v0.23.0: device-ROLE classification + tiered storage-wipe gate (user-data customer-confirmable; system/backup operator-only)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -3,6 +3,43 @@
 All notable changes to **felhom-agent** are recorded here. Update on every code
 change that gets pushed.
 
+## v0.23.0 — device-ROLE classification + tiered storage-wipe gate (system/backup operator-only, user-data customer-confirmable) (2026-06-11)
+
+The storage-authorization redesign (agent half). The gate's destructive-wipe path is now **tiered by
+the device's protection ROLE**, which the agent classifies from its OWN inspection — never the
+caller's claim (the storage analog of classify.go's data-bearing verdict).
+
+- **`internal/storage/role.go`** — `DeviceRole` (`system` | `backup` | `user-data`) + the
+  authoritative classifier. `RoleForStorage` (storage-view targets) and `RoleForRawDevice` (a raw
+  device, e.g. a fresh disk in the init flow) map a device to its tier via `SystemDisks` (the
+  whole-disks backing `/`, `/boot`, `/boot/efi`, root-free reads). Rules: `pbs` → backup; `lvmthin` /
+  builtin `local` / nfs / cifs / unknown → system; `usb` / `local-dir` on a **non-system external
+  device** → user-data. **Fail-safe**: any ambiguity (system disks unknown, or an unrecognizable
+  device topology) → **system** (most-protected) — never silently user-data.
+- **`GET /disks`** — each `DiskInfo` now carries `role`. The controller drives the UI from it
+  (system/backup get a lock + no destructive controls; user-data is customer-manageable).
+- **Gate tier (`reconcile`)** — new `CustomerConfirmable` disposition + `Gate.AuthorizeStorageWipe`:
+  - role=**user-data** → **customer-confirmable**: allowed iff the request carries an explicit
+    customer confirmation **bound to the device's durable id** (the agent re-resolves the durable id
+    and matches; a confirmation for one disk can't wipe another). **No operator signature.** A
+    user-data drive is already within the in-guest controller's blast radius (it bind-mounts `/mnt`),
+    so customer-confirmation adds no new reach. Recorded in the **audit log** with the durable id
+    (`AuditRecord.DurableID`).
+  - role=**system**/**backup** → unchanged **operator-signature** (`pending_signature`). The
+    `confirmed` flag is **IGNORED** — a compromised controller asserting `confirmed:true` on a
+    protected device is refused **by role**. Every other destructive class (`guest_destroy`,
+    `decommission`, `restore_overwrite`, `key_rotation`) keeps operator-signature exactly as before.
+- **`POST /disks/format`** — accepts `confirmed` + `durable_id` (inert for system/backup). The
+  data-bearing path tiers by role: user-data customer-confirmed → `mkfs`; user-data unconfirmed →
+  403 `needs_confirmation` (+ the durable id to confirm against, NOT an opsign command); system/backup
+  → 403 with the operator-signature pending op (as before). Blank devices stay benign `mkfs`.
+- **Tests** — `role_test.go` (demo-storage mapping + fail-safe), `storage_wipe_test.go` (the gate
+  refuses a `confirmed` wipe on system/backup → no exec; durable-id mismatch / missing-durable
+  refused; unknown role fails safe), and the localapi format-handler branches (user-data confirmed →
+  mkfs; user-data unconfirmed → needs_confirmation, no opsign; confirmed-but-protected → still refused).
+
+Pairs with the controller's lockout + type-to-confirm UX + drive-list restyle.
+
 ## v0.22.0 — expose durable_id in GET /disks (enable controller-side guided storage) (2026-06-11)
 
 One-line, read-only addition: `localapi.DiskInfo` gains `durable_id` (mapped from

REPORT.md

@@ -1,30 +1,65 @@
-# REPORT — agent v0.22.0: expose durable_id in GET /disks (2026-06-11)
+# REPORT — felhom-agent v0.23.0: device-ROLE classification + tiered storage-wipe gate
 
-**Repo:** `felhom-agent` · **Version:** 0.22.0 · **Pushed commit:** `4734d4a` · paired with
+## What this implements
-`felhom-controller` v0.43.0 (the controller-side storage-management rebuild that needs this).
 
-## What shipped (one read-only field)
+The **agent half** of the storage-authorization redesign (CC SPEC, Part A). Destructive storage
+wipes are now **tiered by the device's protection ROLE**, classified by the agent from its own
+inspection — never the controller's or hub's claim.
 
-`internal/localapi/DiskInfo` gains `durable_id` (mapped directly from `StorageTarget.DurableID` — e.g.
+### A1 — Device-ROLE classification (authoritative)
-`"uuid:<fs-uuid>"` for usb/local-dir, `"path:…"`/`"store:…"` otherwise). That's the entire change.
+- New `internal/storage/role.go`: `DeviceRole` = `system` | `backup` | `user-data`.
+- `SystemDisks(host)` resolves the OS whole-disks (the disks backing `/`, `/boot`, `/boot/efi`) from
+  the mount table + world-readable `/dev` symlinks (root-free; the root-CLI fence is untouched).
+- `RoleForStorage(typ, backingDevice, …)` tiers a storage-view target; `RoleForRawDevice(device, …)`
+  tiers a raw device (a fresh disk in the init flow, not yet a PVE storage).
+  - `pbs` → **backup**; `lvmthin` / builtin `local` / nfs / cifs / unknown → **system**;
+    `usb` / `local-dir` on a **non-system external device** → **user-data**.
+  - **Fail-safe**: any ambiguity → **system** (most-protected) — consistent with destructive-on-ambiguity.
+- `GET /disks` → each `DiskInfo` now carries `role`.
 
-**Why it's necessary:** the de-privileged controller cannot read a device's filesystem UUID itself, yet
+### A2 — Gate tier (`internal/reconcile`)
-`POST /disks/assign` mounts **strictly by fs UUID** (`EnsureMount` → `/dev/disk/by-uuid/<UUID>`). Without
+- New `CustomerConfirmable` disposition + `StorageRole{System,Backup,UserData}` (string mirror of
-the UUID surfaced somewhere the controller can reach, the guided init/attach flows could not complete the
+  `storage.DeviceRole`, kept in reconcile to avoid a storage→reconcile import edge).
-mount. `GET /disks` already carried everything else (name/type/state/device/mount/class/data_bearing) but
+- `Gate.AuthorizeStorageWipe(StorageWipeAuthz, signed)`:
-dropped the durable id. The controller strips the `uuid:` prefix to get the assign key.
+  - **user-data** → allowed iff `Confirmed` AND the confirmation's durable id matches the device's
+    agent-re-resolved durable id (`ReasonCustomerConfirmed`); unconfirmed → `ReasonPendingConfirmation`;
+    mismatch / missing durable → `ReasonBindingMismatch`. Audited with the durable id.
+  - **system/backup/unknown** → the standard operator-signature path (`pending_signature`); `Confirmed`
+    is ignored — refused **by role**.
+- `AuditRecord.DurableID` added (the customer-visible "who/what/when + durable id").
 
-**Security:** no new privilege, no subprocess, no behaviour change to `format`/`assign`/`eject` or the
+### A3 — Endpoint plumbing (`internal/localapi`)
-data-bearing signature gate. The agent still inspects the device itself at format time and refuses a
+- `POST /disks/format` accepts `confirmed` + `durable_id`. The data-bearing path:
-data-bearing wipe with a `pending_op` (the controller surfaces the `felhom-opsign` command).
+  - resolves the device's **authoritative role** (`deviceRole` — prefers a matching storage target's
+    role so PBS is recognized as backup, else raw classification), re-resolves the durable id, and
+    calls the tiered gate.
+  - user-data confirmed → `mkfs` (200); user-data unconfirmed/mismatch → 403 with `needs_confirmation`
+    + the durable id (no opsign); system/backup → 403 with the operator-signature pending op.
+  - blank devices stay benign `mkfs` (unchanged).
+- `StorageGate` interface widened: `AuthorizeWipe(WipeRequest) WipeDecision`. Adapter in `main.go`
+  bridges to `Gate.AuthorizeStorageWipe`.
+- Eject stays **benign** (unmount, data preserved) — its customer confirmation is a controller-side
+  UI concern, not a gate tier (per the hard rule: confirmation walks the gate ONLY for user-data
+  `storage_wipe`).
 
