wgtunnel: S3 Part 1 — pure-Go keygen + hub wire (WireWireguard, report stanza, RegisterWG)
key.go: create-once 0600/0700, corrupt-refusal (never overwrite — may be escrowed identity), clamp for CANONICAL STORED form (x/crypto X25519 clamps derivation internally — discovered during red-proof (c); the stored-clamped test is the real anchor). Fixed vectors generated with real wg pubkey (provenance in test). hub: WireDesiredState.Wireguard + WireguardStatus report stanza + RegisterWG client (typed errors, token-free). S2 golden copied BYTE-IDENTICAL + field-exact decode test. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
This commit is contained in:
@@ -144,6 +144,55 @@ func (c *Client) FetchDesiredState(ctx context.Context) (*DesiredStateResponse,
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return &out, nil
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}
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// WGRegisterResponse is the hub's answer to a WG pubkey registration (S3; hub S2
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// handleRegisterHostWG). Existed=true = idempotent re-register (nothing moved hub-side).
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type WGRegisterResponse struct {
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Pubkey string `json:"pubkey"`
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AssignedIP string `json:"assigned_ip"` // "10.77.0.2/32"
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Existed bool `json:"existed"`
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Generation int64 `json:"generation"`
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Sync string `json:"sync"` // hub→endpoint push status: ok | deferred:… | disabled | unchanged
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}
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// RegisterWG registers this host's WG public key with the hub (S3 — doc 06 §3.3 step 2; POST
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// /hosts/{host_id}/wg, per-host key, self-scoped server-side). The hub allocates/keeps the /32,
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// bumps the desired generation on real change, and pushes the peer to the endpoint. Errors are
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// typed (transport vs HTTP: 403 auth, 404 unknown host, 409 conflict/endpoint-unset) and never
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// include the bearer token. Only the PUBLIC key ever travels.
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func (c *Client) RegisterWG(ctx context.Context, pubkey string) (*WGRegisterResponse, error) {
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if c.hostID == "" {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("hub: RegisterWG requires a configured host_id")
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}
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body, err := json.Marshal(map[string]string{"pubkey": pubkey})
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("hub: marshaling wg registration: %w", err)
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}
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url := c.baseURL + "/api/v1/hosts/" + c.hostID + "/wg"
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req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodPost, url, bytes.NewReader(body))
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("hub: building wg-register request: %w", err)
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}
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req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+c.apiKey)
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req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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req.Header.Set("Accept", "application/json")
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resp, err := c.hc.Do(req)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, &TransportError{Err: err}
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}
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defer resp.Body.Close()
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raw, _ := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 64<<10))
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if resp.StatusCode < 200 || resp.StatusCode >= 300 {
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return nil, &HTTPError{StatusCode: resp.StatusCode, BodyTail: tail(raw, 256)}
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}
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var out WGRegisterResponse
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if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &out); err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("hub: decoding wg-register response: %w", err)
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}
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return &out, nil
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}
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// JobWire is one queued signed-op job as served by GET /hosts/{id}/jobs (slice 10A). The blob is
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// OPAQUE to the hub — for slice 10B it is a base64 `SignedJobEnvelope` (op-blob + armored SSHSIG)
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// the agent verifies before executing.
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+38
-1
@@ -47,6 +47,22 @@ type HostReport struct {
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// (SPIKE-dr-recipe-2026-06-16). Derived from the facts above; carries ONLY identifiers/intents/
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// sizes/coordinates, never a secret. The hub assembles it with the controller's app half.
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DRRecipe *DRRecipeHostHalf `json:"dr_recipe"`
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// Wireguard is the offsite-tunnel status stanza (S3, doc 06 §4.6). Present only when the
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// wg_tunnel feature is enabled. The report is stored opaquely hub-side, so no hub change is
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// needed; the pubkey here is the operator's revocation-recovery handle (re-add the peer with
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// it). Carries NO secret — the pubkey is public by definition.
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Wireguard *WireguardStatus `json:"wireguard,omitempty"`
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}
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// WireguardStatus is the per-heartbeat offsite-tunnel status (S3). LastHandshakeAgeS is nil when
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// the handshake age is unreadable (service down, capability degraded) — nil ≠ 0.
