app-email: smtp_mapping for vaultwarden + mealie
Vaultwarden via STARTTLS (accepts self-signed shim cert); Mealie via plaintext
(NONE) — no accept-invalid-cert option, spike-validated mode. Compose files
reference injected ${SMTP_*}. README documents the pattern.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
@@ -1,5 +1,20 @@
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# Changelog
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## 2026-06-29 — App-email: smtp_mapping for Vaultwarden + Mealie
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- Added the `smtp_mapping` block to `templates/vaultwarden/.felhom.yml` and `templates/mealie/.felhom.yml`,
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enabling managed outbound email (app → in-controller shim → hub → Resend) for the two spike-proven apps
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(`SPIKE-smtp-app-relay-2026-06-28`). The controller injects `SMTP_*` at deploy/redeploy when app-email is
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on (global + per-app); the From address is `<app>@felhom.eu`. SMTP auth creds are intentionally left unset
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(the shim accepts no-auth on the Docker network).
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- **Vaultwarden:** STARTTLS (`SMTP_SECURITY=starttls`) + `SMTP_ACCEPT_INVALID_CERTS/HOSTNAMES=true` to
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accept the shim's self-signed cert.
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- **Mealie:** plaintext (`SMTP_AUTH_STRATEGY=NONE`) on :2525 — Mealie has no accept-invalid-cert option, so
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STARTTLS to a self-signed shim would fail; plaintext to the Docker-network-only shim is the spike-validated
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mode.
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- Both `docker-compose.yml` files now reference the injected `${SMTP_*}` keys (with harmless defaults) so the
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values reach the container; empty `SMTP_HOST` keeps mail disabled when the toggle is off.
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- Documented the `smtp_mapping` pattern in `README.md` so further apps are easy adds.
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## 2026-06-28 — Add SparkyFitness (v0.17.2) — nutrition/workout tracker
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- New app `templates/sparkyfitness/{docker-compose.yml,.felhom.yml}`: a self-hosted nutrition/calorie +
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workout/weight tracker (alternative to wger). Three containers — nginx **frontend** (SPA :80, the sole
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@@ -148,6 +148,60 @@ deploy_fields:
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locked_after_deploy: true
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```
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### App-email mapping (`smtp_mapping`)
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Apps that can send outbound email (password resets, invites, confirmations) get it through
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one managed path: **app → in-controller SMTP shim → hub → Resend**. The Resend key stays
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hub-side; nothing app-specific lives on the box. An app opts in by declaring `smtp_mapping`,
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which renames the generic relay settings to that app's own env-var names.
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When app-email is on (the household's **global** toggle AND the app's **per-app** toggle),
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the controller injects at deploy/redeploy: `host` = the on-box shim, `port` = `2525`,
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`from` = `<from_local>@felhom.eu`, the `security` value, the optional display name, and any
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fixed `extra` vars. The values are derived from settings on every compose — never written to
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`app.yaml` — so a toggle change applies on the next redeploy without touching secrets. The
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shim accepts **no-auth** on the Docker network, so leave any `SMTP_USERNAME`/`SMTP_PASSWORD`
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unset.
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**The compose file must reference the mapped `${VAR}` keys** (with a harmless default) so the
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injected values reach the container, e.g. `- SMTP_HOST=${SMTP_HOST:-}`. An empty `SMTP_HOST`
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keeps the app's mail disabled when the toggle is off.
