# REUSE.md — felhom-agent

> Before writing new code, check here. Canonical helpers, patterns to copy, traps to avoid.
> Maintenance: update in the SAME commit that adds/changes/deprecates a shared helper.
> Entries cite file + symbol. Line numbers are landmarks only — reconfirm before editing.

## 1. Canonical helpers (MUST reuse — do not reinvent)

### Allowlisted exec / privileged surface (sudoers)

| Symbol | File | Short signature | Use for | Gotchas |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| `Runner` / `ExecRunner.Run`, `RunStdin` | internal/proxmox/privileged.go | `Run(ctx, name, args...) (stdout, stderr []byte, err)` | ALL host command exec (direct or `sudo -n` prefix) | Arg vectors only, never a shell string; `capBuf` caps output at 1 MiB |
| `Privileged` (CreateGoldenLXC/MountUSBByUUID/SMART/Sensors) | internal/proxmox/privileged.go | methods on `*Privileged` | the 3 fenced root-CLI exceptions ONLY | Do NOT add methods — fence is structural (`routing_test.go` asserts it) |
| `SudoHostOps.run` | internal/storage/hostops.go | `run(ctx, name, args...) error` | allowlisted exec with stderr-wrapped error | Every arg pre-validated via validate.go before this is called |
| `Prober.Probe` | internal/capability/probe.go | `Probe(ctx) []Status` | live sudo-policy capability check (`sudo -n -l --`) | Needs a DIRECT runner (never the sudo-prefixing one — double-sudo); never executes probed cmds. v0.86.0: config-gated caps (`Capability.GatedBy` + `Prober.GateActive`) report `inactive`/"disabled by configuration" ONLY when healthy — broken plumbing stays degraded; the pbsdr-* gate answers from `pbsdr.Manager.DRConfigured` (marker-backed across restarts) |
| `stageTemp` | internal/localapi/intermediary.go | `stageTemp(pattern, content) (path, err)` | random-named temp before a root `install` (audit B1) | Fixed /tmp names are a TOCTOU — sudoers globs expect `/tmp/felhom-*-*.ext` |
| `guesthook.InstallSnippet` / `Register` | internal/guesthook/install.go | `InstallSnippet(ctx, runner) error` | pre-start self-heal hook install (C1 net) | Same random-temp+install pattern; snippet delegates to the agent binary (no shell logic). Issues `mkdir -p /var/lib/vz/snippets` FIRST (v0.63.0, B2 — fresh boxes lack the dir; sudoers grants exactly that argv) |

### Disk / format safety (role gates, durable IDs, format guards)

| Symbol | File | Short signature | Use for | Gotchas |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| `SudoHostOps.Format` | internal/storage/hostops.go | `Format(ctx, device, fstype) error` | THE only mkfs path | Guards, in order: `ValidateBlockDevice` + `ValidateFSType` → mandatory `deviceUnclaimed` (claim.go) → exec `felhom-mkfs-guarded` (sudoers allowlists ONLY the wrapper, not raw mkfs) |
| `SudoHostOps.InspectDevice` + `DeviceProbe.DataBearing` | internal/storage/hostops.go | `InspectDevice(ctx, device) (DeviceProbe, error)` | data-bearing verdict from the AGENT's own read | Fail-safe: `Probed=false` ⇒ DataBearing=true; blkid output is evidence, lsblk is read-success authority |
| `classifyClaim` / `SudoHostOps.deviceUnclaimed` | internal/storage/claim.go | `classifyClaim(claimFacts) (unclaimed bool, reason string)` | "is this disk provably free to format" | Pure function of `gatherClaimFacts`; ANY read error/ambiguity/empty-lsblk ⇒ CLAIMED (audit D2); Felhom's own `/mnt/felhom-drives` mounts are not a foreign claim |
| `SudoHostOps.ListCandidateDisks` | internal/storage/candidates.go | `ListCandidateDisks(ctx) ([]CandidateDisk, error)` | enroll-candidate discovery | Fail-safe: omits anything not provably unclaimed |
| `antiRetargetResolveExpect` (+ `antiRetargetResolve`, `antiRetargetResolveBlank`) | internal/localapi/wipe_reresolve.go | `(durableID, expectDataBearing, resolve, derive, inspect) (device, err)` | pre-mkfs anti-retarget: resolve durable id → re-derive+match → re-inspect | AGENT-001 + audit D3; refuses path-only bindings; wired via `Server.reresolveWipe`/`reresolveBlank` (test-injectable) |
| `signedjobs.WipeExecutor.Execute` | internal/signedjobs/wipe.go | `Execute(ctx, op, params) error` | operator-signed data-bearing wipe | Durable-id bound; nonce burned by gate BEFORE execute; refuses no-longer-data-bearing targets |
| `selfupdate.Executor` / `selfupdate.Manager` | internal/selfupdate/{executor,commit}.go | `NewExecutor(Config)` / `NewManager(ManagerConfig)` | operator-signed agent self-update (D1): download+verify-vs-signed-sha → wrapper `apply`; startup dwell → `commit` | sha is the ONLY integrity root; wrapper (`felhom-selfupdate-guarded`) re-verifies as root + does the A/B flip; NEVER rolls back (systemd + wrapper do). `WrapperRunner` seam. Report seam `SelfUpdatePending()` |
| `Gate.AuthorizeStorageWipe` | internal/reconcile/gate.go | `AuthorizeStorageWipe(StorageWipeAuthz, *SignedOp) Decision` | tiered wipe authz | user-data ⇒ customer confirm bound to agent's DeviceDurableID; system/backup ⇒ operator signature only, `Confirmed` IGNORED by role |
| `Gate.Authorize` | internal/reconcile/gate.go | `Authorize(Intent, *SignedOp) Decision` | every destructive intent | role-scoping (`roleAuthorizes`) + op-to-action binding; benign passes unsigned; audits every decision |
| `storage.DeviceDurableID` / `ResolveDurableDevice` | internal/storage/durable_device.go | `DeviceDurableID(device) (string, error)` | WIPE-binding ids (`byid:`/`byuuid:`) | Single seam for /disks list AND gate (F20-BUG2); `ResolveDurableDevice` refuses bare paths |
| `storage.ResolveStorageDevice` | internal/storage/durable_device.go | `ResolveStorageDevice("uuid:<fs-uuid>") (dev, err)` | re-resolve enrolled STORAGE drives (remount) | `uuid:` scheme ONLY — distinct from the wipe schemes; never trust a remembered /dev node |
| `deriveDurableID` | internal/storage/durableid.go | `deriveDurableID(typ, s, backingDevice, uuid) string` | storage-target durable id (DR re-attach key) | Deterministic per type; `uuid:` for usb/local-dir; PBS id includes `#<fingerprint>` |
| `SystemDisks` / `isSystemBacked` / `RoleForStorage` / `RoleForRawDevice` | internal/storage/role.go | `RoleForRawDevice(device, sysDisks, sysKnown) DeviceRole` | protection-tier classification | Fails safe to `system` (most protected) on any ambiguity; role is AGENT-derived, never caller-supplied |
| `ValidateUUID/MountPath/BlockDevice/FSType/SMARTDevice/LVMName`, `UnitNameForMount` | internal/storage/validate.go | `Validate*(v) error` | EVERY arg that reaches a root shell-out | The security boundary; strict whitelists (no by-* symlinks, no dm, no traversal); `systemdEscapePath` computed in-process |
| `ValidateNetworkMountSpec` | internal/storage/netmount.go | `ValidateNetworkMountSpec(spec) error` | NAS mount input boundary | Same discipline as validate.go; SMB requires a creds ref; mountpoint confined under `NetworkMountRoot` |

