fix: P0+P1 critical bug fixes across controller (24 files)
Concurrency fixes: - Deep-copy stacks in GetStack/GetStacks to prevent shared state mutation (C04) - Add per-state mutex to watchdog pathProbeState (C05) - Guard MetricsCollector.Start() with sync.Once against double-start (C06) - Hold diskJobMu across entire raw mount operation (C07) - Add mutex to SetEncryptionKey (C08), MigrateEncryption write lock (H03) - Use sync.Once for sync.Stop() channel close (H08) - Set syncing=true before releasing lock in TriggerSync (H09) - Deep-copy lastDBDump/lastBackup in GetFullStatus (H11) - Add WaitGroup for stderr goroutine in MigrateDrive (H19) - Add mutex to SetBackupRunningCheck (M18) Security fixes: - Validate Bearer token against Hub API key in CSRF middleware (H16) - Validate backup paths start with expected prefix in RemoveStack (M12) - Guard uuid[:8] slice with length check (H20) - Parse fstab fields exactly for mount target matching (H21) Bug fixes: - Use decrypted env vars for compose deploy (C01) - Log decrypt failures in DecryptMap instead of swallowing (C02) - Move Deployed=false inside lock in runComposeDeploy (C03) - Fix activeDrives() to skip disconnected drives (H02) - Fix Snapshot() stderr extraction from exec.ExitError (H01) - Check unlockCmd.Run() error in restic (H01) - Buffer template rendering via bytes.Buffer (H07) - Thread context.Context through cloudflare client (H10) - Fix leaf-name collision detection in cross-drive backup (H15) - Add nil check for crossDriveRunner (H17) - Use strings.TrimSpace instead of slice on command output (H18) - Make SaveAppConfig atomic with write-to-tmp+rename (H04) - Pass encKey on deploy failure SaveAppConfig (H05) - Fix IPv6 address format in TCP health probe Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import (
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"crypto/rand"
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"encoding/base64"
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"fmt"
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"log"
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"os"
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"strings"
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)
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@@ -98,6 +99,7 @@ func IsEncrypted(value string) bool {
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}
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// DecryptMap decrypts all encrypted values in a map, returning a new map with plaintext values.
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// Logs a warning for any value that fails to decrypt (key rotation, data corruption).
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func DecryptMap(key []byte, env map[string]string) map[string]string {
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if key == nil || env == nil {
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return env
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@@ -105,10 +107,14 @@ func DecryptMap(key []byte, env map[string]string) map[string]string {
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result := make(map[string]string, len(env))
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for k, v := range env {
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if IsEncrypted(v) {
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if dec, err := Decrypt(key, v); err == nil {
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result[k] = dec
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dec, err := Decrypt(key, v)
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if err != nil {
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log.Printf("[WARN] Failed to decrypt env var %q: %v — passing through encrypted value", k, err)
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result[k] = v
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continue
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}
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result[k] = dec
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continue
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}
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result[k] = v
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}
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