diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md
index d8e2d5b..b2088fc 100644
--- a/CHANGELOG.md
+++ b/CHANGELOG.md
@@ -1,3 +1,40 @@
+## v0.110.0 — F-LEAK, third attempt: the fourth root-fenced exception (2026-07-28)
+
+**The band-scoped ACL fix (v1.21.0) is durable for exactly ONE use per slot, and the live check caught
+it.** After the first successful teardown of `990000`, `pveum acl list` showed **0 grants** at
+`/vms/990000`. Cause, confirmed in PVE's own source rather than inferred: the destroy path calls
+`PVE::AccessControl::remove_vm_access($vmid)` (`API2/LXC.pm:906`), which deletes
+`acl_root->children->vms->children->{$vmid}` — **every ACL at `/vms/<vmid>`** (`AccessControl.pm:1898`).
+
+**The grant is consumed by the very operation it authorises.** After ten teardowns the whole band is
+ungranted and F-LEAK returns. A per-VM ACL is structurally the wrong tool here; the pool grant is
+durable only because it lives on a *pool* path, which `remove_vm_access` does not touch (it removes the
+guest's pool *membership*, not the pool's ACL).
+
+**So this is attempt three, and it is the route the task offered as the alternative:** route the destroy
+through the same authority that already performs the create. `Privileged.DestroyScratchLXC` is the
+**fourth** root-fenced exception (previously exactly three: keyctl `pct create`, USB mount/fstab,
+SMART/sensors), and it is fenced harder than any of them:
+
+| layer | enforcement |
+|---|---|
+| **sudoers** | `/usr/sbin/pct destroy 99000[0-9] --purge` — sudo matches the vmid **literally**. Even a compromised agent asking for `pct destroy 9201` is refused by sudo itself. |
+| **`DestroyScratchLXC`** | re-checks the band before exec; refuses an unconfigured or inverted band rather than defaulting |
+| **`teardownScratch`** | acts only on this journal entry's own scratch provenance |
+
+None of the three is consumed by use, which is the property the ACL lacked. The API destroy is still
+tried **first** and remains the normal path; this is the fallback that makes teardown deterministic
+instead of once-per-slot. The v1.21.0 band ACLs stay provisioned — they make the common case need no
+privileged call at all.
+
+**Ships with a sudoers change**, so `configs/felhom-agent.sudoers` must be deployed with the binary
+(`visudo -cf`: parsed OK).
+
+Red-proofs 9 and 10, both observed failing: removing the band check →
+`REFUSAL FAILED: executed [pct destroy 9201 --purge] for out-of-band vmid 9201`; removing the
+unconfigured-band check → `an unconfigured band admitted vmid 0 and EXECUTED [pct destroy 0 --purge]`.
+The out-of-band table deliberately includes **9201**, the live customer guest on both demo boxes.
+
 ## v0.109.0 — the guest-power watchdog gets the observable it was shipped without (2026-07-28)
 
 **Self-correction to v0.107.0, found by running the very check this session added elsewhere.** The new
diff --git a/configs/felhom-agent.sudoers b/configs/felhom-agent.sudoers
index 29dcf11..65b6e1b 100644
--- a/configs/felhom-agent.sudoers
+++ b/configs/felhom-agent.sudoers
@@ -133,6 +133,28 @@ Cmnd_Alias FELHOM_CONTROLLERSWAP = \
 Cmnd_Alias FELHOM_STALELOCK = \
   /usr/sbin/pct unlock [0-9]*
 
+# Restore-test scratch teardown (F-LEAK, Campaign 8, v0.110.0). A restore-test whose restore FAILS
+# leaves a scratch guest the API token CANNOT destroy: `FelhomAgentGuest` is granted at /pool/felhom and
+# a guest joins that pool only when its restore COMPLETES, so a failed restore leaves a pool-less guest
+# out of reach (403 VM.Allocate) holding its disks until a human removes it.
+#
+# TWO API-SIDE FIXES WERE TRIED AND BOTH REFUTED LIVE on 2026-07-28, which is why this grant exists:
+#   1. Adopt the stranded guest into the pool, then retry. `PUT /pools/{pool}` ALSO requires
+#      VM.Allocate on the VM being added — pool membership cannot bootstrap its own authority.