### Mount lifecycle (host + guest binds)

| Symbol | File | Short signature | Use for | Gotchas |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| `SudoHostOps.EnsureMount` | internal/storage/hostops.go | `EnsureMount(ctx, MountSpec) error` | persistent by-UUID systemd .mount | Validate→render→stage→`install`→`enable --now`; idempotent |
| `SudoHostOps.Unmount` | internal/storage/hostops.go | `Unmount(ctx, where) error` | detach a mount unit | DESTRUCTIVE — caller MUST have gated it; does not self-authorize |
| `SudoHostOps.ReassertEnrolledMounts` | internal/storage/hostops.go | `ReassertEnrolledMounts(ctx)` | reboot remount (re-resolve by UUID) | Re-asserts unless mounted AND enabled (`shouldReassertMount`); skips absent UUIDs |
| `GuestBinder.AttachDrive` / `DetachDrive` | internal/localapi/intermediary.go | `AttachDrive(ctx, vmid, where) (guestPath, err)` | live drive hot-swap under `/mnt/felhom-drives` | Normalizes to EXACTLY ONE bind via `countHostMounts` (converges double-binds); force re-bind when guest can't see it |
| `GuestBinder.EnsureSharedParent` | internal/localapi/intermediary.go | `EnsureSharedParent(ctx) error` | shared-parent bind + boot unit | make-private+make-shared ONLY on first bind — re-running orphans the guest's slave; F2-a: compares script AND unit for staleness |
| `StablePathForRaw` / `DriveNameFromRaw` | internal/localapi/intermediary.go | `StablePathForRaw("/mnt/<n>") string` | raw host mount → stable guest path | Single source of truth both repos derive from |
| `GuestBinder.GuestSeesMount` / `GuestBootID` | internal/localapi/intermediary.go | `GuestSeesMount(ctx, vmid, path) bool` | guest-visible (usable) signal; reboot detection | Host bind present ≠ guest sees it (non-recursive parent bind) |
| `SudoHostOps.EnsureNetworkMount` / `RemoveNetworkMount` / `ListNetworkMounts` | internal/storage/netmount.go | `EnsureNetworkMount(ctx, spec) error` | NAS automount pair | rm glob confined to `mnt-felhom*` units; NAS ≠ drive (no durable-id/SMART/wipe); RemoveNetworkMount doubles as the verify-fail rollback (idempotent) |
| `NetworkMountedAt` / `NetworkEndpointReachable` | internal/storage/netmount.go | `NetworkMountedAt(where) bool` | verify mount-truth + the 2 s add pre-probe | /proc/mounts is the ONLY mount-success judge (autofs trigger ≠ mounted; readability ≠ mounted — SPIKE-nas-verify §8) |
| `SudoHostOps.ReassertNetworkAutomounts` + `Server.ReassertNetworkMounts` + `guesthook.PostStartNetworkReassert` | internal/storage/netreassert.go, internal/localapi/netreassert.go, internal/guesthook/netreassert.go | `ReassertNetworkAutomounts(ctx) []NetReassertResult` | NAS guest-reboot heal (RCA fix 1): re-arm idle automount triggers (stop + enable --now) so the fresh mount event propagates into running guests | NEVER call from periodic health paths (an idle trigger is HEALTHY); active real mounts are never touched; hook leg runs as root (direct systemctl), daemon leg via sudo |
| `ClassifyNetVerifyFailure` | internal/storage/netverify.go | `ClassifyNetVerifyFailure(journalTail, tcpReachable) (code, hint)` | NAS verify failure categories | String-based BY DESIGN (every mount failure is rc=32); substrings verbatim from SPIKE-nas-verify Q4; `nfs_export` merges not-found/not-permitted (NFSv4 identical) |