-## Validation (live, guest 9201)
+## Tests (non-hollow)
-`GET /disks` (via the controller's `/api/disks` proxy) now returns `durable_id` per disk, e.g.
+- `internal/storage/role_test.go` — demo-storage mapping (`local`/`local-lvm`/`felhom-pbs` protected,
-`felhom-usb` → `/dev/sdb1`, `data_bearing:true`, `durable_id:uuid:277a2179-a764-4758-b840-9ea741517914`.
+  `felhom-usb` on `/dev/sdb1` user-data) + fail-safe when system disks are unknown.
-The controller's guided init on `sdb` correctly drove the agent to a **data-bearing refusal** (HTTP 403 →
+- `internal/reconcile/storage_wipe_test.go` — a `confirmed:true` wipe on **system/backup is refused**
-`pending_op{op:storage_wipe, host_scope:demo-felhom-01, durable_id:byid:wwn-0x5000039ddb108568-part1}`),
+  (falls to pending_signature, no exec); user-data durable-id **mismatch refused**; missing durable
-which the controller surfaced as the operator `felhom-opsign` command — the gate held end-to-end.
+  refused; unconfirmed → pending_confirmation; unknown role fails safe.
+- `internal/localapi/disks_test.go` — format-handler branches: user-data confirmed → mkfs; user-data
+  unconfirmed → 403 needs_confirmation with **no** operator-signature pending op;
+  confirmed-but-protected → still refused (role beats confirmation); blank → mkfs without the gate.
 
-## Notes
+`go build ./... && go vet ./... && go test ./...` all green (Go 1.26, local).
-This pairs with the controller's storage-management rebuild (build-golden default bumped to controller
+
-0.43.0; golden rebaked). No other agent change.
+## Version
+`v0.22.0 → v0.23.0` (`version` var in `cmd/felhom-agent/main.go`).
+
+## Notes / residuals
+- The one accepted residual (per spec): a compromised controller could `mkfs` a **user-data** drive
+  it could already `rm -rf` — same data loss, no new reach. System/backup remain operator-only.
+- LVM-root caveat: when `/` is on device-mapper, the OS whole-disk is pinned via `/boot`/`/boot/efi`
+  (a raw ESP partition on the OS disk on standard Proxmox/Debian installs); the fail-safe default
+  covers anything that cannot be resolved.

cmd/felhom-agent/main.go

@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ import (
 
 // version is the agent version. Overridable at build time with
 // -ldflags "-X main.version=<v>"; defaults to the in-repo CHANGELOG version.
-var version = "0.22.0"
+var version = "0.23.0"
 
 func main() {
 	var (
@@ -580,21 +580,33 @@ func buildLocalAPIServer(cfg config.Config, px *proxmox.Client, store *backup.St
 	return srv
 }
 
-// storageGateAdapter bridges the local-API disk-format path to the slice-4 reversibility gate
+// storageGateAdapter bridges the local-API disk-format path to the reversibility gate, TIERED by the
-// (8C): a data-bearing format is a ClassStorageWipe destructive op, so with no operator signature
+// agent's authoritative device-role verdict: a USER-DATA data-bearing wipe is customer-confirmable
-// the gate returns pending_signature and the agent refuses. The signed completion is slice 10.
+// (durable-id-bound, no signature); a SYSTEM/BACKUP wipe stays operator-signature (unsigned →
+// pending_signature; the signed completion runs via the signed-jobs runner).
 type storageGateAdapter struct {
 	gate   *reconcile.Gate
 	hostID string
 }
 
-func (a storageGateAdapter) AuthorizeWipe(device string) (bool, string) {
+func (a storageGateAdapter) AuthorizeWipe(req localapi.WipeRequest) localapi.WipeDecision {
-	params, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]string{"device": device, "op": "format"})
+	dec := a.gate.AuthorizeStorageWipe(reconcile.StorageWipeAuthz{
-	dec := a.gate.Authorize(
+		HostID:           a.hostID,
-		reconcile.IntentForStorageDestructive(reconcile.ClassStorageWipe, a.hostID, device, params, reconcile.SourceOneShotJob),
+		Role:             req.Role,
-		nil, // no operator signature in 8C → pending_signature
+		DeviceDurableID:  req.DeviceDurableID,
-	)
+		Confirmed:        req.Confirmed,
-	return dec.Allowed, string(dec.Reason)
+		ConfirmDurableID: req.ConfirmDurableID,
+	}, nil) // no operator signature on the inline path → system/backup is pending_signature
+	tier := "destructive"
+	if dec.Disposition == reconcile.CustomerConfirmable {
+		tier = "customer_confirmable"
+	}
+	return localapi.WipeDecision{
+		Allowed:           dec.Allowed,
+		Tier:              tier,
+		Reason:            string(dec.Reason),
+		NeedsConfirmation: dec.Reason == reconcile.ReasonPendingConfirmation,
+	}
 }
 
 // reconcileJournalPath chooses the op-journal path: a `journal.log` sibling of the

internal/localapi/disks.go

@@ -27,10 +27,31 @@ type DiskOps interface {
 }
 
 // StorageGate authorizes a DESTRUCTIVE storage op (a data-bearing wipe/format) through the
-// slice-4 reversibility gate. Satisfied by an adapter over reconcile.Gate in main.go. In 8C an
+// reversibility gate, TIERED by the agent's authoritative device-role verdict. Satisfied by an
-// unsigned destructive op returns (false, "pending_signature"); the signed path is slice 10.
+// adapter over reconcile.Gate in main.go.
+//   - user-data  → customer-confirmable: allowed iff the request carries the customer's confirmation
+//     bound to the device's durable id (no operator signature).
+//   - system/backup → operator-signature only (unsigned → pending_signature; Confirmed is ignored).
 type StorageGate interface {
-	AuthorizeWipe(device string) (allowed bool, reason string)
+	AuthorizeWipe(req WipeRequest) WipeDecision
+}
+
+// WipeRequest is the inspection-derived input to the wipe gate. Role + DeviceDurableID are
+// AGENT-INTERNAL (the agent classified the role and re-resolved the durable id); Confirmed +
+// ConfirmDurableID are the caller's claim, honored ONLY for user-data and ONLY on a durable-id match.
+type WipeRequest struct {
+	Role             string // "system" | "backup" | "user-data" (agent-classified)
+	DeviceDurableID  string // agent-re-resolved durable id of the device ("" if unresolvable)
+	Confirmed        bool
+	ConfirmDurableID string
+}
+
+// WipeDecision is the gate's verdict.
+type WipeDecision struct {
+	Allowed           bool
+	Tier              string // "customer_confirmable" | "destructive"
+	Reason            string // machine reason (audit/UI)
+	NeedsConfirmation bool   // user-data, not-yet-confirmed → ask the customer (NOT a signature)
 }
 
