained a "pool read" line.
-
-## 3. Test results (all green: `go build ./... && go vet ./... && go test ./...`, 17 pkgs ok)
-
-| Test | Result |
+| What | Value |
 |---|---|
-| `TestStaleLock_ForeignGuestNotReaped` (Scenario A) | PASS — foreign 5000 never unlocked/snap-deleted/started |
-| `TestStaleLock_PoolGuestStillReaped` (Scenario B) | PASS — owned 9201 fully recovered (unlock+delsnap+start) |
-| `TestStaleLock_PoolReadFails_SkipsAll` (Scenario C) | PASS — zero mutations on pool-read error; error text names the pool read |
-| `TestStaleLockController_GuestsIntersect` (§8 edges) | PASS — storage-type/vmid-0 members excluded; empty pool = empty scan, no error |
-| 9 pre-existing stalelock tests | PASS **unmodified** (Server-level `fakeStaleLock` seam untouched by design) |
+| Base | `84f3f7d` (v0.62.0, as spec'd) |
+| Fix commit | `f31a76f` — v0.63.0: B3+B2 (tokenstore.go, guesthook/install.go, sudoers, tests, CHANGELOG, REUSE) |
+| Docs commit | (this one — REPORT/CONTEXT) |
 
-**Red-proofs (both run and reverted):**
-- **A:** intersect replaced with raw-ListLXC passthrough → `TestStaleLock_ForeignGuestNotReaped`
-  **FAILED** with `runner calls=[[pct unlock 5000]]` (the exact A1 exploit) and
-  `TestStaleLockController_GuestsIntersect` failed with both vmids returned. Restored.
-- **C:** pool-read error changed to fall back to the unfiltered list →
-  `TestStaleLock_PoolReadFails_SkipsAll` **FAILED** with `runner=[[pct unlock 9201]]
-  delsnap=[9201] started=[9201]`. Restored.
+## What changed
 
-## 4. Live rescope (felhom-pve, PUSHED v1.9.0 script fetched from Gitea raw, `--rescope-acl --vmid 9201`)
+- **B3 — `TokenStore.Lookup` reload-on-miss** (`internal/localapi/tokenstore.go`): the one-shot
+  provisioner Mints into the shared append-only JSONL while the daemon serves Lookup from an index
+  built once at open — the daemon 401'd any token minted after it started (the drill's
+  `/controller/swap: HTTP 401` until a manual restart). Lookup now re-reads the file once on a miss
+  (`reloadLocked()`, factored from `load()`; idempotent under `apply`'s last-write-wins) and
+  re-checks with the same constant-time compare, all under the existing single mutex. Append-only
+  size short-circuit: an unknown token against an unchanged file costs one `stat`, no re-read
+  (`loadedSize` kept accurate by in-process `Mint`). Fail-closed on an unreadable store; missing
+  file = empty. Entirely behind the `TokenAuthority` seam — `server.go` untouched. No token/hash
+  material logged (nothing new is logged at all).
+- **B2 — `guesthook.InstallSnippet` ensures the snippets dir** (`internal/guesthook/install.go`):
+  fenced `mkdir -p /var/lib/vz/snippets` before the `install` op (fresh PVE lacks the dir; `install`
+  without `-D` fails ENOENT — the drill's silent no-hook finding).
+  `configs/felhom-agent.sudoers` FELHOM_GUESTHOOK gains exactly the one grant
+  `/usr/bin/mkdir -p /var/lib/vz/snippets` (comment ties it to B2). Kept the separate-mkdir shape —
+  `install -D` would have changed the allowlisted install argv.
 
-Roles after (only Guest changed; Base/Store byte-identical):
+## Tests & red-proofs (both run, shown failing, restored; `git diff` clean)
 
-```
-FelhomAgentStore → Datastore.Allocate,Datastore.AllocateSpace
-FelhomAgentGuest → Pool.Allocate,Pool.Audit,VM.Allocate,VM.Audit,VM.Backup,VM.Config.CPU,
-                   VM.Config.Disk,VM.Config.Memory,VM.Config.Network,VM.Config.Options,
-                   VM.PowerMgmt,VM.Snapshot,VM.Snapshot.Rollback
-FelhomAgentBase  → Datastore.Audit,SDN.Use,Sys.Audit
-```
+| Test | Asserts | Result |
+|---|---|---|
+| `TestTokenStore_ReloadOnMiss_CrossProcessMint` (Scenario A) | token minted by a SECOND store handle after the daemon handle opened resolves to (120,true) | PASS. **Red-proof:** pre-fix Lookup shape (plain miss, no reload) → FAIL with `got (0,false), want (120,true)` — the exact drill 401 |
+| `TestTokenStore_ReloadOnMiss_BoundedReloads` (Scenario B) | unknown token → (0,false); exactly 1 reload after an external append; 0 further reloads on an unchanged file (size short-circuit) — no loop, no per-candidate re-read | PASS |
+| `TestTokenStore_ReloadOnMiss_RemintCoherence` (Scenario C) | cross-process rotation: new hash → (120,true), rotated-out hash 401s, `byHash`/`byVMID` coherent after full reload | PASS |
+| `TestTokenStore_ReloadOnMiss_MissingFile` (§8 edge) | store deleted → fail closed, no crash | PASS on linux (felhom-pve run); skipped on Windows (can't unlink an open handle) |
+| `TestInstallSnippet_EnsuresSnippetsDirFirst` (Scenario D) | a `mkdir -p /var/lib/vz/snippets` op with exactly the sudoers-fenced argv PRECEDES the install op | PASS. **Red-proof:** mkdir call removed → FAIL with `no mkdir -p /var/lib/vz/snippets op issued … calls: [[install …]]` |
+| Pre-existing suites | tokenstore_test.go originals, `TestInstallSnippet_RandomTempName` (only adapted to filter install calls from the recorded vector — assertions unchanged), full repo | all PASS; green gate `go build && go vet && go test ./...` exit 0 |
 