+#   2. Grant FelhomAgentGuest per-path at /vms/990000..990009. Durable for exactly one use per slot:
+#      PVE's own destroy path calls `AccessControl::remove_vm_access($vmid)` (LXC.pm:906), which DELETES
+#      every ACL at /vms/<vmid> (AccessControl.pm:1898). The grant is consumed by the operation it
+#      authorises, so after ten teardowns the band is ungranted and the defect returns.
+#
+# WHY THIS IS THE TIGHTEST AVAILABLE FENCE, not a widening: sudo matches the vmid LITERALLY, so
+# `99000[0-9]` is exactly the ten-slot scratch band the restore-test picks from — nothing else. There is
+# no `[0-9]*` coarse allowlist here on purpose: unlike `pct unlock`, this op DESTROYS, so the band must
+# be in the policy and not merely validated in the agent. Even a compromised agent asking for
+# `pct destroy 9201` is refused by sudo itself. Unlike an ACL, a sudoers rule is not consumed by use.
+# The agent re-checks the band in code before exec (defence in depth); this is the outer fence.
+Cmnd_Alias FELHOM_SCRATCH_TEARDOWN = \
+  /usr/sbin/pct destroy 99000[0-9] --purge
+
 # Network storage / NAS (Part A1, SPIKE-nas-storage-2026-06-29). The agent mounts a customer NAS share
 # HOST-SIDE under /mnt/felhom-drives/<name> via a systemd .automount (+ .mount) pair so it propagates
 # into the guest through the existing shared bind (an unprivileged LXC cannot mount NFS/CIFS itself).
@@ -274,4 +296,4 @@ Cmnd_Alias FELHOM_GUESTNET = \
   /usr/sbin/pct exec [0-9]* -- pgrep -x dhclient, \
   /usr/sbin/pct exec [0-9]* -- dhclient -pf /run/dhclient.eth0.pid -lf /var/lib/dhcp/dhclient.eth0.leases eth0
 
-felhom-agent ALL=(root) NOPASSWD: FELHOM_MOUNT, FELHOM_DISK, FELHOM_PROVISION, FELHOM_FORMAT, FELHOM_DNSMASQ, FELHOM_GUESTHOOK, FELHOM_INTERMEDIARY, FELHOM_CONTROLLERSWAP, FELHOM_STALELOCK, FELHOM_NETMOUNT, FELHOM_WG, FELHOM_SELFUPDATE, FELHOM_SSHD, FELHOM_OOB, FELHOM_PBSDR, FELHOM_SELFHEAL, FELHOM_ESCROW, FELHOM_GUESTNET
+felhom-agent ALL=(root) NOPASSWD: FELHOM_MOUNT, FELHOM_DISK, FELHOM_PROVISION, FELHOM_FORMAT, FELHOM_DNSMASQ, FELHOM_GUESTHOOK, FELHOM_INTERMEDIARY, FELHOM_CONTROLLERSWAP, FELHOM_STALELOCK, FELHOM_NETMOUNT, FELHOM_WG, FELHOM_SELFUPDATE, FELHOM_SSHD, FELHOM_OOB, FELHOM_PBSDR, FELHOM_SELFHEAL, FELHOM_ESCROW, FELHOM_GUESTNET, FELHOM_SCRATCH_TEARDOWN
diff --git a/internal/proxmox/privileged.go b/internal/proxmox/privileged.go
index 7992069..4cb0997 100644
--- a/internal/proxmox/privileged.go
+++ b/internal/proxmox/privileged.go
@@ -136,6 +136,39 @@ func (p *Privileged) CreateGoldenLXC(ctx context.Context, spec GoldenLXCSpec) er
 	return p.run(ctx, "pct", args...)
 }
 
+// DestroyScratchLXC destroys a restore-test scratch guest through the fenced root path, refusing any
+// vmid outside the caller-supplied scratch band.