 // GuestLister lists the host's guests (to map a mount to the guests that depend on it for the
@@ -49,6 +70,11 @@ type DiskInfo struct {
 	BackingDevice string `json:"backing_device"` // /dev/sdb1, … ("" for network/lvm)
 	MountPath     string `json:"mount_path"`
 	Class         string `json:"class"`        // fast | slow | ""
+	// Role is the agent's AUTHORITATIVE protection tier (system | backup | user-data), derived from
+	// the agent's own storage view + host topology — never from the controller. The controller drives
+	// the UI from it: system/backup get a lock badge and NO destructive controls; user-data is
+	// customer-manageable. Defense in depth — the agent re-enforces role at wipe time regardless.
+	Role          string `json:"role"`
 	DataBearing   bool   `json:"data_bearing"` // agent device-inspection verdict (UI hint)
 	DataReason    string `json:"data_reason,omitempty"`
 	// DurableID is the target's stable identity (e.g. "uuid:<fs-uuid>" for usb/local-dir). The
@@ -68,12 +94,16 @@ func (s *Server) handleDisks(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, vmid int) {
 		writeErr(w, http.StatusBadGateway, "could not read storage view")
 		return
 	}
+	// Resolve the OS/system disks ONCE for this request — role classification is agent-authoritative
+	// (the agent's own mount/topology read, never the caller's claim).
+	sysDisks, sysKnown := storage.SystemDisks(storage.NewProcHostReader())
 	out := make([]DiskInfo, 0, len(targets))
 	for _, t := range targets {
 		di := DiskInfo{
 			Name: t.Name, Type: t.Type, State: t.State,
 			BackingDevice: t.BackingDevice, MountPath: t.MountPath, Class: t.ClassHint,
 			DurableID: t.DurableID,
+			Role:      string(storage.RoleForStorage(t.Type, t.BackingDevice, sysDisks, sysKnown)),
 		}
 		// Inspect the backing device for the UI's data-bearing hint (the authoritative check
 		// is re-run at format time on the actual device).
@@ -159,7 +189,14 @@ type formatRequest struct {
 	VMID   int    `json:"vmid"`
 	Device string `json:"device"`
 	FSType string `json:"fstype"`
-	// NOTE: any caller-supplied "blank"/"force" claim is deliberately IGNORED — the agent
+	// Confirmed + DurableID authorize a USER-DATA data-bearing wipe by the customer's informed-
+	// confirmation bound to the device's durable id. The agent RE-RESOLVES the device's durable id
+	// and matches it against DurableID — a confirmation for one disk can't wipe another. Both are
+	// INERT for system/backup devices (those stay operator-signature only — the role is the agent's,
+	// never the caller's, so confirmed:true on a system device is refused).
+	Confirmed bool   `json:"confirmed"`
+	DurableID string `json:"durable_id"`
+	// NOTE: any caller-supplied "blank"/"force" claim is still deliberately IGNORED — the agent
 	// inspects the device itself (8C invariant).
 }
 
@@ -174,7 +211,14 @@ type FormatResponse struct {
 	Formatted   bool   `json:"formatted"`
 	DataBearing bool   `json:"data_bearing"`
 	Reason      string `json:"reason"`
-	// PendingOp is set on a data-bearing refusal — the exact op to sign (slice 10B).
+	// Role is the agent's authoritative tier for the device (system | backup | user-data).
+	Role string `json:"role,omitempty"`
+	// NeedsConfirmation is set on a USER-DATA data-bearing refusal: the customer must re-submit with
+	// confirmed:true + DurableID (below) after the controller's type-to-confirm UI. NOT an operator
+	// signature — the customer authorizes the wipe of their own data drive.
+	NeedsConfirmation bool   `json:"needs_confirmation,omitempty"`
+	DurableID         string `json:"durable_id,omitempty"` // the durable id to confirm against (user-data)
+	// PendingOp is set on a SYSTEM/BACKUP data-bearing refusal — the exact op the operator must sign.
 	PendingOp *PendingOp `json:"pending_op,omitempty"`
 }
 
@@ -217,44 +261,89 @@ func (s *Server) handleDiskFormat(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, vmid i
 		s.logger.Error("local-api: format device inspect", "device", req.Device, "err", err)
 		// inspect error → fail-safe data-bearing (probe.DataBearing() is true on !Probed)
 	}
-	if probe.DataBearing() {
+	if !probe.DataBearing() {
-		// Destructive: route through the gate. With no operator signature → pending_signature.
+		// Blank device → benign → mkfs (role is irrelevant; there is nothing to destroy).
-		allowed, reason := s.diskGate.AuthorizeWipe(req.Device)
+		if err := s.disks.Format(r.Context(), req.Device, req.FSType); err != nil {
-		if !allowed {
+			s.logger.Error("local-api: format", "vmid", vmid, "device", req.Device, "err", err)
-			// Surface the bound op the operator must sign (slice 10B): derive the DURABLE device id
+			writeErr(w, http.StatusBadGateway, "format failed: "+err.Error())
-			// so the signed wipe binds to this exact physical disk (not the mutable path), and the
-			// runner can re-resolve it at execution. A durable-id derivation failure is non-fatal —
-			// the refusal still stands; we just can't pre-fill the durable id.
-			var pending *PendingOp
-			if durableID, derr := storage.DeviceDurableID(req.Device); derr == nil {
-				pending = &PendingOp{Op: "storage_wipe", HostScope: s.hostID, DurableID: durableID, FSType: req.FSType}
-				s.logger.Warn("local-api: data-bearing format refused — PENDING OPERATOR SIGNATURE",
-					"vmid", vmid, "device", req.Device, "durable_id", durableID, "fstype", req.FSType,
-					"why", probe.Reason(), "to_authorize", "felhom-opsign -op storage_wipe -host "+s.hostID+" -durable-id "+durableID)
-			} else {
-				s.logger.Warn("local-api: data-bearing format refused (no durable id)",
-					"vmid", vmid, "device", req.Device, "why", probe.Reason(), "derive_err", derr)
-			}
-			writeStatus(w, http.StatusForbidden, false,
-				FormatResponse{VMID: vmid, Device: req.Device, Formatted: false, DataBearing: true, Reason: probe.Reason(), PendingOp: pending},
-				"device is data-bearing — format requires an operator signature ("+reason+")")
 			return
 		}
-		// A signed wipe is executed by the signed-jobs runner (queue → verify gate → durable
+		writeOK(w, FormatResponse{VMID: vmid, Device: req.Device, Formatted: true, DataBearing: false, Reason: "blank device formatted " + req.FSType})
-		// re-resolve + re-inspect → mkfs), NOT this synchronous path. This branch (gate ALLOWED a
-		// data-bearing format inline) is unreachable: the inline path passes signed=nil → always
-		// pending. Fail safe.
-		writeErr(w, http.StatusForbidden, "data-bearing format must be completed via a signed job (felhom-opsign → hub queue)")
 		return
 	}
 
