v0.77.0: fork-4 — escrow the offsite restic repo password under R

IdentityBundle gains ResticRepoPassword (rides existing age-under-R
WrapIdentityBundle; custody spike febdc56 proved a recovered value opens the
real repo). POST /escrow/stage-secret (withGuest, scopedFromBody) transiently
stages the controller-pushed password (0600, atomic, NEVER logged), which the
escrow-create ceremony auto-injects then wipes. Adds AttachResticPassword +
StagedResticPasswordPath + WipeStagedResticPassword; EscrowStagePath injectable
for tests. Tests: bundle carries pw byte-exact + not-in-blob + wrong-R fails
closed; stage 0600 + non-secret ack + cross-guest 403 + value-not-in-log.
Additive; PBS-K escrow untouched. NOT yet live-validated (supervised ceremony).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
This commit is contained in:
2026-07-09 14:56:09 +02:00
parent 7f07393623
commit 0c22b9bbf3
8 changed files with 320 additions and 1 deletions
+41
View File
@@ -30,6 +30,47 @@ type IdentityBundle struct {
// blobs created before S3 lack it and CANNOT be retro-fitted (R is never retained) — S5 DR
// falls back to fresh-key re-registration, which keeps the box's /32 (hub S2 re-key-in-place).
WGPrivateKey string `json:"wg_private_key,omitempty"`
// ResticRepoPassword is the offsite restic repo password (fork-4). OPTIONAL: escrow blobs created
// before fork-4 lack it and CANNOT be retro-fitted (R is never retained). It is the DATA key for the
// offsite tier — irreplaceable (unlike the SFTP access key, which is regenerable at DR). The
// controller's atomicity gate ensures no offsite ciphertext exists until this is escrowed.
ResticRepoPassword string `json:"restic_repo_password,omitempty"`
}
// StagedResticPasswordPath is the well-known 0600 file where the controller-pushed restic repo password
// is transiently staged (by the local API) for the escrow-create ceremony to pick up, then wiped. A fixed
// path so the local-API writer and the CLI ceremony reader agree without threading config through.
func StagedResticPasswordPath() string {
return filepath.Join("/var/lib/felhom-agent", "escrow-stage", "restic_repo_password")
}
// WipeStagedResticPassword removes the staged restic password (called by the ceremony after a successful
// escrow-create — the secret now lives only inside the R-wrapped blob). A missing file is a clean no-op.
func WipeStagedResticPassword() error {
if err := os.Remove(StagedResticPasswordPath()); err != nil && !os.IsNotExist(err) {
return fmt.Errorf("escrow: wipe staged restic password: %w", err)
}
return nil
}
// AttachResticPassword injects the offsite restic repo password from the staged 0600 file into the bundle
// when it exists (fork-4 escrow-create auto-inject). Returns whether it attached. The VALUE is validated
// (non-empty) but NEVER logged by callers — log the field NAME only (mirrors AttachWGKey). A missing file
// is a clean no-attach (pre-fork-4 behavior, byte-compatible bundle).
func AttachResticPassword(b *IdentityBundle, stagePath string) (bool, error) {
raw, err := os.ReadFile(stagePath)
if err != nil {
if os.IsNotExist(err) {
return false, nil
}
return false, fmt.Errorf("escrow: reading staged restic password: %w", err)
}
pw := strings.TrimSpace(string(raw))
if pw == "" {
return false, fmt.Errorf("escrow: staged restic password file %s is empty", stagePath)
}
b.ResticRepoPassword = pw
return true, nil
}
// AttachWGKey injects the offsite WG private key into the bundle when the key file exists (S3
+57
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@@ -3,7 +3,9 @@ package escrow
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"os"
"os/exec"
"path/filepath"
"runtime"
"testing"
)
@@ -65,6 +67,61 @@ func TestIdentity_RoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// fork-4: the IdentityBundle carries the offsite restic repo password under R, byte-exact and encrypted;
// a wrong R fails closed. (The spike proved a recovered value opens the real repo; this guards the field.)
func TestIdentity_RoundTrip_CarriesResticPassword(t *testing.T) {
ensureAge(t)
ctx := context.Background()
const R = "throwaway-correct-horse-battery-staple-fork4"
const pw = "deadbeefcafef00d0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef" // 64 hex, synthetic
bundle := IdentityBundle{TunnelToken: "tt", PBSToken: "pt", ResticRepoPassword: pw}
blob, err := WrapIdentityBundle(ctx, bundle, R)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("WrapIdentityBundle: %v", err)
}
if bytes.Contains(blob, []byte(pw)) {
t.Fatal("the blob leaks the restic password plaintext — not encrypted")
}
got, err := UnwrapIdentityBundle(ctx, blob, R)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("UnwrapIdentityBundle: %v", err)
}
if got.ResticRepoPassword != pw {
t.Fatalf("recovered restic password not byte-exact: got %q", got.ResticRepoPassword)
}
if got != bundle {
t.Fatalf("recovered bundle = %+v, want %+v", got, bundle)
}
if _, err := UnwrapIdentityBundle(ctx, blob, R+"-WRONG"); err == nil {
t.Fatal("a wrong recovery code must fail closed (no bundle, no restic password)")
}
}
// AttachResticPassword: missing file → clean no-attach; staged file → trimmed value attached; empty → error.
func TestAttachResticPassword(t *testing.T) {
b := &IdentityBundle{}
if ok, err := AttachResticPassword(b, filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "absent")); ok || err != nil {
t.Fatalf("missing staged file must be a clean no-attach, got ok=%v err=%v", ok, err)
}
f := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "pw")
if err := os.WriteFile(f, []byte(" abc123def \n"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
ok, err := AttachResticPassword(b, f)
if err != nil || !ok {
t.Fatalf("attach from staged file: ok=%v err=%v", ok, err)
}
if b.ResticRepoPassword != "abc123def" {
t.Fatalf("want trimmed value, got %q", b.ResticRepoPassword)
}
if err := os.WriteFile(f, []byte(" \n"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if _, err := AttachResticPassword(&IdentityBundle{}, f); err == nil {
t.Fatal("an empty staged file must error (an operator would want to know)")
}
}
// Wrong R fails CLOSED — no bundle emitted.
func TestIdentity_WrongRFailsClosed(t *testing.T) {
ensureAge(t)