+//
+// WHY THIS CANNOT BE THE API — and this is the fourth fenced exception, so the reasoning is recorded
+// in full. A restore-test whose restore FAILS leaves a scratch guest the API token cannot destroy:
+// `FelhomAgentGuest` is granted at /pool/felhom, and a guest joins that pool only when its restore
+// COMPLETES. A failed restore therefore leaves a guest that exists, is in no pool, and is out of
+// reach (403 VM.Allocate) while holding its disks.
+//
+// TWO API-SIDE FIXES WERE BUILT AND BOTH REFUTED BY LIVE TEST on 2026-07-28:
+//   - Adopt the stranded guest into the pool, then retry. `PUT /pools/{pool}` ALSO requires
+//     VM.Allocate on the VM being added, so pool membership cannot bootstrap its own authority.
+//   - Grant the role per-path at /vms/990000..990009. Durable for exactly ONE use per slot: PVE's own
+//     destroy calls AccessControl::remove_vm_access (LXC.pm:906), deleting every ACL at /vms/<vmid>
+//     (AccessControl.pm:1898). The grant is consumed by the operation it authorises.
+//
+// The band ACLs are still provisioned (host-install v1.21.0) and the API path is still tried FIRST —
+// this is the fallback that makes teardown deterministic rather than once-per-slot.
+//
+// THE FENCE. The band is enforced in THREE places, deliberately: sudoers matches the vmid literally
+// (`pct destroy 99000[0-9] --purge` — even a compromised agent asking for 9201 is refused by sudo
+// itself), this method re-checks it before exec, and the caller checks its own journal provenance.
+// Unlike an ACL, none of these is consumed by use.
+func (p *Privileged) DestroyScratchLXC(ctx context.Context, vmid, bandMin, bandMax int) error {
+	if bandMin <= 0 || bandMax < bandMin {
+		return fmt.Errorf("proxmox: DestroyScratchLXC needs a configured scratch band, got [%d,%d]", bandMin, bandMax)
+	}
+	if vmid < bandMin || vmid > bandMax {
+		return fmt.Errorf("proxmox: refusing to destroy vmid %d — outside the scratch band [%d,%d]", vmid, bandMin, bandMax)
+	}
+	return p.run(ctx, "pct", "destroy", strconv.Itoa(vmid), "--purge")
+}
+
 // MountUSBByUUID mounts a filesystem by UUID at target (creating the mountpoint).
 //
 // WHY THIS CANNOT BE THE API: a physical host mount is not a Proxmox API op; it is
diff --git a/internal/proxmox/scratch_destroy_test.go b/internal/proxmox/scratch_destroy_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9621123
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/proxmox/scratch_destroy_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+package proxmox
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"io"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+// F-LEAK (Campaign 8): the fourth root-fenced exception. Its whole justification is that the band is
+// enforced rather than assumed, so these tests are about the REFUSALS, not the happy path.
+//
+// The band is checked in three independent places on purpose: sudoers matches the vmid literally
+// (`pct destroy 99000[0-9] --purge`), this method re-checks before exec, and the caller checks journal
+// provenance. These tests pin the middle one; the sudoers glob is proven live.
+
+type recordingRunner struct {
+	calls [][]string
+	err   error
+}
+
+func (r *recordingRunner) Run(_ context.Context, name string, args ...string) ([]byte, []byte, error) {
+	r.calls = append(r.calls, append([]string{name}, args...))
+	return nil, nil, r.err
+}
+
+func (r *recordingRunner) RunStdin(_ context.Context, _ io.Reader, name string, args ...string) ([]byte, []byte, error) {
+	r.calls = append(r.calls, append([]string{name}, args...))
+	return nil, nil, r.err
+}
+
+// A vmid inside the band is destroyed, with --purge so no config/ACL/firewall residue survives.
+//
+// RED-PROOF: drop "--purge" from the args → this fails with "destroy is not --purge", and the live
+// sudoers rule (which matches the FULL vector including --purge) would refuse the call outright.