-	// Blank device → benign → mkfs.
+	// Data-bearing → TIER by the agent's authoritative role classification (its own inspection,
-	if err := s.disks.Format(r.Context(), req.Device, req.FSType); err != nil {
+	// never the caller's claim). The agent also re-resolves the device's durable id; the customer's
-		s.logger.Error("local-api: format", "vmid", vmid, "device", req.Device, "err", err)
+	// confirmation must bind to it.
-		writeErr(w, http.StatusBadGateway, "format failed: "+err.Error())
+	role := s.deviceRole(r.Context(), req.Device)
+	deviceDurable, derr := storage.DeviceDurableID(req.Device)
+	if derr != nil {
+		deviceDurable = "" // refusal still stands; binding/pending-op just lack the id
+	}
+	dec := s.diskGate.AuthorizeWipe(WipeRequest{
+		Role: string(role), DeviceDurableID: deviceDurable,
+		Confirmed: req.Confirmed, ConfirmDurableID: req.DurableID,
+	})
+
+	if dec.Allowed {
+		// USER-DATA, customer-confirmed (durable-id-bound). The gate already AUDITED it. Wipe.
+		if err := s.disks.Format(r.Context(), req.Device, req.FSType); err != nil {
+			s.logger.Error("local-api: customer-confirmed format", "vmid", vmid, "device", req.Device, "err", err)
+			writeErr(w, http.StatusBadGateway, "format failed: "+err.Error())
+			return
+		}
+		s.logger.Warn("local-api: USER-DATA data-bearing format — CUSTOMER CONFIRMED (no operator signature)",
+			"vmid", vmid, "device", req.Device, "durable_id", deviceDurable, "fstype", req.FSType, "why", probe.Reason())
+		writeOK(w, FormatResponse{VMID: vmid, Device: req.Device, Formatted: true, DataBearing: true,
+			Role: string(role), DurableID: deviceDurable, Reason: "customer-confirmed wipe (" + probe.Reason() + ")"})
 		return
 	}
-	writeOK(w, FormatResponse{VMID: vmid, Device: req.Device, Formatted: true, DataBearing: false, Reason: "blank device formatted " + req.FSType})
+
+	if dec.Tier == "customer_confirmable" {
+		// USER-DATA refusal: either awaiting the customer's confirmation, or the confirmation didn't
+		// bind to THIS device. Surface the durable id to confirm against — NOT an operator signature.
+		msg := "device is data-bearing — customer confirmation required"
+		if !dec.NeedsConfirmation {
+			msg = "confirmation does not match this device — refused (" + dec.Reason + ")"
+		}
+		s.logger.Warn("local-api: user-data data-bearing format refused",
+			"vmid", vmid, "device", req.Device, "durable_id", deviceDurable, "reason", dec.Reason, "why", probe.Reason())
+		writeStatus(w, http.StatusForbidden, false,
+			FormatResponse{VMID: vmid, Device: req.Device, Formatted: false, DataBearing: true, Role: string(role),
+				NeedsConfirmation: dec.NeedsConfirmation, DurableID: deviceDurable, Reason: probe.Reason()}, msg)
+		return
+	}
+
+	// SYSTEM / BACKUP refusal: operator signature required. Surface the bound op to sign (the durable
+	// id binds the signed wipe to THIS exact physical disk). confirmed:true was ignored — by role.
+	var pending *PendingOp
+	if deviceDurable != "" {
+		pending = &PendingOp{Op: "storage_wipe", HostScope: s.hostID, DurableID: deviceDurable, FSType: req.FSType}
+		s.logger.Warn("local-api: protected (system/backup) data-bearing format refused — PENDING OPERATOR SIGNATURE",
+			"vmid", vmid, "device", req.Device, "role", role, "durable_id", deviceDurable, "fstype", req.FSType,
+			"why", probe.Reason(), "to_authorize", "felhom-opsign -op storage_wipe -host "+s.hostID+" -durable-id "+deviceDurable)
+	} else {
+		s.logger.Warn("local-api: protected data-bearing format refused (no durable id)",
+			"vmid", vmid, "device", req.Device, "role", role, "why", probe.Reason())
+	}
+	writeStatus(w, http.StatusForbidden, false,
+		FormatResponse{VMID: vmid, Device: req.Device, Formatted: false, DataBearing: true, Role: string(role), PendingOp: pending, Reason: probe.Reason()},
+		"device is system/backup-protected — format requires an operator signature ("+dec.Reason+")")
+}
+
+// deviceRole resolves a device's AUTHORITATIVE protection tier. It prefers a known storage target's
+// role (so a PBS-backed device is recognized as backup), falling back to a raw-device classification
+// (for a fresh disk not yet a PVE storage — the init flow). Defaults to system on ambiguity.
+func (s *Server) deviceRole(ctx context.Context, device string) storage.DeviceRole {
+	sysDisks, sysKnown := storage.SystemDisks(storage.NewProcHostReader())
+	if targets, err := s.storage.Observe(ctx); err == nil {
+		for _, t := range targets {
+			if t.BackingDevice != "" && t.BackingDevice == device {
+				return storage.RoleForStorage(t.Type, t.BackingDevice, sysDisks, sysKnown)
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return storage.RoleForRawDevice(device, sysDisks, sysKnown)
 }
 
 // dependentGuests returns the VMIDs whose config has a mount whose storage backs the ejected

internal/localapi/disks_test.go

@@ -52,14 +52,21 @@ func (f *fakeDiskOps) Unmount(_ context.Context, where string) error {
 func (f *fakeDiskOps) formatted() []string { f.mu.Lock(); defer f.mu.Unlock(); return append([]string(nil), f.formatCalls...) }
 
 type fakeGate struct {
-	allowed bool
+	mu       sync.Mutex
-	reason  string
+	decision WipeDecision
-	calls   []string
+	reqs     []WipeRequest
 }
 
-func (g *fakeGate) AuthorizeWipe(device string) (bool, string) {
+func (g *fakeGate) AuthorizeWipe(req WipeRequest) WipeDecision {
-	g.calls = append(g.calls, device)
+	g.mu.Lock()
-	return g.allowed, g.reason
+	defer g.mu.Unlock()
+	g.reqs = append(g.reqs, req)
+	return g.decision
+}
+func (g *fakeGate) requests() []WipeRequest {
+	g.mu.Lock()
+	defer g.mu.Unlock()
+	return append([]WipeRequest(nil), g.reqs...)
 }
 
 type fakeGuestList struct{ guests []proxmox.Guest }
@@ -96,7 +103,7 @@ func newDiskServer(t *testing.T, d *fakeDiskOps, g *fakeGate, sv StorageView, gl
 // A blank device (the agent's own probe says blank) is formatted — mkfs called, gate NOT consulted.
 func TestFormat_BlankDevice_Formats(t *testing.T) {
 	d := &fakeDiskOps{probe: storage.DeviceProbe{Probed: true}} // blank: Probed, nothing set
-	g := &fakeGate{allowed: false, reason: "pending_signature"}
+	g := &fakeGate{}
 	h := newDiskServer(t, d, g, nil, nil)
 
 	w := do(t, h, "POST", "/disks/format", "A", `{"device":"/dev/sdb","fstype":"ext4"}`)
@@ -106,39 +113,106 @@ func TestFormat_BlankDevice_Formats(t *testing.T) {
 	if got := d.formatted(); len(got) != 1 || got[0] != "/dev/sdb" {
 		t.Fatalf("mkfs not called for blank device: %v", got)
 	}
-	if len(g.calls) != 0 {
+	if len(g.requests()) != 0 {
 		t.Fatal("gate was consulted for a blank-device format (should be benign)")
 	}
 }
 
-// THE HEADLINE 8C TEST: a caller asks to format a DATA-BEARING device. The agent inspects the
+// THE HEADLINE SECURITY TEST: a caller asks to format a DATA-BEARING device the gate tiers as
-// device itself, classifies it destructive, the gate refuses pending_signature, and **mkfs is
+// SYSTEM/BACKUP (destructive). The gate refuses pending_signature, **mkfs is NEVER called**, and the
-// NEVER called** — the caller's intent cannot wipe data-bearing storage.
+// response surfaces the operator-signature pending op (NOT a customer-confirmation prompt).
-func TestFormat_DataBearingDevice_RefusedNoMkfs(t *testing.T) {
+func TestFormat_DataBearing_ProtectedRole_RefusedNoMkfs(t *testing.T) {
 	d := &fakeDiskOps{probe: storage.DeviceProbe{Probed: true, HasFilesystem: true, FSType: "ext4"}}
-	g := &fakeGate{allowed: false, reason: "pending_signature"}
+	g := &fakeGate{decision: WipeDecision{Allowed: false, Tier: "destructive", Reason: "pending_signature"}}
 	h := newDiskServer(t, d, g, nil, nil)
 
 	w := do(t, h, "POST", "/disks/format", "A", `{"device":"/dev/sdb","fstype":"ext4"}`)
 	if w.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
-		t.Fatalf("data-bearing format: got %d want 403", w.Code)
+		t.Fatalf("data-bearing protected format: got %d want 403", w.Code)
 	}
 	if got := d.formatted(); len(got) != 0 {
-		t.Fatalf("mkfs WAS called on a data-bearing device — security invariant violated: %v", got)
+		t.Fatalf("mkfs WAS called on a protected data-bearing device — security invariant violated: %v", got)
 	}
-	if len(g.calls) != 1 || g.calls[0] != "/dev/sdb" {
+	if len(g.requests()) != 1 {
-		t.Fatalf("gate not consulted for the destructive format: %v", g.calls)
+		t.Fatalf("gate not consulted for the destructive format: %v", g.requests())
 	}
 	if !strings.Contains(w.Body.String(), "operator signature") {
 		t.Fatalf("response did not signal an operator signature is needed: %s", w.Body.String())
 	}
 }
 