### Durable stores (atomic state)

| Symbol | File | Short signature | Use for | Gotchas |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| `IntentStore` (`Get/SetEnrolled/SetEjected/SetDecommissioned/OnAbsent`) | internal/storage/intent.go | `OpenIntentStore(path)` | drive intent (4-state self-heal) | Keyed by durable-id only; `OnAbsent` is the ONLY ejected→enrolled path; refuses empty ids |
| `GuestBindStore` (`Record/Remove/Guests`) | internal/localapi/guestbindstore.go | `OpenGuestBindStore(path)` | per-guest enrolled binds (F9 re-assert) | Same tmp+rename 0600 pattern as IntentStore |
| `FormatJobStore` + `startFormatDetached` + `RecoverFormatJob` | internal/localapi/formatjob.go | `startFormatDetached(device, durableID, fstype, blank) <-chan error` | detached, restart-surviving mkfs (F20-BUG3) | Runs off `s.baseCtx` (60-min bound) so a request deadline can't SIGKILL mkfs; recovery re-resolves by durable id; blank jobs re-check STILL-blank |
| `TokenStore.Mint` / `Lookup` | internal/localapi/tokenstore.go | `Mint(vmid) (plaintext, error)` | per-guest local-API tokens | Only the SHA-256 hash persists (fsync'd append log); constant-time compare on lookup; plaintext returned exactly once. Lookup RELOADS the file once on a miss (v0.63.0, B3): the one-shot provisioner mints into the same file the daemon indexes — cross-process coherence without a restart; append-only size check bounds the re-read |
| `FileNonceStore.SeenOrRecord` | internal/authz/noncestore.go | `SeenOrRecord(nonce, exp) bool` | durable anti-replay | fsync'd before returning false; prune only after exp |
| `Journal` (`Append/Latest/InFlight/AlreadyApplied`) | internal/reconcile/journal.go | `OpenJournal(path)` | op journal + idempotency + crash recovery | `Recover` consumes `InFlight()`; scratch entries special-cased |

### Local-API plumbing

| Symbol | File | Short signature | Use for | Gotchas |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| `Server.withGuest` | internal/localapi/server.go | `withGuest(fn(w, r, vmid)) http.HandlerFunc` | bearer auth + self-scoping for EVERY route | Token→vmid is the authority; explicit `?vmid=` only a consistency check (403 on mismatch) |
| `Server.scopedFromBody` | internal/localapi/server.go | `scopedFromBody(w, bodyVMID, tokenVMID, path) bool` | POST-body vmid self-scope check | Call right after decode; false = already 403'd |
| `decodeBody` / `writeOK` / `writeErr` / `writeStatus` | internal/localapi/server.go | `writeStatus(w, code, ok, data, errMsg)` | ALL local-API JSON I/O | Do not hand-roll response envelopes |
| `EnsureLeaf` | internal/localapi/cert.go | `EnsureLeaf(certPath, keyPath, host) (cert, fingerprint, generated, err)` | pinned self-signed leaf | `generated=true` invalidates every issued bootstrap pin — log LOUD (B.1) |
| `Server.RecoverStaleLockedGuests` | internal/localapi/stalelock.go | `RecoverStaleLockedGuests(ctx)` | startup stale vzdump-lock heal (F2-b) | Clears ONLY `backup`/`snapshot-delete`, only when no vzdump in-flight; A1 RESOLVED (v0.62.0): scan is pool-intersected (`ListLXC` ∩ `Client.Pool`), fail-safe skip on pool-read failure |
| `ControllerSwapper.Swap` + `ValidControllerImage` | internal/localapi/controllerswap.go | `Swap(ctx, vmid, target) *ControllerSwapState` | agent-owned controller image swap + rollback | Strict image regex (repo + 3-part semver); state file written BEFORE swap; no-healthcheck images need `verifyDwell` |
| `MemoryOps` + `Server.readMemoryBounds` | internal/localapi/guestmemory.go | `readMemoryBounds(ctx, vmid) (memoryBounds, err)` | guest RAM resize (v0.90.0, R-24): GET/POST /guest/memory | NEW narrow seam (never extend `GuestAPI` — it breaks every fake); the AGENT is the boundary — bounds recomputed FRESH per request (min 2048 / max host_total−2048 / shrink floor max(2048, usage+512)); §8 UNITS TRAP (config `memory`=MB, status/node=bytes); verify maxmem==target after `SetConfig` before claiming success; SetConfig NEVER called on a refusal path |