-Production-token `GET /pools/felhom` (403 in the spike) → **HTTP 200, members [9201]**. The running
-v0.61.0 agent stayed `active` through the rescope (order: rescope BEFORE agent deploy, per spec).
+## Deploy verification (felhom-pve)
 
-## 5. Agent deploy verification (felhom-pve)
+- Built on 180 from `f31a76f`; binary backed up as `felhom-agent.bak-0.62.0`; **sudoers shipped WITH
+  the binary** (CRLF-stripped, `visudo -cf` on the file AND the live /etc/sudoers context: parsed OK;
+  the new mkdir grant present).
+- Service active; `--selftest` OK (incl. `pool read pool "felhom", 1 member`); daemon hub report:
+  **agent 0.63.0, 47/47 capabilities ok, `pve:pool-read` ok** (host_reports id 2412). No
+  reassert/rebind or error lines in the journal after restart.
+- Published to Gitea: `felhom-agent/0.63.0`, HTTP 201, sha256 `b4a89c81c33d51ea…`.
+  **OPERATOR FOLLOW-UP: bump the hub Day-0 artifact manifest to agent 0.63.0** (password-gated UI —
+  CC cannot). Until then, fresh installs fetch 0.62.0 and still need the D.1b restart.
 
-- Binary built on 180 from `3f37c5f`, deployed with backup `felhom-agent.bak-0.61.0`;
-  `felhom-agent --version` → **`felhom-agent 0.62.0`**; service `active`.
-- Startup log (live excerpt): `msg="capabilities self-check" ok=47 total=47 degraded=0` (46 → 47:
-  the new `pve:pool-read`, OK) and
-  `msg="stale-lock: scanning pool guests" pool=felhom listed=1 scanned=1` (listed=1 because the
-  scoped token's ListLXC is already pool-filtered — spike T1, expected). ReassertGuestBinds clean
-  (logs only on action/failure; none emitted). No new warnings — the pre-existing PBS
-  token-secret WARN (BUNDLE leftover, CONTEXT open thread) is unchanged.
-- `--selftest`: `[ ok ] pool read      pool "felhom", 1 member(s)` / `- 9201 type=lxc`; suite `OK`.
-- Hub-side: latest stored host report (agent_version 0.62.0) carries
-  `{"name":"pve:pool-read","feature":"stale-lock recovery scoping (pool ownership check)",
-  "critical":false,"status":"ok"}` — 47 capabilities, 0 degraded. Verified against a snapshot of
-  the hub DB (`host_reports.report_json`), since the operator UI is password-gated.
-- Published: Gitea generic package `felhom-agent/0.62.0`, round-trip sha256 verified:
-  `ed1192c9ae8f355dee19128cf4b01984ba7398e860b4a16a8009655b84b32d81`.
+## Scenario E method + result (stated per §7-E; live store NOT polluted)
 
-## 6. Operator follow-ups
+felhom-pve's guest 9201 already has its token in the daemon index, so a live swap cannot reproduce
+the fresh-install miss, and minting into the production store is forbidden. Method used (the spec's
+sanctioned alternative): (1) **compiled the localapi test binary on 180 and ran the full TokenStore
+suite ON felhom-pve** — all 4 reload-on-miss tests PASS on the real platform, including the
+linux-only deleted-file case; (2) **live hit-path/no-regression:** the in-guest controller's
+`agent-channel-health` scheduler job completed cleanly every minute after the restart (no 401, no
+channel event) — the deployed daemon authorizes the existing token exactly as before.
 
-- **Hub Day-0 artifact manifest still vouches 0.60.0 → bump to 0.62.0**
-  (sha256 above; password-gated UI — CC cannot).
-- Rotation + de-git of the 3 committed secrets in `felhom.eu/manifests/felhom.secret.yaml`
-  (spike appendix; REUSE §2 errata now records that `gitea-creds` is NOT out-of-band).
+## Guide follow-through (felhom.eu)
 
-## 7. Observations (not acted on)
+D.1b's unconditional "restart the agent first" step was **narrowed, not dropped**: the fix is
+deployed and platform-proven, but the Day-0 manifest still vouches agent 0.62.0, so a box installed
+today still gets a pre-fix agent. The guide now says: restart first only when the installed agent is
+< v0.63.0; the troubleshooting row records the fix version. Drill ledger B2/B3 marked FIXED
+v0.63.0. (The step drops entirely once the manifest vouches ≥ 0.63.0.)
 
-- Hub capability-name handling confirmed generic: the checker keys on `Critical && status=="degraded"`
-  only (`hub/internal/monitor/host_capability.go`), names are data — the new non-critical entry
-  rides the report/UI without paging and needed no hub change.
-- The spike Q6 consumer observations (hub collect / disks / reconcile `ListLXC` users) remain
-  observations; no other consumer touched, per spec.
-- `_state_get provisioned_vmid` was empty on felhom-pve (state.json holds only `completed`), so
-  `--rescope-acl` needed the explicit `--vmid 9201` — worth knowing for other boxes.
+## Observations (not acted on)
+
+- The one-shot `--selftest=hub` report carries an EMPTY `capabilities` list (the probe is composed
+  only into the daemon loop) — a hub-side capability checker reading the newest report could
+  transiently see 0 capabilities after an operator runs the one-shot. Cosmetic today; worth a look
+  when touching the capability checker.
+- `OpenTokenStore` calls `load()` before `MkdirAll(dir)` — harmless (read tolerates ENOENT) but the
+  ordering reads oddly; left as-is (out of scope).