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| Field | Meaning |
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|-------|---------|
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| `host_var` | env key receiving the shim host (required) |
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| `port_var` | env key receiving the port `2525` (required) |
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| `security_var` | env key receiving the TLS mode (optional) |
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| `security_value` | the app's term for the chosen mode — `starttls`, `TLS`, `NONE`, … |
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| `from_var` | env key receiving the From address (required) |
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| `from_name_var` | env key receiving the From display name (optional) |
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| `from_local` | local-part of the From address (defaults to the app slug) → `<local>@felhom.eu` |
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| `extra` | fixed extra env (e.g. accept-invalid-cert flags) |
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```yaml
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# Vaultwarden — STARTTLS to the shim (it accepts the self-signed cert):
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smtp_mapping:
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host_var: SMTP_HOST
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port_var: SMTP_PORT
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security_var: SMTP_SECURITY
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security_value: starttls
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from_var: SMTP_FROM
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from_name_var: SMTP_FROM_NAME
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from_local: vaultwarden
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extra:
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SMTP_ACCEPT_INVALID_CERTS: "true"
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SMTP_ACCEPT_INVALID_HOSTNAMES: "true"
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```
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> **TLS choice per app.** Prefer STARTTLS to the shim for apps that can accept a self-signed
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> cert (an "accept invalid certs" option). For apps that **can't** (e.g. Mealie), use
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> plaintext (`security_value: "NONE"`) on `2525` — the shim offers it on the Docker network and
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> it was spike-validated. Never publish the shim off-box, so plaintext there is safe.
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Currently mapped: **Vaultwarden**, **Mealie** (the two apps proven in
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`SPIKE-smtp-app-relay-2026-06-28`). Adding email to another app is just its `smtp_mapping`
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block + the matching compose `${VAR}` lines.
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## App Catalog
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| App | DB Type | RAM (request / limit) | Pi | HDD Data | Subdomain |
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@@ -1,110 +1,38 @@
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# REPORT — Add SparkyFitness to the app catalog (+ live deploy & health check)
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# REPORT — App-email `smtp_mapping` for Vaultwarden + Mealie
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**Date:** 2026-06-28
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**Task class:** Implementation — pure catalog addition (no Go/controller/agent/hub code change).
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**Outcome:** ✅ Template added, synced, deployed live on guest 9201, all 3 containers healthy, end-to-end
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`/api` path verified through the public edge. One acceptance item (interactive account register/login) was
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**deliberately left for a human** — see "NOT validated" below.
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**Date:** 2026-06-29
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**Task:** SMTP app-relay (catalog leg). Add `smtp_mapping` to the two spike-proven apps so deployed apps can
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send outbound email via the managed path (app → in-controller shim → hub → Resend). Implements
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`felhom.eu/documentation/audits/SPIKE-smtp-app-relay-2026-06-28.md` §7.
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---
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## Files modified
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- `templates/vaultwarden/.felhom.yml` — added `smtp_mapping` (STARTTLS; SMTP_SECURITY=starttls,
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SMTP_FROM=vaultwarden@felhom.eu, SMTP_FROM_NAME, + SMTP_ACCEPT_INVALID_CERTS/HOSTNAMES). SMTP_USERNAME/
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SMTP_PASSWORD intentionally unset.
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- `templates/vaultwarden/docker-compose.yml` — reference the injected `${SMTP_*}` keys (harmless defaults).
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- `templates/mealie/.felhom.yml` — added `smtp_mapping` (plaintext; SMTP_AUTH_STRATEGY=NONE on :2525,
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SMTP_FROM_EMAIL=mealie@felhom.eu, SMTP_FROM_NAME).
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- `templates/mealie/docker-compose.yml` — reference the injected `${SMTP_*}` keys (harmless defaults).
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- `README.md` — documented the `smtp_mapping` pattern (field table + STARTTLS-vs-plaintext guidance) so further
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apps are easy adds.
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- `CHANGELOG.md` — entry.
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## 1. Confirmed baselines
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## How it works
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When app-email is on (global toggle + per-app toggle), the controller injects at deploy/redeploy:
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`SMTP_HOST` = the on-box shim, `SMTP_PORT` = 2525, From = `<app>@felhom.eu`, the app's security value, plus the
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mapping's fixed `extra` vars. The values are derived from settings each compose — never persisted to `app.yaml`.
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An empty `SMTP_HOST` (toggle off) leaves the app's mail disabled.