### Proxmox client / hub / PBS / provisioning

| Symbol | File | Short signature | Use for | Gotchas |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| `Client.WaitTask` | internal/proxmox/task.go | `WaitTask(ctx, upid, opts) (TaskStatus, error)` | asserting EVERY mutating op | POST 200 ≠ success; authz can fail at task exec; `AllowWarnings` opt-in |
| `Client.Pool` | internal/proxmox/query.go | `Pool(ctx, name) (PoolInfo, error)` | felhom-pool membership (the ownership registry, A1) | Needs `Pool.Audit` at `/pool/<name>` (host-install v1.9.0+); `Pool.Allocate` does NOT satisfy the read; members can be storages (type `storage`, vmid 0) — filter them |
| `Client` mutate wrappers (`RestoreLXC/Vzdump/DestroyLXC/Snapshot/Rollback/SetConfig/ResizeLXC/Start/Stop`) | internal/proxmox/mutate.go | return `(upid, error)` | all API mutations | Async → always pair with WaitTask; route via gate/queue, not ad-hoc |
| `Client.PoolAddVMID` | internal/proxmox/mutate.go | `PoolAddVMID(ctx, pool, vmid) error` | re-assert pool membership after a restore-over-existing (campaign-2 R2) | SYNC (no UPID, don't WaitTask); PVE `PUT /pools` is additive (merge, not replace) — `delete=1` removes; idempotent (already-member swallowed); needs `Pool.Allocate` at `/pool/<pool>`. `pct restore --pool` sets membership only at CREATE — a restore over an existing vmid drops it, so bring-up re-asserts post-restore |
| `TLSConfig.build` / `normalizeFingerprint` | internal/proxmox/tls.go | `build() (*tls.Config, error)` | PVE leaf-cert SHA-256 pinning | No insecure default |
| `pinnedTLS` | internal/pbs/pin.go | `pinnedTLS(fingerprint) (*tls.Config, error)` | PBS leaf pinning | Same model as PVE; 64-hex fingerprint normalized |
| `hub.Client.Report` | internal/hub/client.go | `Report(ctx, *HostReport) (*ControlEnvelope, error)` | the heartbeat | Typed `TransportError`/`HTTPError`, never contain the bearer token |
| `hub.Loop` + `MultiObserver` | internal/hub/loop.go | `NewLoop(...)`; `MultiObserver(obs...)` | resilient report loop + envelope fan-out | Errors logged, loop continues; interval clamped 60–3600 s |
| `provision.BackHalf.Provision` | internal/provision/backhalf.go | `Provision(ctx, Input) (Result, error)` | guest bootstrap back-half | mint→render→0600 write→chown 100000:100000→`pct set` ro bind→onboot; token NEVER logged/returned. Bootstrap `local_api.endpoint` = the caller's `cfg.LocalAPI.ListenAddr` (main.go) — moving the agent bind to the island moves the guest dial for free (R-50, no template) |
| `buildBringUpConfig` island NIC | internal/reconcile/bringup.go | (pure) `BringUpSpec{IslandBridge,IslandGuestAddr}` → `params["net1"]` | R-50 island control plane | When BOTH island fields are set (from `cfg.LocalAPI`), attaches a static `net1=name=eth1,bridge=<vmbr9>,ip=<.2/30>` (no hwaddr → fresh MAC), so the controller reaches the agent over a fixed private address immune to LAN/DHCP/site moves. Empty = pre-R-50, no net1. All-or-nothing + CIDR enforced in `LocalAPIConfig.Validate`. The guestnet healer is eth0-only (`parseMode` is dev-scoped) so it never touches the static island NIC |
| `reconcile.Queue.Submit` | internal/reconcile/queue.go | `Submit(vmid, fn) <-chan error` | per-guest serialization of ALL mutations | Same vmid strictly FIFO; lanes parallel across guests |
| `Engine.RunSignedJob` | internal/reconcile/job.go | `RunSignedJob(ctx, intent, signed, exec) JobResult` | executing a gated destructive job | Idempotency by nonce; journaled |
| `escrow.Create` | internal/escrow/escrow.go | `Create(ctx, CreateOptions) (CreateResult, R, error)` | PBS-key escrow (zero-knowledge) | Recovery code returned SEPARATELY from the result (anti-log); self-verifies recoverability |
| `escrow.GenerateRecoveryCode` / `joinSafe` / `RecoveryCodeSep` | internal/escrow/wordlist.go | `GenerateRecoveryCode() (string, error)` | minting the customer recovery code R | Draws from the EFF large list **filtered of every word containing `RecoveryCodeSep`** (4 entries: drop-down, felt-tip, t-shirt, yo-yo) so a code always segments back into exactly 10 words — a hyphenated word made codes ambiguous to transcribe AND flaked the test ~1/5 (v0.93.0). Generation-only: **already-issued codes stay valid**, R is verified as a whole passphrase and never re-split. Never count words by splitting the joined string — count what the generator drew |
| `escrow.CeremonyBinary` / `CeremonyArgs()` / `CeremonyOutput` | internal/escrow/ceremony.go | the ONE fixed sudo self-invocation argv + the `--output=json` wire object (v1) | controller-driven ceremony (v0.88.0) | SINGLE SOURCE shared by the localapi exec, the capability manifest entry, and (byte-identically) the FELHOM_ESCROW sudoers line — `TestEscrowCeremonyArgvPinned` + `TestManifestCoveredBySudoers` lock all three. Never flag-helpers, never `--`→`-` (spike §2.2) |
| localapi escrow ceremony job | internal/localapi/escrow_ceremony.go | `POST /escrow/ceremony` + status + ONE-SHOT claim + preflight | the wizard's agent half | R lives ONLY in `Server.escrowR` (NEVER the job struct — snapshots must be structurally R-free); zeroed on claim/supersede/10-min TTL (`unclaimed_void`); in-memory BY DESIGN (restart loses R safely; re-run supersedes); subprocess stdout is SECRET-BEARING → parsed then zeroed, never logged |
| `poke.Listener` + `poke.Port` | internal/poke/poke.go | `NewListener(resolve, trigger, port, logger)`; `poke.Port = 51822` | agent-plane immediate-sync (Direction-2a, v0.89.0) | Binds a contentless UDP socket EXCLUSIVELY to the box's WG /32 (`wgtunnel.LoadAssignedAddr`), fires the hub-loop out-of-band trigger. **Port 51822 is a SHARED cross-repo contract** — the hub poke sender + the ep0 `felhom-poke` forced-command target the SAME number; change one → change all three. Contentless (payload ignored), leading-edge debounced (`DebounceWindow`), WG-confined (kernel EKEYREJECTED refuses non-peer /32s). Wired only when `wg_tunnel.enabled` |
| `wgtunnel.LoadAssignedAddr` | internal/wgtunnel/manager.go | `LoadAssignedAddr(stateDir) (netip.Addr, bool)` | the box's own WG /32 without a Manager | Reads `registered.json`; ok=false until registered; strips the /32 → bare addr (the poke bind target) |
| `fasttick.Loop` + `fasttick.SourceFunc` | internal/fasttick/fasttick.go | `New(out chan<- struct{}, interval, logger, sources...)`; `Source.Unconverged() (bool, reason)` | agent-plane immediacy SECONDARY (v0.90.0, R-28): pulse the SAME out-of-band trigger every 30 s while ANY source is unconverged, self-disarm on convergence | STATE-BASED (no timer, nothing to journal). Every source MUST be a CACHED read (no exec/network per tick) — `desiredProvider.Generation()`, `reconcile.Engine.LastResult()` (Planned−Pending>0), `pbsdrLoop.PBSDRStatus().State=="waiting_secret"` ONLY, `wgtunnel.Manager.TunnelConvergence()`. The LOUD pbsdr states + destructive `pending_signature` are DELIBERATELY EXCLUDED (a stuck-loud box must not hammer). Pulses the cap-1 channel non-blocking (coalesces with poke/watchdog); NEVER touch `MinPollSeconds`/`clampInterval`/the ticker |
| `wgtunnel.Manager.TunnelConvergence` / `reconcile.Engine.LastResult` | internal/wgtunnel/manager.go, internal/reconcile/engine.go | `TunnelConvergence() (desired, operational bool)`; `LastResult() (Result, bool)` | cached convergence snapshots for the fast-tick | TunnelConvergence is refreshed at the END of every `Apply` (its own cadence) so the fast-tick never execs `wg`/`systemctl`; LastResult is mutex-recorded per `reconcileOnce`, ok=false until the first pass |