+// A hand-issued confirmed:true on a data-bearing device the gate tiers as SYSTEM/BACKUP is STILL
+// refused (operator-signature) and mkfs is NOT called — role beats confirmation. (The gate's
+// role-tiering is itself asserted in reconcile/gate_test; here we assert the handler honors a
+// destructive verdict even when the caller claimed confirmed:true.)
+func TestFormat_DataBearing_ConfirmedTrueButProtected_StillRefused(t *testing.T) {
+	d := &fakeDiskOps{probe: storage.DeviceProbe{Probed: true, HasFilesystem: true, FSType: "ext4"}}
+	g := &fakeGate{decision: WipeDecision{Allowed: false, Tier: "destructive", Reason: "pending_signature"}}
+	h := newDiskServer(t, d, g, nil, nil)
+
+	w := do(t, h, "POST", "/disks/format", "A", `{"device":"/dev/sdb","fstype":"ext4","confirmed":true,"durable_id":"byid:wwn-xyz"}`)
+	if w.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
+		t.Fatalf("confirmed-but-protected format: got %d want 403", w.Code)
+	}
+	if got := d.formatted(); len(got) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("mkfs called despite protected role — confirmation must not beat role: %v", got)
+	}
+	// The handler must have forwarded the caller's confirmation claim to the gate (the gate, not the
+	// handler, ignores it for protected roles).
+	if reqs := g.requests(); len(reqs) != 1 || !reqs[0].Confirmed || reqs[0].ConfirmDurableID != "byid:wwn-xyz" {
+		t.Fatalf("handler did not forward the confirmation claim to the gate: %+v", reqs)
+	}
+}
+
+// USER-DATA + customer-confirmed (gate Allowed): the wipe proceeds — mkfs IS called, 200.
+func TestFormat_DataBearing_UserDataConfirmed_Formats(t *testing.T) {
+	d := &fakeDiskOps{probe: storage.DeviceProbe{Probed: true, HasFilesystem: true, FSType: "ext4"}}
+	g := &fakeGate{decision: WipeDecision{Allowed: true, Tier: "customer_confirmable", Reason: "customer_confirmed"}}
+	h := newDiskServer(t, d, g, nil, nil)
+
+	w := do(t, h, "POST", "/disks/format", "A", `{"device":"/dev/sdb","fstype":"ext4","confirmed":true,"durable_id":"byuuid:abc"}`)
+	if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("user-data confirmed format: got %d want 200 (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+	if got := d.formatted(); len(got) != 1 || got[0] != "/dev/sdb" {
+		t.Fatalf("mkfs not called for a customer-confirmed user-data wipe: %v", got)
+	}
+}
+
+// USER-DATA + NOT yet confirmed (gate refuses pending_confirmation): 403 with needs_confirmation,
+// mkfs NOT called, and NO operator-signature pending op (it's the customer's to confirm).
+func TestFormat_DataBearing_UserDataNeedsConfirmation(t *testing.T) {
+	d := &fakeDiskOps{probe: storage.DeviceProbe{Probed: true, HasFilesystem: true, FSType: "ext4"}}
+	g := &fakeGate{decision: WipeDecision{Allowed: false, Tier: "customer_confirmable", Reason: "pending_confirmation", NeedsConfirmation: true}}
+	h := newDiskServer(t, d, g, nil, nil)
+
+	w := do(t, h, "POST", "/disks/format", "A", `{"device":"/dev/sdb","fstype":"ext4"}`)
+	if w.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
+		t.Fatalf("user-data unconfirmed: got %d want 403", w.Code)
+	}
+	if len(d.formatted()) != 0 {
+		t.Fatal("mkfs called for an unconfirmed user-data wipe")
+	}
+	var resp struct {
+		Data FormatResponse `json:"data"`
+	}
+	_ = json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &resp)
+	if !resp.Data.NeedsConfirmation {
+		t.Fatalf("response missing needs_confirmation: %s", w.Body.String())
+	}
+	if resp.Data.PendingOp != nil {
+		t.Fatal("user-data refusal must NOT surface an operator-signature pending op")
+	}
+	if strings.Contains(w.Body.String(), "operator signature") {
+		t.Fatalf("user-data refusal must not ask for an operator signature: %s", w.Body.String())
+	}
+}
+
 // Fail-safe: a device the agent could NOT reliably inspect (Probed=false) is treated as
-// data-bearing → refused, mkfs not called.
+// data-bearing → routed through the gate, mkfs not called.
 func TestFormat_AmbiguousProbe_TreatedDestructive(t *testing.T) {
 	d := &fakeDiskOps{probe: storage.DeviceProbe{Probed: false}} // probe failed → DataBearing()=true
-	g := &fakeGate{allowed: false, reason: "pending_signature"}
+	g := &fakeGate{decision: WipeDecision{Allowed: false, Tier: "destructive", Reason: "pending_signature"}}
 	h := newDiskServer(t, d, g, nil, nil)
 
 	w := do(t, h, "POST", "/disks/format", "A", `{"device":"/dev/sdb","fstype":"ext4"}`)
@@ -150,21 +224,6 @@ func TestFormat_AmbiguousProbe_TreatedDestructive(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
-// Even a (hypothetical) gate that ALLOWS does not format a data-bearing device in 8C (the signed
-// completion is slice 10).
-func TestFormat_DataBearing_GateAllows_StillNoMkfsIn8C(t *testing.T) {
-	d := &fakeDiskOps{probe: storage.DeviceProbe{Probed: true, HasPartitionTable: true}}
-	g := &fakeGate{allowed: true, reason: "signed"}
-	h := newDiskServer(t, d, g, nil, nil)
-	w := do(t, h, "POST", "/disks/format", "A", `{"device":"/dev/sdb","fstype":"ext4"}`)
-	if w.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
-		t.Fatalf("got %d want 403 (8C never formats data-bearing)", w.Code)
-	}
-	if len(d.formatted()) != 0 {
-		t.Fatal("mkfs called on a data-bearing device even though 8C must refuse")
-	}
-}
-
 func TestFormat_RejectsBadDeviceOrFSType(t *testing.T) {
 	d := &fakeDiskOps{probe: storage.DeviceProbe{Probed: true}}
 	h := newDiskServer(t, d, &fakeGate{}, nil, nil)

internal/reconcile/classify.go

@@ -49,6 +49,23 @@ const (
 	Benign Disposition = "benign"
 	// Destructive — an operator signature bound to the action is REQUIRED.
 	Destructive Disposition = "destructive"
+	// CustomerConfirmable — a USER-DATA storage wipe: authorized by the customer's informed-
+	// confirmation bound to the device's durable id, NOT an operator signature. This tier is
+	// reachable ONLY for ClassStorageWipe on an agent-classified user-data device (see
+	// Gate.AuthorizeStorageWipe). A user-data drive is already within the in-guest controller's
+	// blast radius (it bind-mounts /mnt), so customer-confirmation adds no new reach — the data was
+	// already destroyable. Every OTHER destructive class keeps the operator signature.
+	CustomerConfirmable Disposition = "customer_confirmable"
+)
+
+// Storage ROLE values — the protection tier the AGENT assigns a device by its own inspection
+// (mirrors storage.DeviceRole). Kept as plain strings here to avoid a storage→reconcile import edge:
+// the localapi adapter passes the agent's classification through verbatim. The gate NEVER derives the
+// role from a caller's claim — it only consumes the agent's verdict.
+const (
+	StorageRoleSystem   = "system"
+	StorageRoleBackup   = "backup"
+	StorageRoleUserData = "user-data"
 )
 