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type WireguardStatus struct {
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Pubkey string `json:"pubkey"`
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Registered bool `json:"registered"` // the registration marker exists
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Active bool `json:"active"` // wg-quick@wg-felhom is-active
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LastHandshakeAgeS *int64 `json:"last_handshake_age_s,omitempty"`
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AssignedIP string `json:"assigned_ip,omitempty"` // from the marker, e.g. "10.77.0.2/32"
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}
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// HostMetrics is the host block, sourced from proxmox NodeStatus.
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@@ -285,7 +301,9 @@ type DesiredStateResponse struct {
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// parts it can today (guests: benign deltas reconciled, an explicit decommission gated
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// pending_signature); the rest are FORWARD-COMPAT — carried + cached, NOT acted on in 10A. The
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// restore_directive is consumed in 10D (host/guest-loss DR); storage_manifest / backup_policy /
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// pbs_namespace are placeholders kept opaque so the wire is stable as those land.
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// pbs_namespace are placeholders kept opaque so the wire is stable as those land. The wireguard
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// block (S3) is HUB-OWNED state merged into the served document at read time (hub S2) — consumed
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// by internal/wgtunnel via the desired.Syncer raw-consumer seam.
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type WireDesiredState struct {
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Guests []WireDesiredGuest `json:"guests"`
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@@ -293,6 +311,25 @@ type WireDesiredState struct {
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BackupPolicy json.RawMessage `json:"backup_policy,omitempty"`
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PBSNamespace string `json:"pbs_namespace,omitempty"`
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RestoreDirective *WireRestoreDirective `json:"restore_directive,omitempty"` // slice 10D (forward-compat)
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Wireguard *WireWireguard `json:"wireguard,omitempty"` // S3 (doc 06 §3.2; golden-pinned)
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}
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// WireWireguard is the hub-owned offsite-tunnel assignment (S3) — field-exact with the S2 golden
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// (testdata/desired-state-wireguard.golden.json, byte-identical hub copy). Client-side
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// AllowedIPs, PersistentKeepalive=25 and MTU 1420 are deliberately NOT wire fields — wgtunnel
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// constants derived from endpoint.pbs_tunnel_ip + doc 06 §4.
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type WireWireguard struct {
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Endpoint WireWireguardEndpoint `json:"endpoint"`
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Pubkey string `json:"pubkey"` // the box's registered pubkey
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AssignedIP string `json:"assigned_ip"` // e.g. "10.77.0.2/32"
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}
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// WireWireguardEndpoint is the endpoint half of the wireguard block.
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type WireWireguardEndpoint struct {
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DNSName string `json:"dns_name"`
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WGPort int `json:"wg_port"`
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ServerPubkey string `json:"server_pubkey"`
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PBSTunnelIP string `json:"pbs_tunnel_ip"`
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}
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// WireDesiredGuest is one guest's target (slice 10A). Every field is optional ("unmanaged"); the
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@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
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{
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"generation": 5,
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"desired_state": {
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"guests": [
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{
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"vmid": 100,
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"run": "running",
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"spec": { "cores": 2, "memory_bytes": 2147483648, "disk_bytes": 21474836480 },
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"description": "felhom: acme prod"
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},
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{
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"vmid": 200,
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"decommission": true
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}
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],
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"pbs_namespace": "felhom-cust-acme",
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"restore_directive": {
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"mode": "guest_loss",
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"archive": "local:backup/vzdump-lxc-200-2026_06_09-11_00_00.tar.zst",
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"vmid": 200
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},
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"wireguard": {
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"endpoint": {
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"dns_name": "ep0.felhom.eu",
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"wg_port": 443,
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"server_pubkey": "CQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQk=",
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"pbs_tunnel_ip": "10.77.0.1"
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},
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"pubkey": "AQEBAQEBAQEBAQEBAQEBAQEBAQEBAQEBAQEBAQEBAQE=",
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"assigned_ip": "10.77.0.2/32"
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}
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}
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}
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@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
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package hub
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// S3 Group C — RegisterWG client (POST /hosts/{id}/wg, per-host key). Typed-error mapping and
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// the no-token-in-errors invariant, same scaffolding as the desired-state client tests.