## 2. Canonical patterns (copy structure from THE named file)

| Pattern | Canonical file | Key traits |
|---|---|---|
| Validate-then-exec privileged op | internal/storage/hostops.go (`EnsureMount`) | validate EVERY arg (validate.go) → render → stage in agent dir → root `install` → `systemctl`; refuse before any command exists |
| Fail-safe pure classifier over gathered facts | internal/storage/claim.go (`classifyClaim` over `claimFacts`) | pure function ⇒ fixture-testable; any error/ambiguity refuses; gather separated from verdict |
| Anti-retarget durable-id binding | internal/localapi/wipe_reresolve.go | resolve id → re-derive + exact match → re-inspect expected state → act on RE-RESOLVED device only |
| Atomic single-file JSON store | internal/storage/intent.go | `Open*` loads (missing=empty, corrupt=fail-loud), mutex, tmp+rename 0600, idempotent set |
| Durable append-only log + index | internal/authz/noncestore.go (`FileNonceStore`) | fsync before returning "new"; replay into index on open; expiry-only compaction |
| Injectable seam funcs on Server | internal/localapi/server.go (`reresolveWipe`, `deviceDurableID`, `boundCheck`, `deviceCheck`, `livenessCheck`, net-verify: `netTrigger`/`netMounted`/`netJournal`/`netReachable`) | prod default wired in `NewServer`; tests override — no real /dev, /proc/mounts, journalctl or TCP in tests. **For mount-table predicates prefer the DATA seams `procSelfMountinfo` / `procGuestMountinfo` (internal/localapi/intermediary.go) over `boundCheck`/`livenessCheck`**: pointing them at a captured fixture runs the real parser, the real predicate and the real handler, so the test cannot go hollow the way R-116's did |
| `Server.devicePresent` (R-113, v0.114.0) | internal/localapi/disks.go | `devicePresent(rawMountPath) bool`; seam `deviceCheck`, default `isHostMountpoint` | the agent's DEVICE-presence signal — asks whether the drive's RAW mount is still mounted | **Use this, never the bind, to answer "is the drive there".** The raw mount is a device-bound systemd unit and dies with its device; the agent's own bind under the shared parent is NOT device-bound and outlives it as a stale shell. `BoundUnderParent` is now `boundUnderParent(...) && devicePresent(...)` at BOTH /disks construction sites — dropping either half is a regression with its own red-proof. Empty path ⇒ **true** (unknown is never absent: absent stops a customer's apps) |
| `bindLiveness` + `BindLiveness` (R-117, v0.117.0) | internal/localapi/intermediary.go | `bindLiveness(stable, raw) BindLiveness`; seam `livenessCheck`; read verdicts ONLY via `.Usable()` | the agent's bind-LIVENESS signal — the third term of `BoundUnderParent` | **`devicePresent` and `boundUnderParent` are both PATH-PRESENCE tests and neither is liveness.** They compare only mountinfo field 5, so both stay true over a bind that names the drive that went away while the raw mount healed onto the returning one (measured: raw 8:32 /dev/sdc, bind 8:16 /dev/sdb `shutdown`, EIO both ways, payload healthy). Two dead states, and a fix needs BOTH checks: devno mismatch (the detach/return case) AND the ext4 abort tokens `shutdown`/`emergency_ro` (the steady-state case, where the devnos AGREE because the device never left). **THREE states, never a bool** — `BindUnknown` must exist and `Usable()` treats it as PRESENT (absent stops a customer's apps). **Order matters:** compare devices first and read the abort flag off the RAW mount in the stale case — abort-first classifies the real return state as aborted and refuses the re-bind that repairs it. **NO BLOCK I/O, ever** (CLAUDE.md rule; a probe on a wedged device survives SIGKILL). 6 red-proofs |
| `AttachDrive` repair ruling (R-117, v0.117.0) | internal/localapi/intermediary.go | the `switch bindLiveness(...)` inside the `n == 1 && GuestSeesMount` arm | decides whether the existing self-heal runs | `BindStaleDevice` ⇒ **re-bind** (the raw mount is a healthy new superblock; repairs live, no guest restart). `BindAborted` ⇒ **quiet no-op** — a re-bind lands on the SAME dead superblock and this runs every 20 s, so re-binding is an infinite silent retry that also masks the state; it must surface via `BoundUnderParent=false`. `BindLive`/`BindUnknown` ⇒ no-op, unchanged. **Do not return an error for the aborted case** — the reconcile loop would log a failure every 20 s |
| Detached IN-MEMORY verify job (single slot, deliberately unpersisted) | internal/localapi/netverifyjob.go | claim slot sync (single-flight 409) → detached pipeline off baseCtx → auto-rollback on fail; restart ⇒ slot empty ⇒ the CALLER rolls back (Scenario F) — contrast formatjob (persisted+recovered) |
| Optional dependency degradation | internal/localapi/server.go (`Options`) | nil dep ⇒ endpoint answers "not configured" (503), never a crash |
| Version channel (v0.82.0) | internal/localapi/server.go (`Options.AgentVersion`; `Handler()` mux wrap) | sets `X-Felhom-Agent-Version` on EVERY response (all routes/statuses, incl. auth-fail/404) — the controller's capability-comparison source; empty version ⇒ header omitted |
| Root-file install via random temp | internal/localapi/intermediary.go (`installSharedParentUnit`) | `stageTemp` (os.CreateTemp) → sudoers-globbed `install -m` → pinned destination |
| Detached destructive job + restart recovery | internal/localapi/formatjob.go | persist `running` → run off baseCtx → record outcome; recovery re-resolves durable id, never a path |
| Signed-op verify pipeline | internal/authz/verifier.go (`Verify`) | armor→namespace→key-material allowlist→crypto over RAW bytes→blob→target→window→nonce LAST |
| Resilient daemon loop | internal/hub/loop.go (`Loop.Run`) | ctx-cancel returns nil; errors logged and loop continues |
| Guarded-below-the-agent wrapper | configs/felhom-mkfs-guarded.sh | root re-checks catastrophic cases (system disk/LVM PV/foreign mount/RO/member FS) even against an agent bug |