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| Repo | Baseline | After |
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|------|----------|-------|
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| app-catalog-felhom.eu | `main` @ `d7a6a17` (working tree clean; `templates/sparkyfitness/` was 404) | template commit `4351d08`, docs commit (this push) |
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| felhom-controller (running on demo) | **v0.87.0** (`gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-controller:0.87.0`, healthy on guest 9201) | unchanged — template proven-compatible against 0.87.0 |
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## Validation
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- Both `.felhom.yml` and both `docker-compose.yml` YAML-validated OK.
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- Field names match the controller's `stacks.SMTPMapping` struct tags exactly (covered by the controller's
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`TestMetadata_SMTPMappingParse` and the Vaultwarden/Mealie env-injection tests).
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- Git sync picks up the change within ~15 min (or via "Sablonok frissítése").
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The running controller renders this template's `type: subdomain` + `data_key` fields correctly (deploy
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screen showed Domain auto-filled, Subdomain `sparky`, and all 4 auto-secrets) — so **no STOP condition**;
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no controller patch was needed.
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## 2. Files created
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- `templates/sparkyfitness/docker-compose.yml`
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- `templates/sparkyfitness/.felhom.yml`
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Commits on `main`:
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- `4351d08` — the two template files (after lint + image probes).
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- (this push) — CHANGELOG + README + REPORT docs.
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`templates.json` (legacy Portainer index) intentionally left untouched. No other catalog apps modified.
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## 3. §1.3 image healthcheck-tooling findings (verified on build server 192.168.0.180, v0.17.2)
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| Image | Probe authored | Finding | Final probe kept |
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|-------|----------------|---------|------------------|
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| `codewithcj/sparkyfitness_server:v0.17.2` | `node -e` GET `/api/health` | `NODE_OK` (node on PATH via `--entrypoint node`) | **kept** the node-exec probe |
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| `codewithcj/sparkyfitness:v0.17.2` (frontend) | `wget --spider` | both present: `/usr/bin/wget` **and** `/usr/bin/curl` | **kept** the `wget --spider` probe |
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No probe changes were required. Compose lints clean
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(`docker compose config -q` with the 4 `${...}` vars set to dummies → `LINT_OK`).
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## 4. Deploy method + evidence
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**Method:** real UI flow via **claude-in-chrome** (no hand-written `app.yaml`).
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1. `https://felhom.demo-felhom.eu` → Alkalmazások → **"Sablonok frissítése"** (sync). App count 55→56,
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Telepíthető 52→53; SparkyFitness card appeared (`/stacks/sparkyfitness/deploy`).
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2. Deploy screen: Domain auto = `demo-felhom.eu`; Subdomain default `sparky`; 4 secrets shown
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"Automatikusan generálva"; memory gate **696 MB / 1664 MB (41%)** → fits, **not refused** (Scenario C
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did not trigger). Clicked **"Telepítés indítása"** → "Konfiguráció mentve" → containers started.
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**`docker ps` (guest 9201):**
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```
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sparkyfitness-frontend codewithcj/sparkyfitness:v0.17.2 Up (healthy)
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sparkyfitness-server codewithcj/sparkyfitness_server:v0.17.2 Up (healthy)
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sparkyfitness-db postgres:15-alpine Up (healthy)
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```
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**Server log excerpts (clean — Scenario A):**
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```
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[INFO] Successfully applied migration: ...20260622120000_add_water_estimated_to_exercise_entries.sql
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[INFO] Ensuring permissions for role: "sparkyapp"
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[INFO] Successfully ensured permissions for role: "sparkyapp"
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[INFO] Permissions granted to application user.
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[INFO] Successfully applied all RLS policies.
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[AUTH] Better Auth handler successfully mounted.
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[INFO] SparkyFitnessServer listening on port 3010
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[INFO] Incoming request: GET /api/health
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```
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No crash loop; **no EACCES** on `/app/SparkyFitnessServer/uploads`. Both DB roles confirmed present in the
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DB (`SELECT rolname ... → sparky, sparkyapp`).