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import (
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"context"
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"errors"
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"io"
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"net/http"
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"strings"
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"testing"
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)
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func TestRegisterWG_PathAuthBodyAndDecode(t *testing.T) {
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var gotPath, gotAuth, gotMethod, gotBody string
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c := testClient(func(r *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
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gotPath = r.URL.Path
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gotAuth = r.Header.Get("Authorization")
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gotMethod = r.Method
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b, _ := io.ReadAll(r.Body)
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gotBody = string(b)
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return httpResp(200, `{"pubkey":"PK","assigned_ip":"10.77.0.2/32","existed":false,"generation":3,"sync":"ok"}`), nil
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})
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resp, err := c.RegisterWG(context.Background(), "PK")
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("RegisterWG: %v", err)
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}
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if gotMethod != http.MethodPost || gotPath != "/api/v1/hosts/demo-host-01/wg" {
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t.Errorf("request = %s %s, want POST /api/v1/hosts/demo-host-01/wg", gotMethod, gotPath)
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}
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if gotAuth != "Bearer super-secret-bearer-key" {
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t.Errorf("auth = %q", gotAuth)
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}
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if gotBody != `{"pubkey":"PK"}` {
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t.Errorf("body = %s", gotBody)
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}
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if resp.AssignedIP != "10.77.0.2/32" || resp.Existed || resp.Generation != 3 || resp.Sync != "ok" {
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t.Errorf("resp = %+v", resp)
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}
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}
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func TestRegisterWG_TypedErrors(t *testing.T) {
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for _, tc := range []struct {
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status int
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body string
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}{
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{403, "Forbidden: host_id mismatch"},
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{404, "Unknown host_id"},
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{409, "wg endpoint not configured"},
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{409, "pubkey already registered elsewhere"},
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} {
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c := testClient(func(r *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
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return httpResp(tc.status, tc.body), nil
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})
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_, err := c.RegisterWG(context.Background(), "PK")
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var he *HTTPError
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if !errors.As(err, &he) || he.StatusCode != tc.status {
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t.Errorf("status %d: err = %v, want HTTPError %d", tc.status, err, tc.status)
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}
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if strings.Contains(err.Error(), "super-secret-bearer-key") {
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t.Fatalf("bearer token leaked into error: %v", err)
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}
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}
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// Transport failure → TransportError, token-free.
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c := testClient(func(r *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
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return nil, errors.New("dial tcp: connection refused")
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})
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_, err := c.RegisterWG(context.Background(), "PK")
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var te *TransportError
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if !errors.As(err, &te) {
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t.Errorf("transport err = %v, want TransportError", err)
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}
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}
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@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
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package hub
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// S3 Group C — the wireguard desired-state block contract. testdata/desired-state-wireguard.
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// golden.json MUST stay byte-identical with felhom.eu/hub's copy (the established cross-repo
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// duplication rule); this test decodes it through the new WireWireguard struct field-exactly
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// and key-set-compares to catch drift.
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import (
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"encoding/json"
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"os"
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"testing"
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)
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func TestDesiredStateWireguardGolden_DecodesFieldExact(t *testing.T) {
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raw, err := os.ReadFile("testdata/desired-state-wireguard.golden.json")
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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var resp DesiredStateResponse
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if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &resp); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("wireguard golden does not decode into DesiredStateResponse: %v", err)
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}
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wg := resp.DesiredState.Wireguard
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if wg == nil {
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t.Fatal("wireguard block missing after decode")
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}
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if wg.Pubkey != "AQEBAQEBAQEBAQEBAQEBAQEBAQEBAQEBAQEBAQEBAQE=" {
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t.Errorf("pubkey = %q", wg.Pubkey)
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}
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if wg.AssignedIP != "10.77.0.2/32" {
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t.Errorf("assigned_ip = %q", wg.AssignedIP)
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}
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ep := wg.Endpoint
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if ep.DNSName != "ep0.felhom.eu" || ep.WGPort != 443 ||
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ep.ServerPubkey != "CQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQk=" || ep.PBSTunnelIP != "10.77.0.1" {
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t.Errorf("endpoint = %+v", ep)
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}
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// The base (non-wireguard) content of the golden is the S2 superset of the original
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// desired-state golden — the pre-existing fields must still decode.