## 3. Dangerous lookalikes — do NOT reuse

| Trap | Why it bites | Use instead |
|---|---|---|
| Acting on the caller's `req.Device` (or any remembered /dev path) after inspection | classify→mkfs TOCTOU (AGENT-001): /dev re-enumeration retargets the node to a different physical disk | `Server.reresolveWipe`/`reresolveBlank` → format the RE-RESOLVED device |
| Exec'ing raw `mkfs.*` (incl. `Binaries.MkfsExt4/MkfsXfs`) | sudoers no longer allowlists raw mkfs; bypasses the claim filter + wrapper re-checks | `SudoHostOps.Format` (→ `felhom-mkfs-guarded`) |
| `DiskInfo.DurableID` (`uuid:`) as a wipe-confirmation id | wipe gate resolves `byid:`/`byuuid:` — a `uuid:` id is a `binding_mismatch` (F20-BUG2) | `DiskInfo.WipeDurableID` / `storage.DeviceDurableID` |
| `ResolveDurableDevice` for enrolled-storage remounts (or vice versa) | schemes differ: wipe = `byid:`/`byuuid:`, storage = `uuid:` — each refuses the other | `ResolveStorageDevice` for mounts; `ResolveDurableDevice` for wipes |
| `authz.MemoryNonceStore` on a real host | replay protection dies on restart | `authz.FileNonceStore` |
| Adding methods to `proxmox.Privileged` | breaks the 3-exception root-CLI fence (`routing_test.go`) | `proxmox.Runner` + a new sudoers Cmnd_Alias + validate.go-style checks |
| Calling `Client.DestroyLXC`/`Vzdump`/`SetConfig` outside the gate/queue/journal | skips classification, signature, per-guest serialization, crash recovery | `reconcile.Engine` paths / `RunSignedJob`; queue via `Queue.Submit` |
| `GuestBinder.AttachBind`/`DetachBind` (per-drive `pct set -mpN`) | legacy model; a missing bind source can brick guest boot (C1) | `AttachDrive`/`DetachDrive` (intermediary model) |
| `isHostMountpoint` to reconcile bind state | boolean can't converge stacked double-binds (the /mnt doubling bug) | `countHostMounts` normalization inside `AttachDrive` |
| Acting on a raw `ListLXC` list as if it were "guests the agent owns" | audit A1 (pre-v0.62.0 the stale-lock reaper did exactly this — contained only by the pool-scoped token) | ownership must be PROVEN: intersect with `Client.Pool` membership like `staleLockController.Guests()` (v0.62.0), fail-safe on read failure |

