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Campaign 10's R-156 found papra writing its database into the container's writable layer while the volume the template preserves stayed empty — a backup that completes, verifies, and contains nothing. papra was never the point: nothing anywhere checked that the folder a template preserves is the folder the app writes to. All 53 templates have now been measured live. 43 CLEAN / 3 BROKEN / 7 UNDETERMINED. UNDETERMINED is counted separately, each with its reason, and never folded into CLEAN. FIXED (neither app is deployed anywhere, so nothing was stranded): - gramps-web mounted /app/data, /app/media, /tmp — and /app/data is a path the application never writes. Its accounts database and ITS FAMILY TREE both landed in the writable layer while gramps_data was tarred nightly as an empty directory. Now persists the eight paths the image's own environment names, matching upstream's reference compose. Proven: users.sqlite and the family-tree files survive a redeploy byte-identical, same inode. - wishlist mounted wishlist_data:/data, another path the app never writes; prod.db landed in the ANONYMOUS volume from the image's VOLUME directive — absent from ResolveDockerVolumeNames, so never backed up, and orphaned by a redeploy. Now mounts /usr/src/app/data + /usr/src/app/uploads. Proven: prod.db byte-identical, same inode, across a redeploy. Every corrected path confirmed by two independent sources — the shipped image's own environment/Config.Volumes and upstream's reference compose — never inferred from a directory name. papra is NOT fixed. It is live on one box, and changing the mount target makes the next compose up recreate the container and destroy the writable layer its documents live in. The fix is prepared and proven in the scratch guest (current: db.sqlite differs after a redeploy, so a real account created via the API is lost; fixed: byte-identical, it survives). Referred to the operator with the two options; no migration written. NEW GATE scripts/check-volume-persistence.py — the third catalog gate and the only RUNTIME one. This class is invisible to static analysis, measured not assumed: a static audit of all 53 composes reports the catalog clean AND reports papra clean. Exit 0 clean / 1 REFUSED / 2 undecided. It refuses to report at all unless it has just re-proven itself in both directions against two canary templates that differ only in which path the volume mounts at, so every run carries a live demonstration of R-156 and of its fix. No docker exec anywhere (Campaign 7 §1.1). 44 fixture tests driving check(), the function __main__ calls; every rule red-proofed. Enforcement is convention, not CI — this repo has no CI. Stated plainly in the report; raising it is proposed as R-160. Report, per-app evidence, proofs and proposed register entries (R-158..R-161, NOT filed — felhom.eu is fenced this session): audits/persistence-sweep-2026-08-02/
3.3 KiB
REPORT — catalog persistence sweep (2026-08-02)
Question: does every app's data actually land in a folder the template preserves? Answer, over all 53 templates: 43 CLEAN · 3 BROKEN · 7 UNDETERMINED.
Full report, per-app evidence, proofs and proposed register entries:
audits/persistence-sweep-2026-08-02/README.md.
What was found
| app | defect | disposition |
|---|---|---|
| gramps-web | Mounted /app/data (a path the app never writes), /app/media, /tmp. Its accounts database AND its family tree landed in the container's writable layer — destroyed by any redeploy, absent from every backup, while gramps_data was tarred nightly as an empty directory. |
FIXED — persists the 8 paths the image's own environment names. Survives-a-redeploy proven: users.sqlite and the family-tree files byte-identical, same inode. |
| wishlist | Mounted wishlist_data:/data, another path the app never writes. prod.db landed in the anonymous volume from the image's VOLUME directive — never in ResolveDockerVolumeNames, so never backed up, and orphaned by a redeploy. |
FIXED — mounts /usr/src/app/data + /usr/src/app/uploads. prod.db byte-identical with the same inode across a redeploy. |
| papra (R-156) | Mounts papra_data:/app/data, which is root-owned, unwritable by uid 999, and does not exist in the image at all; the database is written to /app/app-data/db/. |
NOT FIXED — referred to the operator. It is deployed on one box, and the fix would destroy the writable layer its documents live in. Fix prepared and proven in the scratch guest. See §6.1. |
7 UNDETERMINED are listed with reasons and never folded into CLEAN (§4.2): 4 apps write nothing until a user completes setup, 3 could not be started.
What was built
scripts/check-volume-persistence.py — the third catalog gate and the only RUNTIME one. This
defect class is invisible to static analysis, measured rather than assumed: a static audit of
all 53 composes reports the catalog clean and reports papra clean. So the gate deploys each
template, exercises it into writing data, and compares where the data landed with what is mounted.
Exit 0 clean / 1 REFUSED / 2 undecided; UNDETERMINED is never a pass.
It refuses to report at all unless it has just re-proven itself in both directions against two
canary templates that differ only in which path the volume mounts at — so every run carries a live
demonstration of R-156 and of its fix. 41 fixture tests driving check() (the function __main__
calls); every rule red-proofed.
Registered in CLAUDE.md and REUSE.md. Enforcement is convention, not CI — the catalog repo
has no CI of any kind. Raising that is proposed as R-160.
Method notes worth carrying forward
- Seven detector defects were found by adjudicating flagged apps rather than trusting the label, and six of them made a correct app look broken. Every one came from a rule identifying data by its name rather than by evidence of what it is. Detail: §3.5.
- The sweep was restarted from the first app twice rather than merge a matrix built by more than one version of the rules.
- No
docker execanywhere — Campaign 7 §1.1's OCI-error-to-stdout trap. - No hub record was created; the hub was read-only throughout. Teardown, all three layers: §9.