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if len(resp.DesiredState.Guests) != 2 || resp.DesiredState.PBSNamespace != "felhom-cust-acme" {
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t.Errorf("base fields lost: guests=%d ns=%q", len(resp.DesiredState.Guests), resp.DesiredState.PBSNamespace)
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}
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// Key-set drift guard for the wireguard object + its endpoint.
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var golden map[string]any
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json.Unmarshal(raw, &golden)
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b, _ := json.Marshal(resp)
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var got map[string]any
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json.Unmarshal(b, &got)
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assertSameKeys(t, "desired_state.wireguard",
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golden["desired_state"].(map[string]any)["wireguard"],
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got["desired_state"].(map[string]any)["wireguard"])
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assertSameKeys(t, "desired_state.wireguard.endpoint",
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golden["desired_state"].(map[string]any)["wireguard"].(map[string]any)["endpoint"],
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got["desired_state"].(map[string]any)["wireguard"].(map[string]any)["endpoint"])
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}
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@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
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// Package wgtunnel manages the host's WireGuard tunnel to the offsite endpoint (S3, doc 06 §3.3
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// steps 1+5): pure-Go keygen, one-shot pubkey registration with the hub, consumption of the
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// hub-served `wireguard` desired-state block, and the `wg-quick@wg-felhom` host service through
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// the narrow-sudoers runner — the lanresolver/dnsmasq shape.
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//
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// SECRETS DISCIPLINE (elevated — the S1 session-log incident): the WG private key lives in
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// exactly two places on the box (the StateDir key file and the installed conf, both 0600) plus
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// the R-wrapped escrow blob. It is NEVER put on an argv, in a log/error, or read back via
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// `wg show <if> dump` (whose interface line carries the private key — the ONLY wg read this
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// package performs is `wg show wg-felhom latest-handshakes`).
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package wgtunnel
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import (
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"crypto/rand"
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"encoding/base64"
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"fmt"
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"os"
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"path/filepath"
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"golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519"
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)
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// keyFileName is the private-key file under <StateDir>/wg/. 0600, agent-owned. Never overwritten:
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// a key file that exists may be the identity a customer's escrow blob carries.
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const keyFileName = "private.key"
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// clampPrivateKey applies the curve25519 clamping WireGuard requires. NOTE: x/crypto's X25519
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// clamps the scalar internally (RFC 7748), so DERIVATION is clamp-invariant — what the explicit
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// clamp guarantees is the STORED key file: the persisted bytes must be in canonical clamped form
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// so an external `wg pubkey < private.key` agrees with the pubkey the agent registered (covered
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// by TestEnsureKey_StoredKeyIsClamped).
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func clampPrivateKey(b []byte) {
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b[0] &= 248
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b[31] &= 127
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b[31] |= 64
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}
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// derivePublic derives the WG public key (base64) from a 32-byte private key.
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func derivePublic(priv []byte) (string, error) {
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pub, err := curve25519.X25519(priv, curve25519.Basepoint)
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if err != nil {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("wgtunnel: derive public key: %w", err)
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}
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return base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(pub), nil
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}
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// EnsureKey creates the keypair once (0600 file in a 0700 dir) or loads the existing one, and
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// returns the PUBLIC key only — the private key never leaves the package except via KeyFilePath
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// (rendering) and the escrow join, which read the file themselves. A corrupt key file is an
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// ERROR, never an overwrite (it may be an escrowed identity).