## 4. Seams & interfaces (testing + cross-repo)

| Interface | Defined in | Implemented by | Fakes/tests at |
|---|---|---|---|
| `proxmox.Runner` | internal/proxmox/privileged.go | `*ExecRunner` (direct/sudo) | `mockRunner` internal/proxmox/mock_test.go; runner fakes in storage tests |
| `storage.HostOps` | internal/storage/hostops.go | `*SudoHostOps` (prod), `NoopHostOps` (degraded) | fakes in internal/storage/observe_test.go, watchdog_test.go |
| `storage.HostReader` | internal/storage/hostread.go | `*ProcHostReader` | `fakeHostReader` internal/localapi/disks_test.go; internal/storage/role_test.go. v0.87.0: `BlockSlaves(name)` lists `/sys/block/<name>/slaves` (root-free) — backs the `SystemDisks` dm/md walk (`physicalDisksOf`/`walkSlaves`, role.go); per-branch conservatism: an unresolvable slave fails the WHOLE walk → all-system fail-safe. NEVER weaken the signature test `TestSystemDisks_WalkTopologies` (root-backing disk always in the system set). |
| `localapi.DiskOps` / `StorageGate` / `GuestAttacher` / `GuestLister` | internal/localapi/disks.go | `*storage.SudoHostOps`; `storageGateAdapter` (cmd/felhom-agent/main.go); `*GuestBinder`; `*proxmox.Client` | `fakeDiskOps`/`fakeGate`/`fakeGuestAttacher`/`fakeGuestList` internal/localapi/disks_test.go |
| `localapi.GuestAPI` / `BackupService` / `BackupStore` / `TokenAuthority` | internal/localapi/server.go | `*proxmox.Client`, `*backup.BackupRunner`, `*backup.Store`, `*TokenStore` | `fakeGuests`/`fakeBackups`/`fakeStore` internal/localapi/server_test.go |
| `backup.InFlight` | internal/backup/inflight.go | `TryAcquire(what) (release, busy, ok)` / `Busy()` | THE host-wide "one heavy guest operation at a time" gate — shared by the local-API backup path and the restore-test scheduler (R-85) | A **LINK** guard, not a lock one: the scratch VMID never touches the live guest's vzdump lock, but an offsite restore PULLS multi-GB over the tunnel a backup PUSHES one. Callers **DEFER, never cancel** — a deferred restore-test costs coverage, a cancelled backup costs the backup. A nil gate is ungated (pre-R-85 callers). |
| `backup.RestoreTestState` | internal/backup/restoretest_state.go | `RecordSuccess(target,t)` / `LastSuccess(target)` / `OldestFirst(targets)` | Per-tier restore-test rotation state, persisted (atomic tmp+rename) | **Credit ONLY on success** — a permanently failing tier must keep sorting first, or it looks freshly proven and stops being retried. Ties break on target id: without it, two tiers proven in the same second rotate by Go's randomised map order. **This one NEEDS persistence unlike R-84** — R-84 had ground truth to consult (the archive is still on the storage); a restore-test destroys its scratch and leaves no artifact. |
| `backup.SpecBuilder` / `backup.TierPicker` / `(*BackupRunner).PickRestoreCandidateOn` | internal/backup/schedule.go, runner.go | `func(ctx,archive) RestoreTestSpec`; `func(ctx,target) (string,error)` | The per-run restore-test spec + per-tier candidate lookup (R-85) | The spec is built **PER RUN**, never frozen at construction — the pre-R-85 immediately-invoked value made the offsite tier unschedulable AND went stale on any config change. `SourceTier` comes from **the archive**, never the configured target (the v0.100.0 rule). A tier with no archive returns `("", nil)` — **`""` is NOT an error**, or every fresh box looks broken for its first week. |
| `localapi.BackupTier` + `normalizeBackupTiers` / `config.BackupConfig.BackupTiers` | internal/localapi/backup_tiers.go, internal/config/config.go | `normalizeBackupTiers(tiers, legacy, cadence) []BackupTier`; `BackupTiers() ([]BackupTier, []string)` | THE R-82 multi-tier resolution — one runner per tier, primary first | **The untargeted local-API contract is FROZEN**: no `?target=` ⇒ primary tier ⇒ pre-R-82 response BYTES (Target is `omitempty` and stays empty). Never default a missing cadence — reject it and log the warning at ERROR. Never share one retention knob between tiers. Jobs are keyed by (vmid,target). |
| `localapi.StaleLockController` | internal/localapi/stalelock.go | `*staleLockController` (Client + Runner + pool) | `fakeStaleLock` (Server-level) stalelock_test.go; `fakeStaleLockAPI` (controller-level, tests the A1 pool intersect) stalelock_pool_test.go |
| `localapi.GuestExecutor` | internal/localapi/controllerswap.go | `*GuestBinder` (pct exec) | `fakeGuestExec` internal/localapi/controllerswap_test.go |
| `guestnet.Runner` / `guestnet.GuestSource` (R-54, v0.92.0) | internal/guestnet/{probe,watchdog}.go | `*proxmox.ExecRunner`; the POOL-VERIFIED `localapi.StaleLockController.Guests` (ListLXC ∩ felhom pool, audit A1) | `scriptedRunner` + `fakeGuests` internal/guestnet/watchdog_test.go. **Never wire a bare `ListLXC` here** — under a broad token that would run dhclient inside a co-tenant's container. Every assertion is an exec COUNT, and the load-bearing ones are the negatives: a static guest, an unprobeable guest, a boot-race guest and an unproven guest list must record **zero** heal calls |
| `guestnet.Watchdog.SetDampers` / `now` (clock seam) | internal/guestnet/watchdog.go | config `guest_net.*`; `now` defaults to `time.Now` | tests advance a manual clock (the storage-watchdog pattern) and assert the heal ceilings EXACTLY — ≥10 min apart, ≤3/hour, and ≤30 over a scripted 10 hours of permanent failure. A damper with no test is a comment |
| `hub.GuestNetReporter` (R-54) | internal/hub/collect.go | `*guestnet.Watchdog` (`GuestNetStatus`) | internal/hub/collect_guestnet_test.go asserts the stanza through the PRODUCTION `Collect` path AND that the `guest_net` key is ABSENT from the wire when no reporter is wired — an always-present empty stanza would make "not wired" and "found nothing" the same signal, which is the shape v0.91.0 hid behind |
| `hub.AddressEnumerator` (v0.119.0) | internal/hub/hostaddr.go | **defaults to the REAL `systemInterfaces`** when `Collector.addrEnum` is nil — deliberately inverting the nil-reporter-means-off convention, because this stanza has no config gate and a forgotten wiring call would otherwise ship silently empty (the inert-seam shape, four instances on record) | internal/hub/hostaddr_test.go drives fixtures TRANSCRIBED from `ip -o addr show` on demo-felhom AND demo-hp, including the address-less veth/NIC rows — the "no denylist needed" claim rests on those rows really being empty, so omitting them would prove the claim by assuming it. `filterHostAddresses` keeps GLOBAL UNICAST only: one predicate that drops loopback, `fe80::/10`, and `169.254/16` — the last being the R-50 island literal, identical on every box and actively misleading if surfaced |
| `reconcile.OpVerifier` | internal/reconcile/gate.go | `*authz.Verifier` | fake verifier in internal/reconcile gate tests |
| `signedjobs.WipeOps` / `Executor` (`ExecutorChain`) | internal/signedjobs/wipe.go + runner.go | `*storage.SudoHostOps`; `WipeExecutor`+`DecommissionExecutor` | internal/signedjobs wipe/runner/decommission tests |
| `hub.reporter` / `collectorIface` / `EnvelopeObserver` | internal/hub/loop.go | `*hub.Client`, `*hub.Collector`; `desired.Syncer` + `signedjobs.Runner` | `fakeReporter`/`fakeCollector` internal/hub/loop_test.go; `recordingReporter` loop_logtail_test.go |
| `applog.Ring` (always-DEBUG capture ring) + fan-out `applog.New → (logger, ring)` | internal/log/log.go | wired in cmd/felhom-agent/main.go → `localapi.Options.LogRing` + `Loop.SetLogTailSource(ring.Lines)` | internal/log/log_test.go; localapi/debuglogs_test.go — v0.83.0; the byte-capped `Lines` is the heartbeat tail source |
| `pbsdr.StorageReader` / `SecretConsumer` / `Manager.probeFP` (func seam) | internal/pbsdr/manager.go | `*proxmox.Client`; `*hub.Client`; `pbs.ProbeFingerprint` | `fakeStorage`/`fakeConsumer`/`fakeRunner` internal/pbsdr/manager_test.go (argv+stdin recorder) |
| `capability.Runner` | internal/capability/probe.go | `*proxmox.ExecRunner` (RunnerDirect) | `fakeRunner` internal/capability/probe_test.go |
| Cross-repo: local API ↔ controller | internal/localapi/server.go routes; contract seeded by internal/provision/doc.go (`bootstrap.json`: endpoint + leaf fingerprint + token) | felhom-controller's agentapi client | pin = served leaf cert (memory gotcha) |
| Cross-repo: agent ↔ hub | internal/hub/report.go (`HostReport`), `ControlEnvelope`; POST `/api/v1/host-report` | hub mirrors structs field-for-field | new event/report fields need hub-side ingest changes |
| Cross-repo: shipped host artifacts | configs/felhom-agent.sudoers, configs/felhom-mkfs-guarded.sh, configs/felhom-pbs-apply, shared-parent script/unit (inline in internal/localapi/intermediary.go) | deployed WITH the binary | sudoers globs must match `stageTemp` patterns + staging dirs exactly |
| Operator signing | internal/authz (OpBlob, SSHSIG) | cmd/felhom-opsign (offline CLI) | blob/verify tests in internal/authz |