 // Provenance is AGENT-INTERNAL evidence that an otherwise-destructive action is

internal/reconcile/gate.go

@@ -53,7 +53,11 @@ const (
 	ReasonPendingSignature RefuseReason = "pending_signature" // destructive, no/again-needed signature
 	ReasonRejected         RefuseReason = "rejected"          // signature failed authz verification
 	ReasonRoleDenied       RefuseReason = "role_denied"       // signer role not authorized for this op class
-	ReasonBindingMismatch  RefuseReason = "binding_mismatch"  // signature is for a different action
+	ReasonBindingMismatch  RefuseReason = "binding_mismatch"  // signature/confirmation is for a different action/device
+
+	// Storage-wipe customer-confirmable tier (user-data only).
+	ReasonCustomerConfirmed   RefuseReason = "customer_confirmed"   // allowed by the customer's durable-id-bound confirmation
+	ReasonPendingConfirmation RefuseReason = "pending_confirmation" // user-data wipe awaiting the customer's confirmation
 )
 
 // Decision is the gate verdict.
@@ -94,6 +98,9 @@ type AuditRecord struct {
 	Reason      RefuseReason
 	KeyID       string // matched signer's key id, when signed
 	Nonce       string // the op nonce, when signed
+	// DurableID is the device's durable id on a customer-confirmable storage wipe — the load-bearing
+	// audit detail ("who/what/when + the durable id") so a customer-authorized wipe is attributable.
+	DurableID string
 }
 
 // Gate is the reversibility gate: it sits in front of the per-guest queue's executor
@@ -172,6 +179,75 @@ func (g *Gate) Authorize(intent Intent, signed *SignedOp) Decision {
 	return d
 }
 
+// StorageWipeAuthz is the input to AuthorizeStorageWipe. Role is the agent's AUTHORITATIVE
+// classification (StorageRole* in classify.go) — never a caller's claim. DeviceDurableID is the
+// durable id the AGENT re-resolved for the device. Confirmed/ConfirmDurableID are the customer's
+// informed-confirmation, honored ONLY for user-data and ONLY when ConfirmDurableID matches the agent's
+// DeviceDurableID (a confirmation for one disk can't wipe another).
+type StorageWipeAuthz struct {
+	HostID           string
+	Role             string // StorageRoleSystem | StorageRoleBackup | StorageRoleUserData
+	TargetID         string // storage target identity for the operator-signed (system/backup) binding
+	DeviceDurableID  string // agent-re-resolved durable id of the device ("" if unresolvable)
+	Confirmed        bool
+	ConfirmDurableID string
+}
+
+// AuthorizeStorageWipe tiers a data-bearing storage wipe by the agent's role verdict:
+//
+//   - user-data → CUSTOMER-CONFIRMABLE: allowed iff the request carries an explicit customer
+//     confirmation BOUND to the device's durable id (the agent re-resolved DeviceDurableID and it
+//     matches ConfirmDurableID). No operator signature. The wipe is recorded in the customer-visible
+//     audit log with the durable id.
+//   - system / backup / anything else → the standard DESTRUCTIVE path (operator-signature /
+//     pending_signature). The Confirmed flag is DELIBERATELY IGNORED: no customer confirmation can
+//     wipe the appliance's system storage or the backup safety-net. A compromised controller
+//     asserting confirmed:true is refused here BY ROLE — role is the agent's, never the caller's.
+//
+// signed is the operator signature for the system/backup path (nil on the inline format path → always
+// pending_signature; the signed completion runs via the signed-jobs runner).
+func (g *Gate) AuthorizeStorageWipe(in StorageWipeAuthz, signed *SignedOp) Decision {
+	if in.Role == StorageRoleUserData {
+		if !in.Confirmed {
+			d := Decision{Allowed: false, Disposition: CustomerConfirmable, Reason: ReasonPendingConfirmation}
+			g.recordWipe(in, d)
+			return d
+		}
+		// Durable-id binding: the confirmation must name THIS exact device (re-resolved by the agent).
+		// An unresolved/empty id fails safe (refuse), and a mismatch can't be retargeted to another disk.
+		if in.DeviceDurableID == "" || in.ConfirmDurableID == "" || in.ConfirmDurableID != in.DeviceDurableID {
+			d := Decision{Allowed: false, Disposition: CustomerConfirmable, Reason: ReasonBindingMismatch}
+			g.recordWipe(in, d)
+			return d
+		}
+		d := Decision{Allowed: true, Disposition: CustomerConfirmable, Reason: ReasonCustomerConfirmed}
+		g.recordWipe(in, d)
+		return d
+	}
+	// system / backup / unknown → operator-signature path. Confirmed is NOT consulted.
+	intent := IntentForStorageDestructive(ClassStorageWipe, in.HostID, in.TargetID, nil, SourceOneShotJob)
+	return g.Authorize(intent, signed)
+}
+
+// recordWipe audits a customer-confirmable storage-wipe decision (allowed or refused) with the
+// device's durable id — the customer-visible "who/what/when + durable id" record.
+func (g *Gate) recordWipe(in StorageWipeAuthz, d Decision) {
+	g.audit.Record(AuditRecord{
+		Time:        time.Now().UTC(),
+		Class:       ClassStorageWipe,
+		HostID:      in.HostID,
+		GuestID:     in.TargetID,
+		Source:      SourceOneShotJob,
+		Disposition: d.Disposition,
+		Allowed:     d.Allowed,
+		Reason:      d.Reason,
+		DurableID:   in.DeviceDurableID,
+	})
+	g.logger.Info("gate decision (storage wipe)",
+		"role", in.Role, "disposition", d.Disposition, "allowed", d.Allowed,
+		"reason", d.Reason, "durable_id", in.DeviceDurableID)
+}
+
 // roleAuthorizes enforces the doc 04 §4 two-key role model: the cold recovery key
 // authorizes ONLY key-rotation re-pins; the operational key authorizes ordinary
 // destructive ops AND planned key-rotation.
@@ -278,7 +354,7 @@ func (s SlogAudit) Record(rec AuditRecord) {
 	s.Logger.Info("audit: gate decision",
 		"class", rec.Class, "host", rec.HostID, "guest", rec.GuestID, "source", rec.Source,
 		"disposition", rec.Disposition, "allowed", rec.Allowed, "reason", rec.Reason,
-		"key_id", rec.KeyID, "nonce", auditNonce(rec.Nonce))
+		"key_id", rec.KeyID, "nonce", auditNonce(rec.Nonce), "durable_id", rec.DurableID)
 }
 
 // auditNonce shortens a nonce for the log (full nonce is high-cardinality; a prefix is

