slice 10B: operator-signed destructive completion (offline key + signing CLI) (v0.16.0)

A destructive op runs ONLY on a pinned-key-verified, nonce-fresh, in-window,
host-bound, durable-id-bound operator signature. New cmd/felhom-opsign signs
canonical OpBlobs offline via ssh-keygen -Y sign (hardware-ready); the signing
key is never in the hub or agent. New internal/signedjobs runner verifies each
queued blob through the gate and only on all-pass runs the WipeExecutor, which
re-resolves the DURABLE device id + re-inspects (8C) before mkfs — closing the
8C data-bearing-wipe pending_signature gap. New storage durable-device
resolution; authz.CanonicalBlob promoted to production. Real-crypto tests assert
valid executes and forged/replay/expired/retarget/non-pinned are rejected
(executor never called).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

internal/hub/client.go

@@ -144,6 +144,69 @@ func (c *Client) FetchDesiredState(ctx context.Context) (*DesiredStateResponse,
 	return &out, nil
 }
 
+// JobWire is one queued signed-op job as served by GET /hosts/{id}/jobs (slice 10A). The blob is
+// OPAQUE to the hub — for slice 10B it is a base64 `SignedJobEnvelope` (op-blob + armored SSHSIG)
+// the agent verifies before executing.
+type JobWire struct {
+	JobID     string `json:"job_id"`
+	BlobB64   string `json:"blob_b64"`
+	CreatedAt string `json:"created_at"`
+}
+
+// Jobs fetches this host's pending signed-op jobs (slice 10B). Self-scoped server-side (the
+// per-host key only reads its own host). The agent verifies each before executing.
+func (c *Client) Jobs(ctx context.Context) ([]JobWire, error) {
+	if c.hostID == "" {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("hub: Jobs requires a configured host_id")
+	}
+	req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, c.baseURL+"/api/v1/hosts/"+c.hostID+"/jobs", nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+c.apiKey)
+	req.Header.Set("Accept", "application/json")
+	resp, err := c.hc.Do(req)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, &TransportError{Err: err}
+	}
+	defer resp.Body.Close()
+	raw, _ := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 4<<20))
+	if resp.StatusCode < 200 || resp.StatusCode >= 300 {
+		return nil, &HTTPError{StatusCode: resp.StatusCode, BodyTail: tail(raw, 256)}
+	}
+	var out struct {
+		Jobs []JobWire `json:"jobs"`
+	}
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &out); err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("hub: decoding jobs: %w", err)
+	}
+	return out.Jobs, nil
+}
+
+// CompleteJob clears a processed job from the host's queue (slice 10B): DELETE
+// /hosts/{id}/jobs/{job_id}, self-scoped. Called after a job is executed OR permanently rejected
+// (the nonce is already durably burned on a passing verify, so re-processing is replay-safe).
+func (c *Client) CompleteJob(ctx context.Context, jobID string) error {
+	if c.hostID == "" || jobID == "" {
+		return fmt.Errorf("hub: CompleteJob requires host_id + job_id")
+	}
+	req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodDelete, c.baseURL+"/api/v1/hosts/"+c.hostID+"/jobs/"+jobID, nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+c.apiKey)
+	resp, err := c.hc.Do(req)
+	if err != nil {
+		return &TransportError{Err: err}
+	}
+	defer resp.Body.Close()
+	raw, _ := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 4<<10))
+	if resp.StatusCode < 200 || resp.StatusCode >= 300 {
+		return &HTTPError{StatusCode: resp.StatusCode, BodyTail: tail(raw, 256)}
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
 func tail(b []byte, max int) string {
 	s := strings.TrimSpace(string(b))
 	if len(s) > max {