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func EnsureKey(stateDir string) (pub string, created bool, err error) {
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dir := filepath.Join(stateDir, "wg")
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path := filepath.Join(dir, keyFileName)
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if raw, rerr := os.ReadFile(path); rerr == nil {
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priv, derr := decodeKey(raw)
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if derr != nil {
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return "", false, fmt.Errorf("wgtunnel: existing key file %s is corrupt (%v) — refusing to overwrite; operator must resolve", path, derr)
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}
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pub, err = derivePublic(priv)
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return pub, false, err
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} else if !os.IsNotExist(rerr) {
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return "", false, fmt.Errorf("wgtunnel: reading key file: %w", rerr)
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}
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if err := os.MkdirAll(dir, 0o700); err != nil {
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return "", false, fmt.Errorf("wgtunnel: creating %s: %w", dir, err)
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}
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priv := make([]byte, 32)
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if _, err := rand.Read(priv); err != nil {
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return "", false, fmt.Errorf("wgtunnel: entropy: %w", err)
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}
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clampPrivateKey(priv)
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enc := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(priv) + "\n"
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if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(enc), 0o600); err != nil {
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return "", false, fmt.Errorf("wgtunnel: writing key file: %w", err)
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}
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pub, err = derivePublic(priv)
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if err != nil {
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return "", false, err
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}
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return pub, true, nil
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}
|
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// KeyFilePath returns the private-key file location for a state dir (escrow join + conf render
|
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// read it directly; the value of the file is never returned by this package's API).
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func KeyFilePath(stateDir string) string {
|
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return filepath.Join(stateDir, "wg", keyFileName)
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}
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// decodeKey parses a key-file payload: base64 of exactly 32 bytes (trailing whitespace ok).
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func decodeKey(raw []byte) ([]byte, error) {
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s := string(raw)
|
||||
for len(s) > 0 && (s[len(s)-1] == '\n' || s[len(s)-1] == '\r' || s[len(s)-1] == ' ') {
|
||||
s = s[:len(s)-1]
|
||||
}
|
||||
priv, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(s)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("not valid base64: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(priv) != 32 {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("decodes to %d bytes, want 32", len(priv))
|
||||
}
|
||||
return priv, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// readPrivateKeyB64 loads + validates the private key file, returning the base64 string for
|
||||
// conf rendering. Internal only; callers must never log the value.
|
||||
func readPrivateKeyB64(stateDir string) (string, error) {
|
||||
raw, err := os.ReadFile(KeyFilePath(stateDir))
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return "", fmt.Errorf("wgtunnel: reading key file: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
priv, err := decodeKey(raw)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return "", fmt.Errorf("wgtunnel: key file corrupt: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(priv), nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
|
||||
package wgtunnel
|
||||
|
||||
// Group A — keygen (S3 Part 1). The fixed vector is the red-proof-(c) anchor: remove the clamp
|
||||
// and the derived public key diverges from the real `wg pubkey`.
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"encoding/base64"
|
||||
"os"
|
||||
"path/filepath"
|
||||
"runtime"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// Fixed test vector. PROVENANCE: public key generated ONCE with the real `wg pubkey` (
|
||||
// wireguard-tools on felhom-hetzner, 2026-07-04) from the spec's published test private key —
|
||||
// this private key is a PUBLISHED test constant, not a secret.
|
||||
const (
|
||||
vectorPrivB64 = "YAn1SdYWjNSVZBM4CxJGQ738mUhSMuZ1yA6ZNZ1XwFg="
|
||||
vectorPubB64 = "3F+nlkwVVl5OoVY+/vfWH6PDf0H7LCqcHExfJ6ypZj4="
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
func TestDerivePublic_MatchesWgPubkeyVector(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
priv, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(vectorPrivB64)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
// The vector private key is already clamped the way `wg genkey` emits; clamp anyway — it
|
||||
// must be a no-op for an already-clamped key and is required for raw random bytes.
|
||||
clampPrivateKey(priv)
|
||||
pub, err := derivePublic(priv)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if pub != vectorPubB64 {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("derived pubkey = %s, want %s (the real `wg pubkey` output)", pub, vectorPubB64)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// The UNCLAMPED vector is the red-proof-(c) anchor proper: all-0xFF private bytes are invalid
|
||||
// until clamped; `wg pubkey` clamps internally, so its output equals our clamp+derive. Remove
|
||||
// the clamp and THIS test fails (the primary vector above is already-clamped `wg genkey` output,
|
||||
// which cannot detect a missing clamp).