## 5. Extension points (where new features plug in)

- **Local-API route**: add to `Server.Handler` (internal/localapi/server.go) wrapped in `s.withGuest`; new deps go into `Options` as OPTIONAL fields degrading to "not configured".
- **New signed-job verb**: implement `signedjobs.Executor` (return `ErrNoExecutor` for foreign ops) and append to the `signedjobs.ExecutorChain` in cmd/felhom-agent/main.go; add the op class + role scoping in internal/reconcile (classify.go, gate.go `roleAuthorizes`).
- **New privileged host op**: validate args (internal/storage/validate.go style) → exec via `Runner` → add a `Cmnd_Alias` to configs/felhom-agent.sudoers → add a probe vector to internal/capability/manifest.go (so degradation is visible) → ship sudoers with the binary.
- **New reconcile action**: `ActionKind` + `classOfAction` (internal/reconcile/classify.go), plan emission in internal/reconcile/plan.go; destructive ⇒ gate handles it automatically.
- **Hub-report field**: extend `hub.HostReport` (internal/hub/report.go) + `Collector` — hub side must mirror + allowlist it (cross-repo).
- **DR-recipe section (host-half)**: add the field to `DRRecipeHostHalf` (internal/hub/dr_recipe.go) **AND** to
  the hub's `hostHalfShape` + `AssembledRecipe` (felhom.eu `hub/internal/store/dr_recipe.go`). Those two
  hub structs are **ALLOW-LISTS**: a section only the agent knows about is stored intact and silently
  dropped before any operator sees it — that is R-122, which cost `offsite_restic` its entire existence.
  Then update BOTH copies of `testdata/host-report.golden.json` (byte-identical, cross-repo) and extend
  `TestAssembleDRRecipe_CarriesEveryEmittedSection`. **A recipe field that cannot be resolved records an
  explicit unknown with a reason — never a default, an empty string, or a placeholder** (`DRState*` /
  `DRReason*`); a recipe read during a rebuild must not present a guess as a fact.
- **Envelope-driven behavior**: implement `hub.EnvelopeObserver`, add to the `MultiObserver` in cmd/felhom-agent/main.go.
- **Selftest mode**: `selftestFlag` + `runSelftest*` in cmd/felhom-agent/main.go.
- **Config**: internal/config/config.go (`Load` + `applyEnv` `FELHOM_AGENT_*` overlay; keep secrets out of `Redacted()` output).

## 6. Known duplication (observed — NOT fixed)

- Two lsblk `-J` parsers with near-identical structs: `parseLsblkDevice`/`lsblkDevice` (internal/storage/hostops.go) vs `parseLsblkNodes`/`lsblkDev` (internal/storage/claim.go).
- Two smartctl `-a -j` paths: `SudoHostOps.SMART` (internal/storage/hostops.go, parsed `hub.SmartSummary`) vs `Privileged.SMART` (internal/proxmox/privileged.go, raw map).
- **SMART device resolution (v0.95.0):** `smartDeviceFor` (internal/storage/observe.go) resolves partition→disk AND dm/LVM→disk (`dmWholeDisk` in internal/storage/smartdev.go, via `/sys/block/<dm>/slaves`, `sysBlockRoot` test seam). `storage.SmartReader.SMARTForBacking` is the shared read the localapi `/disks` union path uses (Fix B) — do NOT re-implement smartctl parsing. The builtin-`local` SMART device comes from `containingMountDevice` (SMART-only; never feeds backing/durable_id).
- Atomic tmp+rename JSON store implemented 3×: `IntentStore.saveLocked` (internal/storage/intent.go), `FormatJobStore.save` (internal/localapi/formatjob.go), `GuestBindStore.saveLocked` (internal/localapi/guestbindstore.go) — comments say "mirrors", no shared helper.
- `run(ctx, name, args...) error` stderr-wrapping helper duplicated 4×: `SudoHostOps.run`, `Privileged.run`, `BackHalf.run` (internal/provision/backhalf.go), `GuestBinder.run` (internal/localapi/guestbind.go).
- Several independent /proc mount-table readers: `SudoHostOps.mountedSet` (internal/storage/hostops.go), `ProcHostReader.Mounts` (internal/storage/hostread.go). **In localapi they were unified in v0.117.0**: `isHostMountpoint` and `countHostMounts` are now one-liners over `hostMountEntries`, the single parser that also yields devno/fstype/super-options for `bindLiveness`.
- Deliberate mirror: `antiRetargetResolveExpect` (internal/localapi/wipe_reresolve.go) duplicates `WipeExecutor.Execute` steps 1–3 (internal/signedjobs/wipe.go) across packages.
- `stableParentDir` literal duplicated in internal/provision/backhalf.go to avoid a provision→localapi import edge (commented as intentional); `trim` (internal/storage/hostops.go) vs `trimBody` (internal/proxmox/errors.go) output-truncation twins.
