Files
app-catalog-felhom.eu/REPORT.md
T
admin 6d45b60f94 persistence sweep: renumber proposed findings R-159..R-162 (R-158 collided mid-session)
The register grep that put these at R-158..R-161 was true when run and stale within hours: the
parallel session pushed SPIKE-recovery-unit-space-2026-08-02.md and CAMPAIGN-10-closeout-2026-08-02.md
mid-run, both using R-158 for an unrelated finding, and neither files it — ROADMAP.md and
OPEN-ITEMS.md still stop at R-155.

So two sessions minted the same number for different findings on the same day, which is the exact
failure §8.0 was already documenting about R-154/R-155 and R-156/R-157. Now recorded with itself as
the third instance. R-156, R-157 and R-158 are all live in audit documents and none is filed.
2026-08-02 12:24:48 +02:00

3.6 KiB

REPORT — catalog persistence sweep (2026-08-02)

Question: does every app's data actually land in a folder the template preserves? Answer, over all 53 templates: 43 CLEAN · 3 BROKEN · 7 UNDETERMINED.

Full report, per-app evidence, proofs and proposed register entries: audits/persistence-sweep-2026-08-02/README.md.

What was found

app defect disposition
gramps-web Mounted /app/data (a path the app never writes), /app/media, /tmp. Its accounts database AND its family tree landed in the container's writable layer — destroyed by any redeploy, absent from every backup, while gramps_data was tarred nightly as an empty directory. FIXED — persists the 8 paths the image's own environment names. Survives-a-redeploy proven: users.sqlite and the family-tree files byte-identical, same inode.
wishlist Mounted wishlist_data:/data, another path the app never writes. prod.db landed in the anonymous volume from the image's VOLUME directive — never in ResolveDockerVolumeNames, so never backed up, and orphaned by a redeploy. FIXED — mounts /usr/src/app/data + /usr/src/app/uploads. prod.db byte-identical with the same inode across a redeploy.
papra (R-156) Mounts papra_data:/app/data, which is root-owned, unwritable by uid 999, and does not exist in the papra image at all; the database is written to /app/app-data/db/. NOT FIXED — referred to the operator. Fix prepared and proven in the scratch guest (current: db.sqlite differs after a redeploy, so a real account created via the API is lost; fixed: byte-identical, it survives). It was deployed on one box; that box (c10-soak) was torn down by the other session mid-run and papra now appears nowhere in hub telemetry — but that is absence evidence, and demo-hp is fenced. One command settles it: §6.1a.

7 UNDETERMINED are listed with reasons and never folded into CLEAN (§4.2): 4 apps write nothing until a user completes setup, 3 could not be started.

What was built

scripts/check-volume-persistence.py — the third catalog gate and the only RUNTIME one. This defect class is invisible to static analysis, measured rather than assumed: a static audit of all 53 composes reports the catalog clean and reports papra clean. So the gate deploys each template, exercises it into writing data, and compares where the data landed with what is mounted. Exit 0 clean / 1 REFUSED / 2 undecided; UNDETERMINED is never a pass.

It refuses to report at all unless it has just re-proven itself in both directions against two canary templates that differ only in which path the volume mounts at — so every run carries a live demonstration of R-156 and of its fix. 41 fixture tests driving check() (the function __main__ calls); every rule red-proofed.

Registered in CLAUDE.md and REUSE.md. Enforcement is convention, not CI — the catalog repo has no CI of any kind. Raising that is proposed as R-161.

Method notes worth carrying forward

  • Seven detector defects were found by adjudicating flagged apps rather than trusting the label, and six of them made a correct app look broken. Every one came from a rule identifying data by its name rather than by evidence of what it is. Detail: §3.5.
  • The sweep was restarted from the first app twice rather than merge a matrix built by more than one version of the rules.
  • No docker exec anywhere — Campaign 7 §1.1's OCI-error-to-stdout trap.
  • No hub record was created; the hub was read-only throughout. Teardown, all three layers: §9.