+func TestDestroyScratchLXC_InBandDestroysWithPurge(t *testing.T) {
+	r := &recordingRunner{}
+	if err := NewPrivileged(r, "").DestroyScratchLXC(context.Background(), 990003, 990000, 990009); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("in-band destroy failed: %v", err)
+	}
+	if len(r.calls) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("want exactly 1 exec, got %d: %v", len(r.calls), r.calls)
+	}
+	got := strings.Join(r.calls[0], " ")
+	if got != "pct destroy 990003 --purge" {
+		t.Errorf("exec vector = %q, want %q (it must match the sudoers rule byte for byte)",
+			got, "pct destroy 990003 --purge")
+	}
+}
+
+// THE ONE THAT MATTERS. A vmid outside the band must be refused WITHOUT EXECUTING ANYTHING — a real
+// customer guest, the golden image, a co-tenant's VM.
+//
+// RED-PROOF: remove the `vmid < bandMin || vmid > bandMax` check → this fails with
+// "REFUSAL FAILED: executed [pct destroy 9201 --purge] for out-of-band vmid 9201".
+func TestDestroyScratchLXC_RefusesOutOfBandWithoutExecuting(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, vmid := range []int{
+		1,      // arbitrary
+		9201,   // the LIVE customer guest on both demo boxes
+		9100,   // golden image
+		9999,   // reserved
+		989999, // one below the band
+		990010, // one ABOVE the band — the off-by-one
+	} {
+		r := &recordingRunner{}
+		err := NewPrivileged(r, "").DestroyScratchLXC(context.Background(), vmid, 990000, 990009)
+		if err == nil {
+			t.Errorf("vmid %d was NOT refused — the fence is open", vmid)
+		}
+		if len(r.calls) != 0 {
+			t.Errorf("REFUSAL FAILED: executed %v for out-of-band vmid %d", r.calls, vmid)
+		}
+		if err != nil && !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "outside the scratch band") {
+			t.Errorf("vmid %d refused with an unhelpful error: %v", vmid, err)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// An unconfigured or inverted band must refuse everything rather than defaulting to something. A zero
+// band is what a mis-wired caller looks like, and "destroy vmid 0" must never become reachable.
+//
+// RED-PROOF: drop the `bandMin <= 0 || bandMax < bandMin` check → the [0,0] case admits vmid 0 and
+// this fails with "an unconfigured band admitted vmid 0".
+func TestDestroyScratchLXC_RefusesUnconfiguredBand(t *testing.T) {
+	cases := []struct{ vmid, min, max int }{
+		{0, 0, 0},                // nothing configured at all
+		{990000, 0, 0},           // band absent, real scratch vmid
+		{990000, 0, 990009},      // min unset
+		{990005, 990009, 990000}, // inverted
+		{990000, -1, 990009},     // negative
+	}
+	for _, c := range cases {
+		r := &recordingRunner{}
+		if err := NewPrivileged(r, "").DestroyScratchLXC(context.Background(), c.vmid, c.min, c.max); err == nil {
+			t.Errorf("band [%d,%d] admitted vmid %d — an unconfigured band must refuse", c.min, c.max, c.vmid)
+		}
+		if len(r.calls) != 0 {
+			t.Errorf("an unconfigured band admitted vmid %d and EXECUTED %v", c.vmid, r.calls)
+		}
+	}
+}
diff --git a/internal/reconcile/restoretest.go b/internal/reconcile/restoretest.go
index b27bd90..2f707f7 100644
--- a/internal/reconcile/restoretest.go
+++ b/internal/reconcile/restoretest.go
@@ -198,7 +198,7 @@ func (e *Engine) runScratchTest(ctx context.Context, vmid int, spec RestoreTestS
 	launched := false
 	defer func() {
 		if launched {
-			e.teardownScratch(ctx, base)
+			e.teardownScratch(ctx, base, spec.ScratchMin, spec.ScratchMax)
 			return
 		}
 		e.append(withState(base, OpFailed))
@@ -446,7 +446,12 @@ func sizeToGB(s string) int {
 
 // teardownScratch destroys the scratch guest (benign, gated) and records the entry terminal.
 // On any teardown failure it leaves the entry in-flight so Recover reaps the guest later.
-func (e *Engine) teardownScratch(ctx context.Context, base JournalEntry) {
+//
+// F-LEAK (Campaign 8): the API destroy is tried FIRST and is the normal path. It fails on a scratch
+// left by a FAILED restore, because such a guest never joined /pool/felhom and the token's
+// VM.Allocate lives there — so a band-scoped fallback through the fenced root path follows. See
+// proxmox.DestroyScratchLXC for the two API-side fixes that were built and refuted live.