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**Secrets (Scenario B) — verified without exposing values** (from `docker inspect` env of the server):
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- `SPARKY_FITNESS_API_ENCRYPTION_KEY` length = **64** (hex:32 ✓)
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- `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET` length = **64** (✓)
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- `SPARKY_FITNESS_FRONTEND_URL = https://sparky.demo-felhom.eu` (public https ✓ — CORS/Better-Auth origin)
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- `SPARKY_FITNESS_DB_USER = sparky`, `SPARKY_FITNESS_APP_DB_USER = sparkyapp` (two distinct roles ✓)
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- `SPARKY_FITNESS_DISABLE_SIGNUP = false` (household can register ✓)
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All four secrets are `locked_after_deploy`; the two crypto keys carry `data_key: true`.
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**Browser checks:**
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- `https://sparky.demo-felhom.eu/login` → SparkyFitness **native email/password login + Sign Up** page
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loads over a **valid TLS cert** (no warning). No OIDC buttons (correct for the customer template).
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- `https://sparky.demo-felhom.eu/api/health` (through the public Cloudflare edge → Traefik → frontend
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nginx `/api` proxy → server) → **`{"status":"UP"}`**. This proves the frontend→server proxy + public
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routing + TLS end-to-end.
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## 5. NOT yet validated (explicit)
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- **Interactive account register + login.** Deliberately not performed by me: creating an account /
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entering credentials to authenticate falls under a browser-safety guardrail (prohibited even on
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request). Everything up to the authenticated API path is proven (healthy server, `/api/health` proxied
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through the public edge, CORS origin correctly set). **Recommended human step:** open
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`https://sparky.demo-felhom.eu`, click **Sign Up**, register a throwaway account, confirm login reaches
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the dashboard (≈30s). Expected to pass given the verified config.
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- **Backup / restore of this app** (incl. the `data_key` recovery path for the two crypto keys) — not
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exercised here.
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- **Upload body-size limits** for profile/exercise images (the k3s ingress set `proxy-body-size: 50m`;
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the Felhom Traefik path was not size-tested).
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- **Garmin / MCP integrations** — out of scope (commented out upstream; not enabled).
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## 6. Observations (noticed, not acted on)
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- Upstream's compose uses `postgres:18` + `:latest`; per the validated k3s manifest we pinned
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`postgres:15-alpine` with an explicit `PGDATA` subdir — kept that proven path.
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- The frontend image ships **both** wget and curl; the server image runs node as a valid exec entrypoint —
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both healthchecks are robust without extra tooling.
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- Demo guest 9201 has only 2 GB total RAM; SparkyFitness `mem_limit` is 1792M. The `mem_request` (400M)
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gate passed and real usage is far below the limit, but on a 2 GB box co-tenancy headroom is thin — worth
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noting for nodes running several heavier apps.
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## Notes / deviation
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- **Mealie uses plaintext (NONE), not STARTTLS.** Mealie has no accept-invalid-cert option, so STARTTLS to the
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self-signed shim would fail cert verification; the spike validated Mealie via plaintext on :2525 (the shim is
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Docker-network-only, never published). This is the spike-faithful choice (spike §7 mealie table = NONE),
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deviating from the prompt's Part-4 "TLS for mealie" wording.
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- **Scope = these two proven apps only.** Further apps (immich, nextcloud, …) are a follow-on: each just needs
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its own `smtp_mapping` block + the matching compose `${VAR}` lines.
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@@ -62,3 +62,18 @@ healthcheck:
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checks:
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- type: tcp
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port: 9000
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# --- App-email mapping (apps → in-controller shim → hub → Resend) ---
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# When app-email is on (global toggle + this app's per-app toggle), the controller injects
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# host = the on-box shim, port = 2525, From = mealie@felhom.eu. Mealie has NO accept-invalid-
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# cert option, so it talks PLAINTEXT (SMTP_AUTH_STRATEGY=NONE) to the shim on 2525 — the
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# spike-validated mode (SPIKE-smtp-app-relay-2026-06-28 §7). SMTP_USER/SMTP_PASSWORD stay
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# unset (no auth needed; the shim holds no Resend key).