internal/reconcile/storage_wipe_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+package reconcile
+
+import "testing"
+
+// The storage-authorization redesign: a USER-DATA data-bearing wipe is customer-confirmable
+// (durable-id-bound, no operator signature); SYSTEM and BACKUP stay operator-signature ONLY, and a
+// `confirmed:true` claim on them is REFUSED by role (a compromised controller can't relabel a
+// protected device to walk the gate). These assert the gate's tiering — the non-hollow checks the
+// spec calls for: "the gate refuses a `confirmed` wipe on system/backup (assert no exec); a user-data
+// confirmed wipe binds to the durable id (a mismatched id is refused)".
+
+const durA = "byid:wwn-0x5000c500a"
+const durB = "byuuid:1111-2222"
+
+// user-data + confirmed + matching durable id → allowed (customer-confirmable), audited with the id.
+func TestStorageWipe_UserDataConfirmed_Allowed(t *testing.T) {
+	aud := &captureAudit{}
+	g := NewGate(nil, testHost, aud, nil) // NO verifier pinned — proves no operator signature is needed
+	d := g.AuthorizeStorageWipe(StorageWipeAuthz{
+		HostID: testHost, Role: StorageRoleUserData,
+		DeviceDurableID: durA, Confirmed: true, ConfirmDurableID: durA,
+	}, nil)
+	if !d.Allowed || d.Disposition != CustomerConfirmable || d.Reason != ReasonCustomerConfirmed {
+		t.Fatalf("user-data confirmed+matching: got allowed=%v disp=%s reason=%s", d.Allowed, d.Disposition, d.Reason)
+	}
+	if len(aud.recs) != 1 || !aud.recs[0].Allowed || aud.recs[0].DurableID != durA {
+		t.Fatalf("customer-confirmed wipe must be audited with the durable id: %+v", aud.recs)
+	}
+}
+
+// user-data + confirmed but the confirmation binds to a DIFFERENT disk's durable id → refused
+// (binding_mismatch). A confirmation for one disk can't wipe another.
+func TestStorageWipe_UserDataDurableMismatch_Refused(t *testing.T) {
+	g := NewGate(nil, testHost, &captureAudit{}, nil)
+	d := g.AuthorizeStorageWipe(StorageWipeAuthz{
+		HostID: testHost, Role: StorageRoleUserData,
+		DeviceDurableID: durA, Confirmed: true, ConfirmDurableID: durB, // confirms B, device is A
+	}, nil)
+	if d.Allowed || d.Reason != ReasonBindingMismatch {
+		t.Fatalf("durable-id mismatch: got allowed=%v reason=%s, want refused binding_mismatch", d.Allowed, d.Reason)
+	}
+}
+
+// user-data + an UNRESOLVABLE device durable id fails safe (refused) even when confirmed.
+func TestStorageWipe_UserDataNoDurable_Refused(t *testing.T) {
+	g := NewGate(nil, testHost, &captureAudit{}, nil)
+	d := g.AuthorizeStorageWipe(StorageWipeAuthz{
+		HostID: testHost, Role: StorageRoleUserData,
+		DeviceDurableID: "", Confirmed: true, ConfirmDurableID: "",
+	}, nil)
+	if d.Allowed {
+		t.Fatal("a wipe with no resolvable durable id must not be allowed even when confirmed")
+	}
+}
+
+// user-data, NOT confirmed → pending_confirmation (ask the customer; not a signature).
+func TestStorageWipe_UserDataUnconfirmed_PendingConfirmation(t *testing.T) {
+	g := NewGate(nil, testHost, &captureAudit{}, nil)
+	d := g.AuthorizeStorageWipe(StorageWipeAuthz{
+		HostID: testHost, Role: StorageRoleUserData, DeviceDurableID: durA,
+	}, nil)
+	if d.Allowed || d.Disposition != CustomerConfirmable || d.Reason != ReasonPendingConfirmation {
+		t.Fatalf("user-data unconfirmed: got allowed=%v disp=%s reason=%s", d.Allowed, d.Disposition, d.Reason)
+	}
+}
+
+// THE HEADLINE: a `confirmed:true` wipe on a SYSTEM device is REFUSED — it falls to the
+// operator-signature path (no signer pinned → pending_signature), NOT customer-confirmable. The
+// customer's confirmation is ignored BY ROLE. Same for BACKUP.
+func TestStorageWipe_SystemConfirmedTrue_RefusedBySignature(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, role := range []string{StorageRoleSystem, StorageRoleBackup} {
+		g := NewGate(nil, testHost, &captureAudit{}, nil)
+		d := g.AuthorizeStorageWipe(StorageWipeAuthz{
+			HostID: testHost, Role: role,
+			DeviceDurableID: durA, Confirmed: true, ConfirmDurableID: durA, // a matching confirmation — must NOT help
+		}, nil)
+		if d.Allowed {
+			t.Fatalf("role=%s: a confirmed wipe of a protected device was ALLOWED — invariant violated", role)
+		}
+		if d.Disposition != Destructive || d.Reason != ReasonPendingSignature {
+			t.Fatalf("role=%s: got disp=%s reason=%s, want destructive/pending_signature", role, d.Disposition, d.Reason)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// An UNKNOWN/empty role fails safe to the protected (operator-signature) path, never user-data.
+func TestStorageWipe_UnknownRole_FailsSafeDestructive(t *testing.T) {
+	g := NewGate(nil, testHost, &captureAudit{}, nil)
+	d := g.AuthorizeStorageWipe(StorageWipeAuthz{
+		HostID: testHost, Role: "", Confirmed: true, DeviceDurableID: durA, ConfirmDurableID: durA,
+	}, nil)
+	if d.Allowed || d.Disposition != Destructive {
+		t.Fatalf("unknown role must fail safe to destructive: got allowed=%v disp=%s", d.Allowed, d.Disposition)
+	}
+}