+func (e *Engine) teardownScratch(ctx context.Context, base JournalEntry, scratchMin, scratchMax int) {
 	// Cancel-immune + bounded, so a shutdown mid-test still tears down.
 	tctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.WithoutCancel(ctx), 2*time.Minute)
 	defer cancel()
@@ -459,13 +464,14 @@ func (e *Engine) teardownScratch(ctx context.Context, base JournalEntry) {
 	}
 	upid, err := e.api.DestroyLXC(tctx, base.VMID)
 	if err != nil {
-		// F-LEAK (Campaign 8): a 403 "missing privilege VM.Allocate" here means this scratch is not a
-		// felhom-pool member — a FAILED restore never completes the `--pool` association, and the
-		// token's VM.Allocate is granted at /pool/felhom, never at /. Fixed by GRANTING VM.Allocate on
-		// the scratch VMID band itself (host-install v1.21.0), path-scoped so the agent still cannot
-		// reach a non-scratch guest. NOT fixable from here: adopting the guest into the pool was tried
-		// and refused — `PUT /pools/{pool}` ALSO requires VM.Allocate on the VM being added, so
-		// Pool.Allocate alone cannot bootstrap membership (proven live 2026-07-28).
+		// A 403 "missing privilege VM.Allocate" here means this scratch is not a felhom-pool member: a
+		// FAILED restore never completes the `--pool` association, and the token's VM.Allocate is
+		// granted at /pool/felhom. Fall back to the band-scoped fenced destroy — WITHOUT it the guest
+		// leaks and holds its disks until a human removes it.
+		if e.destroyScratchPrivileged(tctx, base.VMID, scratchMin, scratchMax, err) {
+			e.append(withState(base, OpSucceeded))
+			return
+		}
 		e.logger.Error("restore-test: scratch teardown failed; left for Recover", "vmid", base.VMID, "err", err)
 		return
 	}
@@ -568,3 +574,37 @@ func withUPID(base JournalEntry, upid string, state OpState) JournalEntry {
 	base.At = time.Now().UTC()
 	return base
 }
+
+// destroyScratchPrivileged is the F-LEAK fallback: destroy a stranded scratch through the fenced root
+// path when the API token cannot. Reports whether the guest is gone.
+//
+// It refuses unless the guest is BOTH agent-created scratch provenance (this journal entry) and inside
+// the configured band. That is the innermost of three checks — sudoers matches the vmid literally and
+// proxmox.DestroyScratchLXC re-checks the band — because this op DESTROYS and the band must not rest
+// on a single guard.
+func (e *Engine) destroyScratchPrivileged(ctx context.Context, vmid, bandMin, bandMax int, apiErr error) bool {
+	if e.hostRun == nil {
+		e.logger.Warn("restore-test: no host-root runner wired — cannot reclaim the stranded scratch",
+			"vmid", vmid, "api_err", apiErr)
+		return false
+	}
+	if bandMin <= 0 || bandMax < bandMin {
+		e.logger.Error("restore-test: scratch band is not configured — refusing the privileged teardown",
+			"vmid", vmid, "min", bandMin, "max", bandMax)
+		return false
+	}
+	if vmid < bandMin || vmid > bandMax {
+		e.logger.Error("restore-test: refusing the privileged teardown — vmid is outside the scratch band",
+			"vmid", vmid, "min", bandMin, "max", bandMax)
+		return false
+	}
+	e.logger.Warn("restore-test: API teardown failed (stranded scratch is in no pool) — reclaiming via the fenced root path",
+		"vmid", vmid, "api_err", apiErr)
+	if err := proxmox.NewPrivileged(e.hostRun, "").DestroyScratchLXC(ctx, vmid, bandMin, bandMax); err != nil {
+		e.logger.Error("restore-test: privileged scratch teardown ALSO failed; left for Recover",
+			"vmid", vmid, "err", err)
+		return false
+	}
+	e.logger.Warn("restore-test: stranded scratch guest reclaimed via the fenced root path", "vmid", vmid)
+	return true
+}