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smtp_mapping:
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host_var: SMTP_HOST
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port_var: SMTP_PORT
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security_var: SMTP_AUTH_STRATEGY
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security_value: "NONE"
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from_var: SMTP_FROM_EMAIL
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from_name_var: SMTP_FROM_NAME
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from_local: mealie
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@@ -26,6 +26,15 @@ services:
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- MAX_WORKERS=1
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- WEB_CONCURRENCY=1
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- BASE_URL=https://${SUBDOMAIN}.${DOMAIN}
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# App-email (managed relay). Injected by the controller only when app-email is on
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# (global + per-app); empty SMTP_HOST = Mealie mail stays disabled. Mealie has no
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# accept-invalid-cert option, so the relay uses plaintext (NONE) to the on-box shim —
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# the spike-validated mode. See .felhom.yml smtp_mapping.
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- SMTP_HOST=${SMTP_HOST:-}
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- SMTP_PORT=${SMTP_PORT:-25}
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- SMTP_AUTH_STRATEGY=${SMTP_AUTH_STRATEGY:-NONE}
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- SMTP_FROM_NAME=${SMTP_FROM_NAME:-}
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- SMTP_FROM_EMAIL=${SMTP_FROM_EMAIL:-}
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volumes:
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- mealie_data:/app/data/
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networks:
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@@ -84,3 +84,21 @@ healthcheck:
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path: "/alive"
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expect:
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status: 200
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# --- App-email mapping (apps → in-controller shim → hub → Resend) ---
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# When app-email is on (global toggle + this app's per-app toggle), the controller injects
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# the relay SMTP settings: host = the on-box shim, port = 2525, From = vaultwarden@felhom.eu.
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# Vaultwarden uses STARTTLS to the shim and accepts its self-signed cert
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# (SMTP_ACCEPT_INVALID_CERTS/HOSTNAMES). SMTP_USERNAME/SMTP_PASSWORD are intentionally left
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# unset — the shim accepts no-auth on the Docker network and holds no Resend key.
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smtp_mapping:
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host_var: SMTP_HOST
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port_var: SMTP_PORT
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security_var: SMTP_SECURITY
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security_value: starttls
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from_var: SMTP_FROM
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from_name_var: SMTP_FROM_NAME
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from_local: vaultwarden
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extra:
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SMTP_ACCEPT_INVALID_CERTS: "true"
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SMTP_ACCEPT_INVALID_HOSTNAMES: "true"
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@@ -28,6 +28,15 @@ services:
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- ADMIN_TOKEN=${ADMIN_TOKEN:-}
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- WEBSOCKET_ENABLED=true
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- TZ=Europe/Budapest
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# App-email (managed relay). Injected by the controller only when app-email is on
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# (global + per-app); empty SMTP_HOST = Vaultwarden mail stays disabled. See .felhom.yml smtp_mapping.
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- SMTP_HOST=${SMTP_HOST:-}
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- SMTP_PORT=${SMTP_PORT:-587}
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- SMTP_SECURITY=${SMTP_SECURITY:-off}
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- SMTP_FROM=${SMTP_FROM:-}
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- SMTP_FROM_NAME=${SMTP_FROM_NAME:-}
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- SMTP_ACCEPT_INVALID_CERTS=${SMTP_ACCEPT_INVALID_CERTS:-false}
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- SMTP_ACCEPT_INVALID_HOSTNAMES=${SMTP_ACCEPT_INVALID_HOSTNAMES:-false}
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volumes:
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- vaultwarden_data:/data
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networks:
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Reference in New Issue
Block a user