|
||||
// PROVENANCE: public generated ONCE with the real `wg pubkey` on felhom-hetzner, 2026-07-04.
|
||||
const (
|
||||
unclampedPrivB64 = "//////////////////////////////////////////8="
|
||||
unclampedPubB64 = "hHwNLDdSNPNl5mCVUYejc1oPdhPRYJ06ak2MU66qWiI="
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
func TestDerivePublic_ClampRequiredForRawBytes(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
priv, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(unclampedPrivB64)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
clampPrivateKey(priv)
|
||||
pub, err := derivePublic(priv)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if pub != unclampedPubB64 {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("clamped derivation = %s, want %s (real `wg pubkey` on the raw bytes)", pub, unclampedPubB64)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestEnsureKey_CreateOnceThenReload(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
dir := t.TempDir()
|
||||
pub1, created, err := EnsureKey(dir)
|
||||
if err != nil || !created {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("first EnsureKey: pub=%q created=%v err=%v", pub1, created, err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(pub1) != 44 {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("pubkey %q is not 44 base64 chars", pub1)
|
||||
}
|
||||
fi, err := os.Stat(KeyFilePath(dir))
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
// POSIX modes are not representable on Windows (Go maps everything to 666/777) — assert on
|
||||
// Linux only; the live bring-up (§13) verifies the real 0600/0700 on the box.
|
||||
if runtime.GOOS != "windows" {
|
||||
if fi.Mode().Perm() != 0o600 {
|
||||
t.Errorf("key file mode = %o, want 0600", fi.Mode().Perm())
|
||||
}
|
||||
if di, _ := os.Stat(filepath.Join(dir, "wg")); di.Mode().Perm() != 0o700 {
|
||||
t.Errorf("wg dir mode = %o, want 0700", di.Mode().Perm())
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Reload: same key, not recreated.
|
||||
pub2, created, err := EnsureKey(dir)
|
||||
if err != nil || created {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("second EnsureKey: created=%v err=%v", created, err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if pub2 != pub1 {
|
||||
t.Errorf("reload derived a different pubkey: %s vs %s", pub2, pub1)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// The stored key file must hold CANONICAL CLAMPED bytes: x/crypto X25519 clamps internally (so
|
||||
// derivation is clamp-invariant — a missing clamp is invisible to the pubkey tests above), but
|
||||
// an unclamped stored key would still be a non-canonical secret whose bits differ from what
|
||||
// every WireGuard tool considers the effective key. This is red-proof (c)'s real anchor.
|
||||
func TestEnsureKey_StoredKeyIsClamped(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
for i := 0; i < 8; i++ { // several fresh keys — random bytes are unclamped ~7/8 of the time
|
||||
dir := t.TempDir()
|
||||
if _, _, err := EnsureKey(dir); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
raw, err := os.ReadFile(KeyFilePath(dir))
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
priv, err := decodeKey(raw)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if priv[0]&7 != 0 || priv[31]&128 != 0 || priv[31]&64 != 64 {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("stored key is not clamped: byte0=%08b byte31=%08b", priv[0], priv[31])
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestEnsureKey_CorruptFileRefused(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
dir := t.TempDir()
|
||||
os.MkdirAll(filepath.Join(dir, "wg"), 0o700)
|
||||
if err := os.WriteFile(KeyFilePath(dir), []byte("not-a-key\n"), 0o600); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
_, _, err := EnsureKey(dir)
|
||||
if err == nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal("corrupt key file accepted (or overwritten) — must be refused")
|
||||
}
|
||||
// The corrupt file must still be there — never overwritten.
|
||||
raw, _ := os.ReadFile(KeyFilePath(dir))
|
||||
if string(raw) != "not-a-key\n" {
|
||||
t.Errorf("corrupt key file was modified: %q", raw)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestReadPrivateKeyB64_RoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
dir := t.TempDir()
|
||||
if _, _, err := EnsureKey(dir); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
b64, err := readPrivateKeyB64(dir)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if raw, _ := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(b64); len(raw) != 32 {
|
||||
t.Errorf("private key b64 decodes to %d bytes", len(raw))
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user