internal/storage/role.go

@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
+package storage
+
+import (
+	"path/filepath"
+	"regexp"
+
+	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-agent/internal/hub"
+)
+
+// Device ROLE classification — the protection tier the AGENT assigns a storage/device by its OWN
+// inspection (the PVE storage view + the host mount/topology reads it already gathers), NEVER from
+// the controller's or the hub's claim. This is the storage analog of classify.go's data-bearing
+// verdict: "provenance is agent-internal, never populated from an external input, else a compromised
+// hub could relabel a protected device to walk the gate."
+//
+// The tier decides who may authorize a destructive wipe of the device:
+//   - system    : the appliance's OS/boot/EFI/guest-rootfs storage. Operator-signature ONLY.
+//   - backup    : the backup safety-net (PBS). Operator-signature ONLY (wiping it destroys the net).
+//   - user-data : a customer external data drive — already within the controller's blast radius
+//                 (it bind-mounts /mnt), so a customer informed-confirmation may authorize a wipe.
+//
+// On ANY ambiguity the agent defaults to the MOST-PROTECTED role (system) — consistent with the
+// destructive-on-ambiguity invariant: an unrecognized device is treated as protected, never silently
+// user-data.
+type DeviceRole string
+
+const (
+	RoleSystem   DeviceRole = "system"
+	RoleBackup   DeviceRole = "backup"
+	RoleUserData DeviceRole = "user-data"
+)
+
+// reWholeDisk matches a whole raw disk path (no partition suffix): /dev/sda, /dev/vdb, /dev/nvme0n1.
+var reWholeDisk = regexp.MustCompile(`^/dev/(?:sd|hd|vd)[a-z]+$|^/dev/nvme[0-9]+n[0-9]+$`)
+
+// systemMountPoints are the host mountpoints whose backing whole-disk is, by definition, the OS /
+// system disk. /boot and /boot/efi are the load-bearing ones: on a typical Proxmox/Debian install
+// the ESP is a raw partition directly on the OS disk, so it pins the OS whole-disk even when / is on
+// LVM/device-mapper (which we cannot trace back to a raw disk without privileged LVM introspection).
+var systemMountPoints = map[string]bool{"/": true, "/boot": true, "/boot/efi": true}
+
+// SystemDisks resolves the set of whole-disk device paths that host the OS (the disks backing /,
+// /boot and /boot/efi). ok=false when NONE could be resolved (no system mountpoint mapped to a raw
+// disk) — callers then treat every candidate as system (most protected). Root-free: it parses the
+// mount table + world-readable /dev symlinks only (the root-CLI fence is untouched).
+func SystemDisks(host HostReader) (set map[string]bool, ok bool) {
+	if host == nil {
+		return nil, false
+	}
+	mounts, err := host.Mounts()
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, false
+	}
+	set = map[string]bool{}
+	for _, m := range mounts {
+		if !systemMountPoints[cleanMountPath(m.MountPoint)] {
+			continue
+		}
+		if wd, wok := wholeDiskOf(m.Device); wok {
+			set[wd] = true
+		}
+	}
+	return set, len(set) > 0
+}
+
+// wholeDiskOf maps a device path (a partition, a whole disk, or a /dev/disk/by-* symlink) to its
+// whole-disk /dev path. ok=false when the result is not a recognizable raw disk (device-mapper / LVM
+// / network) — the caller then treats the topology as undeterminable (→ most-protected).
+func wholeDiskOf(device string) (string, bool) {
+	if device == "" {
+		return "", false
+	}
+	dev := device
+	if resolved, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(device); err == nil {
+		dev = resolved // canonicalize /dev/disk/by-uuid/… → /dev/sdXN
+	}
+	if m := reNVMePart.FindStringSubmatch(dev); m != nil {
+		return m[1], true // /dev/nvme0n1p2 → /dev/nvme0n1
+	}
+	if m := reSDPart.FindStringSubmatch(dev); m != nil {
+		return m[1], true // /dev/sdb1 → /dev/sdb
+	}
+	if reWholeDisk.MatchString(dev) {
+		return dev, true // already a whole disk
+	}
+	return "", false // /dev/mapper/*, network, unrecognized → undeterminable
+}
+
+// isSystemBacked reports whether device's whole-disk is an OS/system disk. It FAILS SAFE: any
+// ambiguity (system set unknown, or the device's whole-disk unrecognizable) returns true (system).
+func isSystemBacked(device string, sysDisks map[string]bool, sysKnown bool) bool {
+	if !sysKnown {
+		return true // can't determine the system disks → treat as system (most protected)
+	}
+	wd, ok := wholeDiskOf(device)
+	if !ok {
+		return true // unrecognizable device topology → most protected
+	}
+	return sysDisks[wd]
+}
+
+// RoleForStorage classifies a storage TARGET (from the agent's storage view) into its protection
+// tier. typ is the reported storage type; backingDevice is its resolved block device ("" for
+// network/lvm/dir-on-root). sysDisks/sysKnown come from SystemDisks (resolved once per request).
+func RoleForStorage(typ, backingDevice string, sysDisks map[string]bool, sysKnown bool) DeviceRole {
+	switch typ {
+	case hub.StorageTypePBS:
+		return RoleBackup // the backup safety-net — protected
+	case hub.StorageTypeUSB, hub.StorageTypeLocalDir:
+		// A removable/extra dir storage is user-data ONLY when it has its OWN block device that is
+		// NOT part of the system disk. No device (a dir on the root fs) or a system-disk-backed dir
+		// → system. This is exactly "local-dir/usb on a non-root external device → user-data".
+		if backingDevice == "" {
+			return RoleSystem
+		}
+		if isSystemBacked(backingDevice, sysDisks, sysKnown) {
+			return RoleSystem
+		}
+		return RoleUserData
+	default:
+		// local (builtin, on the root fs), lvmthin (local-lvm), lvm (thick), nfs, cifs, and anything
+		// unrecognized → protected. Network shares are NOT customer-managed external drives in this
+		// model and are not within the controller's blast radius, so protecting them is safe.
+		return RoleSystem
+	}
+}
+
+// RoleForRawDevice classifies a RAW block device (the format endpoint's target, which may not yet be
+// a registered PVE storage — e.g. a fresh external disk in the init flow). It distinguishes system
+// from user-data by system-disk membership. A raw /dev path is never a PBS datastore (those are
+// network/API), so the backup tier is not reachable here — the storage-list view (RoleForStorage)
+// tiers PBS. Defaults to system on ambiguity.
+func RoleForRawDevice(device string, sysDisks map[string]bool, sysKnown bool) DeviceRole {
+	if isSystemBacked(device, sysDisks, sysKnown) {
+		return RoleSystem
+	}
+	return RoleUserData
+}

internal/storage/role_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+package storage
+
+import (
+	"testing"
+
+	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-agent/internal/hub"
+)
+
+// Role classification is AGENT-AUTHORITATIVE (the agent's own storage view + host topology). These
+// assert the demo storages map to the right protection tier, and that ambiguity fails safe to the
+// MOST-PROTECTED role (system) — never silently user-data.
+
+// demoHost models the demo N100: the OS disk /dev/sda (ESP at /dev/sda1, root at /dev/sda2) plus an
+// external data disk /dev/sdb (felhom-usb at /dev/sdb1).
+func demoHost() *fakeHostReader {
+	return &fakeHostReader{
+		mounts: []Mount{
+			{Device: "/dev/sda2", MountPoint: "/", FSType: "ext4"},
+			{Device: "/dev/sda1", MountPoint: "/boot/efi", FSType: "vfat"},
+			{Device: "/dev/sdb1", MountPoint: "/mnt/hdd_1", FSType: "ext4"},
+		},
+	}
+}
+
+func TestSystemDisks_FromBootMounts(t *testing.T) {
+	sys, ok := SystemDisks(demoHost())
+	if !ok {
+		t.Fatal("SystemDisks should resolve the OS disk from / and /boot/efi")
+	}
+	if !sys["/dev/sda"] {
+		t.Fatalf("OS whole-disk /dev/sda not in system set: %v", sys)
+	}
+	if sys["/dev/sdb"] {
+		t.Fatalf("external data disk /dev/sdb wrongly classified as system: %v", sys)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRoleForStorage_DemoMapping(t *testing.T) {
+	sys, ok := SystemDisks(demoHost())
+	cases := []struct {
+		name    string
+		typ     string
+		device  string
+		want    DeviceRole
+	}{
+		{"builtin local (root fs)", hub.StorageTypeLocal, "", RoleSystem},
+		{"local-lvm (lvmthin)", hub.StorageTypeLVMThin, "", RoleSystem},
+		{"felhom-pbs (backup net)", hub.StorageTypePBS, "", RoleBackup},
+		{"nfs share", hub.StorageTypeNFS, "", RoleSystem},
+		{"felhom-usb on external /dev/sdb1", hub.StorageTypeUSB, "/dev/sdb1", RoleUserData},
+		{"local-dir on external /dev/sdb1", hub.StorageTypeLocalDir, "/dev/sdb1", RoleUserData},
+		{"usb-typed but ON the system disk", hub.StorageTypeUSB, "/dev/sda2", RoleSystem},
+		{"local-dir with no device (on root)", hub.StorageTypeLocalDir, "", RoleSystem},
+	}
+	for _, c := range cases {
+		if got := RoleForStorage(c.typ, c.device, sys, ok); got != c.want {
+			t.Errorf("%s: got role %q, want %q", c.name, got, c.want)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRoleForRawDevice_SystemVsUserData(t *testing.T) {
+	sys, ok := SystemDisks(demoHost())
+	if got := RoleForRawDevice("/dev/sdb1", sys, ok); got != RoleUserData {
+		t.Errorf("external /dev/sdb1: got %q, want user-data", got)
+	}
+	if got := RoleForRawDevice("/dev/sda2", sys, ok); got != RoleSystem {
+		t.Errorf("system /dev/sda2: got %q, want system", got)
+	}
+	// A partition on the OS disk is treated as system (protected), not user-data.
+	if got := RoleForRawDevice("/dev/sda3", sys, ok); got != RoleSystem {
+		t.Errorf("OS-disk partition /dev/sda3: got %q, want system", got)
+	}
+}
+
+// Ambiguity fails safe: if the system disks cannot be determined, EVERY candidate is system.
+func TestRole_FailsSafeWhenSystemUnknown(t *testing.T) {
+	noMounts := &fakeHostReader{mountsErr: errFake}
+	sys, ok := SystemDisks(noMounts)
+	if ok {
+		t.Fatal("SystemDisks should report not-ok when mounts cannot be read")
+	}
+	if got := RoleForRawDevice("/dev/sdb1", sys, ok); got != RoleSystem {
+		t.Errorf("unknown system disks → external device must default to system, got %q", got)
+	}
+	if got := RoleForStorage(hub.StorageTypeUSB, "/dev/sdb1", sys, ok); got != RoleSystem {
+		t.Errorf("unknown system disks → usb target must default to system, got %q", got)
+	}
+}
+
+var errFake = &fakeErr{}
+
+type fakeErr struct{}
+
+func (*fakeErr) Error() string { return "fake" }