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v0.61.0: audit fixes B1 (random temp staging) + D1 (mkfs wrapper member/RO re-checks) + D2 (empty-lsblk fail-safe) + D3 (blank-format anti-retarget)

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From AUDIT-blast-radius-hostroot-localapi-2026-07-02.md. Each fix ships with a
non-hollow test + a companion red-proof (shown failing on the pre-fix impl).
Sudoers install-source grants became globs — deploy the sudoers drop-in with
the binary. A1 (stale-lock pool-membership) deliberately excluded (spike).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
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authentik Default Admin
2026-07-03 07:25:50 +02:00
parent cc93dae792
commit 3f382bf762
20 changed files with 767 additions and 44 deletions
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README.md
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@@ -256,12 +256,18 @@ from the intent registry + Felhom `.mount` units (`RegistryKnownTargets`), NOT P
enrolled with no PVE dir-storage is still health-tracked (`Observe()` stays for real PVE storages). The
controller wizard consuming this is Impl-2b.
**Format safety (v0.54.0, Impl-1):** `Format` (mkfs) is gated by a mandatory **unclaimed-disk guard**
(`internal/storage/claim.go`) — it refuses any device not provably free for Felhom (OS disk, LVM PV,
ZFS/mdraid member, foreign mount, read-only; fail-safe on any read error), independent of `DataBearing`.
Below the agent, mkfs runs ONLY through `configs/felhom-mkfs-guarded.sh` (the sole mkfs the sudoers
permits), which re-checks the catastrophic cases as root. The pool-scoped token does NOT touch mkfs
(sudo op) — the filter + wrapper are the guard. See `SPIKE-drive-enrollment-2026-07-01.md`.
**Format safety (v0.54.0, Impl-1; hardened v0.61.0, audit D1/D2/D3):** `Format` (mkfs) is gated by a
mandatory **unclaimed-disk guard** (`internal/storage/claim.go`) — it refuses any device not provably
free for Felhom (OS disk, LVM PV, ZFS/mdraid member, foreign mount, read-only; fail-safe on any read
error, and on an empty/target-absent lsblk topology — D2), independent of `DataBearing`. Below the
agent, mkfs runs ONLY through `configs/felhom-mkfs-guarded.sh` (the sole mkfs the sudoers permits),
which re-checks the catastrophic cases as root: system disk, LVM PV (absolute-path pvs), foreign
mount, read-only device, and any LVM/ZFS/mdraid/LUKS/swap member signature (D1 — validated by
`scripts/mkfs-guarded-harness.sh`, a loop-device + recorder harness). The blank-format local-API path
binds to the device's durable id and anti-retarget re-resolves before mkfs, same as the confirmed
wipe (D3, AGENT-001's benign-branch twin). The pool-scoped token does NOT touch mkfs (sudo op) — the
filter + wrapper are the guard. See `SPIKE-drive-enrollment-2026-07-01.md` and
`felhom.eu/documentation/audits/AUDIT-blast-radius-hostroot-localapi-2026-07-02.md`.
## Process model